


NORTHWARDS FROM ROME, JUNE 10, 1944

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THE ADVANCE ON ROME, MAY 26, 1944



Topical Press.
ADMIRAL SIR BERTRAM RAMSAY, K.C.B., C.B.

A Record of the War

THE
NINETEENTH QUARTER

April 1, 1944—June 30, 1944

PHILIP GRAVES

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P R E F A C E

THE furious activity of preparation or attack which prevailed on all fronts during the Nineteenth Quarter has made it difficult for the author to balance the claims of the different campaigns to a just share of the necessarily limited space available. The development of the Allied attack from the west which culminated in the massive landing on the beaches of Normandy and the capture of Cherbourg will be of most interest to British, Canadian and American readers ; but the brilliant campaign of the Allied armies of Italy which brought about the fall of Rome, and the great successes of the Red Army, described with his usual clarity by Lieutenant-Colonel de Watteville, form an important part of the general picture. The author has devoted considerable space to the account which he has endeavoured to make as lucid as possible of the remarkable campaign in Burma, both because of its striking military interest and in justice to the British and Indian soldiers who fought a hard and ultimately victorious battle in most trying conditions. For the sketch of political developments in Italy, the account of the splendid support given by Fighting France and her leaders to the common cause and the record of developments in the relations between Algiers, Washington and London, I express my great indebtedness to Mr. J. H. Freeman of *The Times*, who has also contributed a chapter dealing with the state of Germany during the first six months of the year so far as it could be recorded by neutral observers or inferred from the utterances of the Nazi-controlled Press. Indian affairs are dealt with in Chapter XIII by Sir Frank Brown. Mr. Stanley Robinson of *The Times* has described the public activities of Their Majesties and chronicled the doings of Ministers and Parliament in Chapter IX. I would also record my thanks to Mr. S. L. Righyni for his review, based on American sources, of the politics of the United States in the first section of Chapter

VI and to Dr. R. Worsley for a valuable analysis of the highly important White Paper on Employment. The advice of the Naval, Military and Aeronautical Correspondents of *The Times*, the kind and valuable assistance of its Map Department and the accurate chronological records of the Bulletin of International Affairs, have also been of great assistance.

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CHAPTER I

THE MEDITERRANEAN

I : ROME AND AFTER

The Italian campaign which is recorded in this opening section of *The Nineteenth Quarter* was of great military and symbolic importance. The defeat of the German armies, ably led as they were by Marshal Kesselring, and the forcing of the enemy's powerful lines across peninsular Italy dispelled any belief, which might have been fostered by the failure before Cassino in March and the deadlock in the Anzio beach-head, that the Allies would be held in Central Italy. Their occupation of Rome appealed to the imagination of Europe and the Americas and brought the final liberation of Italy nearer. These events were hailed by the United Nations and their friends as a presage of victory in the campaigns of the summer and autumn of 1944. The battles on the Gustav and Hitler Lines were, indeed, opening moves in the great plan prepared for this decisive year of the war, and their success compelled the Germans to reinforce their southern front with troops whom they could ill spare. They also dissipated any faint hope of the possibility of a Fascist Republican recovery which the Nazi leaders might have cherished. The liberation of Rome was the last nail in Mussolini's political coffin.

The reports issued by A.H.Q., Italy, during April, so far as ground fighting was concerned, might have been tersely summarized thus :—"Patrol activity in all sectors, occasional artillery exchanges, local attempts to gain minor vantage-points in the Anzio beach-head." The most important of these last engagements was the affair on April 26 when U.S. troops enlarged the salient between Cisterna and Carano and took 50 prisoners. In the air, on the other hand, the Allies maintained their offensive with increasing power as the weather improved, attacking railway yards, bridges, airfields, factories of military importance and ports on which the Germans were increasingly dependent owing to the increasing damage to their railway and road communications. The chief railway centres between Florence and Rome were marked out for attack. The ports of Genoa, Spezia, Leghorn, Civitavecchia and Ancona, the marshalling yards at Ferrara, Milan

and Parma, the aircraft factories at Varese, Milan, Turin and Bresso were among the targets attacked. The raiding bombers ranged as far as Bolzano in Italy besides attacking military objectives in Hungary, Rumania and the Balkans.

The attacks on targets in Yugoslavia are recorded in the next section of this chapter. Further afield the U.S. heavies struck cruel blows on the enemy's communications and on the oil refineries in Rumania. On April 3 they bombed marshalling yards, an aircraft factory and steel works at Budapest, shooting down 24 German and Hungarian aircraft. Next day they attacked military targets at Bucarest and shot down 49 hostile aircraft, losing 12 machines there and in operations over Dalmatia and Italy. On April 5 they attacked Ploesti railway yards and an important oil refinery, losing 12 bombers but claiming the destruction of some 30. After an interval of ten days they returned to attack Bucarest and Ploesti. On the night of April 15-16 R.A.F. bombers raided Turnu-Severin, an important river port and railway centre on the Danube near the Rumanian frontier. On April 17 U.S. heavy bombers attacked this Danubian port again and also visited Brasov in Rumania and Sofia. Plovdiv (Philippopolis) in southern Bulgaria was bombed by the R.A.F. on the nights of April 17 and 19. Liberators and Flying Fortresses in strength bombed Bucarest and Turnu-Severin again on April 21, and on April 24 they bombed Bucarest and Ploesti. Many enemy aircraft were destroyed or damaged in these attacks. The importance of the enemy's steamer traffic on the Danube had been fully recognized by the Allies, and on April 19 it was announced that British aircraft had laid mines in the river for several nights, with the result that several ships had been sunk and that traffic had been held up.

During the first ten days of May the deceptive lull on the Italian front continued. In the air the Allies, whose forces now included a useful Italian contingent, continued to strike at the Italian objectives which they had bombed during the previous month and added new targets to the list. One of these was the Pescara dam, 12 miles south-west of Chieti, which was successfully breached on May 5. The flood from the reservoir inundated the supply and concentration areas behind the enemy's Adriatic defence line. On the other side of the Adriatic large forces of U.S. heavy bombers attacked objectives in Rumania and Hungary. An analysis of reports from the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces during the first week of May gives the following results of these operations in the Danubian basin.

On May 3 Bucarest was raided. On May 5 the great American machines attacked the Budapest railway yards, the Ploesti oil plants and Turnu-Severin, shooting down 34 German and Rumanian aircraft which attempted to intervene. On May 6 when they flew over 2,000 sorties, the U.S. heavies attacked Turnu-Severin, Craiova, Pitesti, Brasov and the Campina refineries in Rumania, and on May 7 they bombed railway and military targets at Bucarest. Factories at the Rumanian capital were bombed by

the R.A.F. on the same night. On May 6 and 7 the Allied bombers and their escorts shot down 38 German and Rumanian aircraft for the loss of 28.

During these five weeks the greater part of the Eighth Army had been unobtrusively transferred from the eastern side of the Italian peninsula to the centre and left centre of the Allied line, where they took over the front from Cassino to the Liri Valley. On May 11, about an hour before moonrise, the Allies attacked. A special announcement was issued on the following day by Allied Headquarters. It ran :

"The regrouping of the Allied armies of Italy has now been successfully completed without enemy interference. The operations have been covered by continual air action and patrol activity along the whole front. Complicated and heavy road and rail movements of men and material have been smoothly carried out. This has made heavy calls on all the administrative services. All formations have been involved. In spite of bad weather and difficult terrain the regrouping has been accomplished in time. The Fifth and Eighth Armies, directed by General Alexander and supported by the Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force, began an attack against the Gustav Line at 11 p.m. on Thursday. In an order of the day to his troops General Alexander told them that though the results of the past months' fighting might not have been spectacular they had drawn into Italy and mauled many of the enemy's best divisions which he needed to stem the Russian advance. Hitler had admitted that his defeats in the east were largely due to the bitterness of the fighting and his losses in Italy. This was in itself a great achievement. To-day the bad times were behind them and victory lay ahead. The German war machine was beginning to crumble. The Allied armies were assembling for the final battles. "We are going to destroy the German armies in Italy." The message was sent to the troops in four languages, English, French, Italian and Polish.

Covered by a crushing artillery bombardment, the Fifth and Eighth Armies drove in the German outpost line and heavy fighting was soon raging from Cassino to the sea. On May 12 the French, fighting with tremendous spirit under General Juin's command, carried Monte Faito, while American troops of the Fifth Army took Ventosa and the Ceracoli and Damiano hills. Next day British troops established a bridge-head across the Garigliano south of Cassino at the entrance to the Liri Valley. Indian troops carried San Angelo by storm to lose and to retake it in fierce fighting. Farther south the French on the right flank of General Clark's Fifth Army stormed Castelforte. On May 14 the French, still fighting with astonishing dash over difficult mountain

country, stormed Monte Majo, while the Americans retook Sta. Maria Infante and made ground on the coast where their left flank received constant support from British and United States warships. Meanwhile, General Anders's Polish troops on the extreme right of the Eighth Army had been engaged in the hardest struggle of a hard battle in the Cassino sector. The ground was most difficult and had been well fortified. As luck would have it, when they attacked on May 12 the German battalions in their front were changing over. They belonged to the splendidly trained and fanatically determined 1st Parachute Division and the Poles thus found themselves opposed by twice as many Germans as would ordinarily have been there. The Polish advance was therefore slow and costly, but these fine fighting men gradually made ground and inflicted heavy losses on their opponents.

On May 15 Allied Headquarters announced further progress against the Gustav Line. "Eighth Army troops in the Liri Valley have penetrated deeper into the defences, overcoming fierce resistance in many places, and have mopped up strong-points of the enemy which had been by-passed in the first 24 hours. French troops of the Fifth Army, after capturing the predominating mountain, Monte Majo, an important bastion in the enemy defence line, have been quick to exploit their success. Pressing forward with infantry and tanks they have captured more hill features, and the villages of Sant' Ambrogio, Valle Majo and Ausonia. Thus a significant breach has been made in the Gustav Line. . . . American troops have also advanced and cut the Ausonia-Formia road. . . ."

Next day the advance continued on both sides of the River Liri and Allied Headquarters reported :

. . . While the Eighth Army's bridgehead over the Rapido has been again expanded . . . French troops of the Fifth Army have made further advances in the mountains in the south. All organized resistance has ceased up to the road which runs north and south through Ausonia. American troops have also advanced and taken the town of Spigno. . . . west of this road." A.H.Q. also reported the effective co-operation with the Fifth Army of British and U.S. warships on the coast near Formia, and great Allied activity in the air in which only 30 enemy aircraft were encountered, while M.A.A.F.¹ flew over 1,800 sorties.

On May 17 A.H.Q. reported that all positions of the Gustav Line south of the Liri had been overrun. By this time over 3,000 prisoners had fallen into Allied hands, and although the Germans had rushed reinforcements to the front they were still being forced back. The 71st Infantry Division had been terribly mauled by General Juin's French Colonial Corps and the French had virtually destroyed the 131st Regiment of the 44th (Hoch und Deutschmeister) Division, a Viennese formation with great traditions.

¹ i.e. Mediterranean Allied Air Force.

On the following day A.H.Q. announced that the battle for the Gustav Line was drawing to a close and the battle for the Hitler Line was about to begin. It followed up the announcement with another which began :

"Cassino and the monastery have been captured. The final assault on the town was carried out by British troops, while Poles took the monastery. The enemy has been completely outmanœuvred by the Allied armies . . . after the original breach in the Gustav Line by the Fifth Army on May 14 and the subsequent rapid advance of French and American troops through the mountains. Troops of the Eighth Army . . . during the last 24 hours have developed a decisive pincer movement which cut Highway 6, i.e. the Via Casilina, and so prevented a withdrawal of the enemy. A substantial proportion of the 1st German Parachute Division has been destroyed in its efforts to escape. Both armies contributed to this triumph. The Gustav Line south of the Apennines has now ceased to exist."

The Allies were quick to exploit their success. By May 21 they were in close contact with the Hitler Line at all points. The Poles were hammering at its northern hinge and were mastering the stronghold of Piedimonte. In the plain below, the British had reached the defences between Aquino and Pontecorvo. South of the Liri the French, after breaking through the enemy's outer line at Esperia, had advanced their left to Campodimele on the Itri-Pico road and were attempting to reach the Pico-Pontecorvo road from Sant' Oliva against stubborn resistance. Farther south and to the coast the Americans were making good progress. They had taken Gaeta and Itri, and on the night of May 21 they were at Fondi, while the Canadian Army Corps and the French were attacking Pontecorvo from the north-east and west respectively. Fighting was especially fierce in the Aquino-Pico-Pontecorvo sector where Monte Leucio between Pontecorvo and Pico changed hands more than once. Down on the coast the Americans who had pressed on to Terracina from Fondi were driven out again by Kesselring's reserves who were being thrown into the battle in increasing numbers.

But by this time northern Italy was giving the Germans serious trouble, and it was no longer safe for them to treat Italian resistance as negligible.

On May 22 A.H.Q., Italy, issued the first official announcement of the doings of Italian patriots in occupied Italy, which stated, among other things, that six of the 25 German divisions in Italy were now being employed against patriot bands or against Yugoslav partisans on the border of

Venezia Giulia. Some of these six divisions might otherwise have been reinforcing Marshal Kesselring. The announcement also referred to a number of attacks on German communications in northern Italy.

On May 22 the Canadians were reported to have gained some ground in their attack near Pontecorvo. The Poles had surrounded Piedimonte and the Americans were making much headway north of Fondi. Next day a new phase in the Allied offensive opened at dawn when the powerful force in the Anzio beach-head broke out of its defences and attacked the German lines. Simultaneously the Eighth Army, which had made a breach in the enemy's line, "used crowbar tactics to enlarge the hole."¹ Both attacks were preceded and supported by a highly organized aerial offensive. The Anzio force had been strongly reinforced by sea from a large convoy of landing craft which had put great numbers of troops and vehicles ashore without interference on the part of the enemy.

The Germans were in no case to meet this new blow. Their 14th Army facing the beach-head numbered only five divisions, the 4th (Parachute), not in the same class as the 1st Parachute Division, the 3rd (Panzer Grenadier), 65th, 362nd and 715th. The 10th Army led by General Wietinghoff had at least 12 divisions. On the Adriatic flank were the 278th and 334th. Facing the Americans on the opposite coastal sector were the 29th (Panzer Grenadier) and 94th Divisions. The front from Monte Cairo to Pico was believed to be held by eight divisions, the 44th, 5th (Mountain), 1st (Parachute), 15th and 26th (Panzer Grenadiers), 71st, 90th (Panzer Grenadier) and 305th. The first three of these had been greatly thinned, the 71st had been almost destroyed, and the 90th was in little better state. Fiercely as they still fought and strong as were their positions, the Germans could not stand up to the two-fold onset on their front and flank. They had lost much equipment. The French had captured most of the artillery of the 44th and 71st Divisions when they broke the Gustav Line and other divisions had left many guns and vehicles behind. They were greatly inferior to the Allies in the air and their losses in prisoners alone were now over 6,000.

On May 25 A.H.Q. announced that early on May 24 armoured units of the Canadian Corps went through the breach in the Adolf Hitler line made by their infantry and had reached the River Melfa. Pontecorvo had fallen, Terracina, Sonnino and Roccaseca dei Volsci had been taken. The beach-head force was fighting its way through the enemy's defences, had cut the Via Appia north of Cisterna and had taken over 1,100 prisoners.

Later, a special announcement was issued from A.H.Q. stating that patrols from the Fifth Army main front had made contact with patrols from the Anzio beach-head

¹ The Special Correspondent of *The Times*, *loc. cit.* May 24.

early on May 25. "This brings to a climax the spectacular advance of the Fifth Army of more than 60 miles in only 14 days." The statement concluded with the following appreciation of the work of the armies :

"The troops from the main front, overcoming powerful enemy resistance, have fought their way forward relentlessly since the night of May 11-12 through some of the most difficult terrain of the whole Italian campaign. The troops of the beach-head have broken through the powerful defences built by the enemy to prevent the beach-head force from participating in our advance from the main front."

Cisterna and Littoria, the key-points in the enemy's beach-head defences, fell on May 25, while on the main front the Poles made an end of the defenders of Piedimonte and Canadian and French attacks had overpowered the garrisons of Aquino and Pontecorvo. Next day the Allies were well over the River Melfa and the Hitler Line had ceased to exist. Now followed a hard struggle between the Allied forces pressing up from the Terracina-Cassino line and fanning out from the Anzio position against the flank and rear of the retreating Germans. Difficult as the country was, the skill and devotion of the Allied troops, and especially of their technical formations, prevented the enemy from breaking off the battle and getting clear of the pursuit. On May 26 the Special Correspondent of *The Times* (*loc. cit.* May 27) said :

"The success of the whole of the Eighth Army's push up the Liri Valley is due to the magnificent work of the sappers, who in the shortest possible time reconditioned the whole surface of Highway 6 through the ruins of Cassino and beyond. Units which have taken a hand in this include South African road construction companies and Indian, Basuto and Bechuana pioneers." On the same occasion he described the astonishing activity of the M.A.A.F. which flew more than 3,000 sorties on May 25. Two-thirds of these were made by the medium, light, and fighter-bombers of Tactical Air Force, which destroyed or damaged over 1,100 vehicles on the roads followed by the retreating Germans. Sezze on Highway 7 (the Appian Way or Via Appia) fell on May 27 and the Americans pressing north from Cisterna took Ardena near Valmontone, on the edge of the Alban Hills, and brought the Via Casilina under the fire of their guns. Here, however, the enemy, realizing the importance of the position, succeeded in holding the advance by a series of counter-attacks from Valmontone to Velletri which he supported by mortar-fire, tanks and flame-throwers. Meanwhile his troops farther south wheeled eastward and north-eastward along the Arce-Sora-Avezzano and the Frosinone-Subiaco roads, making every possible use of natural obstacles to delay the Allied pursuit.

By May 29 two distinct battles were being fought. The Eighth Army was pressing on the heels of the Germans

on the Arce and Frosinone roads. The American, British and French troops of the Fifth Army were fighting for the Alban Hills where the Germans, ordered to resist to the last, held the line Campoleone-Lanuvio-Velletri-Valmontone with dogged determination against attack after attack. On May 29 American tanks actually broke through the German line and fought their way for some distance into the defences, but they outran their infantry and were obliged to come back by the threat to their flanks. When they repeated their attempt next day—this time with infantry in close support—they found the line much stronger and more anti-tank guns in position. Meanwhile the British infantry were advancing slowly nearer to the sea over ground seamed by deep gullies and water-courses, strewn with mines and skilfully defended by machine-gun posts. The threatened deadlock was suddenly broken on the night of May 29-30 by American troops who by an unexpected manoeuvre occupied the ridge of Monte Artemisio above Velletri and descending on that stronghold blocked all but one of its exits. This happy stroke decided the battle. The Americans renewed their attacks, and on June 2 after nightfall A.H.Q. announced the capture of Velletri and Valmontone. Meanwhile the Eighth Army farther south had made good progress in their advance up Highway 6. On June 1 British infantry had captured Frosinone, the junction of Highway 6 and the road leading to Rome through Subiaco and Tivoli, while the New Zealanders took Sora on the Avezzano road. On the inland flank of the Fifth Army the French Colonial Corps pressing the enemy through the Volscian Hills took Carpineto and made other gains against fierce resistance. Yet it seemed that the enemy might still hold his pivotal position in the Alban Hills while swinging back his left in the Apennines to cover Highway 5, the road across the Italian Peninsula from Pescara to Rome.

On June 4, however, A.H.Q. reported that on June 3 the troops of the Fifth Army had "converted their penetration in the enemy defence line south of Rome into a break-through in many places." They held the greater part of the mass of hills dominating the approaches to Rome and to the south of them all resistance south of the Via Casilina had ceased,

Lanuvio and Nemi had fallen. Allied tanks were rounding the hills and moving westward along Highway 6, and west of Valmontone the Fifth and Eighth Armies were in contact.

Unable to hold Rome, the Germans made a virtue of its abandonment. On June 3 General Maitland Wilson had announced that every possible precaution would be taken by the Allies to safeguard the population of Rome and its religious and historical monuments. The Allies would only take military action in so far as the Germans used the city and its roads for military purposes.

On June 4 the German High Command announced from the Führer's Headquarters that Marshal Kesselring had proposed to the Vatican that the belligerents should recognize Rome as an open city with the request that the proposal should be conveyed to the Anglo-American High Command. The Germans undertook to keep no military installations or troops within the confines of the city, which they specified in detail, and to carry out no military movements therein. No destruction would be carried out within the limits of the open town. Almost at the same time the Führer's Headquarters announced that as the front line in the course of the present fighting in Italy was approaching Rome, "one of the oldest cultural centres in the world," and the city might be involved in the fighting, Hitler had ordered the withdrawal of the German troops to the north-west of Rome to prevent its destruction. The announcement added that the struggle in Italy would be continued with unshakable determination to break the enemy's attacks and forge final victory for Germany and her allies. . . . The year of the invasion "will bring Germany's enemies an annihilating defeat at the most decisive moment."

Meanwhile, General Alexander and Marshal Badoglio had called upon the citizens of Rome to help the Allies in saving their city from destruction by preventing the enemy from exploding mines under bridges and public buildings and from wrecking the public services. He urged them to leave the streets free for the passage of the Allied troops, and to abstain from demonstrations. "Your task is to save the city. Ours is to destroy the enemy."

Happily, this co-operation was not required. After sharp skirmishes with German rearguards American tanks and infantry entered the city towards nightfall on June 4 and by 9.15 p.m. they had reached the heart of the city. The Germans retreated northward at their best speed. They were continually harried by the squadrons of the M.A.A.F. which had been extremely active during the last ten days, flying as many as 3,000 sorties on several occasions and often disabling hundreds of vehicles in a day. On June 4 several tanks and nearly 600 lorries and motor vehicles were destroyed on the three main roads north of Rome and great numbers were

damaged. The railways running southward into peninsular Italy were also heavily and frequently bombed.


The capture of Rome without damage to its monuments and shrines aroused great enthusiasm in the free Allied countries, while Mussolini's rage and grief knew no bounds. General Alexander was warmly congratulated. In his first statement on the military situation on June 7—the second dealt with the landing in France—Mr. Churchill said that he thought that Parliament should take formal cognizance of the liberation of Rome by General Alexander's armies.

Summarizing the operations he said that it was remarkable that the Polish, British Empire, French and United States forces broke the German lines in front of them by frontal attack. He described how the great thrust from the Anzio beach-head, made at the right moment by a force 150,000 strong, and the junction of this force with the main armies had forced the Germans from their chief line of retreat northwards and compelled a large part of their army to retreat with heavy losses of material through the mountains. The Allied forces, with great rapidity, were regrouped with special emphasis on their left flank, which soon deployed against Rome "where Allied troops have been received with joy by the population." But great as were the moral, political and psychological advantages of that episode, the liberation of Rome had not been the prime object of General Alexander's campaign. That was the destruction of the hostile armies which were now being engaged along the whole length of their line as they sought to escape northwards. It was hoped that the 20,000 prisoners thus far taken would be followed by further captures. We could not estimate our final gains yet. But, he added, "It is our duty to pay the warmest tribute of admiration to General Alexander for the skill with which he has handled this army of so many different nations and for the tenacity and fortitude with which he has sustained the long period when success was denied. In General Clark the United States Army has found a fighting leader of the highest order, and the qualities of all the Allied troops have shone in a noble and unjealous rivalry. . . ."

Mr. Roosevelt also welcomed the liberation of Rome with the words "One up and two to go," but he warned the nation to whom he broadcast that Germany had not yet been driven to the point where she would be unable to recommence world conquest in a generation's time. It would be a source of deep satisfaction that the freedom of the Pope in the Vatican City was assured by the armies of the United Nations, and it was significant that the armies of so many nations had liberated Rome. He spoke feelingly of the plight of Italy and expressed the opinion that in spite of the grave economic state of Italy and the degradation caused by Fascist rule, the Italian people was capable of self-government and deserved the relief which Americans and British would endeavour to bring them.

Mr. Roosevelt had broadcast on the night of June 5. On that day the Pope appeared on the balcony of St. Peter's and addressed a great multitude of Italians and many soldiers of the Fifth Army. He thanked God that

Rome had been saved the horrors of war by the belligerents and urged his audience to show their gratitude by good works and charity and to cease from hatred and rancour.



THE ITALIAN FRONT, JUNE 10

On the whole Rome had suffered less under the German occupation than had been expected. The city was overcrowded. The influx of refugees from the invaded provinces of Italy was believed to have nearly doubled its population of 1,500,000. Food was scarce and dear and

electric lighting had been cut off, but this was soon restored. Though low, the water supply was adequate and the sewers were in order. The problem of the police was solved by the importation of the excellent Carabinieri (whom the Germans had disbanded in Rome) from Naples and the disbanding of the African Police Corps (P.A.I.), a thoroughly Fascist body, whom the Germans had used to maintain order. The leading political figures in Rome had not been abducted and large numbers of prominent anti-Fascist Italians emerged from hiding, among them Signor Bonomi, a probable Prime Minister after the liberation of the capital. The Allied troops were welcomed with enthusiasm but with dignity. The Special Correspondent of *The Times* wrote (*loc. cit.*, June 10) :

The Imperial City has made a deep impression on Allied soldiers both American and British. From men of education and some experience of foreign countries one hears such expressions as "The most beautiful city I have ever seen," while the less sophisticated . . . say, with a note of genuine enthusiasm, "Ah, it's grand to be in a clean town, and the girls look fine." Naples, with its dirty and narrow streets, rendered shabbier than ever by bombing, had not attracted them, and the servile character of the low-class Neapolitan commanded no respect. Nor did the famous monuments of Rome disappoint the Allied armies.

The retreat of the German 14th Army into Tuscany was rapid and at first disorderly. It was vigorously pursued by the Fifth Army and continually harassed by the Allied air arm. The reports issued from A.H.Q. during the week ending June 11 gave the following broad results :

On June 5 British and American troops were well across the Tiber on both sides of Rome, and on June 6 their vanguards were from five to ten miles along Highway 2 (the Via Cassia). To the east the French captured Tivoli¹ and the Eighth Army made further progress in the general direction of the Rome-Pescara road. The small port of Civita Vecchia fell to the Fifth Army on June 7 while the Eighth Army fought their way on beyond Subiaco. Next day the extreme right of the Eighth Army on the Adriatic flank captured Tollo and reported the beginning of a German retreat on this flank. On June 9 the Fifth Army took Viterbo, Tuscania and Tarquinia in Tuscany, and Caprarola 12 miles beyond Lake Bracciano near which prisoners were taken from a new formation, the 20th *Luftwaffe* Field Division. This formation had been brought from Denmark which it left at the beginning of June. Its men, like those of the Hermann Göring Panzer Division, were drawn from the *Luftwaffe's* ground staff. The capture

¹ Which was sadly damaged by the fighting and by previous air bombardments.

of Viterbo gave the Allies an important road and railway junction. On June 11 A.H.Q. reported a general advance from sea to sea. Indian troops had occupied Pescara on the Adriatic flank. North-east of Rome the Eighth Army, in spite of road-blocks, mines and extensive demolitions, e.g. a gap of 250 feet in one mountain bridge in the upper valley of the Tiber, had advanced nearly 20 miles at one point. To the north-west of the capital the Fifth Army spear-heads were ten miles beyond Viterbo.

In a message from A.H.Q. on June 11 the Special Correspondent of *The Times* said that the losses of the Germans in Italy since the opening of the offensive a month ago were estimated at 70,000 killed, wounded and prisoners. Another new division, the 356th, had appeared on the Tuscan front from northern Italy. It had become known that the 715th Division had been destroyed and that the Hermann Göring Division was a mere skeleton force. Next day he reported the capture of Avezzano by New Zealand troops and remarkably effective work by the 6th (Armoured) South African Division. This fine unit had been in action in the Liri and Sacco Valleys and north-east of Valmontone. After the fall of Rome it had "leap-frogged" through the Fifth Army forces, in spite of the congestion of the roads, and on June 10 had broken up a German attempt to rally north of Viterbo. Two new German divisions were identified on the 14th Army front that day. They were the 28th *Luftwaffe* Field Division and the 162nd (Turcoman) Division. This last surprisingly-named unit was composed of Russian Moslem prisoners of war under the command of German officers and n.c.o.s. Whether they had been induced to fight by the Moslem propagandists whom the Germans employed (e.g. the Mufti of Jerusalem), or because they preferred the risk of death in battle to the miseries of a prisoners-of-war camp was not clear.

During the next week, though the Germans had to some extent rallied and put up a fierce resistance round Lake Bolsena and near Narni on the road to Terni, and some 40 miles north-east of Rome, the advance of the Fifth and Eighth Armies was unchecked. Narni was taken on June 13, the important town of Terni with its railway and road junctions, steel works and hydro-electric plant, fell next day, as did Orvieto which was also captured by the Eighth Army. General Leese's troops took Ficulle, north of Orvieto, on June 15 when they had advanced 60 miles as the crow flies through difficult mountain country since June 6. Spoleto fell on June 17. So the advance continued steadily though less rapidly than during the first week after the fall of Rome.

The weather was at times unfavourable—exceptionally so for the time of year. The Germans had regained some of their cohesion and Marshal Kesselring endeavoured by counter-attacks, by obstinate rearguard actions, by extensive and indeed "sadistic"¹ demolitions, to gain

¹ The expression was used in a German document ordering demolitions to be carried out "with sadistic imaginativeness," which fell into Allied hands.


time for the construction of a new fortified line by impressed Italian labour from Rimini on the Adriatic to Pisa on the Tyrrhenian Sea.

There was much obstinate fighting during the last fortnight of June. Perugia was taken by Eighth Army troops including an Indian Division on June 20, but the stiffest fighting was round the historic Lake Trasimene where the Germans had established a strong line and were only gradually driven out by French forces on the west and British on the east. Marshal Kesselring had received further reinforcements, especially on the west where the Fifth Army also found resistance stiffening. These included the 19th *Luftwaffe* Field Division from Belgium, and part, at least, of the 16th S.S. Division from the Balkans. On June 24 Fullonica was captured by the Fifth Army advancing on a broad front in the coastal sector, and by June 30 its left was approaching Cecina on the coast, while its right was nearing Siena. Further inland the Eighth Army, fighting for almost every foot of ground, had taken Castiglione del Lago on the north-west corner of Lake Trasimene after several days of stubborn defence by the Germans, and Montepulciano, some nine miles to the west of the lake. On the Adriatic flank our forward troops, after crossing the Saline, Menocchio and Chienti Rivers, had reached a point ten miles south of the important Adriatic port of Ancona.

During these operations on the mainland the Allied High Command in Italy planned the capture of Elba where the enemy maintained a base for E-boats and U-boats and had useful observation posts only 15 miles from the nearest point on the coast of Tuscany occupied by the advancing Fifth Army. The operation was entrusted to a detachment of the French "B" Army commanded by General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. British, French and American warships and aircraft took part in it, but the landing force led by General Henri Martin was composed entirely of French troops, Commandos, Senegalese and Moroccan *Goums*. Rear-Admiral Troubridge, R.N., commanded the Allied warships, while the air operations were directed by Colonel Thomas d'Arcy, U.S. Army Air Force. The expedition landed on June 17.

A special announcement from A.H.Q. received early on June 20 stated: "By noon on Monday, June 19, operations on the island of Elba were brought to a successful conclusion. During the past 24 hours French forces, in spite of stubborn enemy resistance, have thrown the Germans from their positions and with the capture of Portoferraio all organized resistance has ceased. The vigorous and rapid advance of the French forces prevented the evacuation of all but a small portion of the enemy garrison, and 1,800 prisoners, most of them Germans, were captured. A large quantity of material has also been abandoned by the enemy."

By the end of June the Allies had taken some 35,000 German prisoners in the campaign which had opened on May 11, together with a great number of guns and much other war material. The German losses from all causes probably exceeded 80,000. But the Allied losses had been far from light. On June 27 Mr. Churchill informed the



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House of Commons that up to February 12 the British armies in Italy including Indian and Dominion troops had lost 7,635 killed, 23,283 wounded and 5,708 missing.

From that date until the fall of Rome we had 6,696 killed, 24,683 wounded, and 5,117 missing, and our total casualties from the landing in Italy until the fall of Rome therefore amounted to 73,122. Mr. Churchill explained that these figures were for Army casualties only, Navy and Air Force casualties having been excluded, since it was impossible to give a figure for these services exclusively relating to operations in Italy as distinct from other operations of the Navy in the Mediterranean and of the Air Force based on Italy over Central Europe including Germany, the Balkans and the Mediterranean area in general.

It remains to give a brief record of the operations of the Allied Strategic Air Force in Italy against Germany and southern France during the nineteenth quarter of the war, and those directed against Balkan and Danubian countries other than Greece and Yugoslavia¹ between May 11 and June 30. Mention must also be made of the work of British submarines off the French and Italian Riviera.

¹ For Greece and Yugoslavia see the next section of this chapter.

On April 2 U.S. heavy bombers with a strong fighter escort attacked the ball-bearing works and aircraft factory at Steyr, 90 miles west of Vienna, and shot down 115 of 300 fighters which attacked them. Wiener Neustadt was raided on April 12 when the Messerschmitt production centre was badly hit and the neighbouring plants at Voslau and Fischamend were bombed for the first time. The attack was repeated on April 23. The dock area at Toulon was bombed by Liberators and Flying Fortresses on April 29 and on May 4 targets in the French Riviera were attacked by medium and fighter-bombers of the Tactical Air Force. Wiener Neustadt experienced another attack by medium forces of heavy bombers on May 10. The Atzgersdorf aircraft factory and aerodromes in the Vienna region were raided "in great strength" on May 24 by American heavies, and targets in the Vienna region were again attacked in force on May 29, and again on May 30.

During the last three weeks in May U.S. and R.A.F. heavy bombers continued their attacks on Danubian targets, Budapest on the night of May 10, the Ploesti oil plants by 500 U.S. American heavy bombers on May 17, Ploesti again and Turnu-Severin on June 1, when 43 German and Rumanian fighters were shot down by the bombers and their escorts for the loss of 23, and the railway installations at the Iron Gates, where locomotives tow ships up the rapids of the Danube, were heavily bombed. On June 2 U.S. heavy bombers attacked a number of targets in Rumania and Hungary, after which some of them went on to bases prepared in Russia. On June 6 several score of these bombers attacked Galatz from their Russian bases, losing two of their escorting fighters, but shooting down six enemy machines. On June 9 15th U.S.A.A.F. heavy bombers exceeding 750 in number with strong fighter escort attacked Munich and targets near Venice. Two days later heavy bombers in a shuttle raid from Russia reached Italy after bombing two Rumanian airfields near Focsani. Lieutenant-General Ira C. Eaker, Allied Air Commander, Mediterranean, flew to Russia with the original task force and returned with the first westward shuttle flight. Munich was again attacked from Italy by U.S. bombers on June 13. In addition to these attacks, medium and light bombers based on Italy made a number of raids on German communications in southern France during June, while objectives near Vienna, the Ploesti oil refineries and other targets, especially oil refineries and bridges in Hungary and Rumania and airfields in Bulgaria, were attacked during the last ten days of the month. Many enemy aircraft were destroyed in the attacks on Ploesti, 31 on June 23 alone.

The respective losses in combat of Allied aircraft based on Italy and the enemy aircraft (mostly German piloted) which they encountered during these three months were :

| | | | <i>German</i> | <i>Allied</i> |
|-------|----|----|---------------|---------------|
| April | .. | .. | 607 | 286 |
| May | .. | .. | 433 | 385 |
| June | .. | .. | 460 | 373 |
| | | | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| Total | .. | | 1,500 | 1,044 |
| | | | <hr/> | <hr/> |

Enemy coastwise shipping in the Western Mediterranean was harassed throughout the quarter by aircraft, surface ships and submarines. On May 1 the Admiralty announced the sinking of two supply ships by British submarines off the French Riviera and damage to three other vessels, two of them tankers. Light coastal craft operating in the Ligurian Sea (i.e. the waters between Tuscany, Genoa and Corsica) had already scored successes. A.H.Q. reported that

on April 24 "our coastal forces operating in the south-eastern part of the Ligurian Sea (presumably off the Tuscan coast) . . . sank four small supply ships, three lighters and a tug. Prisoners were taken. Our forces suffered neither damage nor casualties. The same night two destroyers and a corvette were attacked by the U.S. Navy and by aircraft of the M.A.A.F. The destroyers were damaged and the corvette was seen to blow up and sink."¹ British and American cruisers and destroyers gave valuable support to the Fifth Army's advance along the Italian coast in May and June by shelling hostile positions and communications.

The loss of the British destroyer *Laforey* which had had a distinguished career in the Mediterranean and may have been sunk there was announced in April. The U.S. destroyer *Landsdale* was torpedoed and sunk by German aircraft in the Mediterranean on April 20. On May 1 the U.S. War Department announced that an American ship had been recently sunk in the Mediterranean, and that 498 military personnel were missing.

2 : THE WAR IN THE BALKANS

A. YUGOSLAVIA AND ALBANIA

The quarrel which locally attained the dimensions of civil war between Marshal Tito's Liberation Committee and his army of "Partisans," and General Mihailovitch's organization and his Chetniks, continued to profit the Germans during the second quarter of 1944. It was further complicated by serious political strife between the Liberation Committee and the Croat Peasant Party (C.P.P.) leaders of which, e.g. Dr. Matchek and M. Koshutitch, were the targets of violent attacks emanating

¹ These were probably Italian warships which had been seized by the enemy.

from the Free Yugoslavia radio station in Tiflis (U.S.S.R.). The C.P.P. still possessed much influence in Croatia and the accusations made, without any evidence being adduced in their support, against its chiefs left a painful impression in Croatia and among discriminating friends of Yugoslavia in this country. This, however, was a minor complication by comparison with the feud between General Mihailovitch's and Marshal Tito's organizations; and it must be said that the Allied decision to suspend military assistance to Mihailovitch until he played a more active part in the struggle against German and Bulgar, while eminently defensible from a military standpoint, promised to make the political confusion in the Yugoslav Kingdom worse confounded before the war was over. Military events in the various regions of Yugoslavia where Marshal Tito's armies or bands were operating at first took a fairly favourable course from the Allied standpoint. An analysis of the *communiqués* issued by Marshal Tito's Staff during April and the first three weeks in May gives the following results:

Early in April the Partisans reported successful actions in east and west Bosnia, the cutting of the main Zagreb-Belgrade railway at a number of points and the defeat of Germans and "Chetniks"¹ in Montenegro.

Later in April there was much minor fighting on the Dalmatian coast. The Partisans took Kortchula Island and destroyed the German garrison of Blato on April 22, but less than a week later the Germans claimed to have "cleared Kortchula of Communists." On April 30 came news of a German drive on a 60-mile front between Bihatch and Knin. On May 3 Tito's Headquarters announced the capture of points near Zagreb and claimed that the Croatian capital and the important Dalmatian port of Spalato were "practically surrounded" and short of food. Krushevo, in western Bosnia, was taken about April 28, and the Partisans claimed that the German force which had recaptured Mrkonjitchgrad on April 24 was now encircled. Bands were stated to be operating against German communications in Slavonia and on the border between Carinthia and Slovenia.

It does not, however, appear that the Partisans were able to maintain themselves for any length of time near Zagreb and Spalato, and the Germans assisted by Pavelitch's Croats took the offensive at several points. At the beginning of May the Germans claimed that during April the Partisans had lost 11,380 killed and 3,871 prisoners. These figures were no doubt largely

¹ A question-begging term which might refer to independent pro-German bands, to Pavelitch's non-regular formations or to Mihailovitch's men.

conjectural as far as the killed were concerned, nor was it known how many of the "prisoners" were in reality non-combatants seized and drafted off for forced labour in the Reich or elsewhere. The Croats of the Pavelitch faction also claimed to have "liberated" a great part of their country during the last four months, and to have killed over 3,000 "Communists." Between May 1 and May 15 the Germans averred that 5,000 more "Communists" had been killed and 1,300 captured, and that 34 of the Partisans' supply depots had been captured or destroyed.

These alleged losses did not prevent the Partisans from opening a new offensive campaign on May 13 against the enemy's railways and roads in the valleys of the Vardar and Ibar, the links between Yugoslavia and Greece. They also raided and captured Starigrad on Havr Island south of Spalato (Shplit). But on May 25 the Germans made a counter-attack on Marshal Tito's Headquarters which was thus described by the *Associated Press* in a message from Bari dispatched on May 29 :

"... German parachutists, supported by glider-borne infantry, swarmed down on the Bosnian headquarters of Marshal Tito on May 25, but failed to catch him. . . . A dive-bombing attack at 6 a.m. preceded the airborne attack on the Headquarters which were situated in a vast grotto near Dravar, 70 miles north of Shplit. Parachutists and gliders followed up quickly in a co-ordinated attack in which airborne tanks took part. Bitter fighting followed . . . and vantage-points of high ground changed hands several times. Junkers transports, in addition to gliders, poured in more men, field artillery and supplies throughout the afternoon and night and the following day. The Partisans regained much ground during the night. On the second day, however, the enemy managed to push an armoured column into Dravar, meanwhile taking the important airport of Petrovatch, 14 miles to the north, and bombing several towns in the vicinity.

Withdrawing into the Dinaric Alps . . . Marshal Tito and his staff were gone before the first enemy troops reached the stronghold deep in the ravine from which he had been directing Partisan operations for over a year. His headquarters was so organized that it could be moved within 30 minutes' notice. Members of the British mission, taking note of the recent strengthening of German forces in the vicinity, had left several days before the attack." It was stated that Major Randolph Churchill, M.P., had escaped with Marshal Tito, and that four Press correspondents, British and American, fell into the hands of the Germans, who came near shooting them but eventually realized that they were non-combatants. One afterwards escaped.

It is hard to say how far this stroke, which might have been disastrous to the Partisans, hampered their subsequent activities. Marshal Tito very naturally and rightly retorted by ordering a general offensive against German communications, and his Headquarters stated

on May 29 that the Partisan forces had made ground in Slovenia and in Herzegovina. At the same time the small scale of the operations reported in the first three weeks of June gave the impression that Tito's organization had received a temporary shock. But there was no collapse.

On June 26 Tito's Headquarters stated that the Germans, after an attack in the Fojnitcha-Vakuf area, had evacuated Grahovo and opened a new offensive in eastern Bosnia, using tanks and aircraft. They also attacked Partisan forces which had established themselves only 18 miles north-east of Fiume. On the other hand the Partisans raided and took Ogulin, 25 miles east of Fiume, and attacked the enemy's communications in Macedonia east of the Belgrade-Salonika railway.

The Allied navies and their Mediterranean Air Force gave the Partisans frequent support during these three months.

On April 6 and 7 five schooners carrying arms and stores to the German garrisons in Dalmatia and Albania were captured. On the night of May 2-3 German traffic on the Albanian coastal road south of Valona was shelled by British destroyers. During the last days of May and the early part of June Allied naval activity was mainly directed against the communications of the Germans on the western coast of Italy, but on the night of June 7-8 British destroyers shelled Lussin Piccolo harbour south-east of Pola. They shelled it again on the night of June 10-11 and on the following night they met four E-boats, sinking one and driving off the rest. On the night of June 16 French naval units attacked an escorted enemy convoy in the Adriatic and blew up one ship. On the night of June 29-30 light naval forces operating in the Straits of Otranto bombarded a German look-out station south of Valona, after which a raiding party "demolished the station and made some prisoners."

In early April Allied air squadrons operating from Italy attacked targets in Yugoslavia, including the German base of Miksitch, east of Dubrovnik, the Mostar and Zagreb airfields and the railway junctions at Brod in northern Bosnia and at Nish, where the railway to Salonika and Athens parts company with the Belgrade-Sofia-Istanbul line. On April 17 Belgrade was raided by heavy U.S. bombers and the Fortresses on April 24 bombed the Belgrade-Ikarus aircraft factory. A large motor-convoy was machine-gunned and bombed by fighter-bombers near Elbasan in Central Albania on April 25. On May 7 the Panchevo bridge near Belgrade on the railway line to Sofia was hit. Nish and Belgrade railway stations were bombed later in May. On May 31 Zagreb railway yard was attacked by Flying Fortresses, and on June 6 these formidable aircraft again bombed Belgrade railway targets. Nish was attacked on the night of June 8-9 and on June 10-11 oil installations at Brod were hit. On June 11 heavy bombers escorted by fighters¹ attacked the railway yards and oil refinery at Smederevo. These attacks on oil refineries and railway yards in Yugoslavia were repeated on several occasions before the end of the quarter. Mean-

¹ A new type of fighter, the P518 Mustang, with a radius of 600 miles and return, was most successfully used to escort heavy bombers in the Balkans.

while light and medium bombers, some flown by Italians, continually harassed enemy transport and shipping besides bombing airfields and supply depots.

It was announced from Cairo on April 25 that an R.A.F. "forward post" had been established on a Dalmatian island as a direct link between Marshal Tito's troops and the Allied air squadrons operating over Yugoslavia; and on April 30 that the Marshal's chief of air staff had signed an agreement with Air Marshal Sir Keith Park by which Yugoslavs should be trained in the R.A.F.V.R. to form the nucleus of a Yugoslav Air Force.

The growth of Marshal Tito's movement; the arrival of a Yugoslav military mission under General Terzitch at Moscow and the arrival of a Soviet military representative at the Liberation Committee's headquarters; the visit of a military mission from Marshal Tito led by General Velebit to London, and the refusal of the members of this mission to make any contact with the King's representatives, had their effect on the Yugoslav Government in exile. It grew increasingly inarticulate and increasingly conscious of its powerlessness and unrepresentative quality. Almost its last utterance was a rejoinder on May 5 to a statement made by General Velebit to the Press in London that Mihailovitch and his men were fighting Marshal Tito's forces on the German side and that his men wore German uniforms. To this allegation, the Government Information Office gave the following reply:

For the last four years General Mihailovitch had been fighting the Germans with unswerving determination and the German Government had offered a reward of 100,000 gold marks for his head. To blame his men for wearing German uniforms was equivalent to blaming the Partisans for wearing Italian, Ustashi or German uniforms. These fighters had to wear what they could capture.

On May 18 King Peter of Yugoslavia accepted the resignation of the Puritch Government. It was understood that Dr. Shubashitch, former Ban (Governor-General) of Croatia, had been appointed interim Prime Minister, subject to the conclusion of an agreement with Marshal Tito and his National Liberation Committee, and that he would shortly leave London, where he had returned from the United States, to open negotiations with the Partisans. On May 24 Mr. Churchill, in his review of foreign affairs in Parliament, gave the following account of the Yugoslav situation:

He began by saying that the difficulties in Yugoslavia had been great since there were not only three strongly marked races there, Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, but farther south the Albanians were also making a bold bid for freedom. They too were split into several competing and antagonistic sections. King Peter had accepted the resignation of M. Puritch and was forming a new and smaller Cabinet to assist active resistance in Yugoslavia and to unite all the fighting groups in that country as far as possible. This involved the severance of General Mihailovitch from his post as Minister of War; it was also understood that the Ban of Croatia was an important factor in the new political arrangements "around whom or beside whom other elements may group themselves for the purpose of beating the enemy and uniting Yugoslavia. . . . We do not know what may happen in the Serbian part of Yugoslavia." They had ceased to supply General Mihailovitch with arms and support because he had ceased fighting the enemy, and "some of his subordinates have made accommodation with the enemy from which have arisen armed conflicts with the forces of the Marshal, accompanied by many charges and counter-charges and the loss of patriot lives to the German advantage." Mihailovitch certainly held a powerful position locally as Commander-in-Chief; there were some 200,000 Serb peasant proprietors who were anti-German but strongly Serbian and were less enthusiastic about Communism than some of those in Slovenia and Croatia. Marshal Tito had largely sunk his Communist aspect in his character as a patriot leader and had often proclaimed that he had no intention of reversing the property and social systems which prevail in Serbia, "but these facts are not accepted yet by the other side."

After speaking of the fine historic and military record of the Serbs, Mr. Churchill said that a very large number of them were fighting in Marshal Tito's forces.¹ The British desire was to see all forces in Yugoslavia united against the Germans. It had been arranged that Marshal Tito should send a military representative to London to maintain the closest touch with the Allies. Nothing could be neglected that might obstruct a real unity in regions where upwards of 12 German divisions were gripped in Yugoslavia alone. All questions of monarchy or republic, of Left or Right, were strictly subordinate to the purpose we had in mind. "In one place we support a king, in another a Communist, there is no attempt by us to enforce particular ideologies." Our only aim was to beat the enemy and then, with a happy and serene peace, "let the best expression be given to the will of the people in every way."

On June 1 King Peter issued a declaration to the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes expressing his admiration for the deeds of the men who were fighting the Germans in Yugoslavia.

But, for this heroism to be fruitful, there must be unity. He therefore appealed to all to lay aside their differences and postpone all political issues until after the war, when they would be free to express their will as to the organization of the State. In this as in all things he was at their service.

He had resolved accordingly to form a Government which, without regard to political views, would consecrate itself to co-operation with all elements actively resisting the Germans. He had entrusted the task of leading it to Dr. Shubashitch, but as the new Government could only

¹ True, but what proportion of these came from Serbia proper was not stated. Many were dispossessed Bosnians and Serbs from the Vovodina.

fulfil its task in collaboration with all these elements, he had directed the Prime Minister to establish contact with them before the final formation of the new Ministry.

In an interview the King stated that Dr. Shubashitch would soon leave for Bari to see representatives of Marshal Tito and General Mihailovitch would be invited to send a delegate there. He believed that the General would collaborate with Tito; if not his value to his country would cease. The General had been instructed to open hostilities against the Germans.

On June 18 the Yugoslav official News Agency announced that from June 14-17 there had been discussions "on liberated territory" between Marshal Tito, President of the National Liberation Committee, and Dr. Shubasitch, Prime Minister of the Royal Yugoslav Government. Members of the Liberation Committee and of the governing body of the anti-Fascist Council took part.

"Agreement and mutual accord" had been reached regarding many questions. "This will undoubtedly help to strengthen still further our relations with the Allies and help the peoples of Yugoslavia to liberate their country as soon as possible."

By the end of the quarter it was understood that the relations between Dr. Shubasitch and the National Liberation Committee were friendly and that a new government would soon be formed.

In Albania, according to a statement made by Mr. Attlee in Parliament on May 23, irregular forces were fighting the Germans in different parts of the country, and sometimes fighting one another. These patriots were composed of three main groups, viz: the National Liberation Movement, a Left Wing group and the most active of all, the Legality Movement composed of King Zog's supporters, and the Balli Kombetar or National Front. All held strong political views which sometimes led to clashes. Some bands were receiving supplies from the British Government.

B. GREECE AND THE ÆGEAN

After a bad start followed by a promise of recovery, the Greek political situation deteriorated again at the close of the quarter. In the previous volume of this series (Chapter II, Section 2B) the author concluded a sketch of Greek political developments with a reference to the visit, in a threatening and turbulent mood, of representatives of the Greek fighting services to the

Prime Minister, M. Tsouderos, in Cairo. In consequence of his refusal to comply with all the demands of the delegates who were working in the interests of the E.A.M. (q.v., *loc. cit.*) disorders fomented by agitators broke out in the Greek Navy and were followed by a mutiny in the First Greek Brigade. M. Tsouderos resigned office on April 3. On April 11 King George of Greece arrived in Egypt. The Tsouderos Government agreed to remain in office until the King should have appointed a new Prime Minister. On arriving in Egypt King George issued a statement saying that he had returned because the political crisis demanded an immediate solution.

When Greece had regained her liberty the whole nation would be called upon to decide by a free vote the regime under which it wished to be governed. Like every other citizen, he was at the disposal of the people and would submit freely to their decision as soon as normal conditions were restored. Meanwhile the Greek Government outside Greece must be as representative as possible, and such a Government would be largely composed of Greeks who had lived in their country under enemy occupation and were thus conscious from their experience in the cities and "the free mountains of Greece," of the real interests of the nation. Arrangements were being made to bring these representatives to Egypt. "Until the day of liberation," he concluded, "let us put aside political discussions in the interests of the war effort of the United Nations."

On April 14 M. Sophocles Venizelos, son of the famous statesman, formed a Cabinet. After he had taken the oath he issued a statement on the intentions of the new Ministry.

Its object, he said, was to achieve national unity. The prolongation of the existing suspense and uncertainty which was causing grave national danger had imposed upon him the duty of accepting the responsibility of forming a government. Their aim was the achievement as soon as possible of a Pan-Hellenic Government which was clearly desired by the nation.

Unfortunately, though the Greek parties and organizations had responded to the appeal to send representatives to confer with the Government in Egypt, the mutineers in the Army and Navy remained defiant. The painful sequel was recorded in official statements issued by the British naval authorities in the Eastern Mediterranean on April 23 and by the British Middle Eastern Command on April 24. The naval announcement said :

"Three Greek warships, the *Apostolis*, *Ierax*, and *Saktouris*, which for three weeks have refused to obey orders, were boarded last night by Greek officers and men acting under the orders of Vice-Admiral Voulgaris, Greek

Commander-in-Chief. There was some exchange of machine-gun fire and a few casualties were incurred. These ships have now been recovered, and Admiral Voulgaris's flag has been hoisted from the *Saktouris*." The Correspondent of *The Times* at Cairo, commenting on the affair, said that the mutineers insisted that their action was no mutiny because it was dictated by political causes! The fact remained that on the instigation of agitators the crews of Greek destroyers refused to sail as convoy escorts, which meant that British destroyers had to be brought from elsewhere to escort convoys, and that Greek minesweepers had refused to carry out their duty of keeping open vital sea lanes in the Mediterranean.

The military announcement of April 24 ran thus: "Early this morning the 1st Greek Brigade, which for the past three weeks had refused to comply with orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief, laid down their arms and vacated their camp. This brought to an end a mutiny by subversive political elements which had destroyed all discipline in the brigade. It is now hoped to reorganize the reliable elements of the brigade so that they may play a worthy part in the liberation of their country."

During this period M. Papandreou, the leader of the small Social Democratic Party, a man of experience, probity and courage, had escaped from Greece and reached Egypt "as a crusader for national union." M. Venizelos had already offered his resignation to the King on account of the unrest in the armed forces, and on April 26 King George accepted it and asked M. Papandreou to form a government. He accepted this task, succeeded, and took the oath as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Next day he issued two proclamations addressed to the Greek nation and the armed forces respectively.

In the first he said that his mission was to complete the Government of National Union by obtaining the participation in it of all political parties and organizations aiming at the liberation of Greece. The watchword would be "One Fatherland, one Government, one Army." He outlined the Government's programme, which was afterwards adopted virtually in its entirety by the Pan-Hellenic Congress. To the armed forces he said that the Army could not belong to any person, party or class organization. It was the Nation's Army. Sections of the Army and Navy had been impelled to commit "acts which have been harmful to the common Allied struggle and advantageous to the enemy." But for the warm affection for Greece felt by the Admiral commanding the Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean and his recognition of the great services of Greece to the Allied cause, Greece "might now be lamenting countless victims and our national disaster would have been irreparable." The reform of the armed forces would begin at once and he called upon them to obey the Government's orders.

On April 30 the text of a message from Mr. Churchill to M. Papandreou was published in Cairo. Mr. Churchill promised him all support "in his supreme task and duty of directing all Greek forces against the common foe." As soon as the foreign tyrant had been expelled and tranquillity had

been restored, the Greek nation, free from foreign interference, would choose the form of democratic government, monarchy or republic, which it preferred. "The King . . . I am sure . . . has no wish to force himself upon the nation. Having begun the war against Italy in a victorious manner, he is now bound to fight it through to the end against the Germans. No one has a constitutional right to stand between him and his duty."

During the war the British Government was responsible for maintaining good relations with the Egyptian sovereign Power and they could not, therefore, permit sporadic disorders to break out among the Greek forces in Egypt, who were under the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. It was for the Greek nation, not for small bodies of soldiers, sailors and politicians "resting under our shield" to decide the Greek future. In facing the toils and perils of a renewed attack on Germany M. Papandreou would have Great Britain's persevering and powerful support.

Meanwhile, the relations between the E.A.M. and other Greek organizations had not been improved by the brutal and treacherous murder of Colonel Psarros, the leader of E.K.K.A. organization. This is a progressive Liberal body which had already played a more than useful part as intermediary between the Communist-commanded E.A.M. organization and the democratic E.D.E.S. which Colonel Zervas led and had rendered valuable services to the British officers in Greece who were endeavouring to compose the differences between the two major Partisan organizations. Colonel Psarros, so religious a man that he was nicknamed "the Bishop" by his followers, had always urged the subordination of constitutional and political issues to the prosecution of the struggle against the Germans, and had condemned the attempt of the E.A.M. to institute a sort of monopoly of patriotism. In mid-April he was kidnapped and shot. His followers laid the responsibility for this crime on Klaras, a prominent Communist partisan leader, who was accused of other acts of violence and had convictions for larceny to his debit. This crime was a bad prelude to the Pan-Hellenic Congress of representatives of the Greek parties, old and new, which finally opened in the Lebanon on May 17th.

M. Papandreou opened the proceedings by making a sharp criticism of the policy of the Liberation Front (E.A.M.) which wished to prepare for its own domination by a policy of terrorism; and this terrorism and persecution had enabled the Germans in the third year of their tyranny to raise security battalions of Greeks, and thus to extend and perpetuate internal strife. It was not the invader but civil war which was fatally undermining the future of Greece, which was becoming, as he could say from experience,

an inferno. But from his conversations with the representative¹ of the Communist section of E.A.M. he had formed the opinion that this organization had come, not to oppose, but to join forces with the other parties.

The Lebanon Conference concluded on May 21 when M. Papandreou announced that virtually the whole of his programme had been accepted by the 25 delegates. These were its chief points, which were embodied in a National Charter to which all the delegates agreed.

(1) The reorganization and disciplining of the Greek armed forces in the Middle East. The recent mutiny was an anti-national crime and its instigators must be punished; (2) the unification and disciplining of all the partisan bands of free Greece under the orders of the new Government and the mobilization of all the fighting forces against the conquerors; (3) the suppression of terrorism throughout Greece and the guarantee of personal safety and political liberty on the retreat of the enemy; (4) the continued organization of the dispatch of provisions and medical relief to Greece; (5) the guarantee, during the liberation of Greece, in co-operation with the Allies, of order and liberty so that the Greek people might express their sovereign will concerning the future constitution, the social order and the form of government. It was the intention of the Government to clear up the question of the monarchy; (6) the imposition of severe penalties on those who had betrayed their country and exploited the misery of the people, and the satisfaction of the material needs of the Greek people, who by their epic struggle in Albania had saved the war and shortened it by at least a year. If in repayment Greece asked for one day's war expenses from her Allies to enable her to rebuild her ruins, would that be too much.

On the same day it was announced that the leaders of the Committee of National Liberation in Greece, the E.A.M., and the Greek Communist Party had sent a message to Mr. Churchill thanking him for his interest in Greece and pointing out that the Greek national resistance exceeded in moral importance the mad acts of irresponsible persons which had had disastrous results. They assured him that they would do all in their power to achieve national unity. They did not, however, prevent the Prime Minister from expressing his candid opinion of these acts and their consequences in his review of foreign policy in Parliament on May 24.

Greek affairs, he said, had taken a hopeful turn. The King had returned to Cairo after everyone concerned there had warned him not to go back since his life would be in danger. The situation was then most serious with a Greek brigade and a large portion of the Greek Navy in open mutiny. He disclosed that the mutinous Greek brigade in the desert near Alexandria had to be assaulted by British forces, "which captured the eminences . . . commanding the camp, and the 4,000 men then surrendered. There were

¹ M. Roussos. The E.A.M. was represented by M. Porphyroghannis.

no casualties among the Greeks, but one British officer was killed in the attack. . . . This is a matter that cannot be overlooked." Mr. Churchill, after referring to the attempts made by M. Tsouderos, aided by M. Venizelos, to arrange a meeting of representatives of Greek public opinion, spoke of the emergence of M. Papandreou and of the Pan-Hellenic Conference which he summoned, and at which every Greek party was represented, "a dozen parties or more."

The meetings had revealed an appalling situation in Greece. The excesses of E.L.A.S., the military body operating under E.A.M., had so alienated the population in many parts that the Germans had been able to form security battalions of Greeks to fight the E.A.M. These battalions "were made up of men in many cases who would far rather have been out on the hills maintaining the guerilla warfare." At the same time there was the state of hostility between the E.L.A.S. and the E.D.E.S. led by Colonel Zervas who had the full support of the civil population in his area and "has always shown the strictest compliance with the orders sent him from G.H.Q. Middle East."

Nevertheless the success of the Lebanon Conference held out promise of unity under the new all-party Government which would devote itself to the task of forming a national army, incorporating all the partisan bands, which would expel the Germans from the country.¹

Unfortunately for the hopes raised by the unanimity expressed at the Conference, the E.A.M. and Communist representatives were unable to obtain the agreement of their organizations to their participation in the Government which King George had called on M. Papandreou to form on May 22. It was not until June 8 that he completed his Cabinet, which included representatives of most of the Greek parties and the E.K.K.A. and E.L.A.S. fighting organizations. It was composed of the following members :

M. Papandreou (Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs) ; M. Sophocles Venizelos (Deputy Premier) ; M. Kanellopoulos (Finance and Reconstruction) ; M. Kartalis (Information) ; M. Londos (Public Assistance) ; M. Mylonas (Navy) ; M. Rallis (Air) ; M. Sgouritsas (Education) ; M. Theotokis (Supply) ; Professor Tsatsos (Justice) ; M. Vassiliades (Mercantile Marine) ; MM. Rendis and Sakalis (Ministers without Portfolio). M. Papandreou was acting Minister of War. M. Kartalis and Professor Tsatsos respectively represented the E.K.K.A. and E.L.A.S. fighting organizations. M. Kanellopoulos was the head of the National Unionist Party. The only parties and organizations not represented were the E.D.E.S. whose chief, Colonel Zervas, said that as his organization was military and had no political colour, it could not assume the functions of a political party, and the E.A.M. and Communist Party,

¹ It may be reasonably supposed that Mr. Churchill in his criticisms of the excesses of the E.L.A.S. spoke with knowledge of the reports of British officers who had been sent to Greece ; and that he was also aware that the E.L.A.S. differed from the E.D.E.S. in only carrying out the instructions of the Allied High Command when it suited them.

whose representatives in Egypt were unable to obtain the consent of their principals to their nomination in the new Cabinet.

On June 12 M. Papandreou, outlining his Government's policy at the first Cabinet meeting, made an important statement regarding the position of the King. He recalled King George's letter of November 8, 1943, and continued :

"But the question was more clearly settled during the Congress in the Lebanon. Chapter 5 of the National Charter reads : 'On the question of the supreme Ruler all the political leaders have expressed views, and while joining the Government of National Unity, they certainly retain these views.' The expressed opinion of our political parties is well known. It is that the King must await the verdict of the people, and until then he must as Head of the Greek State watch over our national interests with our great allies. . . ." It had been made clear that the King agreed with this view for, having been informed of the National Charter, he had approved the formation of the Government of National Unity, whose mission it was to apply this programme. All the Ministers signed this declaration in evidence of their agreement.

M. Papandreou also said that representatives of the E.A.M. and Communist parties had not yet reached a decision as to participation in the united Government. On June 28 he broadcast to the Greek people and "to the world" that the negotiations with the E.A.M. and its Political Committee had broken down. He said that the Government had exercised great restraint and tolerance in the hope that the Communists in the E.A.M. organization would agree to its representation in the Government.

Unfortunately, while negotiations were proceeding hostilities broke out between the E.L.A.S. and Colonel Zervas's forces, each accusing the other of aggression. It was hoped that even so M. Papandreou's broadcast would recall the chiefs of the Partisans to a sense of their responsibilities, and it was pointed out that the idea of an all-party Government had originated with the E.A.M. organization and that impatience with the delay in bringing this to pass had contributed to the recent mutinies, the ring-leaders of which were now on trial. Logically the E.A.M. should have welcomed participation, but political fanaticism, personal jealousies and ambitions and the fears of certain *guerillero* chiefs that they might be called to account for their misdeeds were too strong for logic.

With dissension rampant in Greece it was not surprising that partisan resistance gave the Germans less trouble than in previous months. The only exception was in Epirus and Acarnania, where Colonel Zervas's troops occupied the towns of Parga and Paramythia in June,

repulsed a German attempt to recapture Paramythia on June 30 and on the same day organized a successful attack on the Missolonghi-Agrinion railway, wrecking a train and rescuing many hostages.

German repression reached the extreme of brutality during the quarter. Any village near which Germans had been attacked was liable to destruction, and by the end of June over 750,000 persons were believed to be homeless. On May 1 the Germans avenged the death of a general shot by irregulars on the Sparta-Molai road by shooting all males found within rifle shot of the road and executing 200 hostages at Athens and 130 at Tripolis. Several villages on Mount Olympus were sacked and their inhabitants atrociously slaughtered by a German column in May, but the column was then surprised by Greek irregulars, and a British officer counted 150 German corpses.

Among the islands of the Ægean British and Allied aircraft and submarines were active during the quarter. Maleme airfield in Crete was heavily bombed on April 19. Bombers sank two ships off the Greek coast on April 26, and on May 1 the Admiralty announced the sinking by British submarines in Ægean waters of 20 small craft, some carrying petroleum. On the same day came news that Major-General Kreipe, Commander of the 22nd (Panzer Grenadier) Division in Crete, had been surprised near Heraklion (Candia) on the night of April 26 by members of a British Commando unit who drove his car, the passage of which was ensured by the two pennants of a divisional commander, through 22 control posts to a point 30 miles beyond Candia, where the prisoner was put aboard a British ship. Airfields and ports in Greece and the islands were bombed on several occasions in May. On June 1 R.A.F. bombers blew up a destroyer, damaged three others and four escort vessels with three cargo ships which they were escorting among the islands.

During the quarter ten German aircraft were reported shot down in the Middle Eastern theatre, including Greece, against 31 Allied machines.

3 : THE ARAB LANDS

The questions of Palestine and of closer union among the Arab States occupied the Governments of most of the Arab lands during the quarter. In Palestine itself Jewish extremists gave sporadic trouble, committing several murders.

Thus on April 1 they killed a Jewish police sergeant and a constable and wounded a British inspector. On April 2 curfew regulations in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa were cancelled after the arrest of 60 persons. Two men who attacked the police searching a Galilaean village were killed on April 6. Trouble revived in May when among other political crimes the broadcasting station at Ramallah was temporarily seized by an armed band said to be composed of members of the *Irgun Zvi Le-umi*, a Jewish "private army" (May 17). On May 8 police headquarters in Jerusalem had offered rewards for the capture of members of the "Stern gang," the leader of which they identified as one Jacob Levstein.

The Palestinian Arabs watched these criminal follies complacently in the hope that Zionism would lose support in the English-speaking countries. But they were disagreeably impressed by the suggestion contained in the report of the National Executive Committee of the British Labour Party to the impending annual conference that the Arabs of Palestine

"be encouraged to move out as the Jews move in. Let them be compensated handsomely for their land and let their settlement elsewhere be carefully organized and generously financed. . . . We should re-examine also the possibility of extending the present Palestinian boundaries by agreement with Egypt, Syria, or Transjordan." Nor were the Arabs cheered by the concluding paragraph of the platform of the Republican Party of the United States which was published on June 29. It called for the opening of Palestine in order to give refuge to millions of distressed Jews driven from their homes by tyranny, "to their unrestricted immigration and land ownership," so that in accordance with the purpose of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the resolution of a Republican Congress in 1922, Palestine "may be constituted as a free and democratic commonwealth." The platform condemned the failure of the President "to insist that the Mandatory of Palestine carry out the provisions of the Balfour Declaration and of the Mandate. . . ."

It was easy enough to see that the Republicans with a Presidential Election in the offing were angling for the large Jewish vote in the United States and to foretell that the Democrats would do likewise.

On May 9 Makram Ebeid Pasha, before his quarrel Egypt with Nahas Pasha one of the leading members of the Wafdist Party, and now leader of the Independent Party, was arrested on a charge of subversive activities.

On April 24 Lord Moyne, British Minister Resident in the Middle East, and Amin Pasha Osman, Egyptian Minister of Finance, jointly opened a financial conference called by the Middle East Supply Centre. Delegates from 11 Middle Eastern countries, with representatives of the U.S. and British Treasuries, the British forces in the Middle East, the occupied territories, the League of Nations, Indian and Ethiopian observers and members of the Middle East Supply Centre were present. The proceedings were secret since many of the statistics presented concerned military expenditure, but the chief problem before the conference was inflation caused by the heavy local expenditure of the Allied Armies in the Middle East which the Allied Powers could not set off immediately by the import of goods. A list of 28 resolutions was drawn up at the end of a week, outlining the steps which the Middle Eastern Governments should take to prevent the spread of inflation now, and when the end of the war brought its own problems.

The new Advisory Council of the Northern Sudan was The Sudan opened on May 16 by the Governor-General, Sir Herbert Huddleston, who described it as "the first concrete expression of a Sudanese nation."

Lebanon

The exhibition of a "foreign" (French) flag outside the Parliament building at Beirut on April 27 caused a riot in which several persons were killed. The Government received a vote of confidence from the Chamber after the Prime Minister had described the steps taken to restore order.

Iraq

It was announced on June 4 that General Nuri es-Said, Prime Minister of Iraq, had resigned owing to ill-health, and that Hamdi Pachachi, President of the Chamber of Deputies, had formed a Ministry after negotiations lasting several days. Two members of General Nuri es-Said's Cabinet retained their portfolios in the new formation.

CHAPTER II

THE SECOND FRONT

Prefatory

The invasion of Normandy on Tuesday, June 6, marked the opening of a new and decisive stage of the World War. This chapter records this great enterprise as well as the naval and aerial operations of the Allies and the Germans in the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans. The opening section deals with the war against the U-boats in the Atlantic and the defence of the British and American convoys bound to the Arctic ports of Russia throughout the quarter under review and with operations in the narrow seas until the beginning of the invasion of France. Section 2 deals with all air operations based on or directed against Great Britain until the invasion. After that date until the end of the quarter on June 30 it chronicles only the strategic bombing of Germany and the German attack on London by means of robot planes. The third section of this chapter is devoted to the invasion of France from June 6 to June 30 and includes some account of the naval operations in the Channel which accompanied and followed it, and the vigorous tactical air offensive against the enemy's troops, positions, transport and communications in France and in the Low Countries.

I : AT SEA

The King's Navy opened the quarter with a disabling blow from the air at the German battleship *Tirpitz* in Alten Fjord on April 3. A brief announcement that night was followed by a fuller account of this brilliant operation which the Admiralty issued on April 5. It ran thus :

"Fuller accounts have been received of the successful bombing attack carried out by naval aircraft against the German battleship *Tirpitz* in

Alten Fjord, North Norway. Towards dawn last Monday [April 3], H.M. aircraft-carriers, supported by other units of the Home Fleet, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir Henry R. Moore . . . Second-in-Command, Home Fleet, approached the vicinity of Alten Fjord. Two forces of Barracuda aircraft were flown from the carriers to the attack, with escort and cover provided by Seafire, Corsair, Hellcat and Wildcat fighters.

The first strike caught the *Tirpitz* apparently as she was about to move from her anchorage. Hits were obtained near the bridge, amidships and forward of the bridge, with heavy and medium-sized bombs. The enemy endeavoured to screen the *Tirpitz* with smoke, but none the less further hits were obtained during the second attack in the vicinity of the after turret, amidships and on the forecastle, large explosions being observed by the mainmast and on the forecastle.

Anti-aircraft from the *Tirpitz* and from shore batteries was encountered during the attack, but by the time the last aircraft attacked the battleship had been silenced. When last seen the *Tirpitz* was on fire amidships.

During the course of the operation no enemy fighter aircraft was sighted. Of all the aircraft which took part in this successful operation three Barracudas and one fighter were lost. The fighter pilot is safe. The next-of-kin of casualties will be informed as soon as possible. No other casualties were incurred."

Experts who examined the photographs of the damaged *Tirpitz* estimated that she would be out of action for several months. There was no indication in the photographs brought back by the pilots of the second wave that her engines were working. When this wave attacked her she had turned and was possibly aground by the stern.

Thus the last sea-worthy capital ship in the German Navy was left heavily damaged and incapable of action.

The Allied flotillas engaged in the campaign against the U-boats continued their successes. The joint Anglo-American statement issued on May 9 was distinctly "short and sweet."

"In April the United Nations anti-submarine activity continued at a highly satisfactory level. Again for another month the extraordinary fact continues that the number of enemy submarines sunk exceeds the number of Allied merchant ships sunk by submarines."

Commenting on the statement the Naval Correspondent of *The Times* (*loc. cit.* May 10) said: "Rear-Admiral Francis Low, U.S.N., in a speech last month in Washington, revealed that it now takes Germany three or four times as long to build a U-boat as that U-boat's 'expectation of life' after she goes into operational service. . . . It remains to be seen how long the German Navy can keep up a campaign which has become so futile and suicidal. At the same time, it must be realized that the upper hand of the U-boats is maintained only by unremitting vigilance, by the continued labours of the large forces, both sea and air, devoted to the task of keeping command of the sea, and by their maintenance in undiminished strength."

An Admiralty announcement issued on May 11

described how the frigate, H.M.S. *Spey* (Commander G. A. Ormsby) had destroyed two U-boats recently while she was helping to escort a convoy in the North Atlantic. She forced the first to the surface with depth charges. The enemy appeared some 500 yards astern of H.M.S. *Spey*, which opened fire with every gun that would bear. The engagement lasted only a few minutes. The U-boat then sank, leaving 45 survivors in the water who were all picked up.

Later, the *Spey* made another contact and again attacked with depth-charges. The enemy, apparently much damaged, broke surface, bows first and at a steep angle, about 800 yards from the frigate. The *Spey* altered course to close, but the U-boat though under heavy fire started to proceed ahead and returned the frigate's fire until she was straddled by a shallow pattern of depth-charges fired by the *Spey*. Some of her crew then abandoned ship, but the U-boat, though badly damaged, still went ahead. At last, however, hits from the frigate's 4-in. guns and close-range armament inflicted heavy losses on her crew, more of whom jumped into the sea, and shortly afterwards the U-boat reared up her bows and sank. Sixteen survivors, including her captain, were rescued.

On May 17 the Admiralty described another success, the destruction of two more U-boats in the North Atlantic by frigates of the First Escort Group under the command of Commander C. Gwinner in H.M.S. *Affleck*. The other vessels of the Group mentioned were H.M. frigates *Gore*, *Gould* and *Garlies*. The *Gould* was sunk in the course of the two actions. Both U-boats were driven to the surface by depth charges and then shot to pieces, although the second was finally destroyed by depth charges. Seventeen survivors were picked up, only one from the second U-boat.

Another success was recorded by the Admiralty on June 1. This was the work of a Canadian escort group commanded by Commander P. W. Burnett in the frigate *St. Catherines*.

The official report said that after the first contact with the enemy had been made by the destroyer H.M.C.S. *Gatineau* (Lieut.-Commander H. V. Groos), she and other ships forced the enemy to the surface with depth-charges and made so many hits on the U-boat that her crew could not man their guns. The submarine was finally sunk by H.M. destroyer *Icarus* (Lieut.-Commander R. Dyer). In spite of bad weather a number of survivors were picked up. Other ships engaged in this operation were the destroyer H.M.C.S. *Chaudiere*, the Canadian corvettes *Chilliwack* and *Fennel*, and H.M.S. *Kenilworth Castle*. Yet another U-boat was sunk by depth-charges and gunfire in an action involving two Canadian warships—

the destroyer *St. Laurent* and the frigate *Swansea*—and the British destroyer *Forester*. The captain of the U-boat was killed and a number of her complement were made prisoners.¹

On June 9 the following joint statement was issued on the authority of President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill :

During May our shipping losses have been by far the lowest for any month of the war, and they have in fact been a fraction of the losses inflicted on enemy shipping by our warships and aircraft, although their merchant shipping is petty compared with that of the Allies.

There has been a lull in the operations of the U-boats, which perhaps indicates preparations for a renewed offensive. The change which has come over the scene is illustrated by the fact that in spite of the few U-boats at sea, several are now sent to the bottom for each merchant ship sunk, whereas formerly each U-boat accounted for a considerable number of merchant ships before being destroyed. This is to be ascribed to the relentless attacks of our Anglo-American-Canadian and other anti-U-boat forces, including the scientists who support them in a brilliant manner.

American escort vessels and aircraft also made an end of several U-boats in the Atlantic during the quarter. One was sunk by a Wellington bomber off the Azores. Her captain, who attempted to commit suicide but did not wound himself fatally, and several of the U-boat's crew were picked up by American warships which had arrived.

On July 9 two joint statements were issued regarding U-boat activity. One dealt with the failure of these craft to hinder Allied landing operations in Normandy and will be given in the third section of this chapter. The monthly statement covering U-boat warfare in June said :

Hitler's submarine fleet failed on all counts in June, 1944. Not only were the U-boats unable to halt the United Nations' invasion of the Continent, but their efforts to prevent the necessary supplying of our constantly growing Allied Army in Europe were made completely ineffective. The U-boats apparently concentrated to the west of the invasion during the month, relatively few of them being disposed over the Atlantic. Their sinking of United Nations merchant vessels reached almost the lowest figure of the entire war. For every United Nations merchant vessel sunk by German submarines, several times as many U-boats were sent to the bottom.

Enemy aircraft co-operated with the U-boats in the Atlantic at times and there were several occasions when our aircraft of Coastal Command operating independently scored important successes over these pests. On April 25

¹ This action was announced by the Canadian Minister for Naval Services on June 5.

the Air Ministry News Service told the story of attacks on U-boats by Coastal Command aircraft fitted with Leigh Light apparatus which vastly improved their crews' powers of observation at night. Two U-boats were certainly destroyed and others damaged in this encounter.

Allied losses in the Atlantic included the Canadian frigate *Valleyfield*, torpedoed and sunk while on escort duty. Announcing her loss on May 15 the Canadian Navy Minister said that of her complement 38, including two officers, had been rescued, five had been killed and 121, including her commander, Lieut.-Commander D. T. English, were missing. The American escort carrier *Block Island* was sunk by enemy action in the Atlantic in May.

The disablement of the *Tirpitz* had removed one danger to our Arctic convoys to Russia, but German aircraft and U-boats operating from Norwegian bases had still to be kept at a distance and whenever possible attacked. On May 19 the Admiralty announced the destruction in the Arctic Ocean of two U-boats at least by British warships and aircraft escorting an important convoy to and from Russia. The operation was carried out under the command of Vice-Admiral J. G. Glennie flying his flag in the cruiser *Black Prince*. Naval aircraft flown from the escort carrier H.M.S. *Chaser* (Captain H. V. McClintock) played an important part in the attacks on the U-boats. Four destroyers, the *Onslaught*, *Oribi*, *Boadicea* and *Mahratta*, were mentioned, and it was stated that the *Mahratta* had been sunk by a torpedo in this operation.¹ Prisoners were taken from two U-boats.

After the attack on the *Tirpitz* several strokes were aimed with success at hostile convoys off the Norwegian coast. On April 27 the Admiralty issued the following announcement :

"Naval carrier-borne aircraft carried out an attack on Wednesday morning [April 26] on a German convoy off Bodø, in northern Norway. A preliminary report indicates that four ships of the enemy convoy and one escort vessel were hit. . . ." A later report stated that the convoy, which was composed of four medium-sized supply ships accompanied by five escort craft, was southward bound when attacked. Three of the supply ships were left on fire, and the largest of them had run aground. Other naval aircraft penetrated to Bodø harbour and bombed and set on fire a large supply ship.

¹ cf. *The Eighteenth Quarter*, Chapter IV, Section 1.

British submarines were also engaged in these waters and had successes. On April 29 the Admiralty announced:

"During recent patrols in northern waters H.M. submarines sank a tanker of medium size and so severely damaged a large tanker and a large supply ship that they probably sank." The medium-sized tanker, the announcement said, was torpedoed off Statlandet, and sank after blowing up. The large supply ship was torpedoed in the approaches to the Skagerrak. In addition to these successes the large German catapult ship *Schwabenland* (8,000 tons) was torpedoed and had to be beached. Four large supply ships, one of medium size, and a large tanker were also damaged. The names of six officers commanding the submarines which made these successful attacks were given in the announcement. On the same occasion the Admiralty announced that the submarine H.M.S. *Syrtris* (Lieut. M. H. Jupp) was overdue and must be presumed lost.¹

Two attacks on enemy convoys off Kristiansund, Norway, were carried out by carrier-borne Barracuda aircraft early on May 6. A large, heavily laden supply ship was both bombed and torpedoed and broke in two. A medium-sized supply ship was also seen to sink and three other enemy ships were damaged. We lost two naval aircraft and two German machines were shot down. The ships escorting the aircraft-carriers of the Home Fleet in this action were commanded by Captain N. V. Grace in the cruiser *Berwick*. Another successful attack, again near Statlandet, a promontory about 115 miles south-west of Kristiansund, was announced by the Admiralty on June 2. The report ran thus :

"Carrier-borne aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm, continuing their offensive against enemy shipping off Norway, on Thursday night [June 1] attacked a strongly escorted enemy convoy of three ships in the vicinity of Statlandet. The force which carried out this operation was under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Ruthven Moore. . . . Hits with bombs were obtained on all three supply ships, and, in addition, four escorting anti-aircraft ships were damaged by gunfire. Two naval fighter aircraft are missing. . . ."

The announcement added that during the last two months naval aircraft had made six successful attacks in northern waters, beginning with that on the *Tirpitz*. They had also attacked shore installations including oil-tanks. Eleven hostile aircraft had been shot down while attempting to interfere with these operations. During the same period 17 naval aircraft were lost. The announcement then enumerated the aircraft-carriers and escort carriers engaged in these attacks. They were the aircraft-carriers *Victorious* and *Furious*, and the escort carriers *Searcher*, *Emperor*, *Pursuer*, *Fencer* and *Striker*, commanded respectively by Captains M. M. Denny, G. T. Philip, G. O. Davies, T. J. Hilken, H. R. Graham, W. W. Bentinck, and W. F. Carne.

On June 24 the Admiralty, after an interval of about

¹ Not necessarily in these seas.

two months, due to reasons of security, issued an account of engagements within the Arctic Circle which had resulted in the destruction of three U-boats and six enemy aircraft. The official report said that

these engagements had taken place during April in weather of extreme severity. The operations had been directed by Vice-Admiral F. H. Dalrymple-Hamilton, flying his flag in the cruiser H.M.S. *Diadem* (Captain E. G. Clifford). The naval aircraft operated from the escort carriers *Activity* (Captain G. Willoughby) and *Tracker* (Captain J. H. Huntley).

The first contact with the enemy was made by the Second Escort Group commanded by Captain F. J. Walker in the sloop H.M.S. *Starling* which, in company with H.M.S. *Magpie* (Lieut.-Commander R. S. Abram), destroyed a U-boat with depth-charges. Another U-boat was detected and destroyed by the destroyer *Keppel* (Commander J. J. Tyson). A third was sighted on the surface by a Swordfish aircraft flown from the carrier *Activity*. The U-boat engaged the Swordfish with gunfire, but was eventually sunk by supporting aircraft flown from the *Tracker*. The valuable convoy which was the U-boats' quarry reached its destination without loss or damage. The only loss suffered by the escort was a Wildcat aircraft which was shot down into the sea by gunfire from a U-boat. The pilot was rescued.

On June 25 an official Norwegian naval report stated that during recent patrols in northern waters H.N.M.¹ submarine *Ula* had certainly sunk a supply ship of 2,000 tons, probably sunk another ship of 2,500 tons, and damaged a large ship of 8,000 tons. The *Ula* was heavily counter-attacked for over an hour, but she escaped undamaged, although more than 100 depth-charges were dropped.

The Russians were also active in Arctic waters. On May 15 the Soviet High Command reported that Russian aircraft had sighted and attacked a convoy of 16 transports and 25 escort vessels off Kirkenes, in Arctic Norway, on the night of May 13-14. The Russians claimed that

three transports totalling 19,000 tons and three small craft had been sunk. Five other vessels suffered damage, one of which had to be beached. They reported another success on May 27. Aircraft of their Fleet Air Arm had attacked a strongly escorted convoy in the Barents Sea on the night of May 25, sinking two German transports totalling some 15,000 tons, a patrol vessel and a destroyer. Seven Russian and ten German aircraft were shot down.

It may be mentioned here that a statement was circulated by Mr. Churchill in answer to a Parliamentary question asked on May 10 which showed that, in addition to military and naval supplies and aircraft, British aid to Russia during the past two and a half years had included raw materials worth £39,115,000, foodstuffs valued at

¹ H.N.M.—His Norwegian Majesty's.

£7,223,000 and industrial plant and machinery worth £20,781,000. A list was appended giving details of the various classes of supplies dispatched to the U.S.S.R. from October 1, 1941, to March 31, 1944. Among these may be mentioned :

Tanks, 5,031, of which 1,223 were Canadian built ; vehicles including ambulances, 4,020 ; 636 two-pounder anti-tank guns with 2,591,000 rounds of ammunition ; 96 six-pounder anti-tank guns with 409,000 rounds of ammunition ; 581 Besa tank guns with over 51,000,000 rounds ; more than 30,000 miles of telephone cable ; nine minesweeping trawlers ; 102 Asdic detectors ; 50 Vickers 130-mm. guns ; 603 A.A. machine-guns, and 6,778 aircraft. Among these last were 2,672 from the U.S.A. sent on American lend-lease to Russia as part of the British commitment, in exchange for a supply of British aircraft to U.S. forces in Europe.

Among the other supplies shipped were 32,000 tons of aluminium, of which 30,000 tons were from Canada ; 27,000 tons of Canadian and 10,000 tons of British copper ; 28,050 tons of tin from Malaya and the United Kingdom ; over 81,000 tons of rubber from the Far East and Ceylon ; nearly 30,000 tons of Australian and New Zealand wool ; machine tools to the value of £8,218,000, and over £12,000,000 of industrial plant and machinery.

It was fortunate that the reticence so long observed by the Admiralty on the subject of the Arctic convoys was at last broken by the Prime Minister. Its purpose was obscure for the enemy was at all times able to follow Allied shipping movements in the Arctic by air reconnaissance. Its only result, in the words of the Naval Correspondent of *The Times* (*loc. cit.* May 11) "was to keep British and Russian publics in ignorance of what the Western Allies were doing for Russia and thus to cause some not unnatural dissatisfaction on both sides."

There were many encounters between Allied and German light craft in the narrow seas during the quarter before the invasion of France, so many that they can be only briefly enumerated here. There were three engagements early on April 24. The Admiralty reported that the first two were fought off the Cherbourg Peninsula against two groups of E-boats.

In the first of these the enemy were driven off and a number of hits were registered. In the second we lost an M.T.B. sunk by a concentration of hostile fire. Our remaining ships suffered few casualties. On the same morning a strong force of E-boats attempting to intercept a convoy in the Channel was driven off in a number of actions in which a force of M.T.B.s commanded by Lieut. A. J. Rickards, the destroyer *Campbell* (Commander E. C. Coats) and the frigate *Halsted* (Commander J. R. Westmacott) and finally Canadian Albacores of Coastal Command took part.

Early on April 26 British and Canadian warships, under the command of Captain D. M. Lees in the cruiser *Black Prince*, encountered three or four German destroyers of the Elbing class near the Île de Bas off the north-west coast of France. The enemy endeavoured to escape under cover of a smoke screen. Torpedoes fired by the enemy forced the *Black Prince* to turn away, but two Canadian destroyers of the tribal class, the *Haida* and *Athabaskan*, intercepted and engaged a German destroyer which had been damaged earlier in the combat. They were joined by the Canadian destroyer *Huron* and the British *Ashanti*, and the German sank after receiving many hits. Little damage and only minor casualties were suffered by our ships. The other German destroyers escaped into harbour.

Early on April 29 the *Haida* (Commander H. G. de Wolf) and the *Athabaskan* (Lieut.-Commander J. H. Stubbs) encountered two destroyers of the Elbing class off Ushant. A sharp action followed. One German ship was driven ashore in flames, but the *Athabaskan* was torpedoed and sank. Six of her officers and 79 of her crew were rescued by the Germans. Thirty of these were wounded. Forty men were picked up by H.M.C.S. *Haida* and eight were afterwards picked up by the *Haida's* motor-boat. The wrecked German destroyer, after being further damaged by bomb-carrying Typhoon aircraft, was completely destroyed early on May 8 by light coastal craft commanded by Lieut.-Commander T. N. Cartwright.

On May 4 the Admiralty announced the repulse of a force of E-boats approaching the English coast by the French destroyer *La Combattante* (originally the Hunt class destroyer *Haldon*) and the frigate H.M.S. *Rowley* (Lieut.-Commander F. J. Jones). The enemy were pursued to within a few miles of Cape Barfleur and one was sunk by the French ship. Twelve survivors were made prisoners. The Allied ships suffered neither loss nor damage. Early on May 6 light coastal forces manned by the French Navy attacked a strongly escorted enemy convoy in the Channel and struck a supply ship and trawler with torpedoes. Both are believed to have been sunk. The French force sustained no casualties and only superficial damage. On May 11 light coastal forces of the Royal Navy attacked a strong force of German patrol vessels, destroyed an armed trawler and damaged two others, returning to harbour with "minor casualties and superficial damage." On May 12 light coastal forces led by Lieutenant J. D. Dixon attacked a small convoy off the French coast and left two ships on fire and two damaged. Our losses were light. Next day *La Combattante* encountered a strong force of E-boats some 25 miles south of the Isle of Wight before dawn, sank one, taking prisoners, and drove the rest away without loss to her crew or damage. On May 20 light coastal ships with French crews sank an enemy trawler off the Channel Islands. Subsequent operations in the narrow seas will be recorded in the final section of this chapter.

2 : AIR WAR IN THE WEST

A. THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE

The Allied attack on German and German-controlled war industry was maintained at a high pitch during April and May, and it was combined with a campaign reaching new levels of violence on the enemy's communications

and airfields in Western Europe. The Allies had learnt that to inflict really serious damage on the enemy's railway system attacks must be made and repeated in strength, rolling stock and installations destroyed, and the marshalling yards so often bombarded from the air that the repairs could not keep pace with the destruction. Only thus could the German communications be crippled by the time the invasion of the Continent had begun. Other important objectives were the German airfields in France and the Low Countries. It was the object of the Allies to inflict the maximum possible loss and damage on the *Luftwaffe* in order to weaken its power of interference when "The Day" came. To this end heavy attacks were directed by day and night on aircraft factories from southern France to Hungary and on almost every German airfield within range of the Allied bombers. In these attacks the Allies at times suffered heavily, but they inflicted even greater losses on many occasions on German aircraft which attacked them, and they also claimed to have destroyed many on the ground. The development of the long-range fighter greatly increased the effectiveness of the attacks made by the great American bombers, Liberators and Flying Fortresses, in daylight. Not that these "battleships of the air" were incapable of fighting off and destroying the fighters which attacked them. They could and sometimes did dispense with fighter aid and suffered no inordinate loss. But whenever the targets were within fighter range it was found that the presence of fighter escorts took much of the edge off German fighter interference. Not many pilots could concentrate their entire attention and will on the attack on the heavy bombers—in itself a dangerous adventure enough—when they were themselves liable to be pounced upon and shot down by Thunderbolts or Lightnings. To take first the night attacks which were made by the heavy bombers of the R.A.F., the first raid of consequence in April was launched against three aircraft factories in Toulouse which were badly damaged on April 5. On April 9 the R.A.F. attacked Mannheim and other places in west Germany, Lille and rail centres near Paris, where



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AIR CHIEF MARSHAL
SIR TRAFFORD LEIGH-MALLORY, K.C.B., D.S.O.

they did great damage (11).¹ Further attacks by night were made in April. Here is a list of the most important :

April 10 : attacks on Ghent, Tours, Tergnier, Laon and other railway targets, on St. Cyr radio-location depot and airfields in France and the Low Countries by some 900 heavy bombers (22). April 11 : railway targets at Aachen, Hanover and other places in west Germany (9. 2L). April 12 : Osnabruck and other German targets (2). April 18 : French railways attacked by fully 1,000 heavy bombers which dropped over 4,000 tons of bombs (14). April 20 : railway centres in Germany, France and the Low Countries attacked by over 1,100 bombers which dropped 4,500 tons of bombs, losing only 16 machines. April 22 : Düsseldorf, Brunswick and Mannheim with other targets attacked by over 1,000 bombers (42).

On April 24 the R.A.F. raided Karlsruhe, Munich and other places in strength (29). The Lancasters tricked the defence, entering Italy over the French Alps and nearing Milan, before turning north to Munich, a round flight of nearly 2,000 miles. Two days later over 1,000 aircraft attacked Essen (29). During the last days of April British heavy bombers attacked Friedrichshafen and railways in the Low Countries in force (36. 5L). On April 29 they raided St. Madard-en-Jalles explosive factory causing terrific explosions near Bordeaux, and aircraft plant at Clermont-Ferrand without loss. On April 30 the French railways suffered and a great ammunition dump was destroyed.

The first outstanding attack on Germany by day was directed against the Steyr ball-bearing factory on April 2. The *Luftwaffe* came up in strength but suffered extremely heavy losses from the batteries of the powerful force of American heavy bombers and the fire of their attendant fighters. The Americans claimed to have shot down 115 German machines. On April 5 objectives in the Berlin and Munich areas were raided. Five German machines were shot down in combat and many more were believed to have been damaged on the ground. Next came on April 8 a multiple attack on aircraft factories at Brunswick, five airfields in north-western Germany and military and industrial targets near Frankfurt (34b., 24f.) in which over 1,000 American machines were engaged. Again the *Luftwaffe* attacked in great numbers and again its attacking squadrons were severely handled, losing, according to the Americans, 148 machines shot down. Next day the Americans again attacked in great strength. Their targets were the aircraft works at Poznan (Posen) and military and industrial installations at Gdynia, Warnemunde and Marienburg. They lost 31 bombers, ten of which came down in neutral Sweden, and eight fighters. The *Luftwaffe* lost 63 shot down and about 30 machines were said to have been damaged on the ground.

On April 10 came a widespread attack on railway yards and traffic, power stations and airfields in France and Belgium. The points where the attack was most heavily concentrated appear to have been Orleans, Bourges, Namur, Coxyde, and Hasselt. The "secret weapon" platforms in the Pas de Calais were also bombed in the course of these operations,

¹ Figures in brackets represent Allied aircraft missing after the engagements recorded, though they were not all necessarily shot down in these operations. When two sets of figures are given the letter L following a second number refers to the losses of the *Luftwaffe*. Thus (12. 7L) means that 12 Allied aircraft failed to return and that seven German machines were destroyed in the operation or during the night of the operation. (7b. 3f.) means that the Allies lost seven bombers and three fighters.

which were conducted by some 1,600 machines (5b. 4f.). A dozen German fighters were reported destroyed. April 11 saw a heavy attack on aircraft plants, airfields and military factories at Bernberg, Rostock, Oschersleben and Arnimswalde and on railway targets at Charleroi and Chievres (65b. 19f.). The Americans claimed 126 fighters destroyed in air combats and many hit on the airfields. Nine of their machines came down in Sweden.

On April 12 German aircraft factories at Wiener Neustadt and various military targets in west Germany and Holland, with airfields at Coxyde and Courtrai, were raided as were French railway targets (23. 43L). On April 13 a powerful force of U.S. bombers attacked the Messerschmitt works near Augsburg, the aircraft factory at Oberpfaffenhofen, the Schweinfurt ball-bearing factory which the Germans had been repairing since the raid of August 17, 1943, and the airfields at Lechfeld (36b. 8f. 76L). As usual when ball-bearing plants or airfields were attacked, the *Luftwaffe* made an energetic if costly defence. The Namur railway yards and railway and coastal targets as well as the Chievres airfield were subjected to a succession of raids throughout the day which cost the attackers only two machines. On April 14 and 15 airfields in northern France, ten airfields in western Germany, with canal and railway installations in that region and Kastrup airfield near Copenhagen were raided (30).¹

On April 18 the Americans were out in great strength. Berlin, Oranienburg and Rathenow aircraft factories, airfields in Germany and in the Pas de Calais region with Charleroi and other railway junctions were bombed and strafed by a force of nearly 2,000 bombers and escorting fighters (27. 13L). A force of at least equal strength raided Kassel, Paderborn and other airfields and aircraft factories and the Koblenz railway yards on April 19 (7. 21L). On April 20 a "very large force" of bombers with powerful fighter support attacked Poix airfield and other targets in northern France (9. 4L). The next large-scale operation was undertaken on April 22 when Hamm railway yards and Koblenz were raided in strength, while 250 medium bombers made widespread attacks on railways and airfields in Belgium and northern France (31. 57L). Seven airfields as well as railway yards in northern France and Namur railway yard in Belgium were attacked in a long series of raids on April 23, when some heavy bombers struck Wiener Neustadt aircraft factory and other targets in Austria.

On April 24 a force of some 1,750 U.S. heavy bombers and escorting machines attacked Friedrichshafen and airfields in the Munich region. The *Luftwaffe* counter-attacked with vigour and lost 103 machines. Allied losses were 38 bombers and 17 fighters. Ten of the bombers came down in Switzerland. Targets in France and Belgium were raided on the same day. The daylight raids were growing in strength and frequency in spite of losses. On April 25 French railways and the Nancy, Metz and Dijon aerodromes, on April 26 airfields in northern France and railway targets in western Germany, France and Belgium, and on April 27 a great number of French railway yards and junctions and the Nancy and Toul aerodromes were bombed (15). Raids on airfields and railway targets in France were made during the last three days of April, and on April 29 750 Fortresses and escorting fighters attacked Berlin, paying especial attention to railway yards and rolling stock and to the important airfields around the city (63b. 14f. 88L).

An important joint statement was issued on April 23 by the Air Ministry and the U.S. Strategic Air Force.

¹ The Americans claimed to have destroyed 20 aircraft on the French airfields on April 14 and others in Germany next day.

It said that the first priority for the Eighth U.S.A.A.F. was the destruction of the industry which maintained the *Luftwaffe*. After the Battle of Britain the German aircraft industry had set out to quadruple its monthly output of single-engined fighter machines by April, 1944.

Between August, 1942, and July, 1943, the *Luftwaffe* in the West had nearly doubled its fighter strength, and the German output of aircraft had more than doubled. Indeed, on July 31, 1943, German war industry had gone quite half-way to the completion of the plan, but this was its peak point. The increasing power and extent of the Allied air attacks and the increasing dislocation of German transport told more and more every succeeding month. During the first quarter of 1944 the German fighter force on all fronts lost more machines than could be turned out and put into service during that period. The March output was below that of August, 1942. That of April would prove to have been lower still. The fighter resources of the *Luftwaffe* were sinking fast. There was only a trickle of reserve machines between the factories and the operational units. The front-line squadrons were tiring; their value was becoming uncertain, and in consequence of the destruction of factories the flow of machines to replace those destroyed or otherwise written off had fallen "far below the danger mark."

Night operations opened in May with an extensive attack (May 1-2) on a great number of targets in France, railways, airfields, factories manufacturing aircraft, chemicals, explosives, etc., and on an important German target, the great chemical works at Ludwigshafen (10).

On May 3 Ludwigshafen was again the target as were several objectives in France, notably the tank park and depot at Mailly on which 1,500 tons of bombs were dropped. The night cost the R.A.F. 49 machines. On May 6 Ludwigshafen had its third visit in the week and Rennes airfield and other objectives in France were bombed. On May 7-8 it was the turn of Leverkusen in the Reich and more French targets were attacked, including "targets on the coast of Normandy"—a presage of the coming attack. These two nights cost the R.A.F. 14 machines.

The next fortnight saw a wide extension of night attacks. These were mostly directed against railways and airfields in France, and the enemy's coast defences on the Channel shore, and great numbers of aircraft took part in them. On the night of May 7-8 no less than eight forces were out, one over Leverkusen north of Cologne, six over various objectives in France and one mining enemy waters. The number was surpassed on the night of May 9-10 when ball-bearing plant at Annecy in Savoy, Berlin, and a great number of objectives on the French Channel coast were bombed and mines were laid at sea by 11 different formations. The attacks were directed against targets in France and the Low Countries and on Ludwigshafen on May 11 (16); against French and Belgian rail centres on May 13 (14); against Cologne and French and Belgian targets on May 14 (no loss); on Ludwigshafen and targets in north-western Germany and a French airfield on May 15 (4). Then, after a pause attributable to unfavourable weather, a force of between 750 and 1,000 British heavy bombers divided into several operational units attacked railways and airfields in northern and north-western France and gave Cologne another bombing (7). On May 21 Duisburg, on which 2,000 tons of bombs were dropped, and Hanover were raided (30).

During the last third of May there were four nights on which large-scale operations were carried out. On May 22 over 1,000 Halifaxes and other British heavies attacked Dortmund and Brunswick and railway targets in France and Belgium (35). Aachen railway yards and targets in Berlin and in enemy-occupied territory were attacked on May 24-25 (28). On May 27 over 1,000 R.A.F. bombers attacked Aachen, Düsseldorf and railway targets at Nantes as well as an important German depot east of Antwerp on which 1,200 tons of bombs were dropped (27). On May 31 military objectives and railway junctions, etc., in France were the chief targets (8). As in April Mosquitoes made a number of harassing raids including Berlin, Ludwigshafen and targets in Denmark in their sphere of operations, and mines were laid in great numbers in enemy waters.

During May the attack by day was "stepped up" to heights which would have seemed incredible even in 1942 when the R.A.F. made its first "1,000 bomber raids" on Cologne, Essen and Bremen.¹ On several occasions more than 3,000 aircraft, less often as many as 4,000 were engaged. While communications, airfields, coastal batteries and the installations connected by the Allied Intelligence with the enemy's secret weapon were the chief targets of these heavy attacks, the bombing of German synthetic oil plants on May 12 and 13 was a foretaste of what the enemy was to experience later, a blow at the source of his power to fight a mechanized war at all.

May Day was celebrated by all-day attacks ranging from the Pas de Calais to Namur, in which 3,300 Allied aircraft were engaged. All but seven returned. From May 2 to May 6 a great number of military objectives were raided by strong forces and 27 enemy aircraft were shot down. Allied losses were much lighter. Airfields were attacked in northern and central France, Belgium and Holland, as were many railway junctions and marshalling yards. On May 7 Berlin and the Münster-Osnabrück region were raided in strength (13), Belgian railway targets were attacked all day as were junctions, stations and bridges in France. Next day came attacks on Berlin and Brunswick by powerful forces (36b, 13f.). The *Luftwaffe* counter-attacked in strength and lost 119 fighters. On the same day the enemy's installations for his secret weapon in the Pas de Calais and also in the Cherbourg area were bombed, as were the Brussels railway yards and other French and Belgian military targets, including the important bridges at Rouen, Hirson and Mezières (10). Some 4,000 aircraft took part in operations against airfields and important railway centres in France and the Low Countries on May 9 (21, 5L). These and similar targets were bombed on May 10 (7, 9L), and on May 11 the Allies attacked no less than 11 railway centres, including Belfort, Mulhouse, Saarbrücken, Konz and Ehrang. Marauders and Havocs made three major attacks for the first time on the same day.

Mention must be made here of a most remarkable feat

¹ *q.v.* *The Eleventh Quarter*, pp. 39-42.

performed by a group of six Mosquito bombers of the Second Tactical Air Force. The Dutch Government had learned that a number of important documents "of paramount value to the German authorities" were stored in a house in the Scheveningsche Weg in The Hague. They informed the R.A.F. On May 3 the group led by Wing-Commander R. N. Bateson gave an astonishing example of "pin-point bombing," discovering, attacking and destroying the house without inflicting serious damage to the houses on either side of it.

On May 12 about 1,000 U.S. heavies attacked synthetic oil plants at Merseburg, Bohlen and Brux (near Prague) and other places. Liege, Brussels and Hasselt railway yards and five airfields in France were the targets of medium bombers. The day cost the Allies 52 machines, against 150 German aircraft shot down in attempts to defend the oil plants and airfields. About 750 U.S. bombers were engaged against the oil plants and the raid on Brux represented the deepest penetration of the Continent until then by American bombers based on Great Britain. The other oil plants were near Leipzig.

Next day the synthetic oil plant at Pölit, aircraft plant at Tutow, the Bremen airfield, and the Osnabrück railway yards were among the targets in the Reich, while airfields and communications in many parts of France and Belgium were bombed (22. 63L). On May 14 northern French railways and shipping off the Dutch coast where two cargo vessels were torpedoed, on May 15 the Pas de Calais region and Creil and other airfields and Courtrai were attacked (3. 6L for two days). On May 16 "targets near Stettin" were attacked (1. 5L); and on May 17 seven German aircraft were brought down for the loss of two Allied machines in sweeps over Denmark. On May 19 came a heavy attack by over 500 U.S. heavy bombers with escorts on Brunswick and Berlin in which the raiders lost the rather high number of 45 machines, but claimed the destruction of 125 fighters of the *Luftwaffe*.

Next day came an immense attack on 12 rail centres and nine airfields extending from Brest to east of Berlin. Not far short of 5,000 aircraft were engaged in these far-flung raids in which the Allies lost 14 machines and shot down two. The Eighth U.S.A.A.F. (part of the Strategic Air Force), the Second Tactical Air Force and the Air Defence of Great Britain joined forces in this attack. On May 21 the Pas de Calais targets and hostile communications from Brest to Coblenz were attacked by three powerful forces, largely composed of fighters, in a series of sweeps. One force of 500 Thunderbolts claimed to have wrecked 70 locomotives in the day. The Allies lost 55 machines and they claimed to have shot down 20 and to have damaged many more on the ground.

After another day's activity on May 22, when Kiel, the Pas de Calais targets, several airfields and a number of railway yards and bridges in Belgium were the objectives (13. 22L), the Allies sent out the largest force of fighters yet employed in a single operation to escort over 1,000 U.S. "heavies" engaged against aerodromes, railways and other military objectives in France and western Germany. On May 24 they mounted a powerful attack on German targets, including Berlin, in which 77 enemy aircraft were reported destroyed for a loss of 45 machines. On May 25

came heavy attacks on German communications, mainly in France, in which several troop trains were hit and 36 locomotives were disabled (16. 32L). On May 27 over 3,000 aircraft dropped more than 3,000 tons of bombs on Ludwigshafen, Mannheim, Karlsruhe, Saarbrücken, Strasbourg and various other airfields and railway yards in Germany and France (51. 49L).¹ On May 28 a great force of U.S. heavy bombers, escorted or assisted by nearly 2,000 fighters, attacked targets near Cologne and synthetic oil plants at Merseburg, Zeitz, Lutzkendorf and Königsborn (47. 93L). On May 29 airfields in the Reich and western Poland and synthetic oil factories in Saxony and Posen were heavily bombed (46. 100L). On May 30 the Allies made widespread attacks on airfields, aircraft factories, railways and bridges in France and western Germany (21. 64L).

During May the Ninth Allied Air Force had carried out over 30,000 individual operations and dropped not far short of 15,000 tons of bombs. The U.S. Strategic Air Force based on Great Britain and Italy had dropped more than four times that weight on French, German and Balkan targets. Bomber Command R.A.F. had dropped over 37,000 tons of bombs and made more than 44,000 sorties. In April, as figures published on May 2 had shown, over 81,000 tons of H.E. and incendiary bombs had been dropped on European targets. The increase in May had been nearly 40 per cent.

During the first five days of June the Allied air forces struck still heavier blows at airfields and communications (especially bridges) all over northern and central France and paid especial attention to the bridges over the Seine. The special military targets in the Pas de Calais were also attacked in strength. In spite of weather conditions being only moderately favourable the bombing was almost continuous and events proved that it had been most effective. During these days the enemy made little or no attempt to meet the raids with his fighters and the losses of the Allied squadrons were remarkably light. The damage which they did to the German communications and also to the enemy's coastal batteries, which were heavily and repeatedly attacked often by the heaviest British and American bombers during the last days of May and the opening days of June, had deprived the German High Command in France of the power to build up strength more rapidly by land than the Allies could do by sea, and had greatly diminished the defensive strength of the "Atlantic Wall."

More than two months after the invasion Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, A.O.C.-in-C., Allied Expeditionary Air Force, in the course of an account of the part which the Allied air forces had played and were playing in the invasion of Europe summarized the work of preparation by air attack for the invasion.

¹ This figure may include losses suffered or inflicted by Allied bombers operating against southern France from Italian bases.

Air planning, he said, had begun early in 1943 and had been developed systematically ever since both by the Strategic and Tactical Allied Air Forces.

The pre-invasion attack by air on the enemy had three main objectives. The first was to obtain and hold air superiority over the battle area, and this was fully achieved. The second was to cripple the enemy's productive capacity and destroy his air force in being. The third was to wreck his system of communications, so that he could not build up strength more rapidly by land than we could build up ours by sea. It was also imperative to knock out his radiolocation system so that our landings could achieve surprise.

There were two ways of disrupting German communications. One was a short-term policy of smashing bridges and blocking railway lines, but this depended too much on favourable flying weather and the damage done could be relatively quickly repaired as a rule. Once the land battle started we should have to devote a tremendous effort to keeping these communications cut and we should have little strength in hand for the many other tasks imposed by the land battle. The other policy was the long-term one of disorganizing the enemy's entire railway system. Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory said that he had consulted our railway experts and had decided that the proper policy was to aim at the railway organization, the repair sheds, the signalling system and the marshalling yards. In view of the frequent spells of bad flying weather which had followed "D-day," it was fortunate that we had adopted this policy, for the enemy had been favoured with many days on which he could have made progress with normal repairs. Once the battle had started we could take up the short-term policy of destroying bridges and tracks and attacking movements of troops whenever they were sighted.

We had set out to attack 80 major railway centres and by June 6 (D-day) we had destroyed 51 and severely damaged 25 more. This had required 22,000 sorties and 66,000 tons of bombs. In order to isolate the enemy the Allied air forces had wrecked the Seine bridges before the landing.

During the six weeks before D-day, when our ports were full of shipping, the enemy had attempted 129 reconnaissance flights, but only on 11 occasions were his aircraft able to penetrate our defensive fighter screen, with the result that he obtained a very inadequate picture of our preparations. On the other hand, the Allied air forces had made 5,000 photographic reconnaissance sorties during this period. By D-day most of the 21 chief battery positions on the invasion coast had been knocked out, and by the time our ships had set out almost the whole of the enemy's radiolocation network was out of action. Thus the Germans' first real intimation that the invasion had started and where it was being made was the landing of our airborne troops.

From the small hours of June 6 when the invasion of Normandy began, the tactical operations of the Allied air arm were, so to speak, fused with those of the invading armies and the fleet which escorted and supported them. They will be described in the third section of this chapter. It remains to chronicle the long-range or strategic air attacks on Germany during the last 24 days of June.

Eight major operations were carried out during this period and a high proportion of them had oil plants among their objectives.

To take night operations first, over 1,000 four-engined bombers of the R.A.F. raided the synthetic oil factory at Gelsenkirchen, bombed targets near Cologne and dropped mines in enemy waters on June 12 (17). On the night of June 16 a "very strong force" of aircraft of Bomber Command attacked the synthetic oil centre at Sterkrade in the Ruhr, and made a diversionary raid on Berlin (33). Mosquitoes bombed objectives in Berlin and western Germany on the following night. After an interval during which the R.A.F. heavies were engaged in operations over France, a strong force of Lancasters attacked industrial objectives in the Ruhr and Rhineland on the night of June 21, while Mosquitoes harassed Berlin (46).

By day the Americans made several powerful attacks on the Reich. On June 14 part of a force of over 1,500 heavy bombers which were attacking airfields and other targets in France and Belgium crossed the German border to bomb the oil refinery at Emmerich. On June 18 over 1,300 Flying Fortresses and Liberators struck oil plants in Hamburg and other targets in north-west Germany. They were escorted by medium forces of Lightnings, Thunderbolts and Mustangs, but they encountered no fighter opposition, although the *flak* was intense. Eleven bombers were lost. On June 20 more than 1,500 U.S. heavy bombers went out from England, and while some attacked the launching platforms for flying bombs near the French coast, a great number attacked German targets. These included 12 synthetic oil plants at Hamburg, Magdeburg, Ostermoor and Pölit, an ordnance tank depot at Königsborn and an aircraft repair factory at Sallersleben. The Liberators attacking Pölit were heavily attacked for the greater part of their way from the coast to their objective and back again. Fighters escorting the bombers reported the destruction of 41 German fighters in combat and the bombers claimed another 12. "Forty-seven of our bombers and seven of our fighters did not return."

On June 21 the Berlin region was raided by more than 1,000 U.S. heavies escorted by over 1,200 fighters, including Thunderbolts which had now been given sufficient range to do a 1,200 mile round journey (43b. 7f. 50L). The War Office and the Gestapo Headquarters were much damaged as were three railway stations, five marshalling yards and over 30 factories in the suburbs and at Basdorf, near Berlin. On June 29 over 750 American heavy bombers attacked aircraft factories at Leipzig, Oschersleben, and other places, synthetic oil plants at Bohlen, near Leipzig, and three German airfields with marshalling yards and other targets in central Germany (15b. 2f. 36L).¹

Mention has been made in the first section of the preceding chapter of the development of "shuttle bombing" from British and Italian, and from Russian and Italian bases. This was further extended in June when U.S. bombers based on British airfields bombed targets in Germany and then went on to the U.S. bases established in Russia. On June 21 Flying Fortresses of the Eighth U.S.A.A.F. which had taken part in the raid on Berlin

¹ The Americans claimed 16 aircraft destroyed on the ground.

went on to their airfields in Russia. They were accompanied all the way—a distance of about 1,570 miles—by Mustang fighters. This was almost certainly the longest flight in which escort fighters had taken part. After bombing the synthetic oil plant at Drohobycz in Poland, 45 miles from Lvov, on June 27, the Fortresses made their return journey to Italy.

The figures for aircraft shot down in combat or by A.A. fire over Western and North-Western Europe during the period under review are not complete since, for obvious reasons, the Allied High Command did not publish losses incurred after the opening of the campaign in Normandy and the losses suffered or inflicted by the 9th U.S.A.A.F. were not published. Here are those available :

| <i>Over and Around Britain</i> | | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------|---------------|-------------------|
| | <i>German</i> | <i>R.A.F.</i> | <i>U.S.A.A.F.</i> |
| April .. | 45 | 1 | — |
| May .. | 30 | — | — |
| June .. | 7 | — | — |
| | — | — | — |
| Total .. | 82 | 1 | nil |
| | — | — | — |

Over Western and North-Western Europe.

| <i>German</i> | | | | |
|---------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| | <i>By</i> | <i>R.A.F.</i> | <i>U.S.A.A.F.</i> | <i>8th</i> |
| | <i>8th</i> | | | |
| | <i>By R.A.F.</i> | <i>U.S.A.A.F.</i> | | |
| April .. | 63 | 1,282 | 259 | 728 ¹ |
| May .. | 26 | 1,268 | 388 | 716 ² |
| June .. | 25 | 1 | 181 | 11 |
| | — | — | — | — |
| Total .. | 114 | 2,551 | 828 | 1,455 |
| | — | — | — | — |

B. THE FLYING BOMB

German activity over Great Britain was slight during April. A few casualties were caused in London and the

¹ Including 537 bombers,

² Including 481 bombers.

south-eastern counties, but only three attacks were more than very small-scale nuisance raids.

On the night of April 18-19 the enemy raided London and "incidents" were reported from several districts. At least 13 of the raiders were destroyed over southern England and one which crashed upon a house killed four people. There were many casualties in the hospital which was hit and five members of the staff perished. On April 23 the enemy made what appeared to be an armed reconnaissance rather than an attack on coastal areas in southern and south-western England. The enemy claimed to have attacked Bristol. Five of his machines were brought down, three by night-fighters. On the night of April 29-30 a small force made a sharp attack on "a south-western town," killing some people and injuring others. The Germans claimed that Plymouth had been their main target. They lost three machines. Casualties reported for April were :

| | <i>Men</i> | <i>Women</i> | <i>Children under 16</i> | <i>Total</i> |
|--|------------|--------------|--------------------------|--------------|
| Killed | 65 | 63 | 18 | 146 |
| Injured and detained in hospital | 133 | 77 | 16 | 226 |

On the nights of May 14 and 15 the enemy attacked several towns in southern and south-western England and did some damage, though the attack was not concentrated on any one centre. At least 20 raiders were shot down. Otherwise the enemy did little in May as the following casualty return shows :

| | <i>Men</i> | <i>Women</i> | <i>Children under 16</i> | <i>Total</i> |
|--|------------|--------------|--------------------------|--------------|
| Killed | 26 | 32 | 10 | 68 |
| Injured and detained in hospital | 36 | 38 | 1 | 75 |

After a few unimportant attacks during the first half of June the Germans turned to their secret weapon, V1 as they called it. This was a pilotless aeroplane carrying a large amount of high explosive, in fact a "flying bomb" which became its official designation in this country. It was first used on a small scale on June 13 when it did no particular damage. During the night of June 15-16 the first flying bombs fell at various points in the London area, where the strange noise made by its engine and the method of its use told Londoners that the enemy was employing a new contrivance. The first of these attacks on London caused damage and a fair number of casualties. For the rest of the month the enemy discharged a varying number of these missiles by day and night. The Government lost no time in telling the public what was happening. On June 16 the Home Secretary made a statement in Parliament. The first attack had been light, he said, but that of June 15-16 had been more serious. He continued :

"The enemy's preparations have not, of course, passed unnoticed and counter-measures have already been, and will continue to be applied with full vigour. It is, however, probable that the attacks will continue, and that subject to experience the usual siren warning will be given. . . .

Meanwhile, it is important not to give the enemy any information which would help him in directing his shooting by telling him where his missiles have landed. It may be difficult to distinguish these attacks from ordinary air raids, and therefore it has been decided that for the present information published about air raids in southern England—i.e. south of a line from the Wash to the Bristol Channel—will not give any indication where the raid has taken place beyond saying that it had occurred in southern England."

He went on to say that exaggerated importance should not be attached to this development and that the nation "should carry on with its normal business." People were urged not to expose themselves unnecessarily during daylight when the fire of A.A. guns would add to their danger, though their use might be liable to review with more experience.

On June 19 the Air Ministry issued all the information then available concerning this weapon. The statementsaid:

The range of the type now in use is about 150 miles, the speed in level flight is between 300 and 350 m.p.h., and the explosive power is equivalent to a 1,000 kilogramme German bomb—a bomb of about a ton. The machine itself has a wing span of only 16 feet; its fuselage is 21 feet 10 inches in length, with a maximum width of 2 feet 8½ inches; while the overall length of the missile is 25 feet 4½ inches. The explosive is carried in a "war-head" mounted in a thin casing in the front of the fuselage. The engine is petrol-driven, and the noise heard while the machine is in flight is due to intermittent explosions within the jet-propulsion unit.

Construction consists almost entirely of steel, the projectile is coloured with the usual *Luftwaffe* camouflage—dark green superimposed on light blue. It is not radio-controlled, but operated by an automatic pilot which is set on the desired course before take-off. This means that once the missile has been launched the enemy has no further control over it.

The flying bomb was launched from a ramp, the Air Ministry stated, probably with the aid of a rocket to assist the jet-propulsion mechanism when the missile took off.

It was disclosed that these attacks had been planned to take place many months before in order to divert the Allied air attack on German industry and communications, but prompt measures were taken to counter this threat. On August 17, 1943, the experimental station at Peenemünde on the Baltic coast was attacked by Bomber Command, R.A.F., and the experiments in this new weapon suffered a severe set-back. Factories and plants engaged in its production were also raided, notably the works at Friedrichshafen, where this and other special weapons were being produced, by the R.A.F. and by the U.S. 8th and 9th Air Forces. Meanwhile, reconnaissance photographs of northern France had shown the construction of discharge points for pilotless aircraft. They were carefully watched and it was realized that formidable attacks on England could be made from these installations, each of which consisted of a launching ramp and several small buildings. In December, 1943, the Allied air forces began a series of heavy bombing attacks on these points which were continued as weather and operational requirements permitted. Since the New Year thousands of tons had been dropped on them, and although the sites being small and scattered were difficult targets, great damage was done to them. When

the Germans eventually opened their attack by pilotless aircraft on England, it was, according to the Air Ministry, on less than a quarter of the scale originally planned.¹

It may be presumed that the first intention of the Germans had been to use these contrivances against the "invasion ports" in southern Britain where large quantities of war material had been assembled as well as against London. That they did not begin to use them until the invasion had begun was, no doubt, due to the damage inflicted on their launching ramps. That they were able to begin at all was perhaps the result of the inevitable and, indeed, necessary concentration of Allied striking power on attacks on hostile communications in France, on the Atlantic Wall itself, and on the provision of air support for the invading armies. By this time any chance of interfering seriously with the preparations at the ports had passed and the enemy concentrated his attack mainly on London in the hope that this unaimed bombardment might shake British morale, and in the expectation that the German public would be vastly encouraged by the news that "Hitler's first secret weapon" was at last in action, and by exaggerated tales of its success. The event proved the expectation to be well founded. For three days from the night of June 15-16 the flying bomb was given pride of place by the German Press which published surprising exaggerations of its effect. The Special Correspondent of *The Times* at Stockholm telegraphed (*loc. cit.* June 18) :

"Newspapers announced its first appearance with the boldest red headlines, and speakers to-day say the explosions from London were clearly heard on the French coast, while the ruddy sky indicates fires over the whole of the south of England which has been shaken as if by an earthquake. Most reports say that London and the south coast are shrouded in a pall of dense smoke preventing exact observation by German reconnaissance aeroplanes, but the best description is by Lieut. Franz Worschek, who flew over London during the night and saw London ablaze, incomparably worse than Berlin ever was. . . ." The German Press, it is true, warned the public against expecting that these "dynamite meteors" could decide the war, adding that they could not be used in Normandy as the effects of their explosions were such that they could not avoid harming the German defenders in so confined a space. But it maintained that the weapon was seriously influencing the invasion front, and one commentator had the

¹ For the attacks on Peenemünde see *The Sixteenth Quarter*, Chapter IV, pp. 137 and 140-141.

nerve to claim that the explosion of one such meteor was greater than that of a 1,000-bomber attack, while a report went round Berlin that the rations of the Allied forces in Normandy had been reduced by one-third since the reprisal campaign had begun.

These fantasies merely convinced the British public that the Germans must be sorely in need of any straw of comfort to which to cling if they could believe this sort of nonsense. The damage wrought by these bombs was great in built-up areas and although the loss of life did not average more than one person for every bomb discharged it was heavy enough to arouse bitter anger in London and the south-eastern areas most exposed to these attacks. Many persons were killed and wounded by flying glass; others were killed by blast; indeed, the blast effect of a ton of high explosive bursting virtually instantaneously on impact was as formidable as that of the land mines dropped by the enemy in the winter of 1940-41. Many people found these attacks more alarming than the earlier "blitzes." Nor was this surprising since a piloted aeroplane might be driven away by A.A. fire or fighter attack while the flying bomb was certain to fall, although those who watched it coming could not tell when its engine would cut off and the projectile would dive—or glide—to explode with extreme violence as it "touched down." Nevertheless the Londoners, though they were often scared, refused to panic before the new weapon to which popular fancy gave a variety of names, "fly-bombs," "robots," "doodle-bugs," and less politely, "blastards."

No attempt was made by the Germans to launch the huge rocket-projectiles to which rumour gave weights ranging from two tons to twelve tons, although one ramp for their discharge at Watten, in the Pas de Calais, had seemed not far short of completion in the spring. This ramp was heavily and assiduously attacked with bombs of the largest size, as were other possible sites. It was believe that experiments with this weapon had been brought to a long standstill by the attack on Peenemünde.¹

¹ It was far from certain that the huge unfinished concrete structure found near Cherbourg (*q.v.* Section 3 of this chapter) was designed for launching rocket-projectiles.

Methods of defence against the flying bomb had been carefully studied for many months before the attack began. It was soon realized that the best defence for London—or any other large city attacked by these missiles—was to destroy them before they came over the built-up area. Shooting down a flying bomb over a large city was profitless. There was no pilot to kill and the battery or aircraft which brought it down made it certain that it would do the maximum of damage when it might have overshot its mark and fallen in open country. Accordingly A.A. batteries and other defensive apparatus were massed at points where the robots could be shot into the sea or felled in open country. Fast fighter aircraft, particularly the new Tempest machines, were detailed to attack the bombs during their flight and their pilots soon became extremely expert in bringing them down. The Aeronautical Correspondent of *The Times* (*loc. cit.* June 22) quoted the pilot of a Tempest fighter as saying: "If your bullets strike home on the jet unit, the whole thing goes down with a crash; if you hit the bomb, the robot blows up. When we started attacking these things we trod warily, attacking from long range, but as we have got experience . . . we find that we can close in, sometimes to 100 yards. If you are close when the bomb goes up you sometimes fly through the debris, and some of our Tempests have come back with their paint scorched; some have been turned over on their backs by the force of the explosion, but the pilot feels no effect except a jolt. . . ."

The great increase in civilian casualties due to air raids in June was caused by the new method of attack. The official figures were:

| | | <i>Men</i> | <i>Women</i> | <i>Children under 16</i> | <i>Total</i> |
|--|-------|------------|--------------|------------------------------|--------------|
| Killed . . | | 716 | 988 | 231 | 1,935 |
| Injured and de- tained in hos- pital . . | 2,151 | 3,262 | 493 | 5,906 | |

Although the prohibition of the mention of London in connection with flying bomb attacks was withdrawn, no details of the damage done there was released with one exception. This was the destruction of the Guards' Chapel which was hit during divine service and wrecked with heavy loss of life. Speaking in Parliament after a week's experience of the new weapon, Mr. Morrison said (June 23) that little damage of national importance had been caused and public utilities had been only slightly affected so far. The attack had had no material effect on the war effort. The Press generally took the line that this form of attack was not only inhuman but also militarily valueless. It certainly appeared to contravene all the established laws of war which forbade indiscriminate bombardments. But the claim that it had no military value to the enemy neglected the fact that large numbers of British and United States bombers were engaged in attacking flying bomb sites when they might have been dropping bombs on German troops and transport. On the other hand it was more than doubtful whether the expenditure of fuel, materials, labour and explosives on contrivances which could not be aimed with any sort of accuracy instead of on bomber and fighter aircraft was likely to be of any military advantage to

the enemy. Politically it was a gross blunder. If the Germans still hoped for a negotiated peace—and they had put out feelers for this purpose in neutral capitals—it was a gross blunder to adopt military measures which could only infuriate their British enemies but could not exercise any decisive effect on the course of the war.

C. STALAG LUFT III

On May 19 Mr. Eden made the following statement in the House of Commons :

"I deeply regret to have to tell the House that H.M. Government have received information from the protecting Power [Switzerland] that 47 officers of the Royal Air Force, Dominion and Allied air forces have been shot by the Germans after a mass escape from Stalag Luft III. According to the information given to a representative of the protecting Power by the German authorities in the course of a routine visit to this camp on April 17, 76 officers had escaped from Stalag Luft III on March 22. Of these 76, 15 had been recaptured, 14 were still at large, and 47 had been shot, some while resisting arrest and some in the course of a new attempt to escape after capture.

His Majesty's Government are profoundly shocked at this news, and have urgently requested the protecting Power to demand from the German Government a full and immediate report of the circumstances in which these men met their death, and an explanation of its failure to report the facts at once to the protecting Power.

The names of the officers shot were furnished to the representative of the protecting Power on the occasion of his visit, and the next-of-kin have been informed. I am sure the House will wish me to express its deepest sympathy with the relatives, and to pay tribute to the courage and high sense of military duty shown by these gallant officers."

The House was deeply shocked by this disclosure. In reply to further questions, Mr. Eden said that he would consider the publication of the names of the victims. He had received the news four days ago and the Foreign Office had telegraphed next day to the protecting Power for information. The list of the victims was given to the Press on the same evening. It showed that the total was made up of 25 members of the R.A.F., six members of the R.C.A.F., three of the R.A.A.F., two of the R.N.Z.A.F., three of the South African Air Force, four Poles, two Norwegians, one member of the Fighting French Air Force, and one of the Royal Hellenic Air Force. Of the officers listed as members of the R.A.F. one was a Lithuanian and one a Czech.

The news caused deep concern and distress in this country and the German explanation of the killings was

manifestly inadequate. While the only legitimate explanation of the deaths of so many officers was that they had lost their lives in the fight that preceded their recapture, the Press pointed out with remarkable unanimity that were it so it was strange indeed that 47 should have been killed outright, but not a single one should have been wounded. *The Times* observed, too, that

"the reasons why so tragic a happening should not have been thought worthy of special mention to the protecting Power, but should have been left to be revealed in the course of a routine inspection three weeks later, demand the most thorough investigation."

The suspense with which more news of the tragedy was awaited was terminated by an important statement by Mr. Eden on June 23. After telling Parliament that the British Government had no knowledge of any other mass shooting of British prisoners of war, he continued :

He had told the House that 47 British and Allied Air Force officers had been shot as a result of their escape from Stalag Luft III. They had now received a communication from the German Government stating that the number of officers shot was 50. The German note gave the same explanation and attempted justification of these shootings as was given to the Swiss inspector on April 17, viz. : these officers were shot while offering resistance when found after their escape, or while attempting a renewed escape after capture. The note added that during the month of March there were a number of mass escapes of prisoners of war from camps throughout Germany involving several thousand persons ; that these escapes were systematically prepared by the Allied General Staffs ; and that they had political and military objectives. This situation was said to have endangered public security in Germany. Specially severe orders had been given to pursue at all costs prisoners who failed to halt on being challenged or offered resistance or renewed their attempts to escape after capture, and to make use of weapons until the prisoners had been deprived of all possibility of resistance or escape. Of the prisoners who escaped in March all were recaptured but about 100. Weapons had, however, to be used against some of the rest, including 50 from Stalag Luft III. The ashes of 28 of these 50 officers had been taken to the camp.

From this singular explanation Mr. Eden turned to statements on oath made "by officers who were in the camp at the time of the escape and have been recently repatriated." They included Group Captain H. M. Massey, who was the senior officer for the whole camp and acted as prisoners' representative. They gave the following information :

On the night of March 24-25 some 76 prisoners of war escaped through a

tunnel which they had excavated. Four more who were following them were detected, arrested, and removed to camp cells. Next day the Gestapo arrived and took control of the camp. On April 6 the Camp Commandant informed Group Captain Massey that the High Command had ordered him to give information to the senior officer among the prisoners of war concerning those who had escaped. The Commandant read out the following statement :

"With reference to the recent escape from the North Compound at Stalag Luft III, Sagan, I am commanded by the German High Command to state that 41 of the escapers were shot while resisting rearrest or in their endeavours to escape again after having been rearrested."

The Commandant declined to give further information regarding the circumstances. Asked whether all the men shot were dead, he said that all had been killed. A similar statement, with the substitution of the figure 47 for 41, was posted up on May 8 at the camp at Annaburg where Group Captain Massey and the other repatriates from Stalag Luft III were removed on April 11 on their journey home. Save for one shot fired at the last of the 76 as he emerged from the tunnel no one in the camp heard any shooting at the time of the escape. After Group Captain Massey had been given the news the whole camp went into mourning. The Germans at the time refused to allow the bodies of those shot to be brought back to camp for burial in the camp cemetery.

So much for what happened in the camp. The information which the repatriated officers have given goes further. Within a few days of the escape some of the officers were brought back to the camp under heavy guard, and were put into the camp cells. According to the report of the protecting Power they are still in the camp. They reported that after capture they had been taken over by the Gestapo, who had removed them to a Gestapo prison at Görlitz, some 40 miles away. On the way there, cars with armed Gestapo both preceded and followed the vehicle in which they were driven.

At Görlitz they were put into cells containing five or six each. They were all interrogated by the Gestapo, and in the meantime were kept in shocking conditions with very little food. Among other threats, the Gestapo used the following words to them : "We have got you here. Nobody knows you are here. To all intents and purposes you are civilians. You are wearing civilian clothes, and we can do what we like with you. You can disappear." Others were told that anyone dressed in civilian clothes would be without the protection of the Convention.

After their interrogation they were taken back to the cells, and some German officials came in and picked out a number of men. Those picked out were seen from the prison being driven away handcuffed and in the charge of the Gestapo officials, who were armed with tommy-guns, while the remainder were handed over to the *Luftwaffe* and brought back to the camp. Those shot included all the officers of European Allied nationality who were recaptured. These were taken away on different days in small parties, with one larger party of about 20. On April 6, the very day on which the Commandant of the camp informed Group Captain Massey that the number shot was 41, a party of eight, six of whom were later shot, were taken away. The number given to the Swiss inspector on April 17 was 47.

The German note states that a final communication giving further details will be forthcoming, but His Majesty's Government feel obliged to declare at once that the explanation now put forward by the German Government is in fact the confession of an odious crime against the laws and conventions of war.

Mr. Eden continued :

I would draw the attention of the House to the following facts :

First, no orders have at any time been given to British prisoners of war to take part, in the event of their escape, in any subversive action as is alleged in the German note.

Secondly, all these officers knew the futility of attempting any resistance if they were recaptured.

Thirdly, as to the possibility of a renewed attempt to escape we now know that owing to physical exhaustion and ill-treatment at Görlitz they were incapable of any such attempt.

Fourthly, whether these officers escaped in small or large numbers there can be no justification for the German authorities executing them. We know, however, that during the original escape the officers were in pairs, and that when last seen after leaving Görlitz prison they were in comparatively small numbers handcuffed and under heavy guard.

Fifthly, and most significant, there were no wounded, as would have been inevitable if the shootings had taken place during an attempt to resist capture.

Sixthly, the German statement omits all reference to Görlitz, and contains no account of the circumstances which led to the death of any single officer.

Finally, the ashes of 28 of the escaped prisoners have now been returned to Stalag Luft III, although the Germans had previously refused to send back the bodies for burial. This is the only occasion known to His Majesty's Government or the protecting Power upon which any British prisoner of war who has died during captivity has been cremated.

It is abundantly clear that none of these officers met his death in the course of making his escape from Stalag Luft III or while resisting capture. The Gestapo's contention that the wearing of civilian clothes by an escaping prisoner of war deprives him of the protection of the Prisoners of War Convention is entirely without foundation in international law and practice. From these facts there is, in His Majesty's Government's view, only one possible conclusion. These prisoners of war were murdered at some undefined place or places after their removal from the Gestapo prison at Görlitz, at some date or dates unknown.

His Majesty's Government must, therefore, record their solemn protest against these cold-blooded acts of butchery. They will never cease in their efforts to collect the evidence to identify all those responsible. They are firmly resolved that these foul criminals shall be tracked down to the last man, wherever they may take refuge. When the war is over they will be brought to exemplary justice.

The Foreign Secretary's announcement of the Government's determination to hunt down the criminals responsible for this massacre was loudly cheered by the House.

3 : THE INVASION OF FRANCE

A. WINNING THE BEACHES, JUNE 6-12

In the earliest hours of the morning of June 6 sleepers in southern Hampshire were awakened by the din of hundreds of aircraft passing overhead. They had heard the sound often enough during the past two months, but this time it was louder, nearer, and more continuous. Troop transports and aircraft towing gliders full of airborne troops were carrying thousands of British and American soldiers in a procession which took almost an hour to pass across the coast over the Channel at a height of some 300 feet, while above and around them flew and wheeled swarms of fighter aeroplanes of the Second Tactical Air Force. All the sky thundered to their passage and those who heard them pass—and few did not—knew that the day of decision had come.

At the end of question hour that morning in the House of Commons, Mr. Churchill, after announcing the fall of Rome to his expectant audience and complimenting General Alexander on his leadership, continued after a brief pause :

"I have also to announce to the House that during the night and the early hours of this morning the first of a series of landings in force upon the European Continent has been carried out. In this case the liberating assault fell upon the coast of France. An immense armada of upwards of 4,000 ships, together with several thousand smaller craft, crossed the Channel. Massed airborne landings have been successfully effected behind the enemy and landings on the beaches are proceeding at various points at the present time. The fire of the shore batteries has been largely quelled. The obstacles that were constructed in the sea have not proved so difficult as was apprehended.

The Anglo-American allies are sustained by about 11,000 first-line aircraft which can be drawn upon as may be needed for the purposes of the battle. . . . Reports are coming in in rapid succession. So far the commanders engaged report that everything is proceeding according to plan.

And what a plan ! This vast operation is undoubtedly the most complicated and difficult that has ever occurred. It involves tides, winds, waves, visibility both from the air and the sea standpoint, and the combined employment of land, air and sea forces in the highest degree of intimacy and in contact with conditions which could not and cannot be fully foreseen. There are already hopes that actual tactical surprise has been attained, and we hope to furnish the enemy with a succession of surprises during the course of the fighting."

The battle, Mr. Churchill continued, would grow in scale and intensity for many weeks. He could not forecast its course. But he might say that complete unity prevailed throughout the Allied armies. There was complete confidence in their supreme commander, General Eisenhower, and his lieutenants, and also in the commander of the expeditionary force, General Montgomery. The ardour and spirit of the troops embarking, as he had seen himself, was splendid to witness. Nothing that science, equipment and foresight could do had been neglected and the opening of this new front would be pursued with the utmost resolution both by the commanders and by the United States and British Governments whom they served.

The first official news of the landing had been given out by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (henceforth known as SHAEF) in the following statement :

Communiqué No. 1.

Under the command of General Eisenhower, Allied naval forces, supported by strong air forces, began landing Allied armies this morning on the northern coast of France.

At the end of the sitting of the House of Commons Mr. Churchill made a further statement. Operations, he said, were proceeding in a most satisfactory manner. The landing had been made on a broad front, by British and American—and Allied—troops, and in some cases troops had penetrated several miles inland. The passage of the sea had been made with far less loss than we had apprehended. The resistance of the batteries had been weakened by the bombing of the Air Force, and their fire had been reduced by the bombardment of our ships “to dimensions which did not affect the problem.” The outstanding feature had been the landings of

“the air-borne troops, which were . . . on a scale far larger than anything that has been seen so far. . . . These landings took place with extremely little loss and with great accuracy.” Particular anxiety attached to them since their success largely depended on conditions of visibility on the point of dawn. But while a great degree of risk had to be taken in respect of the weather, General Eisenhower’s courage was equal to all the necessary decisions and the airborne landings and the follow-ups were proceeding with “very much less loss” than had been expected.

Shortly before midnight on June 6 the second official statement was issued from SHAEF. It recapitulated the operations of the last 24 hours. Here is a summary :

Shortly before midnight on June 5 the Allied night bombers opened the assault in “very great” strength and continued it until dawn. Between 6.30 and 7.30 on the morning of June 6 two naval task forces, commanded respectively by Rear-Admiral Vian, flying his flag in H.M.S. *Scylla*, and

Rear-Admiral Kirk in the U.S. cruiser *Augusta*, launched their assault forces at enemy beaches.

The naval forces previously assembled under the over-all command of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay made their departure in fresh weather and were joined during the night by bombarding forces from northern waters. Channels had to be swept through the enemy's minefields. This operation was completed before dawn, and while the mine-sweepers continued to sweep towards the hostile coast the entire naval force followed through the channels which they had cleared.

Shortly before the assault three enemy torpedo craft, accompanied by armed trawlers, attempted to interfere with the operation, but were beaten off and a trawler sunk. Covered by a heavy bombardment from destroyers and other supporting ships, while heavier Allied ships engaged the enemy's batteries, silenced some and continued to attack others, the Allied assault craft moved towards the beaches and effected the landings. Airborne landings involving troop-carrying aircraft and gliders "carrying large forces," were also made successfully at many points. The initial landings were successful. Fighting continued.

The paragraph dealing with the day's air operations is best given in full, because it reveals the extent to which the Allied air forces contributed to the success of the landing and it applies equally well to the events of the next three or four days during which these forces gave the expedition every assistance in maintaining and in extending its foothold. It runs:

"Allied heavy, medium, light and fighter-bombers continued the air bombardment in very great strength throughout the day with attacks on gun emplacements, defensive works and communications. Continuous fighter cover was maintained over the beaches and for some distance inland and over other naval operations in the Channel. Our night fighters played an equally important role in protecting shipping and troop-carrier forces and intruder operations. Allied reconnaissance aircraft maintained continuous watch by day and night over shipping and ground forces. Our aircraft met with little enemy fighter opposition or anti-aircraft gunfire."

The *communiqué* added that the naval losses had been "very light, especially when the magnitude of the operations is taken into account." It was stated that evening that in addition to the cruisers mentioned other large warships took part in the operations against the German batteries and fortifications. Among these were the British battleships *Warspite*, *Rodney*, *Nelson*, and *Ramillies*, and the cruisers *Enterprise*, *Glasgow*, *Belfast*, *Mauritius* and *Orion*. The larger American warships included the battleships *Arkansas* and *Nevada*, and the cruisers *Tuscaloosa* and *Quincy*. A Canadian correspondent with the Fleet wrote (*The Times*, June 8):

Of the warships and larger ships involved, down to infantry landing ships, approximately 75 per cent were British and Canadian. A large number of smaller craft were American. The force as a whole was approximately 60 per cent British and 40 per cent American.

Warships protecting the carrying force included battleships, monitors, cruisers, and destroyers. Among Canadian warships were the Fleet class destroyers *Sioux* and *Algonquin*, while carriers of Canadian troops included the *Prince Henry* and the *Prince David*, both formerly auxiliary cruisers and peace-time luxury liners off the coasts of Canada.

Although neither SHAEF in its first *communiqués* nor Mr. Churchill had mentioned the places where landings had been effected, it was soon known from the German

radio and other sources that the Allied forces, British, American, Canadian and some French Commando units, had established themselves on a number of beaches and in several small coast towns from the mouth of the River Orne, near Caen, to Quinéville on the eastern coast of the Cherbourg Peninsula, known by the French as *le Cotentin*. The Americans landed on the western, the British on the eastern coastal sectors. Port en Bessin, Vierville, Arromanches and Ouistreham were among the places occupied, often after sharp fighting, on June 6. The actual landing had been none too easy. The weather had been bad, so bad, indeed, that General Eisenhower, who had already postponed "D day" as the day of invasion was called by the Staffs for 24 hours, might have been justified in ordering another postponement. But he banked upon a recovery, and it came, although the sea was if anything rougher than it had been when the Allies landed on the coast of Sicily, a high proportion of the men in the smaller craft were sea-sick and most were soaked and some were battered by the waves as they struggled ashore. The most dangerous obstacles to the landing craft were a wide belt of steel obstructions, known as "Element C," and wooden stakes driven into the sand with explosive charges attached which would be submerged and serve as mines at high tide. But the assault was timed for half-tide when most of these obstacles and traps were visible, and they consequently did less damage than had been expected.

On the beaches the Allied losses from mines were not heavy, for the majority of them had been exploded by the bombs of the Allied aircraft. The German troops manning the defences were of mixed quality. Some surrendered incontinently to the first rush. Some, however, were of a very different type and fought fiercely in concrete blockhouses, machine-gun emplacements and in fortified buildings on the sea-front. "In spite of the formidable bombardment from air and sea that preceded the assault, some of the positions had escaped . . . and . . . from these some of our landing parties came under withering cross-fire as soon as they began to move up the beach." (*The Times*, June 9.) Here new weapons, notably the heavy "Crocodile" flame-throwers, and the special detachments of the R.E. who came quickly up to the aid of the Commandos and of the American Engineers who supported the Rangers, restored the situation. So did the tanks and armoured cars which, like our supply vehicles, had been carefully waterproofed so that they could go ashore from the special landing craft with their engines running. They forced the surrender of many strong-

points and they reached the shore so quickly that on no occasion were German tanks able to intervene on the beaches. Some were encountered farther inland, but not enough arrived to prevent the invaders from forcing their way forward to a distance of more than three and a half miles at some points. As for the *Luftwaffe*, it hardly appeared at all on June 6, and its absence greatly lightened the burdens and the losses of the men engaged in landing supplies on the shore.

But while the losses of the Allies on D day had generally been light in comparison with expectations, the 1st U.S. Division had suffered very heavily. Five days after the landing General Montgomery told its story to war correspondents. He said that when the division landed east of the Carentan Estuary, where the Vire enters the Seine Bay, they found that sector of the beaches defended by a German field division, not by one of the high-numbered coastal divisions.

"German prisoners said that the division had just moved up to thicken the coastal crust and was . . . carrying out coastal exercises when the Americans landed. There was very heavy fighting on that beach for the rest of D day, and in the evening the leading American troops were no more than 100 yards inland. They were hanging on by their eyelids . . . the American troops in that sector fought absolutely magnificently. . . . To-day they are over ten miles inland. The situation was retrieved by three things : first, the gallantry of the American soldier, who is a very brave man ; secondly, the very fine supporting fire of the Allied navies ; and thirdly, very good support by the fighter-bombers. The retrieving of that situation and the advance to the present very good situation are among the finest things done in this operation."

The next two *communiqués* from SHAEF (Nos. 3 and 4) reported further satisfactory progress, and the linking up of several of the beach-head positions. At the same time the enemy's reserves were moving up and his opposition was stiffening. But his attempts against the two flanks of the landed and landing troops, against the Americans on the Cotentin and the British on the coast north of Caen, were held by the magnificent resistance of the British and the American 82nd Airborne Divisions.

Accounts of the exploits of these fine troops which were released later showed that detachments of the Sixth Division had landed a short distance from the streets of Caen, capturing several German officers in their beds, and had then taken up defensive positions covering important road junctions and bridges which they had seized, where they beat off the attacks which came in increasing strength as German reinforcements arrived. "The weather," wrote a Special Correspondent of *The Times*,¹ "was not ideal for an airborne operation, but it was nevertheless decided to carry it

¹ *Loc. cit.*, June 9.

out." The Germans would be less on their guard on a night unfavourable to attack. First came parachutists to destroy as far as possible the enemy's defences against an air landing. Then came gliders carrying troops detailed to seize various points, and then more gliders carrying equipment and weapons.

In spite of the forests of poles which the enemy had erected at several points where gliders were likely to land, the losses of the landing were not too heavy, but the Germans countered swiftly and fiercely and did their utmost to recover the two bridges across the canalized Orne and expel the Sixth Division from the bridgeheads which it had established across the river. But the Sixth, fighting magnificently, beat off attack after attack, and its resistance against the powerful thrusts of the German local reserves which included the 21st Panzer Division and other crack troops helped greatly to hold the enemy at Caen where he had his best divisions and more concentrated artillery and armoured strength than at any other point on this front. By June 8 this fine division had linked up firmly with British and Canadian troops on its right.

Another outstanding success was achieved by troops of the U.S. 82nd (Airborne) Division who landed in the neighbourhood of Ste. Mère Eglise in the Cotentin Peninsula. One glider which landed on the roof of a house in the town secured the surrender of the garrison. In spite of sharp fire from the German A.A. batteries the losses were light and the American paratroops and glider-borne troops fought with great dash and skill, capturing a number of German positions and several guns.

In spite of bad weather in the Channel which delayed the landing of supplies on June 7 and again on June 9, and much low cloud and mist which limited the tactical co-operation of the Allied air forces with the troops at the front ; in spite, too, of the stiffening of German resistance as the local reserves reached the front, the Allies made steady progress. The capture of Bayeux was announced early on June 8. That night SHAEF *communiqué* No. 6 reported the repulse of German attacks by the 6th Airborne Division, the gradual enlargement of the American bridgeheads on the Cotentin and east of the Carentan estuary, and further progress by British and Canadian troops. German reserves were now in action along the whole front, but supplies and reinforcements built up the Allied fighting lines and the airborne troops were successfully supplied from the air. Meanwhile, although the *Luftwaffe* showed more activity than on D day, the Allies continued to dominate the air, and the enemy's attempts at interference by sea did little damage. Three encounters were recorded during the first three days after the Allied landing.

On the night of June 7 "enemy E-boats operating in four groups entered

the assault area and attempted to interfere with our lines of communication. A series of running fights ensued and the attacks were successfully beaten off. Three of the enemy were seen to be repeatedly hit. . . ." The *communiqué* (No. 6) went on to record attacks by our coastal aircraft on E-boats off the French and Belgian coasts in which one E-boat was sunk and three were either sunk or seriously damaged. *Communiqué* No. 8, issued at midnight on June 9, reported a sharp action at dawn that day between a force of eight Allied destroyers and a German destroyer flotilla which had previously been sighted off Ushant by coastal aircraft. The Allied force was under the command of Commander B. Jones in H.M.S. *Tartar*. The other Allied ships engaged were the British destroyers *Ashanti*, *Eskimo* and *Javelin*, the Canadian *Haida* and *Huron*, and the Polish *Blyskawica* and *Piorun*. In the course of the action which followed and was sometimes conducted at point-blank range, H.M.S. *Tartar* passed through the hostile line and, though she suffered some damage and a few casualties, continued the action and returned safely to harbour. One German destroyer was torpedoed and sank. Another was driven ashore in flames. Two more escaped after being set on fire. Further attempts by E-boats to attack Allied transport from east and west were beaten off. The *communiqué* added that during the 24 hours ending at 8 a.m. on June 8 Allied warships had engaged 46 targets. Spotting was carried out by aircraft and military forward observing officers who had been landed with the assault troops. H.M.S. *Belfast*, "wearing the flag of Rear-Admiral F. H. Dalrymple-Hamilton," and H.M.S. *Frobisher* had done considerable execution on enemy concentrations.

The same *communiqué* stated that American troops had crossed the Carentan-Vogeuves road at several points and had cut the broad-gauge railway to Cherbourg. Further gains had been made west and south-west of Bayeux. "Fighting is severe in the area of Caen, where the enemy is making a determined effort to stem the advance. The weight of armour is increasing on both sides and heavy fighting continues in all areas. The enemy's strong-points previously by-passed have now been eliminated."

"The weather has deteriorated, but our beach-heads are being steadily developed. Poor visibility and stormy weather have reduced Allied air activity to a minimum over the battle area to-day."

In spite of these handicaps to air activity, official reports covering June 6 and 7 and the forenoon of June 8 showed that the 8th and 9th U.S.A.A.F. had sent out over 9,000 aircraft on June 6 alone, while 2,000 machines of the Second Tactical Air Force operated over the beaches. During the two and a half opening days 27,000 sorties had been flown and 176 German aeroplanes shot down, not counting those destroyed on the airfields, for the loss of 289 Allied machines. More will be said later of the success with which the Allied air arm and the F.F.I. (French Forces of the Interior) were already delaying the advance of the strategic reserves which the enemy was beginning to call up now that the invasion of Normandy had proved to be a major operation and no diversion or feint.

On June 8 General Eisenhower issued this statement on the first 54 hours of the campaign :

"My complete confidence in the ability of the Allied armies, navies, and air forces to do all they are asked to do has been completely justified. In the early landing operations, which are always largely naval, the two Allied navies, together with elements of naval units of the United Nations under Admiral Ramsay have excelled, in the high standard of their planning and their execution, any prior venture in which I have seen them engaged."

The long and brilliant campaign conducted in the past months by the combined air forces, including the Commands of Air Chief Marshal Harris, General Spaatz and Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory, was an essential preliminary to the undertaking of the operation and has proved its effectiveness by the fact that the landing was made as planned. Their good work is continuing. General Montgomery is in immediate and direct charge of all the assault ground forces. Under him, all the troops are performing magnificently.¹

On June 10 it was announced that the British and Canadian troops had linked up north of Caen, that the Third Canadian Division was engaged, and that the Americans were thrusting in the direction of St. Lô from the beaches east of the Vire estuary and were also enlarging their beach-head on the Cotentin Peninsula. *Communiqué* No. 9 announced the American capture of Isigny, apparently on June 9, heavy attacks on enemy airfields in Brittany and Normandy by our heavy bombers, of which only eight were missing, and a firm stand by British and Canadian troops against vigorous attacks by German armour and infantry north of Caen. The next three *communiqués*, covering the period June 10-12, recorded more hard fighting north of Caen and a number of heavy engagements all along the rest of the front. These may be summarized as follows :

Trévières, some seven miles west of Bayeux, had been captured. British armour, powerfully aided by naval fire,² had reached Tilly-sur-Seulles, some six miles south-south-west of Bayeux, on the 10th and the Americans further west had taken Lison, south-east of Isigny, and had occupied the Forest of Cerisy north-west of St. Lô, from which their vanguards were only three miles distant. Although the Germans had flooded the lower valley of the River Aure, the Americans had crossed the flooded region and con-

¹ During the earlier stages of the assault few details of the divisions engaged in the first landings were made public. It was, however, stated that the 50th (Northumbrian) Division, which had acquitted itself splendidly in the Eighth Army in Africa and Sicily, had played a leading part in the landing.

² *Communiqué* No. 12 paid a tribute to the effective fire of the British cruisers *Argonaut* and *Orion* in this area.

trolled the high ground between Isigny and Carentan. On the east side of the Cotentin they had crossed the Merderet River west of Ste. Mère Eglise and had thrust to the outskirts of Montebourg, but were held up in the outskirts of the town.

Not all these gains were held. Tilly-sur-Seulles was recaptured by the Germans, who now had four Panzer Divisions totalling 600 tanks between that small town and Caen. Three of these divisions, the 21st and the 12th S.S. Panzer among them, made a number of attacks on June 10 and 11 on the bridge-heads over the Caen canal and the Orne, but the 6th Airborne Division once again held its own. By this time more German infantry divisions had been identified on the front and an American estimate gave the enemy five or six infantry divisions—not all complete—three or four Panzer Divisions, and two parachute divisions fighting as infantry. Three more divisions were approaching the battle area.

On June 10 it was officially announced that Allied fighter aircraft were now operating from landing strips in Normandy. On the same day General Montgomery set up his Headquarters in France. In a message to the troops he congratulated them on having secured “a good and firm lodgment area on the mainland of France.”

Next day he addressed a large gathering of war correspondents. He told them that he was very pleased with the situation so far, although much remained to be done. The British and American beach-heads had all been linked up and the Allies now held a front of about 60 miles in length from the mouth of the Orne to the northernmost American lodgment on the Cotentin, which was only 15 miles from Cherbourg. The depth of the beach-head varied, but it amounted in places to as much as ten miles. “We have won what I would call the Battle of the Beaches,” he said, adding that there was no harm in making the claim since the Germans must know it.

He added that the landings had achieved a large measure of tactical surprise, although there was some evidence in the last-minute stiffening of some positions that the enemy half expected it. The order that every man must be imbued with one idea, to penetrate inland as rapidly and deeply as possible, had left the Germans in possession of several defended localities which had to be reduced later and gave trouble. But it would have been valueless to secure a small beach-head and then dig in. One of these defended localities was still holding out. A number of snipers had been wandering about in our area and these included “some very stout-hearted women—and women snipers have been killed while doing their stuff.” They were German women.¹

There was further progress in some areas on June 12. The Americans after hard fighting took Carentan and

¹ It was rather puzzling that the statement that women snipers had been killed or captured should have been officially denied. The denial may have been inspired by the fear that if the impression that women snipers, Germans or French collaborationists, were active became general, Frenchwomen working in fields or gardens might be shot by over-excited Allied soldiers. Perhaps General Montgomery was misinformed.

held it against fierce counter-attacks and they made progress south of the Cerisy Forest. On the Cotentin they were gaining ground near Le Ham, but were hard pressed at Montebourg. On the eastern flank of the front the British pressed into Troarn, well to the east of Caen. Elsewhere the fighting was give and take and forward positions, Tilly-sur-Seulles for one, changed hands repeatedly. It was a hard battle fought in a close country of woods, orchards and hedgerows where tank formations, German or Allied, found it impossible to deploy, and were generally used in detachments seldom exceeding 20 in number. Yet the great counter-attack expected by the Allied High Command had not come, though German tactical reserves were now entering the fight, and all the while the Allies, greatly aided by calmer seas, were receiving abundant reinforcements and supplies.

On June 12 *Communiqué* No. 14, after recording gains at various points, the complete fusion of the beach-heads and the constant aid given to the assault by deep support in the centre and close support on the flanks described a number of important air operations. "Striking in very great strength, our aircraft . . . hammered enemy airfields and communications over a 400-mile arc from St. Nazaire to Lille. . . . The largest single striking force of heavy bombers ever dispatched from England struck this morning at a broad belt of 16 airfields from Dreux to Lille, and at six rail bridges in the St. Nazaire and Paris areas." Rennes was a major target in this operation, in which 1,400 "heavies" were engaged. Medium bombers bombed targets nearer the front, and in the night others attacked objectives such as the Nantes and Tours railway yards between the Loire and the Seine. That day 7,000 sorties were flown.

On June 12 Mr. Churchill, accompanied by General Smuts and Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, visited the beach-heads and spent nearly seven hours with the troops, by whom he was enthusiastically welcomed. He crossed the Channel in H.M. destroyer *Kelvin*, escorted by the destroyer *Scourge*. He conferred some time with General Montgomery and his Staff. On the same day General Eisenhower, with General Marshall, Chief of Staff, Admiral King, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet, and General Arnold, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Air Forces, visited the American portion of the front for five hours and held a conference with General Omar Bradley, Commander of the U.S. land forces.

On June 13 General Eisenhower issued a statement on the results of the first week's fighting in Normandy.

It was addressed to General Montgomery, Admiral Ramsay, Air Chief Marshal Leigh Mallory, Air Chief Marshal Harris, Lieutenant-General Spaatz and "soldiers, sailors, airmen, and merchant seamen, and all others of the Allied expeditionary forces." He said: "One week ago this morning there was established, through your co-ordinated efforts, our first foothold in north-western Europe. High as was my pre-invasion confidence in your courage, skill and effectiveness in working together as a unit, your accomplishments in the first seven days of this campaign have exceeded my brightest hopes.

You are truly a great allied team: a team in which each part gains its greatest satisfaction in rendering maximum assistance to the entire body and in which each individual body is justifiably confident in all others. No matter how prolonged or bitter the struggle that lies ahead, you will do your fullest part towards the restoration of free France, the liberation of all European nations under Axis domination and the destruction of the Nazi military machine. I truly congratulate you upon a brilliantly successful beginning to this great undertaking. Liberty-loving people, everywhere, would to-day like to join me in saying to you: 'I am proud of you.'

On the same day the Supreme Allied Commander sent a message to President Roosevelt in which he stated that the first great obstacles, the breaching of the beach defences that the enemy had installed "in forest-like density" along the entire coast of north-western Europe had been surmounted. But satisfactory as Allied progress had been, "this initial success has given us only a foothold upon north-west France."

Through the opening thus made and through others yet to come the flood of our fighting strength must be poured. The Nazis will be forced to fight throughout the perimeter of their stronghold, daily expending their dwindling resources. . . . To this end we need every man, every weapon and all the courage and fortitude of our respective peoples. The Allied soldier will do his duty. A particularly satisfying feature of the fighting has been the fine performance of the troops, American, British and Canadian, committed to battle for the first time."

B. ALLIED AND GERMAN DISPOSITIONS

Before continuing the story of the Allied invasion of France after the solid establishment of the First American and Second British Armies on the coast of Normandy, it is necessary to give some outlines of the dispositions of the rival forces. Naturally little can be said of the composition of the Allied armies. A few divisions, e.g. the British Sixth (Airborne), 50th (Northumbrian) and 51st

(Highland), the U.S. 1st, 29th and 82nd (Airborne) Divisions, and the 3rd Canadian Division were mentioned in official statements during June, but official silence was rightly preserved on the identity and numbers of the units landed between June 6 and June 14 and of the numerous reinforcements who joined them during the last half of the month. But it was widely believed that between 200,000 and 250,000 men were landed during the first twenty-four hours of the campaign—an amazing feat of organization and transport. The German commentators, who had boasted a year earlier that while the Allies might be able to get 50,000 men ashore on some part of the coast of Western Europe, they would be lucky if these troops were not thrown into the sea within a week, had been already obliged to revise their estimates by the successful landings in Sicily, at Salerno and the Anzio beach-head. But their admissions after the landing were significant of their anxiety, although they still claimed that the High Command had the Allies “just where we want them” and talked of a coming counter-attack on a huge scale. On June 8 official spokesmen at Berlin gave General Montgomery a strength of three tank divisions and seven infantry and airborne divisions. On June 15 the German High Command reported that the battle was “approaching its climax,” a phrase often repeated during the succeeding weeks.

A message of the same date from Field-Marshal von Rundstedt's Headquarters gave the Allies 500,000 men in the battle area, and on June 22 the German Press, referring to the advance on Cherbourg, said that the majority of the “25 American Divisions landed so far” were engaged against the fortress. The enemy also paid his tribute to the quality of the Allied troops, whether American, Canadian or British, and described them as worthy opponents of “our crack divisions from Russia,” several of which were included in the Seventh Army, which had been disposed in depth in the region between the mouths of the Seine and the Loire when the invasion began.

The Germans had formed four armies in two Army Groups, for the defence of France, Belgium and Holland. These were under the supreme command of Field-Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt. The northern Army Group was responsible for the defence of the Low Countries and northern France as far as the Loire. It was commanded

by Field-Marshal Rommel, brilliant, erratic, energetic, of whom the Military Correspondent of *The Times* wrote :

"Opinion is divided about his fitness for his present post. Some think the combination with Rundstedt is ideal, and that it is a great thing to have in France a commander who will never rest while there is a single enemy alive. Others say that he 'is not up to Manstein by a long chalk,' a great front-line leader, but not fit for the command of an army group and too impulsive and intuitive for the defence of Europe. It is noted that he has always been a difficult colleague, and that he and Kesselring were constantly at loggerheads in Africa. . . . It is also considered that he has no conception of the administrative side of war, and disregards the question of supplies. This is representative of the instructed German view of this strange, erratic soldier, undoubtedly touched at moments by the finger of genius, but apt to bewilder his own side and throw his own machine out of gear when attempting to upset and deceive the enemy. It should be recognized frankly that, under Rundstedt, he might prove a success of the first order if the combination worked smoothly. If it did not there might be serious trouble. . . ."¹

The southern Army Group was under the command of Field-Marshal Jacob von Blaskowitz, to whom the High Command had entrusted the defence of the Biscayan and Mediterranean coasts of France and the policing of the interior south of the Loire-Lyons-Jura line. He was considered a thoroughly competent soldier, though by no means so outstanding a figure as Rommel or von Rundstedt. It was to his credit that he had protested in writing against German atrocities in Poland, which is said to have brought about his temporary dismissal by Hitler. He had commanded an army in the Polish campaign and had commanded another in northern France in 1940 and had acquitted himself well on each occasion. Field-Marshal von Rundstedt's position corresponded to that of General Eisenhower, since the German naval and air forces in the west came under his orders. German opinion of him, both as a man and as a soldier, was high. The Military Correspondent of *The Times* (*loc. cit.*) wrote that his fellow-soldiers held that though he might be less clever than Leeb, he is the best all-round German Commander—

"knowledgeable, reliable, calm and canny, practical and resolute." He refused to have anything to do with reprisals and mass executions in the East, but the most interesting point about him was that the army regarded him as the most prominent anti-Nazi among its senior officers, and that he "is believed to have come to the conclusion that the defeat of Germany

¹ *Loc. cit.* June 12.

was inevitable at least two years ago." But, Captain Falls continued, there was no evidence that he entertained any idea of overthrowing the Nazi régime. His situation was certainly difficult. "He detests Nazidom; he wants to save his caste, that of the military Junkers, of which he is now the *doyen*; he wants to save the army from destruction; as a political conservative so far as he has any politics . . . he must want to avoid a left-wing ascendancy such as might result from a complete collapse in the field. But, first, he is surrounded by Nazis, some doubtless detailed to watch him carefully, and, secondly, he is a patriotic man. Among the Nazi soldiers the most prominent is his lieutenant Rommel, and it may not have been without design that the two have been thus balanced."

The Field-Marshal had served with distinction in Poland. In France in 1940 he commanded the force totalling some 50 divisions which broke through the Ardennes and the Meuse line. This done, two of his four armies, commanded by Generals von Kluge and von Blaskowitz and preceded by two Armoured Corps as their advanced guard, broke through to the Channel, while the armies under von Witzleben and von Bock held the Aisne-Somme line against a possible French counter-attack. A formidable opponent, if he were allowed a free hand.

There had been much speculation as to how the German High Command would meet the Allied attack. One school held that the enemy would make his main effort on or near the beaches; another that he would fight a delaying action there but would reserve his heaviest counter-strokes until the invading Allies had pressed so far inland that they could no longer expect support from the long-range guns of their warships, which had turned the scale against the defence at Salerno. Some German commentators encouraged the second view by their claims that the largely "green" American and British divisions and their staffs would be outmatched by German armour and still more by German mobility and manoeuvring power when they encountered the German strategical reserves some distance inland. Each plan was ascribed, apparently without any supporting evidence, to Field-Marshal von Rundstedt and Rommel in turn, and it was rumoured (inevitably) that the German Commander in the West and his best-known lieutenant differed entirely as to the strategy to be followed should the first landings succeed.

There may have been some ground for the supposition that Rundstedt had urged the necessity of retiring behind the Seine line should the Allies maintain themselves successfully until the end of June but nothing was known definitely on this subject.¹

It is now time to give a brief outline of the strength and distribution on D day of the German forces in occupation of the Netherlands, Belgium, France and the Channel Islands. The German Army of Occupation in Holland numbered four divisions and would seem to have formed an independent force. The two armies of Rommel's (Northern) Army Group were the 15th Army under General Salmuth disposed between the Scheldt and the Seine and the 7th Army under General Dollmann between Seine and Loire. The 15th Army was composed of three panzer divisions and 16 infantry divisions, some field divisions on the nine-battalion establishment with generally mechanized transport, some coast defence divisions on a lower—probably six-battalion—establishment, and at least one parachute division serving as field troops. The Seventh Army was composed of three divisions and 15 panzer infantry divisions, including both coast defence divisions on the lower, and field divisions on the higher establishment. On D day the 21st (Panzer) Division, the greater part of the 77th (Infantry) Division, the whole of the 91st, 243rd, and 352nd Infantry Divisions, and the 709th, 711th, and 716th Coast Defence Divisions were in Normandy. The balance of the 77th Division was moving into Normandy from Brittany, the 17th (Panzer Grenadier) Division was *en route* from southern France to Normandy. In Brittany were two paratroop divisions, the 3rd and the 5th, the 265th, 266th, 275th, and 353rd Infantry Divisions. To these forces in Brittany and Normandy must be added the coastal artillery and fortress engineer units stationed in Cherbourg, Brest, Lorient, and St. Nazaire, and the garrison of St. Malo, composed of elements, perhaps three battalions strong, of an infantry division, the rest of which, with coastal artillery and naval forces, was garrisoning the Channel Islands. Two panzer divisions, the Lehr (Training) and 12th S.S., were within the Seventh Army area.

Field-Marshal Blaskowitz's Southern Army Group was composed of the First Army in south-western France from the Loire to the Pyrenees with a strength of three armoured divisions and five infantry divisions, and the 19th Army under General von Wiese, who had an armoured division and nine infantry divisions, mostly on the lower establishment, under his orders. The fortress artillery and engineers, *flak* and searchlight units and naval contingents in the Biscayan and Mediterranean ports must also be reckoned in any estimate the reader may care to make of the German strength.

Omitting these sedentary troops and the garrison of the Channel Islands, the Germans therefore had 59 more or less mobile divisions, ten of them armoured, between the Dutch Frisian coast and the Mediterranean. They were dangerous opponents though their high-numbered low-

¹ The Marshal's removal from the German command in France, which was announced on July 6, certainly left the impression that he had disagreed with the Führer and/or the General Staff on some strategic issue.

establishment divisions were both numerically weaker and far less mobile than the rest, and although they contained an appreciable percentage of non-Germans, Russians, Slovaks, Poles and Yugoslavs, whom the enemy had pressed into his service from labour and prisoner-of-war camps. The field divisions were good, the S.S. armoured divisions superlatively good. Two of these last, the 9th and 10th S.S. Panzer Divisions, had been transferred to France from before D day from the Polish front, where they had won much distinction. Other troops, armoured and infantry, were reaching the Norman battle-front from Brittany, from southern France and from the Seventh Army area before the end of June.¹

Although the enemy showed an unexpected caution in his moves during the opening days of the invasion—and this was well since rough seas impeded the landing of troops, stores and equipment and at times prevented it altogether—the Allies had to count on the possibility of a heavy attack on a wide front as soon as the enemy had brought up enough armour for a counter-stroke. They had been preparing both for the landing and for the offensive and defensive operations following it since 1942. The story of these preparations was told as fully as was permissible at the time by a Special Correspondent of *The Times* (*loc. cit.* June 7), who described how a number of special training centres for both the British and the U.S. forces were organized on the British coasts, how the civil population was removed to enable live ammunition to be used, and replicas of enemy fortifications and other obstacles were set up to be destroyed by the Allied engineers with the aid of special weapons. He continued :

The plan elaborated by the Combined Staff was naturally subject to final revision and approval by General Eisenhower, who assumed in January, 1944, the appointment of Supreme Commander. A further examination was then carried out to check and revise the original forecast of resources made in 1943. It was during these last few months that the final intricate co-ordination of action by all three services was completed down to the last

¹ Thus the 265th Division from Brittany provided battlegroups, and the Third (Paratroop) Division was moving into Normandy before June was out. Other arrivals included elements of the 346th Division from the Le Havre area, and the armoured units mentioned in the next section.

detail. It remained for the Supreme Commander to make the final decision as to the precise date of the assault and to give the word. . . .

The object which the administrative staff had to keep in mind was to place the assaulting force in a position to attack the enemy and to ensure the synchronization of its impact on the enemy with a smooth flow of supporting reinforcements of men and material. The attainment of this object . . . involved a task of planning and organizing which falls into four phases :

(I) Formations must be concentrated in an area reasonably adjacent to the points at which they are to embark for the over-sea theatre. This area must be cleared to some extent of its normal military population.

(II) The concentrated troops must then be moved into marshalling areas, where they are divided into assault troops, first reinforcements and follow-up "reserves" and then split into unit parties and craft loads for embarkation.

(III) The assault flight, with "follow-up" wave and a steady increment of "build-up" reinforcements on their heels, must be transported by sea to the target area.

(IV) The force which secures the bridge-head must be sustained by a maintenance flow of ammunition, supplies, and stores of all kinds.

In relation to each of these phases, the essence of administrative planning was to secure an even regularity of movement and to avoid bottlenecks ; and this, in turn, depended upon foresight and organization, in relation both to the capacity of the beach-head—complicated . . . by the magnitude of tides—and the rate of "lift" which could be attained, having regard to shipping tonnage available and both railway and loading facilities in the United Kingdom base.

The loading of the vessels employed in this immense operation involved many administrative problems.

Stores for maintenance in the first phase of the operation had to be pre-loaded and the shipping dispersed as a precaution against enemy attack in many ports. For the early phases of the maintenance of the beach-head every ship had to be loaded with a mixed cargo, "so much food, so much ammunition, so much signals equipment, so many engineering and ordnance stores, and so much water and medical supplies, not forgetting . . . that the Army is responsible for transporting for the R.A.F. materials needed for any airfield captured or constructed."

Pre-loading called for a most elaborate organization. The cargo for one pre-loaded ship might be drawn from 20 different depots in the United Kingdom, "crated in accordance with a packaging technique perfected by the experience of nearly five years of war, the supplies duly moved from depot to loading port, some by train, others by road. For the second phase of the operation the organization of supplies and their movement from depot to port also had to begin long before the first of the assault troops set foot on enemy soil.

The design and planning of the Army's road transport services are cared for . . . by the supply and transport branch of the War Office in conjunction with the R.A.O.C. In terms of vehicles few branches were required to begin at an earlier date their planning for the second front. The production programmes had to be settled and put in hand years before the invading force was finally assembled with all its transport. The vehicle which has the place of honour in the provision made for invasion is the amphibious

lorry, whose function it is to transport personnel and supplies from ship to shore, and to convert itself instantly on reaching the beach into a land vehicle.

For manning these vehicles extensive water training of R.A.S.C. personnel was necessary. The provision of petrol, oil, and lubricants is an essential element for which the supply and transport branch of the War Office is responsible. . . . Between bulk reserves held in the United Kingdom and the fighting and other vehicles operating in the bridgehead, an elaborate chain of organization had to be planned and made ready. The range of "war-like stores which come within the purview of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps . . . runs into more than half a million items."

In the initial phase of the invasion the immediate task of Ordnance was twofold. Special "invasion" depots, together with transit depots, had to be organized, from which to draw, both for pre-loaded "build-up" craft and for the immediate needs of the assault brigades, those items . . . which, it was judged, would be operationally essential for opposed landings.

Much special medical planning was also required to secure the prompt arrival by air or sea of needed medical equipment and supplies and to make the best use of returning transport. Thousands of mechanical vehicles had to be water-proofed, provision had to be made for the employment of many special weapons of assault; above all, steps had to be taken to ensure the smooth passage of the mechanical equipment of the invading forces from concentration area to marshalling area and thence to embarkation point. To effect this an elaborate system of traffic control had to be worked out on the British roads. Finally, every man received what was known as the 24-hour ration pack containing less than two and a half pounds of food with a high calorific value, and various types of ration packs, the largest of which "the Compo" of 64 lbs. gross weight provided a day's ration for 14 men, had to be provided.

Yet after everything had been done to ensure a rapid landing and a continual build-up of the forces on the beach-heads, the Allies, in spite of their advantages, e.g. their great superiority in the air, their ability to choose their point of attack, and the vast quantity of shipping at their disposal, had to contend with serious difficulties. The Military Correspondent of *The Times* wrote (*loc. cit.* June 7) :

Any landing in northern or western France comes into quite a different category from those undertaken in the Mediterranean. The tide alone makes a vast difference. The defences which have to be surmounted are

enormously superior in strength. The defensive preparations have been much more thorough. The sea is less calm and the weather is more changeable.

The enemy has concentrated, on all beaches where landings are considered practicable, obstacles at high-water mark and below it. By landing at low tide it would in some instances be possible to get through such obstacles more easily, but there would then be a long assault up a glacis-like beach. In front of these obstacles are zones of sea-mines. Behind them are the typical beach defences. . . . Behind them again are the coast defence guns, a serious menace because so hard to put out of action. Broadly speaking, the method adopted was to sweep the sea-mines, allow bombardment ships to stand in and cover the demolition of obstacles at low water ; carried out dry-shod by special forces, and land the first assault troops—apart from the airborne troops—on the rising tide.

It must be added that on the Normandy coast there are a number of reefs and sand-banks which cannot always be avoided in a large-scale landing. Careful calculation had to be made as to how soon—and how late—these could be crossed. In fine, there were a considerable number of difficulties to be added to that one which is common to all amphibian enterprises, the attack upon forces standing organized upon the firm basis of land by forces taking off in less well organized dispositions from the unstable element of water. These forces are themselves almost helpless until they are well ashore, but they have the support and protection of the forces of the sea and the air.

Other measures taken by the Allies were not made known until the autumn although Mr. Churchill on August 2 made some reference to measures which had been taken to solve the problem of the landing on the French beaches of the enormous quantities of stores required by the powerful armies of invasion. During the administrative planning of this gigantic operation it became clear that even if all the French ports from Havre to Cherbourg fell into our hands undamaged at an early stage of the invasion, the quantity of stores required for the maintenance of the expeditionary force would exceed the port capacity. It was therefore decided to construct two artificial harbours, one in the British and one in the American sector. The decision received the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Quebec Conference of August, 1943, and in September the detailed recommendations of the British and American experts were submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and passed by them. Work began at once.

Here are some details of this immense undertaking. Two prefabricated harbours were planned, each roughly as big as Dover harbour and accommodating the necessary shipping and port equipment. These ports were made up of concrete caissons, floating breakwaters and blockships.

Inside these artificial harbours were floating piers, on which coasters could unload direct into lorries. These were fortunately already in hand, thanks largely to the great interest taken by the Prime Minister in these necessary implements of a large-scale invasion.

The caissons were constructed in different sizes to suit various depths of water. Those who saw them leaving Southampton Water compared their appearance to that of a roofless Noah's Ark. They were towed across the Channel by tugs, great numbers of which were concentrated in our southern and south-eastern ports for this difficult and delicate operation, which their masters carried out with rare skill and courage. Happily very few of them were lost.

The blockships were first to arrive. Some followed, under their own steam, on the heels of the assault forces. They were brought to the appointed places and sunk by explosive charges so as to form five distinct breakwaters, of which two were to form part of the artificial ports. The old ships sacrificed for this purpose included the old battleship *Centurion*, the French *Courbet* and the Dutch cruiser *Sumatra*. All had been successfully sunk according to plan by midnight on June 11. The Admiralty must have been particularly amused to learn from the German radio that the *Courbet* and a British battleship had been sunk off Normandy by German submarines and E-boats!

By D day plus 12—i.e., June 18—the operation was going well. Half the caissons were in position. Heavy moorings had been laid to which the floating breakwaters were attached as they arrived. Bodies of Royal Engineers, and "Seebecs" in the American sector, made preparations for the piers. But unfortunately on June 19 a north-easterly gale began and continued for three days with remarkable violence. The American harbour, which was in a more exposed site, suffered most and when Cherbourg was captured work on it was discontinued. The Calvados reef protected the British harbour, which suffered much less damage, though the floating breakwater was broken up and many small craft were cast ashore and a large amount of equipment was lost in transit. Nevertheless the blockships, the piers already completed and the caissons already in their places saved great loss of men and material and the harbour, jokingly styled "Port Mulberry" from its code name, was rendering valuable service by the end of June, although it was not completed until later.

The Germans were unquestionably surprised by this development. There is reason to believe that Rommel did not believe that the Allies could land enough supplies for the force which they would require to defeat his Army Group and the reinforcements on which he could count unless and until they had captured Cherbourg and Havre, and that he was also convinced that they would land on some other point on the French Channel coast. These false assumptions may well have led him to hold back troops which were available for a swift attack on the beach-heads until the opportunity had passed. And so it came to pass that the Allies were in a position to build up their strength by sea at least as quickly as the

enemy could build up his by land. In fact their build-up was faster. Their air power had wrecked his railways in northern France so comprehensively that his mobile reserves were largely confined to movement by road and were sorely harassed and delayed as they moved up to the front. Moreover the destruction of a number of important bridges over the Seine and Loire imposed long detours on German transport and armour moving into Normandy from outside the Seventh Army area. This in conjunction with the spirited campaign of ambush and sabotage opened by the French *maquisards* of the Resistance Movement deranged the German time-table.

On June 17 SHAEF issued a special *communiqué* dealing with the activities of the Army of the French Forces of the Interior.

These had increased in scope as the Army had increased in size. The Army had undertaken "a large plan of sabotage which includes in part the paralyzing of railway and road traffic and the interruption of telegraph and telephone communications." In those cases these objectives had been obtained. The destruction of railways had been most effective. "Bridges have been destroyed, derailment effected, and at least 70 locomotives have been sabotaged. It is reported that both road and railway traffic is completely stopped in the valley of the Rhone. Canals have not been spared. . . . Subterranean cables have been cut in many places, and although some were well defended they have been attacked and destroyed. Many acts of sabotage have been carried out against transformer stations."

While it was neither possible nor desirable to enumerate all the "many effective acts of destruction," these "multiple and simultaneous cases of sabotage, co-ordinated with the Allied effort, have delayed considerably the movement of German reserves to the combat zone. Direct action also has been taken against the enemy. The *maquis* are reported to have taken 300 prisoners. German garrisons have been attacked. In some areas villages have been occupied. Street fighting has occurred elsewhere. Enemy detachments have been destroyed. Guerilla operations against the enemy are in full swing, and in some areas the Army of the French Forces of the Interior are in full control. . . ."

Nor were these all the services which the units commanded by General Koenig rendered to the Allied cause. They had received full instructions concerning the collection and transmission of information as to the enemy's movements and from D day onwards they kept Supreme Headquarters and the armies in France fully informed of the movements, composition, equipment and morale of the enemy's forces. They suffered heavy losses on occasion, and the Gestapo frequently tortured prisoners

and suspects to extract information, besides burning villages and committing other violences. The Germans claimed to have destroyed several bodies of "terrorists" reinforced by parachute detachments dropped by Allied aircraft in southern and western France, but whether these stories were true or not it is certain that they suffered heavily, notably in Brittany, in the Vercors region in the Department of Drome in south-eastern France, and in the neighbourhood of the Swiss frontier. The French had made an invaluable contribution to the Allied success and they were destined to play a still greater part in the campaign.

C. CHERBOURG FALLS

The Allied armies had now completed their initial tasks. They had consolidated their positions near the coast. They had extended their flanks in order to bring the port and the vital communication centre of Caen and the port of Cherbourg within their grasp. They now made ready for the capture of these two cities. Caen was the hinge of the German position and it was certain that it would be defended with the utmost vigour. Cherbourg, on the other hand, was somewhat less approachable owing to the flooding by the Germans of extensive areas in the south-east of the Cotentin peninsula, but it was plain that if the Americans could fight their way across the Cotentin and fend off attempts to relieve Cherbourg from the south their chances of capturing this most valuable harbour would be excellent.

On June 14 American troops driving south-east from the Forest of Cerisy took and held Caumont. British troops reached Villers Bocage, an important village on a road junction south-west of Caen, but were driven out again. All along the left centre and left of the Allied front there was heavy fighting in which both sides brought up large numbers of tanks. Three Panzer Divisions of the *Wehrmacht*, the 2nd, the re-constituted 21st and the Lehr (Instructional) Division and the 12th (Hitler Jugend) S.S. Panzer Division, were fighting here, and the 17th (Panzer Grenadier) Division, a motorized formation with a fairly strong tank regiment, was engaged with the Americans in the Cherbourg Peninsula. On the extreme east of the front the Germans managed to retain Troarn after hard fighting but British troops made some gains south-west of it on June 15.

The Germans did not confine their counter-attacks to the Villers Bocage-Caen sectors. *Communiqué* No. 19 reported the successful repulse


by American airborne troops of attempts to retake Carentan on June 13 and their advance south of the town and in the Baupré area. On the other hand, Montebourg was retaken by a heavy German attack. Next day, however, the U.S. troops, besides making further ground in the Carentan region, took Quinéville with the bayonet, an exploit which according to *Communiqué* No. 20 "made available a valuable new outlet from the beaches." During June 14 Allied warships engaged the enemy's mobile batteries, both across the Orne and in the Le Havre Peninsula and north of Quinéville. H.M.S. *Nelson* (Captain A. H. Maxwell-Hyslop) engaged the batteries at Le Havre and H.M.S. *Belfast* shelled enemy concentrations on the eastern flank.

The enemy's concentrations and communications in the Cotentin were subjected to heavy attacks throughout June 14 and these were followed by renewed thrusts by the American ground forces.

On June 16 St. Sauveur fell and the Americans pressed vigorously westward. After two days' hard fighting they broke through to the western coast of the peninsula. *Communiqué* No. 26 laconically recorded that "Allied troops have cut off the Cherbourg Peninsula from the rest of Normandy, reaching the west coast at Berneville-sur-Mer." In the centre a steady advance east of the Vire brought the Americans nearer St. Lo. The strong point at Douvres which had resisted since D day had been captured on June 17. The British troops, Commandos of the Royal Marines, who took it lost but one man, thanks to the excellent cover provided by mortar and howitzer fire and the co-operation of Churchill tanks. They took 150 prisoners, and it does not appear that the Germans, whose shelters and magazines were 50 feet below the surface, had lost many killed though they were much shaken by the bombardment and extremely tired by eleven days' shelling and siege.

Having fought their way across the Cherbourg Peninsula, General Bradley's troops set to work to exploit their success. They had driven a corridor from sea to sea, some 12 miles in width from Carentan to Le Ham and above five miles deep at its western extremity, and they now thrust forward to the north, driving a salient into the German line by the capture of the important road junction of Bricquebec, eight miles north-west of St. Sauveur, and several neighbouring villages. On the same day (June 19) they stormed Montebourg, which had been reduced to a heap of ruins during the fighting of the last five days, and made local gains on the southern flank of the corridor. Before noon on June 20 they had almost surrounded Valognes after heavy fighting.

By this time the German defence in the Cotentin was weakening, especially on the western side, where a vigorous thrust brought the American infantry to within five miles of the northern coast of the peninsula on June 21. The defenders of Valognes gave up the struggle



On the morning of June 25 *Communiqué* No. 39 said :

Allied troops are in the outskirts of Cherbourg and the final assault has begun. On a ten-mile front extending east and west of the city our forces have advanced to within three miles of the sea. The enemy continues to fight desperately, but relentless Allied pressure is steadily overcoming the defences throughout the entire length of the narrow coastal strip." The *communiqué* added that fighters and fighter-bombers had "attacked railway yards, tracks, bridges, tunnels and rolling stock at the base of the Cherbourg Peninsula," obviously with the intention of checking any German attempt to effect a diversion from the south. In Germany, the High Command prepared the public for news of the fall of the fortress by admitting that the garrison had yielded ground "in close, grim combat." Unofficial commentators were less guarded. After having told the German reader or listener that the West Wall could not be compared for strength to Cherbourg, which was "the real thing," they now explained that the loss of the port would to some degree fall in with the wishes of Marshal Rundstedt, since the Germans were anxious to get, "not elements of the Anglo-American Army, but its full strength ashore and in range of their guns."

Another sign of the impending fall of Cherbourg was the attempt of the enemy to run the blockade of the harbour by sending merchantment and small naval craft out by night. Several of these ships were caught and destroyed by Allied aircraft. Shortly after midnight on June 23-24 a convoy of seven vessels attempting to escape with its escort to the westward was detected and attacked by our light coastal craft.

"In a series of attacks," SHAEF announced, "two of the merchant vessels were destroyed and a further three received serious damage. The remnant of the convoy found shelter at Alderney. Our forces sustained some superficial damage and a few casualties. . . ." The names of four officers commanding coastal force units engaged were given in the *communiqué*.

Communiqué No. 41 issued from SHAEF early on June 26 announced the entry of the American forces into the port. Allied troops were fighting in the streets and on Sunday afternoon (June 25) had reached within a mile of the port on the east side. During a day of fierce fighting with the support of naval bombardment, enemy strong points were reduced one by one and the town was entered at many points simultaneously. The mopping-up of the still resisting posts of the outer defences continued.

On June 26 Cherbourg fell, twenty days after the initial landing on the beaches. Its fall followed 24 hours' hard fighting, chiefly in the north-western part of the city. *Communiqué* No. 43 summed up the enemy's losses in a laconic paragraph which ran :

"In the battle the enemy has lost the greater part of four infantry divisions, numerous naval and marine units, and line of communication troops. Lieutenant-General Carl Wilhelm von Schlieben, commander of the Cherbourg garrison, and Rear-Admiral Hennecke, sea defence com-

mander of Normandy, have been captured." The German troops defending the Cherbourg arsenal held out for another 12 hours before surrendering. Other bodies of Germans continued to resist in the forts on the breakwater, near Cap Barfleur, at the north-eastern, and at the Maupertus aerodrome and Cap de la Hague at the north-western tip of the peninsula. The positions near Cap Barfleur were soon taken but the forts on the breakwater and the Maupertus position held out until June 29 and it was not until the morning of July 1 that the last German pill-boxes and bunkers in the Cap de la Hague area surrendered. The count of prisoners taken in the Cherbourg campaign until June 28 was officially stated to have been 37,333. They came from the 77th, 91st, 243rd and 709th Divisions, from the naval and coastal artillery units employed in the defence of the port and from various technical units. The Americans buried about 4,000 German dead.

The Allied navies kept a close watch on Cherbourg Harbour during the last days in order to prevent the escape of part of the garrison by sea. Two armed German trawlers were destroyed off the Channel Islands early on June 28 by H.M.S. *Eskimo* and H.M.C.S. *Huron*. The enemy did as much damage as he could to the harbour installations before he surrendered—and that was plenty—and the removal of his mines and, still more, of some of the wrecks which blocked the approaches to the harbour was a lengthy business. Large quantities of war material and supplies were, nevertheless, captured intact by the victors. They also took several flying-bomb installations during their advance¹ and a large concrete structure, which greatly puzzled Allied technical experts. It was at first thought to be designed for the firing of *Vergeltungswaffe*² *Zwei* (V2), which was said to be a huge rocket-propelled projectile, but after closer examination it seemed more probable that it was intended as a store for great numbers of flying-bombs³.

¹ It is doubtful whether any of these had yet been used.

² i.e. "Retribution-weapon Two."

³ The Aeronautical Correspondent of *The Times* described the still unfinished structure as follows: "There is a main ramp 700 ft. to 750 ft. in length, 50 ft. thick, and 70 ft. wide, with a slight elevation, pointing 10 degrees north of due west. An extension which joins the main ramp at right angles is 300 ft. long, 120 ft. wide, and 36 ft. deep. Running through the entire length and full width of the extension is a tunnel 20 ft. high." (*The Times*, June 27).

The fact that the ramp pointed in the direction of western Kerry and ultimately of Newfoundland seemed to rule out the theory that it was intended for the launching of rockets—unless, indeed, the Germans hoped, firstly to establish themselves for good in northern France, and secondly to devise a rocket-propelled projectile which could cross the Atlantic!

While the American forces under General Bradley's command had been battling for the prize, a great port, its garrison and its supplies, the British and Canadian troops in the area between Caen and Villers Bocage had been pressing the Germans hard. Their task was in some respects more difficult than that of the American First Army, and they were often impeded by the weather, of which General Eisenhower was said to have observed that even the English had criticized it.

On June 19 British and Canadian troops retook Tilly-sur-Seulles and held it against a series of heavy counter-attacks in which the Germans employed many tanks on June 20 and 21. Fighting was particularly heavy about Hottot, $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles west-south-west of Tilly, and even when the main German counter-attacks had died down sharp local encounters continued here and between Tilly and Caen. The American troops north and north-east of St. Lo also nibbled at the German positions, making small gains here and there, and like the British and Canadians, holding powerful German forces in expectation of a major attack. It came on June 25 when British troops attacked before dawn under cover of a heavy barrage. The attack was at first described as a local offensive but next day it developed into a more extensive thrust. Here is a summary of the progress which it made as recorded in SHAEF *communiqués* and by war correspondents at the front :

The attack which opened June 25 had given us the villages of Fontenay-le-Pesnel and Juvigny, and the troops who had carried Juvigny attacked again next day and broke through the German line to a depth of from one to three miles, reaching Cheux to the east. The attack was pressed home, and on June 27 our men had crossed the Caen-Villers Bocage railway five miles west of Caen and had reached the River Odon, which joins the Orne from the south-west a short distance south of Caen. The Germans fought fiercely. They were troops of excellent quality and the weather, which was usually atrocious, generally protected them from the attacks of our aircraft. But in spite of their resistance, they were forced back to the south-east. *Communiqué* No. 46 (June 28, night) recorded their expulsion from Rauray, south-east of Fontenay, and also that "after further heavy fighting in Grainville and Tourville, our infantry and armour crossed the River Odon, south of Tourville, on a front of about two miles." By nightfall on June 28 a salient about 8,000 yards deep and 5,000 yards wide had been driven into the enemy's position and frequent German attacks on its flanks had been beaten off.

On June 29 strong British armoured forces advanced towards Evrecy and Esquay on the road to Aunay-sur-Odon, and north of Evrecy they met German reinforcements. Heavy fighting followed and though the enemy held Evrecy, the flanks of our bridgehead over the Odon were extended and *Communiqué* No. 50 issued during the night of June 30 said : "Allied forces driving their salient towards the Orne River in the Caen sector have compelled the enemy to throw in strong armoured reserves in an effort to hold our advance. In spite of repeated counter-attacks by these formations our positions have not only been held, but improved." It was stated on July 1 that the Germans had seven armoured divisions, an unusual strength of tanks, between the Vire and the Orne and that most of these were in the eastern sectors of the front. But the battle was going in our favour ; German attempts against the flanks of our extending salient failed and German losses were proportionate to the vigour of these thrusts.

On June 28 it was estimated that the enemy's losses in Normandy since D day had amounted to about 75,000, of whom 40,000 were prisoners. An official statement was issued on that day announcing the total of casualties among the Allied forces in Normandy from June 6 to June 20 inclusive. They were :

| | <i>Killed</i> | <i>Wounded</i> | <i>Missing</i> | <i>Total</i> |
|-------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|
| American .. | 3,082 | 13,121 | 7,959 | 24,162 |
| British .. | 1,842 | 8,599 | 3,131 | 13,572 |
| Canadian .. | 363 | 1,359 | 1,093 | 2,815 |

This total of 40,549 fell far below the expectations of not a few observers who, not unnaturally, based their calculations on what had happened at Dieppe, where nothing heavier than a destroyer provided naval cover and air support was mainly composed of fighters. Nor did the pessimists realize how greatly the technique of landing operations and the actual landing craft had been improved since 1942.

In the air the Allied squadrons had continued to give the ground troops all possible tactical support from Cherbourg to Caen, and still more in the enemy's rear. It is impossible to enumerate all their targets in this section, but it can be said that in spite of bad weather, which greatly restricted air activity on June 26 and 27 and during part of June 28, they left unbombed very few important road or railway bridges, marshalling yards, supply depots or airfields in northern, central or western France.

The greatest weight of attack was naturally concentrated on the area between Loire and Seine, but the bombers went further afield, reaching the Bordeaux-Mérignac aerodrome in the south-west, Laon and St. Quentin in the north, and Metz in the east. On June 24 Angers was raided and the attackers claimed the destruction of 50 German aircraft on the ground. The launching ramps of the flying bombs between Le

Havre and Dunkirk were also punished, and on June 23-24 ten sites were attacked within ten hours by over 1,000 aircraft. The effect of some of these raids on German mobility was summed up as follows (B.I.N. XXI, No. 14, p. 556) : "The destruction of the railways, particularly north and west of Paris, forced the Germans to send their troop trains right round the south of Paris and thence north-west *via* Chartres and Dreux, and there were many reports of several days being wasted *en route* and of tanks having to come all the way by road," while "the life of the Panther tank's engine was believed to run to only 620 miles." On days when the weather was not too bad at least 6,000 sorties were flown.

CHAPTER III

THE GERMAN-SOVIET WAR

By Lieut.-Colonel H. de Watteville, C.B.E., M.A., p.s.c.

By the end of March, 1944, the protracted and sanguinary struggle for the possession of the Ukraine had come near to its end. Although the Germans were still holding on to Odessa and a few other points, their complete eviction from the whole of south Russia, properly speaking, was all but accomplished. The principal strategic outcome of the past winter campaign was now clear. The German Ukrainian Armies had first been forced back on their left flank until they faced generally towards the north instead of towards the east; then they were attacked piecemeal. Further, in the course of their retreat, their forces had gradually been split into two main groups as their centre was pressed back against the projecting bastion of the Carpathian Mountains. Consequently the unity both of their command and of their supply lines had been broken. So they were perforce being reorganized into two separate Army Groups. Their former left wing remained under the command of von Manstein who now received the task of holding the open country lying to the north of the Carpathians so as to cover the important base of Lwow (Lemberg) and the approaches to Silesia; while the former right wing was now placed under the orders of von Kleist, erstwhile commander of the armoured divisions that were routed at Rostov in November, 1941, and subsequently in other battles. His mission was to hold the Russian advance into Rumania and towards the Danube delta. This separation of the two German Armies, intensified to a dangerous degree by the miserable communications existing in rear of von Kleist's group, exposed either of these forces to a serious risk of being attacked and defeated without the hope of receiving any assistance from its neighbour.

On the other hand, the difficulties now facing all further Russian advances were considerable ; to that extent, then, the Germans might hope to escape from their immediate predicament. In particular, the railway problems facing the Russian engineers were likely to become more than serious. The rehabilitation of the Russian railways which had been proceeding night and day behind the Red Army's progress for the past nine months was about to encounter some formidable obstacles. As far as the old frontiers of Russia railway reconstruction had consisted mainly in restoring the tracks to their original Russian gauge. But now the problem was to alter somewhat. If the Russian rolling stock, which was built for a gauge of line broader than the European standard, not to mention a higher loading gauge, was to run on European systems the Russian engineers would soon be faced with the task of a total reconstruction of the European lines to accommodate the larger Russian rolling stock. If not, then it would seem that there must take place a change of rolling stock, which must first be procured, and then a change-over of loads.

Even so, besides making ready for any of these tasks, there must also be carried out a considerable volume of preparation for any further advance by road. The work that had fallen on the Russian transport services during the first three months of the year, or rather since Vatutin's first moves out of Kiev in late November, 1943, must have been so exacting as to require a thorough overhaul of those services, and probably an incalculable amount of replacement. Finally, there was the question of renewing the roads over which these great movements had been carried out, since roads improvised to take transport in winter must require a deal of reconstruction to stand up to summer droughts and, possibly, faster progress ; let alone the fact that sleigh transport ceases to be practicable.

Finally, there were considerations of yet another kind. The Russian High Command—whether or not in conformity with decisions taken in conjunction with their Allies does not matter—were clearly going to make a great

effort to strike down the German Armies by one mortal stroke. This result was to be attained by the employment of an overwhelming weight of numbers and of armament. At the same time the Russian Armies were to be prepared to move over far greater distances and at a far higher rate of speed than had been the case during the previous years. To make ready for such a contingency needed time.

Now, it would appear that official Russian computations estimated the strength of the German Armies on the Eastern Front, in the spring of 1944, to be still no less than 230 German and satellite divisions. But on the other hand, it was admitted that each one of these divisions had now sunk to an average strength of no more than 7,000 men, that is half the effective war establishment of the *Wehrmacht* of 1941. There would thus be not more than one and three-quarter million German front-line combatant troops spread out along the entire Russian front.¹ But behind these troops there stood a second line of ancillary services and labour forces whose numbers it would be idle to state, even if trustworthy figures could be given, since heavy calls were now undoubtedly being made upon the Eastern Front for the purposes of fortifying the West Wall and of stiffening the garrisons in the West. The shadow of impending events on the Atlantic coast was undoubtedly beginning to exert a decidedly weakening influence along the Russian front. Hitler's strategy of attack by sheer weight of fire and of numbers, with every disregard for casualty lists, had exhausted the *Wehrmacht* to a degree that had never yet been brought home so clearly to the High Command. That legendary lament of "Varus, Varus, give me back my legions!" was now echoing from the other side of the valley and in another tongue.

The Russians intended to make sure of their stroke : so they began massing their forces for the summer cam-

¹ If to this total there be added every man that the Germans could place in the field between northern Finland and all the way along the "Western Wall," Italy and the Balkans, this would give a grand total of 4,000,000 combatants.

paign until these cannot have numbered less than 4,000,000 combatants in the front line. How far they called upon their "winter" and "intermediate" armies of 1942-1943 to reinforce the great armies assembling for a campaign which was to prove decisive, cannot be said. New units were certainly formed out of reserves. Anyhow, it can be assumed that troops and armament were being concentrated from every source for the coming battles.

Already the new Russian Air Force had been brought to a high level in regard to both numbers and efficiency. The Russians would thus be entering upon the summer campaign with a superiority, both on the ground and in the air, which may have risen to a proportion of over three to one: what their superiority may have been at any decisive point or points it is as yet impossible to say. In places it might well have reached the proportions of six, eight, or even ten to one.

Nevertheless in spite of such superiority the prospects of the whole coming campaign seemed to turn upon the satisfactory solution of two main problems—railways, road transport.

In the meantime the Russians, whilst getting ready to launch their massive summer offensive, were still able to continue winding up their spring campaign. Indeed, there was still much to be done in southern Russia. In the first place it was necessary to complete the repulse of the German forces from Odessa and from along the adjoining Black Sea coast. Secondly, they must make sure that the Germans should not have the necessary space to emerge and to deploy in the eastern Carpathian foot-hills with a view to a counter-offensive launched into the Ukrainian plain against Russian communications. Thirdly, they must cover themselves adequately from attack along the Lwow corridor. Lastly, there was the matter of recovering the Crimea.

Consequently the first ten days of April were spent by the second and third Russian Ukrainian Armies in thrusting forward and consolidating their gains. Malinovsky, at the head of the Third Army, moved the fastest.

Having already secured the historic fortress of Ochakov on the last day of March he could afford to move briskly towards Odessa. This great port was not strongly defended by the Germans. Its evacuation was, in fact, admitted by the German radio as being inevitable since it lay on the eastern bank of the Dniester. So Malinovsky entered Odessa, his own native town, on April 10.



SITUATION ON APRIL 12

Simultaneously with this advance Konev's Second Army was making slower but sure progress along the centre, that is on Malinovsky's right. On April 2 he reached the River Pruth, which he proceeded to cross without any delay. This event possessed a deep significance which was made clear, in Moscow, on that same evening, when M. Molotov, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, made the following statement :

"As a result of its successful advance, the Red Army reached the River Pruth, which forms the State frontier between the U.S.S.R. and Rumania.

This constitutes the beginning of the full restoration of the Soviet State frontier established in 1940 by a treaty between the Soviet Union and Rumania, which was treacherously violated in 1941 by the Rumanian Government in alliance with Hitlerite Germany.

At the present time the Red Army is clearing Soviet territory of all enemy troops, and the time is not far distant when the entire Soviet frontier with Rumania will be completely restored.

The Soviet Government announces that advancing Red Army troops, pursuing the German armies and the Rumanian troops allied with them

have crossed the River Pruth in several sectors and have entered Rumanian territory.

The Supreme Command of the Red Army has given the order to the advancing Soviet troops to pursue the enemy until he is routed and has surrendered.

At the same time, the Soviet Government declares that it does not pursue the aim of acquiring any part of Rumanian territory, or of changing the existing social system of Rumania, and that the entry of the Soviet troops into Rumania is dictated exclusively by military necessity and by the continued resistance of enemy troops."

The blow aimed at this, their most docile satellite state, was most unwelcome to the German authorities. In every broadcast pronouncement made by German news services the fact was emphasized that Rumania would not be abandoned to her fate. Here, for instance, is what Dittmar had to say on the subject :

"It is necessary to protect the area of Greater Rumania with all the forces and means at our disposal. If enemy and even some neutral countries recently insinuated that the German Command would leave Rumania and Hungary to their fate, this suspicion must be termed completely absurd, even if only strategic considerations could apply. The words of the German Foreign Minister have made the situation entirely clear. They have shown the difference between our idea of loyalty to allies and that of our enemies who cold-bloodedly and unscrupulously hand over their former allies to their present stronger comrades-in-arms. For a people with a soldierly attitude, loyalty to a promise is always a matter of course. A policy of alliances is therefore never merely a matter of calculation or of business, but also in every case a matter of the heart. It would seem to us that the common European interest has never been so obvious as it is now when the defence of one of the integral parts of our space and of the political and ethnical community which make up the conception of Europe is at stake."

But these bold words did not deter the Russian High Command from extending and improving their hold on these newly won gains in every direction. By April 4 the River Yiyia was reached to the north-west of Jassy. Konev had thus penetrated 15 miles to the west of the River Pruth and had cut the Germans' last lateral railway line at Denzhini. By the 8th the Pruth had been crossed at several other points along a front of 100 miles ; beyond it the River Sereth had been reached along a length of 50 miles. By the 10th it was announced that the Sereth was crossed to the west of Isotosani and that the Russians were in possession of the railway running from Cernauti to Bacau ; so the rail communications in the Carpathian foothills and the rail junctions leading

into Transylvania were now securely in their hands. Rumania was being seriously invaded—despite the German declarations.

Further to the right Russian progress was not so marked. The town of Kovel, an important German supply and communication centre, would appear to have been occupied by the Russians at the end of March. But the forces in occupation were insufficient to stave off the very strong German counter-attacks aimed at recovering the place. So it was lost, a fact which the Germans trumpeted abroad as showing that the fighting qualities of the German soldier were “fully intact.”

In the meantime, Tarnopol, another great communication centre, surrounded since March 20, was still holding out : the Germans there besieged are said to have received orders to fight to the very last.

The battle for Tarnopol assumed epic proportions in German publicity. While these “siege” operations were still in progress, on April 8 an Order of the Day from Moscow announced the fact that Zhukov’s troops had then reached the frontiers of the Soviet Union marching with Russia and Czechoslovakia for a length of over 120 miles. Three days later came the first news, through a similar Order of the Day that for “some days” (no date given) the Fourth Army under General Tolbukhin had reappeared and was then engaged in penetrating into the Crimea through the German defences of the Perekop Isthmus, whilst another “Independent Maritime Army,” commanded by General Yeremenko, had captured the long and fiercely contested town of Kerch at the eastern tip of the Crimea and had advanced some 20 miles into the peninsula.

At this point it is not proposed to describe the Crimean campaign at greater length. But it needs mention since it is as well to remember that the Russian High Command had shown the decision and courage to conduct a simultaneous four-pronged campaign. We will, therefore, deal with the last phase of the great Dnieper operations and then sum up their main features.

In Bessarabia on April 15 Tarnopol was finally captured by the Russians after some stubborn street fighting. Tarnopol, an important junction of railways, highways and country roads radiating throughout the whole of the Ukraine, was perhaps one of the three focal points which the Germans were determined to contest to the last ; the others being Sebastopol and the south-west crossings


of the River Dniester. So they struggled grimly as long as they could to hold on to the city. The fighting at the approaches to the town was extremely violent. The Germans mounted heavy tank attacks, but still failed to prevent Russian armour and infantry from driving home their assault.

The offensive had developed mainly along the highways. Turning the town, and investing it in a semi-circle, the Red Army cut the Tarnopol-Brody, Tarnopol-Volochissk and Tarnopol-Proskurov highways. The enemy continued to fight back, since the opportune arrival of operational reserves made it possible for him to draw out the struggle for yet a few days longer. By massing these reserves in one sector at a time, he succeeded in checking the Russians, but this success was partial and temporary. Slowly the ring closed. The German command organized a relief operation and hurled several tank units to aid the surrounded troops. They repeatedly attempted to break into the ring ; but the Red Army fought them off.

The Germans had dug three lines of trenches on the south-eastern outskirts of the town. The advancing Russians pierced them, while equally powerful blows were aimed at other parts of the defences. Breaking into Tarnopol simultaneously from the north, east and south, the Russians wrested house after house, block after block from the enemy, drawing the noose tighter and tighter. The position of the surrounded garrison grew worse every day. It suffered an acute shortage of ammunition and provisions.

Sixteen thousand officers and men had been surrounded in the town. An order from Hitler was read to them, demanding that Tarnopol must in all circumstances be held, stressing the huge strategical importance of this "gate to Germany." They were promised assistance in the shape of tanks from Lwow. But no aid came. After his tanks had taken heavy punishment, the enemy risked no more counter-attacks from outside. Transport planes dropped ammunition, food and even a box of iron crosses for the surrounded garrison. The end came on April 15. The garrison was destroyed except for 2,400 men who surrendered.

On the other hand, some remnants of the German divisions, which had been surrounded at Skala in late March, managed to rejoin a powerful counter-attack which had been mounted by the Germans to break into the Russian besieging troops from the west. On April 10 this attempt at relief succeeded in capturing Buczac. At this point more Germans escaping from Skala managed to rejoin the relieving force ; these however can only have been mere detachments of what at an early stage of this sanguinary campaign had been no less than 14 divisions. Satisfied with this result the German relieving troops seemed to withdraw while the Russians gradually followed up the enemy in a westerly direction. It is curious that the Germans should have said so little in their announce-



THE INVASION OF RUMANIA, APRIL, 1944

ments of this relief, whereas fantastic claims were made by them as to "breaking out" of the Tarnopol garrison. Is it possible that for reasons of prestige they made use of the meagre success won at Skala in order to glorify the defence of Tarnopol which had already assumed heroic proportions in their reports?

In this fashion the general advance of the three Russian armies continued fitfully, though surely. Tiraspol, a good road and rail centre near the south-west course of the River Dniester, fell; then with that success the Russian pressure relaxed. West of Tarnopol the German resistance grew harder, as the Russian attacks grew more laboured. South of Tarnopol and south-east of Stanislavov the Germans even counter-attacked. They claimed gains of ground to the north-west of Jassy. They even asserted that they had secured the initiative on the Cernauti-Kovel front. Then east of Stanislavov they claimed that a Hungarian division had recovered ground on the road to the Jablonica Pass between April 19 and 21. On the lower Dniester they announced a complete "defensive victory" on April 20.

Broadly speaking, it may be said that with the end of the third week of April the vast battle—or rather sequence of battles—of the Dnieper had ended with the complete eviction of the German invaders from the Ukraine after suffering at least 1,500,000 casualties and sacrificing masses of every sort of armament and material. This great operation had run through several distinct phases; it merits recapitulation as follows:

1. The savage fighting in the Kursk-Orel salients which occupied the last three weeks of July, 1943.
2. The beginning of the great Russian counter-offensive throughout August with occasional fierce struggles that extended as far to the south-east as the River Donetz.
3. The German withdrawal to the general line of the River Dnieper in late August and September.
4. The forcing of the great river barrier beginning on September 29 at Kremenchug and ending with the capture of Kiev on November 6.
5. The subsequent Russian advance from Kiev and the splitting of the greater German front against the Pripet marshes (November).
6. Von Manstein's prolonged and fierce counter-attacks against the Russian salient driven out westwards from Kiev (November-December).
7. The renewed Russian thrust westwards and south-westwards which

ended in a second splitting of the German front against the bastion of the Carpathians, in the invasion of Rumania and the final eviction of the Germans from the Russian Black Sea coast.

The Dnieper is one of the most formidable water barriers in Europe. The Red Army crossed it over a length of about 440 miles, along its middle and lower reaches where it is widest and deepest. Moreover, the western bank, which had been strongly fortified by the Germans, dominates the eastern bank, and there the enemy had prepared to defend himself with the utmost stubbornness. Yet the Red Army forced the Dnieper, rapidly captured bridgeheads on the western bank, broadened them in the teeth of violent resistance, and swiftly developed an all-out offensive.

The Soviet success in these crossings was due to the fact that the Russian High Command had been able to crush simultaneously and beforehand the four main enemy concentrations—the Orel-Bryansk, Kharkov-Poltava, Smolensk and Donbas groupings—thus depriving them of any real operational and strategical unity. As a result, the German High Command was unable to display any serious initiative on the east bank of the Dnieper, though it tried time and again to parry the coming blow. Indeed, it would seem that the Germans had calculated on launching a great concentric blow, chiefly from the Poltava direction, in conjunction with an auxiliary blow from the line of the lower reaches of the Desna, by which they had hoped to rout the entire Soviet concentrations along the middle reaches of the Dnieper. But the Russian Supreme Command saw what was intended and acted in good time. So the Germans were afforded no chance of consolidating their grip anywhere on the east bank, no chance of stemming the offensive, even along well-prepared defence lines.

The original battles for the bridgeheads on the western bank then developed while the Germans brought up isolated infantry and tank groups which pressed hard on the Russian crossings in heavy counter-attacks. But by that time the Russian artillery had reached the western bank and was just able to paralyse even whole German

divisions, while the tanks, working with the infantrymen, carried the latter deep into the enemy positions, and helped them to capture dominating heights, while the Red Air Force dealt with enemy reserves.

The remarkable features of the fighting on the Dnieper were :

1. The Red Army's success in crossing the river on a wide front, almost as soon as the advanced troops had reached the bank. The enemy was thus forced to fritter away his reserves in futile counter-attacks.

2. The widening of the bridgeheads on the western bank was so rapid that it created most advantageous conditions for the next stage of the battle.

3. The accuracy with which the Russian Supreme Command had directed their forces in directions which ensured that all fronts had close operational collaboration, and that all enemy counter-manceuvres could be paralysed by rapid movement.

Yet that was not all. Simultaneously with the Kiev operations, the Russian Supreme Command carried out the vast Gomel operation. The two were closely interconnected since the Gomel operation deprived the enemy of all opportunity to strike a deadly counter-blow at the Kiev operation from the north-west. Finally, with the capture of Kiev, the battle of the Dnieper grew into a battle for the whole of the Ukraine on the western bank of the river, and also for at least part of White Russia to the north.

There still remained the clearance of the Crimea. As already related, by April 10 Tolbukhin's Fourth Army had forced the defences of the Perekop Isthmus and had, farther to the east, carried out a bold attack across the very shallow Sivash lagoons, known as "The Putrid Sea."


The Perekop Isthmus, a strip of land nine miles wide, bristled with German defence works and minefields. For success the Russians relied on two factors ; first, a thorough and accurate reconnaissance of all the enemy's works which had been proceeding for five months ; secondly,

an overwhelming artillery bombardment of all the German works that had been located thereby. Further, the actual attack was preceded by a very effective feint assault that caused the Germans to disclose their plan of defence.

Simultaneously, a powerful attack had been launched farther east across the Sivash where the enemy's defences were so far penetrated that in spite of heavy gunfire directed on this absolutely flat and treeless surface, mostly swamp, the Russians made fast progress along the narrow causeways which separate the lagoons. The combined drive for Perekop and over the Sivash caused the whole German defence system to crumble. At the eastern end of the peninsula at Kerch it was much the same tale. For five months, that is since the previous November, the two opponents had continued bickering over this scene of much past fighting. Now at last, after a terrific artillery and air bombardment, the town was carried by the Russians.

By April 13 the Russians had captured Dzhankoi, the greatest traffic centre of the Crimea, as well as the two little ports of Eupatoria and Feodosia. Simferopol, the Crimean capital, next fell. The Germans had now lost the whole of the Crimea except Sevastopol, so it was to the reduction of that fortress that the Russians at once turned. The siege was fierce. The Russian approach across forested and hilly terrain, cut up by little gorges, was strongly contested, whilst the German engineers were busy strengthening the already powerful defences of the fortress. In 1942 it had taken the Germans 45 days to reduce; now in three days it was once more to be in Russian hands. The precipitous crags round Sevastopol had been converted into a labyrinth of cunningly devised defences. Three great belts of works surrounded the harbour. In each of these the cliffs had been honey-combed and crammed with artillery and every kind of defensive weapon. It was up such rocks that hour after hour, under murderous fire, the Russian assault groups clawed their way up to the highest dominating point of the defences—and so through the triple girdle of the

German works. It is perhaps best to reproduce the description in which that gifted journalist, Alexander Werth, has recorded the bare facts of this feat of arms only a few days after its achievement.¹



SEVASTOPOL

"The enemy's idea was to hold Sevastopol for a considerable time with picked German troops. Around Sevastopol there is a crescent of hills west of the Inkerman Valley, and the best known of these is the Sapun Ridge, where the Germans had built what they believed to be impregnable fortifications, or, at any rate, fortifications which would enable them to bleed the Russians white for weeks and months. But the Russians took the Sapun Ridge by storm. The attack by the infantry was preceded by a devastating artillery and mortar barrage, together with aerial bombardment. Then the infantry, despite the German artillery and mortar fire, reached the top of the ridge, though with unquestionably heavy losses. The operation was carried out by picked troops, many of whom had taken part in the defence of Stalingrad. Two days later the Russians were inside Sevastopol.

The storming of Sapun Ridge was one of the boldest operations of this war. Its success had been determined by a big diversion two days previously, when the Russians had attacked Sevastopol in great strength from the north and the Germans were compelled to move northward part of their forces from the main defences in the east.

When Sevastopol fell about 30,000 Germans, all first-class troops, retreated to the 10-mile wide Chersonese Peninsula, west of Sevastopol. This was a death-trap to the Germans. Their troops, whose one desire was to get away by sea, were demoralized by ceaseless shelling and bombing. The German fighter opposition had become very weak and sporadic because all their three airfields on the small peninsula were under shell-fire and

¹ *Sunday Times*, May 21, 1943.

constant bombing. Nevertheless, they received bomber support from Rumania, and German bombers also still raided Sevastopol itself.

But on the night of May 11-12 the Russians attacked in force. They broke through the first line running four miles across the peninsula. The Germans fell back to the second line, which was nearer the points where they expected their evacuation ships to be. But that night only four ships arrived, and two were promptly sunk by the Russian guns. The German prisoners themselves reckoned later that not more than a thousand men of the 30,000 could have escaped from the Chersonese trap. Despair seized the doomed troops as they waited in vain for the ships to come.

In the early hours of May 12 the second line was captured and then the Germans began to surrender in thousands, though no general order to surrender had been given. It was a complete debacle. The Germans had been deceived by vain promises of ships coming and their feeling against their own Command was considerable. Hitler's Crimean Army ended its days in an atmosphere of panic and recrimination.

His mad decision to hold the Crimea at any price cost him 120,000 men, much more than half of them Germans and first-class troops at that. Except in the costly but very rapid actions of the storming of Perekop, the Sivash, Kerch and the Outer Ring of the Sevastopol defences, the Russian losses were not great."

During the last ten days of April the fighting on the Ukrainian front would seem to have died down to insignificant proportions. Indeed, from that moment until the end of this quarter a virtual lull in the campaign might be said to have prevailed in south Russia. Still it cannot be said that hostilities really ever ceased. Minor activity persisted, especially during the last ten days of May when the Germans made a prolonged attempt, to the north and north-west of Jassy, to thrust back the Russian front. This effort was in fact quite substantial; and it involved the use of a certain amount of armour. Little benefit can be said to have accrued to the Germans from these attacks, which it is legitimate to assume were tinged with a political purpose in that they clearly sought to put some substance into the grandiloquent promises made to Rumania to the effect that the latter country would be protected with the full German might. Otherwise this offensive was scarcely of a calibre that could be calculated to upset the equilibrium of the Russian preparations for their coming summer offensive, although the Germans were able to claim some gains of ground as the fruits of their counter-attack. But the Russian reports spoke of these as "a few small wedges" driven into their positions "at heavy cost," this including 95 tanks and 106 aircraft.

Elsewhere on the remaining Eastern Front no engagement took place that might be considered worthy of special record. At first the Germans would report the defeat of strong enemy attempts to break through all principal sectors, though mainly in the Ukraine. The Russians in their turn announced the defeat of German attacks south-east of Stanislavov. The Germans next claimed great "defensive successes" on the lower course of the River Dnieper in actions that were never even mentioned in any Russian counter-claim. During May the Russians had announced strong German efforts to reduce their (Russian) bridgehead on the Dniester north-west of Tiraspol, which were held. On May 12 the Germans proclaimed the total liquidation of this bridgehead with the killing of thousands of Russians and the capture of 600 guns. At the end of the month similar statements were again made concerning fighting said to have taken place east of Lvov and again on the lower Dniester, where there were reported to exist new large-scale Russian concentrations of troops.

So things continued along various sectors of the front after the close of the first week in June when far more serious operations placed all these relatively trivial encounters well in the shade.

In all the operations taking place in this quarter one of the main causes of Russian success, even against the strongest of German counter-attacks supported by armour, had consistently proved to be the superiority of the artillery arm. Still, the new mobility which the Russian artillery formations now possessed was being enhanced. If and when full details become known, nothing may prove more surprising than this increasing mobility of the Russian heavy artillery. To this fact, combined with the huge scale of the supplies of available munitions, may be attributed the powerful and cleverly directed concentrations of artillery fire that seemed able to shatter not only the most powerful "hedgehog" defence works but also the strongest of tank assaults. The experiences gained during the German defeat at Kursk-Byelgorod in July, 1943, were the basis on which the

Russians were continually working to secure even better tactical results. The outcome of the latest fighting, both on the lower Dniester and at Sevastopol, provides an eloquent demonstration of the power of the Russian gunners.

Air warfare, however, seems to have been maintained throughout May on a far more intensive scale. The Russians aimed heavy attacks at all the more important communication centres in rear of the entire German front. Details of these operations are so meagre as to render any further examination of them quite nugatory : it would be scarcely possible to do more than repeat mere catalogue of names. However, the fact that these Russian undertakings possessed considerable value and importance admits of no doubt ; the more so when the events of the subsequent campaign come to be unravelled.

The Germans, too, claim to have been active in the air, mainly by night. Nevertheless, in view of the known inferiority of the *Luftwaffe*, any aerial operations that were then carried out can never have proved productive of truly remunerative results. It is at any rate scarcely possible to believe that they resulted in the collection of any information of the slightest value by the weakened German air forces.

Yet another entirely new development in the air war was foreshadowed in the announcement made on June 2 to the effect that strong formations of U.S.A. Flying Fortresses escorted by long-distance Mustangs coming from the Mediterranean had landed on Russian aerodromes. Further explanation made it clear that this was no fortuitous nor single occurrence, but that regular bases were henceforth to be used by the American Air Force in the southern Ukraine at a few hundred kilometres distance behind the fighting front. The purpose served by such a new development should prove of incalculable advantage in an intensified air offensive against Germany.

Great changes in the Armies, too, were taking place. For some time past a complete reconstruction of the Russian Armies was being carried out with a view to the launching of the great summer offensive. Indeed it is more

than probable that a preliminary redistribution of reinforcements of troops and armament had been in hand for months, especially on the northern sectors and in rear of the fighting zone on the centre of the great front. From subsequent information it would appear that it had been planned to place not less—and probably more—than 300 divisions in the front line. These formations were to be fully up to war establishment. The supply of armament and ammunition was calculated on a lavish scale. In particular the organization of highly mobile artillery divisions and corps was to be improved and extended. The front-line Russian strength may finally have exceeded 4,500,000 men.

Soviet Orders of the Day, published later, show that the newly organized Armies, or Groups of Armies, numbered not less than twelve. Each of these, it may be assumed, comprised on an average some 25–30 divisions of all natures. The lines of communication used to supply these vast assemblies of men were greatly improved in capacity whilst they were reorganized so as to admit of considerable variations in the forward flow of convoys.

These twelve Armies, or Army Groups, designated by the Russians as “Fronts,” are named below, together with the names of their commanders. These Army titles do not connote any strict topographical location of the Army in question, but only a general and initial distribution. From north to south, these new Russian Armies were roughly allocated as follows :

| <i>Front.</i> | <i>Commander.</i> |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Karelian | Army-General Meretskov. |
| Leningrad | Army-General Govorov. |
| 1st Baltic | Army-General Bagramyan |
| 2nd Baltic | Army-General Yermenko. |
| 3rd Baltic | Colonel-General Maslennikov. |
| 1st White Russian ¹ .. | Army-General Rokossovsky. |
| 2nd White Russian .. | Colonel-General Zakharov |
| 3rd White Russian .. | Colonel-General Chernyakhovsky. |
| 1st Ukrainian | Marshal Konev. |
| 2nd Ukrainian | Army-General Malinovsky. |
| 3rd Ukrainian* | Army-General Tolbukhin. |
| 4th Ukrainian | Colonel-General Petrov. |

The fall of Odessa and that of Sebastopol fulfilled the premises necessary to complete the re-distribution of forces on the southern half of the Eastern Front. The Black Sea would now rapidly fall under Russian domination, and so could be left to the care of the Black Sea Fleet, assisted by a decreasing number of aircraft. Conse-

¹ In translated Russian reports the term “White Russian” is given in preference to the more Slavonic form, Byelorussian.

quently, two armies, freed from their tasks in the Crimea, were available to take part in the great summer offensive. It may be assumed that very soon after the fall of Sebastopol, General Yeremenko and troops of the Maritime Army had been entrained for the Baltic front. General Tolbukhin and his army, being destined for a much nearer sector of the front, could be left longer in the peninsula.

Having made safe the left (Black Sea) flank of their front, it was scarcely surprising that the Russian High Command should have decided to pursue the same course with regard to their northern wing. There the Finnish war had been dragging on without change of front and without any important incident for over a year. Yet this flank, owing to its proximity to Leningrad and also because of the presence of not less than seven German divisions in the extreme north, constituted a source of possible anxiety to the Russians. The control of the Gulf of Finland, still in German hands, might at any moment prove a source of weakness to any Russian operations in the three little Baltic republics. Accordingly, it was necessary to eliminate all chances of trouble by placing Finland in a position in which she could take no further active part in the war : and above all to ensure that Finland could not in any way be utilized by Germany as a military, naval or air base which might threaten the Russian flank on the south of the Gulf of Finland.¹

Consequently, after waiting until their preparations were complete—and possibly until after the attention of the Germans was fully absorbed by the Allied landing in Normandy, the Russian High Command on June 10 proceeded to launch a concentrated and powerful attack against the Finnish defences on the Karelian Isthmus. These "Mannerheim" lines were perhaps as strong as any military engineering works of their kind then in existence. Through their southern area ran the River Sestra between high steep banks : its western bank was particularly well fortified : the lower ground had all

¹ The political aspects of the Russian-Finnish relations are discussed in Chapter IV, Section 2, of this volume.

been flooded. This sector was attacked by Govorov's troops of the Leningrad Front. In two days they had advanced to a depth of 15 miles into the first zone of the defences and had widened the breach to a width of 25 miles. Three days later the second zone had also been breached; the attack had gained another ten miles, again widening the breach to 47 miles. On June 18 Soviet troops rushed through the more distant and immensely powerful third defensive zone. By next day this last breach was 30 miles wide: the Finnish defences had been completely broken—all in the space of ten days.

The Russian offensive had begun under the ground rather than on the ground. By night the Russian infantry had dug trenches leading towards the Finnish position. When they had come to within 120 yards of it they turned and began to dig parallel to it. Before long an entirely new position had sprung up in front of the Finnish lines. Meanwhile, the Russian artillery was brought up to some three to four miles from their objectives and, suddenly opening fire, methodically dealt with targets throughout the defence zone. Simultaneously the latter were attacked from the sea and even by the guns of Kronstadt. From the air a pitiless bombardment began. The Finns had to some extent been caught napping. So they were rapidly demoralized by this terrific bombardment from land, sea and air. In their hurried retreat after the first assault they even forgot to blow up the bridges over the Sestra.

A good idea of the strength of the first two zones can be obtained from a description given by a Russian officer of the approach to the strong-point of Kuterselka.

"A single country road leads to this settlement from the south-east through marshy country which stretches to north and south. A wooded defile a little over a mile from Kuterselka was blocked by the first line of defence, running from south-west to north-east. Four rows of anti-tank obstacles stretched some 300 yards from the forest edge: concrete pyramids six feet high with a wide base, placed not on ground level, but in a wide ditch, the far slope of which was levelled down. The parapet concealed the obstacles from the attackers, while the gentle slopes on the Finnish side enabled the enemy to keep the concrete pyramids under fire. The approaches to the anti-tank obstacles were protected by a continuous 15-yard-wide field of German anti-tank mines.

Behind the tank obstacles were five lines of barbed wire entanglements and a widespread network of trenches and numerous weapon pits and artillery positions. Twenty or 30 yards behind the trenches were shelters connected with the forward positions by covered communication passages. These reinforced concrete shelters with yard-thick walls went deep into the ground and were covered with several layers of rock and earth. They were built on a level with the ground ; each held 15 men.

A mile farther back there was another line of fortifications. These ran across a range of bare hills, and consisted of three rows of concrete tank obstacles, four rows of barbed wire entanglements, trenches and reinforced concrete shelters. Each of these rectangular structures accommodated a platoon.

The decisive assault on the second fortified line was preceded by a powerful and prolonged artillery barrage. The heavy guns, firing over open sights, dealt with the anti-tank obstacles, wire entanglements and earthen pill-boxes. Wave after wave of Soviet bombers escorted by fighters roared overhead, dropping tons of bombs on the Finnish artillery positions and rearward areas.

As on the first day of the offensive, Soviet troops advancing along the coast of the gulf had to force a river protected by an unbroken line of formidable defences along the western bank. Supported by artillery fire, a rifle unit established and consolidated a small bridgehead. Then the sappers built a bridge for the tanks.

The enemy held on to their second defence zone with much greater stubbornness and ferocity than to the first. They moved fresh divisions to the area and sent a mass of tanks and self-propelled guns into action. But it did them no good.

Immediately after the Russians had breached the second fortified zone they pushed on rapidly to attack the old Mannerheim Line proper, that is the third zone. They covered these 25 miles in two days and so took the Finnish garrison completely unprepared. There had been some heavy fighting on the road as the Finns made desperate efforts to delay the Russians so as to find troops to man their third line. But in vain. The Finns were utterly demoralized by this failure. So these formidable concrete and steel works were overrun by the Russians in a few hours.

By June 20 the important Finnish fortress and port of Vyborg had been captured ; no obstacle now remained to a Russian march on Helsinki, the Finnish capital. Accordingly it was decided to advance the front to the north of Lake Onega and still more across the isthmus of land between Lakes Onega and Ladoga. Consequently on June 20 troops of Meretskov's Karelian Front went forward to the attack north of Lake Onega to the east of Medvezhegorsk ; this town was subsequently captured. Between the two lakes they seized the enemy's bridgehead on the southern bank of the River Svir, while elsewhere they actually forced a passage over the river. Similar progress was maintained until the Finns had been thrust back between 10 and 20 miles along the whole length of

"The Russian army has lost its solidarity. Great differences are noticeable between its component units and arms. The four armies of the Moscow Front which have fought continuously through the winter have been hard hit; they have been so far weakened as to have lost all their original quality. They need rest, good supplies, reinforcements in men and munitions. This should be no easy task to satisfy under present conditions. We can therefore face the future on the Eastern Front with greater confidence than heretofore."

In May it had been freely stated in the German Press that the Russians "were completely exhausted."¹

It is true that the Russians during the past winter had failed to capture Vitebsk. They may even have suffered heavily on the Central Front as the result of that failure, as the German critic seems to imply. But this does not in the slightest degree justify the manner in which the German High Command persistently closed its eyes to the possibility of a great Russian offensive materializing along the White Russian Front. There is little doubt that the Germans had made up their minds that the Russians must and would continue their Ukrainian offensive, either into Rumania and the Danube Valley or—more probably—along the Lvov corridor in the direction of Silesia. That hypothesis might gain credence, firstly if there be taken into account the German offensive in the Jassy region at the close of May, since this operation would gain far greater significance in that it had been intended as a true "spoiling" attack; secondly in view of the bombastic statements so freely published in the spring as to the defence of Rumania and of Hungary, "with all the might of Germany." At the last moment the Russian attack on the Karelian Isthmus may have further distracted the attention of the German defence.

The Swiss *Journal de Genève* of July 13 published an illuminating letter from a German correspondent which reads :

"When on June 22 the Soviet artillery began to batter Vitebsk on the White Russian Front this event aroused veritable consternation in the Reich's governing circles. The Führer's H.Q. was expecting the Russian offensive to develop on the Southern Front, in the Balkans. Accordingly, when Bagramyan's and Rokossovsky's troops had wrecked the German front, advanced 150 miles and inflicted losses on the *Wehrmacht* which under actual circumstances are irreplaceable, the first confusion grew into almost

¹ See *Völkischer Beobachter* during May.

utter demoralization. For this there was good reason, since not only were the original dispositions of the Germans in need of thorough modification but the Russian break-through had brought about the collapse of the plans previously elaborated by the German High Command. These plans had been based on a series of axioms amongst which the most far-reaching had been : The Eastern Front will give ground slowly up to the moment when the Anglo-Americans have been defeated in the West and the menace of an invasion on that side has been removed. Thereupon the greater part of the divisions fighting in the West can be restored to the armies which are now holding the Russians. . . . All the postulates on which reposed the German strategy had foundered."

Two other circumstances may have contributed further to the Russian success. In the first place the Germans, owing to shortage of troops, may have held this White Russian sector on the customary "quiet season" or "winter" scale, that is they had maintained full garrisons in all their hedgehogs and other defence works ; but they had neglected to strengthen the already weak mobile troops who, mainly by counter-attack, should have formed an essential part of any sound plan of defence of a front menaced by any more serious or "summer" offensive, such as might now be expected. Again, it was precisely in the matter of artillery formations that the Russians seem to have strengthened their White Russian front. Apart from their (qualitative and quantitative) superiority in artillery, the Red Army had gained ample experience in the reduction of German "hedgehogs" in the past. So here was a Heaven-sent opportunity to exploit to the utmost all those details in which they were by now true masters of war.

White Russia offers no easy terrain to any army on the offensive, nor yet on the defensive, that is unless it lay in the grip of hard frost. White Russia is in fact a land of swamps and forests, particularly in its more southerly parts which there form the notorious marshes of the basin of the Pripet. In summer, however, to the north of that area the bogs tend to dry up as well as some of the smaller streams. Movement, however, was never too easy on these White Russian battlefields. On every hand there still remained bogs, swamps, and sunken plains, now criss-crossed all over with trenches and wire entanglements, sown with mines and peppered with machine-gun

nests. It seems a miracle that any horse or man, let alone a tank, could pass rapidly through this country. Russian correspondents write of sappers strung out in long lines, looking rather like mowers in a field, moving slowly forward, as with drowsy movements they reaped a harvest of mines.

Owing to the nature of the country, perhaps, the Germans had expended ingenuity and labour on a most lavish scale in creating the four "field fortresses" or "hedgehogs" of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Zhlobin; and in rear there were others nearly as strong. Ever since the Russians had failed to capture Vitebsk during the previous winter they had abandoned all further attempt to drive back the Germans along this White Russian front. Accordingly the whole sector had been left as a bastion of the German line projecting well into Russian-held territory. With a straight front running due north and south for close on 300 miles, it followed roughly the course of the upper Dnieper. Behind it there lay the last sector of the great Leningrad-Odessa railway line still in German hands, forming a most important line of lateral communication in the German defence.

The Russians, acting as usual on far better intelligence than the Germans, determined to attack this strong line frontally. But they did not do so by any form of linear attack. Taking a leaf out of the German book, they had adapted and perfected the German tactics of 1941 when the latter had sent their armoured divisions in headlong thrusts far into Russia. So now the Red Army sought out the weak intervals between the powerful German "hedgehogs," and poured their armoured units through these and other gaps torn in the lesser German defences. In strong contrast to the traditional German procedure they refrained from trusting to the full weight of the initial stroke for victory. They acted on the principle of committing their total strength to battle gradually and only applying the maximum of force where this was clearly advisable. Enjoying complete superiority in numbers they could afford to disregard any or all German strong-points in their advance, since special divisions had

been left to reduce the "hedgehogs" and strong German centres of resistance.

The momentum of the Russian armies was such that it crashed through the German front and inflicted terrible casualties on the defenders who were literally overrun. In one week the four great "hedgehogs" of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Zhlobin, originally left far behind by the first wave of the Russian armies, had been carried by assault. The leading Russian armour was then already over 100 miles from the starting point. The fortified centres of Bobruisk in the south and Borisov in the north were both surrounded. Minsk, capital of White Russia and a great German headquarters, was threatened from north and south.

Their Fourth, and also part of the Ninth Army, commanded by Marshal von Busch, which numbered some 50 front-line divisions and included the Third Armoured Army, had in a single week been totally routed with losses from which it could never hope to recover. Indeed, the Russian superiority had proved crushing, and it was even greater than the mere reckoning of divisions would indicate. The 50 German divisions were weak and much below establishment. They could hardly have numbered much over 400,000 front-line combatants. The four Russian armies probably comprised the equivalent of well over 100 divisions; and these consisted of fresh troops organized in complete formations; they must have numbered over 1,500,000 front-line troops. The German inferiority was further accentuated by the shortage of armoured units; many of the Third Army's tank units had been sent to the Lvov sector as late as the previous spring, all in accordance with the German obsession that the Russians intended to continue the attack in that area, which was by them regarded as the main corridor leading to Germany's vitals and so demanded armoured strength. As a climax of misfortune the Russians succeeded in destroying or capturing what are said to have been no less than five of the Third Army's divisions in Vitebsk itself.

The actual course of events was the following.

Four Russian armies, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd White Russian, and, to the north of these, the 1st Baltic Army, were committed to the assault on a front of some 250 miles.

On June 23 the 1st Baltic Army after a concentrated artillery and aircraft bombardment attacked the German defences to the north-west of Vitebsk on a front of 22 miles. In two days they had broken into this fortified



WHITE RUSSIA, END OF JUNE, 1944

zone from 12 to 25 miles and had broadened the gap in the German defences to 50 miles. They also succeeded in reaching and making good their hold on a 20-mile stretch of the River Dvina. Simultaneously, the 3rd White Russian Army set out on a similar task to the south of Vitebsk and achieved analogous results to that of the army to the north of the German fortress.

Further south again towards the German stronghold of Orsha, and to the north of it, the same 3rd White Russian Army broke through the German defences, though on a somewhat lesser scale.

At the same time the 2nd White Russian Army was also engaged to the north of Mogilev, where it forced a crossing over the River Pronya and made good progress and reached the Dnieper. Their success, however, was not so spectacular as that realized round Vitebsk.

Little was heard of the activity of the 1st White Russian Army until on June 26th it was suddenly announced that the great "hedgehog" of Zhlobin had been stormed by troops of that army. On that day also the capture of Vitebsk by the combined troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd White Russian Armies was announced. On the 27th the latter army carried the important railway centre and airfield of Orsha. On the 28th Mogilev fell to the 2nd White Russian Army. Finally, on that same day the 1st White Russian Army captured yet another railway junction at Ossipovich, a success which led to the encirclement of a large German force at Bobruisk. This latter place was carried by storm on June 29 by the same Russian Army.

Such, in brief, is a summary of a great achievement, an achievement in fact such as this war had until then not witnessed. And there was more to follow.¹

The Germans sullenly declared that it was the triumph of brute force, of numbers, of weight of metal and of all material factors that make for success in war. But even if this be admitted, it is only a particle of the truth. The Germans are far too deeply committed to the pre-fabrication of the new legend, that is to show the invincible German soldier being borne down by sheer numbers and by limitless resources in munitions, to allow them to do any particle of justice to the growing military skill and power of the Soviet Union. In particular they cannot see their way to admit for one instant that in this struggle of June, 1944, they were utterly at a loss to counter the Russian strategy. The latter, exploiting to the full the enormous forces, the huge resources in artillery which the Red Army now possessed, had indeed inflicted an unparalleled defeat on the German *Wehrmacht*. The German

¹ A further examination of this entire campaign can only be held over for the present.

excuses for this humiliating reversal of fortune can only be described as pitiful. Here is one instance taken from a well of the pure Nazi faith.

After the first World War there remained in Germany 1,500,000 women unmarried or at any rate childless. If every one of these had produced on an average two children, that would mean 3,000,000 children in all, of which total 1,500,000 would have been boys. Deduct 200,000—and this is in fact a high proportion—for premature deaths and physically unfit: this would have left us to-day with 1,300,000 more men fit for service. This would mean 100 more divisions in the front line. Now every private soldier realizes how the war would now stand—or rather would have stood long ago, since it would have been won long ago.—(*Das Schwarze Korps*, May, 1944.)

It is out of such shoddy arguments and self-pity that the Nazis are now busy preparing the so-called history of this Russian war.

Yet even when every allowance is made for all the material circumstances that rendered the Russian armies so irresistible, above all it is the spirit that made those Russian armies so formidable.

That night of June 22 when the Red Army moved to the attack was the third anniversary of the German invasion of Russia: it was also the hundred and thirty-second anniversary of the day on which Napoleon had set out for Moscow. Every Russian soldier knew what that day represented. And they had learnt much since that first day of the Nazi invasion. For eighteen months they had known nothing but retreat. Then came Stalingrad. Then for another eighteen months they had marched from one success to another. The countryside, from which they had driven the invader, they were horrified to see violated, tortured and wrecked. Those sights could only urge them on to wreak vengeance on their ruthless enemies. In the words of Ilya Ehrenburg:

"When they [the invaders] found the house in which Leo Tolstoy had lived, they turned it into a stable. From the gold of the Novgorod Kremlin they made ash-trays and beer-mugs. They lit their fires with our books. They wanted to rob us of our dreams, of our faith in brotherhood, in all that is good. Even the tamest of us blessed our arms. To-day we must think of nothing but revenge.

Sorrow takes away, and sorrow gives. Sorrow has given us wisdom. That is how clay is baked, how ships are tarred, how steel is tempered. On the battlefields we have learned things which are not contained in the wisest of books. Life has become simpler, and at the same time more

complex. We learned to tell beauty from tawdriness, goodness from goodness. We have become stricter. We smile as we think of the sorrows and joys which three years ago seemed so important to us.

We had noble ideas, great natural wealth, much national talent. But we have learned yet more on the battlefield. It is not only a matter of privates becoming majors. The privates of 1944 are not those of 1941. Some may say that we have matured. I myself think that our people have become greater.

Before the war those people abroad who did not wish us well called Russia 'a Colossus with feet of clay.' In the autumn of 1941 they said 'It will collapse any moment.' They did not understand that we were retreating, but not giving way. They did not know that from its setbacks the Red Army was learning to win. They did not see how our factories were being re-born in the Urals, in Kazakhstan and in Siberia.

Now the 'Colossus' is marching forward. He has entered Rumania, and the world is speaking of our might. In the most brilliant periods, when Suvorov's name shook Europe, when Napoleon fell—even then Russia did not seem as powerful as she is to-day, after three years of terrible war.

These three years have changed the climate of the world, altered maps, transformed history. All peoples see to-day that the Soviet Union is the foremost soldier of liberty and the first forger of victory. . . .

We are led westwards not by desire for gain, not by calculation, but by our conscience. We have seen the cruelty, the ferocity, the meanness of the Hitlerites. There will be no pardon for them. We might forgive for our own sake, but not for our children's.

We have all sworn to exterminate these beasts. I do not speak of revenge. We shall not start smashing telescopes in Jena. We shall not burn the house of Goethe. We are not Fascists, and we shall not start smearing the lips of German children with hydrocyanic acid. We shall come to them so that they shall never come to us again."¹

What a contrast to the words of wisdom and the platitudes Dittmar and his likes can offer to their German listeners !

¹*Soviet War News*, 23-6-44.

CHAPTER IV

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Introductory

During the three months from April 1 to June 30 the decline of the fortunes of the Reich in Europe and the ebbing of the tide of Japanese conquest in the Far East had a marked effect on international relations. In this chapter the writer will attempt to outline the changes in the attitude of the neutral or non-belligerent states, no longer haunted by fears of a German triumph, towards the demands of the United Nations for a stricter interpretation of neutrality; the difficulties encountered by Germany in her attempt to maintain her control over her apprehensive or restive satellites; and the relations between the principal Allied Powers.

I : BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE NEUTRALS

On April 9 Mr. Cordell Hull broadcast an important speech on the foundations of American foreign policy in the course of which he spoke of the relations between the United States and the neutral nations. He said that in the two years following Pearl Harbour, while the country was mustering its strength and helping to restore that of its allies,

"our relations with these neutral nations and their attitude towards our enemies were conditioned by the position in which we found ourselves." The United States Government had constantly sought to keep before them what they knew themselves, that their independent existence as free nations hung upon an Allied victory. "We have sought . . . to reduce the aid which their trade with the enemy gives him and to increase the strength which we might draw from them, but our power was limited. They and we have continually been forced to accept compromises which we certainly would not have chosen."

That period, he believed, was rapidly drawing to a close. It was clear that the strength of the United States and its allies now made only one outcome of the war possible. We were not now asking the neutral nations

to expose themselves to certain destruction when we asked them not to prolong the war by sending aid to the enemy.

"We can no longer acquiesce in these nations drawing upon the resources of the Allied world when they at the same time contribute to the death of troops whose sacrifice contributes to their salvation as well as ours. We have scrupulously respected the sovereignty of these nations, and we have not coerced, nor shall we coerce any nation to join us in the fight. We have said to those countries that it is no longer necessary for them to purchase protection against aggression by furnishing aid to our enemy—whether it be by permitting official German agents to carry on their activities of espionage against the Allies within neutral borders . . . or by permitting highly skilled workers and factories to supply products which can no longer issue from the smoking ruins of German factories. We ask them only, but with insistence, to cease aiding our enemy."

Negotiations were already on foot with Spain and **Spain** Portugal when Mr. Hull broadcast. Other nations took note of the American Secretary of State's warning (which was strongly supported by public opinion in all the Allied countries), as the following record shows.

The conclusion of the negotiations with Spain to which reference was made in the last volume of this series (*The Eighteenth Quarter*, Chapter VII) was announced by Mr. Eden in Parliament on May 2. He said that for some time the British and United States Governments had been in negotiation with the Spanish Government in regard

"to a number of matters in which the attitude of the Spanish Government in the past seemed to them contrary to the declared policy of Spanish neutrality. The matters under discussion were the presence and activities of the German Consul-General at Tangier and of German agents throughout Spanish-controlled and Spanish territory; the continued presence of certain Spanish units on the Eastern Front; the detention of Italian ships in Spanish ports; and the level of exports of Spanish wolfram to Germany. These negotiations had now been brought to a satisfactory conclusion.

Mr. Eden then gave the main features of the agreement reached. These were :

1. The Spanish Government had undertaken to close the German Consulate-General at Tangier forthwith and to arrange for the departure of the Consul-General and his staff. They had already expelled from Tangier, the Spanish zone in Morocco and the neighbourhood of Gibraltar certain German agents who had been working against British interests and they were "in the process of expelling" from the mainland, Tangier and Spanish Morocco other such agents to whose activities the British Government had drawn their attention.

2. The Spanish Government had assured the two Allied Governments that the remaining Spanish units had been withdrawn from the Eastern Front and that all survivors of the Blue Division and the Blue Air Squadron had returned to Spain save a few wounded and administrative details supervising the withdrawal.

3. Six of the Italian merchantmen detained in Spanish ports at the time of the Italian armistice had been released. The remainder would now be released except two, the ownership of which was disputed. They would be chartered by the Spanish Government subject to arbitration as to their eventual ownership. The Spanish Government had agreed to the British proposal that the disposal of the Italian warships which had sought refuge in Spanish ports after the Italian armistice should be settled by arbitration.

4. As regards wolfram, German export permits during the current year would be drastically reduced to 20 tons in May and June. Thereafter, "if as a practical matter they can be made," exports would not exceed 40 tons a month. Mr. Eden added that during the three months of negotiation Spain maintained a complete embargo on all wolfram exports to Germany.

Mr. Eden added that as a result of the settlement which marked a substantial gain for the United Nations and gave definite evidence of the Spanish Government's intention to maintain neutrality, permission would now be given for the renewal of petrol loadings in the Caribbean and for the lifting from U.S. ports of minor quantities of packaged petroleum products.

The Spanish public was curiously silent about the agreement. The Germans were extremely annoyed, but there was nothing they could do about it. On June 7 Mr. Eden stated that all the members of the staff of the German Consulate-General at Tangier, with the possible exception of one or two clerks, had left, and that they would not remain in Spain or in any Spanish-controlled territory.

One of the most discussed passages in Mr. Churchill's review of foreign policy on May 24 was his interesting review of Anglo-Spanish relations.

He said that when the British Ambassador, Sir Samuel Hoare, went to Spain four years ago "we arranged to keep his aeroplane waiting on the airfield as it seemed almost certain that Spain, whose dominant party were under the influence of Germany because Germany had helped them . . . in the recently ended civil war, would . . . join the victorious Germans in the war against the British." Had Spain yielded to German pressure, "our burden would have been much heavier. The Straits of Gibraltar would have been closed and all access to Malta . . . cut off from the west. All the Spanish coast would have become the nesting-place of German U-boats."

None of these things had happened. Our ambassador deserved great credit for the influence which he rapidly acquired and which increasingly grew. He had been greatly assisted by Mr. Yencken, whose loss must have been noted by the House. But the main credit was undoubtedly due to the Spanish resolve to keep out of the war. They had had enough of war, and, he added, some of the sentiment may have been due to their memory—and the Spaniards are a people who look back—of Britain's part in the liberation of Spain from Napoleon 130 years ago. The critical moment passed. The Battle of Britain was won. The Power which was

expected to be subjugated in a few months rose stronger in the homeland and made giant strides along the African coast. "But another very serious crisis occurred in our relations with Spain before the operation designated 'the torch' . . . the descent of the United States and British forces upon North-West Africa was begun."

Before it began Spain's power to injure us was at its highest. For a month before zero hour we had "something like 600 aeroplanes" crowded on our extended airfield at Gibraltar "in full range and in full view of the Spanish batteries." It was difficult for the Spaniards to believe that all these aircraft were intended to reinforce Malta, and the passage of these critical days was anxious indeed. However, the Spaniards continued absolutely friendly and tranquil. They asked no questions; they raised no inconvenience. If on some occasions they had taken an indulgent view of German U-boats in distress, "they made amends on this occasion . . . by completely ignoring the situation at Gibraltar where . . . enormous numbers of ships were anchored far outside the neutral waters of the Bay of Algeciras, always under the command of Spanish shore guns. We should have suffered the greatest inconvenience if we had been ordered to move those ships. . . . I must say that I shall always consider a service was rendered . . . by Spain, not only to the United Kingdom and to the British Empire and Commonwealth, but to the cause of the United Nations. I have therefore no sympathy with those who think it clever, and even funny, to insult and abuse the Government of Spain, whenever occasion serves."

After referring with satisfaction to the agreement with Spain, Mr. Churchill expressed his hope for a great increase of Anglo-Spanish trade after the war. He disclaimed any intention on the part of the Government to meddle with Spanish internal affairs, and when Dr. Haden Guest asked whether a Fascist Government anywhere was not a preparation for attack, he replied, to the amusement of the House: "There is all the difference in the world between a man who knocks you down and a man who leaves you alone." His "kindly words" concerning Spain were nevertheless subjected to much criticism in Labour circles and among the "Left-Wing intellectuals," both in this country and in the United States.

On June 7 Mr. Eden announced in Parliament the ^{Portugal} conclusion of the Anglo-Portuguese negotiations which had opened in February on the subject of the export of Portuguese wolfram to Germany. These negotiations had been crowned with success. Mr. Eden told the House that

His Majesty's Government, "basing themselves upon the special relationship between this country and Portugal embodied in the Anglo-Portuguese Treaties of Alliance . . . requested the Portuguese Government to impose a

total prohibition upon the export of wolfram. The Portuguese Government had acceded to this request on June 5 and the appropriate measures were coming into force immediately. The British Government warmly welcomed this further proof of Anglo-Portuguese friendship and of the fidelity of Portugal to the ancient alliance. The recent decision of the Portuguese Government in the view of the British Government represented a service to their cause comparable with the grant of facilities in October, 1943, and one which should prove an important factor in shortening the war. The British Government had been in close contact with the United States and Brazilian Governments during the negotiations.

On the same day the Portuguese authorities announced their decision to suspend all wolfram exports "in order to shorten the war." They added that in making "this grave decision" the Portuguese Government had wished "once more to prove its fidelity to the traditional alliance between the two nations," and they had appreciated the manner in which the British Government had taken the resolution and their recognition of the importance for the future of the strong ties between the two peoples and their Governments, as expressed by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons. Friendly messages were exchanged by Mr. Eden and Dr. Salazar on the subject.

The decree suspending all mining of and trading in wolfram was issued on June 12. All stocks would remain in official hands until the end of the war.

Sweden On April 13 the Swedish Foreign Office announced that the American and British Ministers had presented Notes concerning Sweden's trade relations with Germany. It was understood that the Allied Governments had asked that Sweden should cease all deliveries to Germany of ball-bearings and of materials and machinery for their manufacture. On April 19 the Riksdag met in secret session to consider the Allied Notes. On April 22 the Government delivered their reply to the Allies' request. They stated that they were unable to break their trade treaty with Germany which was valid for a year. The British Minister was also informed that the Swedish Government considered the British suspension of diplomatic privileges of communication (*q.v.* Chapter IV, p. 139) to be incompatible with international law and diplomatic custom, but would confine themselves to this declaration so long as these limitations could be considered as temporary and caused by an exceptional military situation.

On May 13 a Swedish Foreign Office spokesman said that before the

intensive Allied bombing of German factories, Swedish exports of ball-bearings might be presumed to have amounted to about three per cent of Germany's production. After the bombings the percentage naturally increased, but still constituted a small proportion of the German output. On May 17 an official of the British Ministry of Supply issued a statement in Stockholm clarifying the British and U.S. point of view regarding ball-bearing exports. This affirmed that the Swedish exports to Germany had expanded to five or six times the pre-war total. It might be true that Sweden did not manufacture special types of ball-bearings for aircraft, but the frame of a heavy bomber contained up to 3,000 bearings, many of which were of standard types. This applied also to tanks and other armoured vehicles. In 1937 Sweden had passed legislation to prevent the export of war material and the export of ball and roller bearings was surely in contradiction to that law. The bearing which helped to drive the machine which made cannon or small arms was as much an article of war as that found in tanks or aircraft.

On June 14, however, the Swedish Press published an announcement from Washington that an acceptable agreement had been reached with the Allies whereby the Swedish export of ball-bearings to Germany would be curtailed. It was understood that the agreement involved no breach of contract. It seemed possible that the affair of the maps (*q.v.* Chapter VIII, Section 3) had made the Swedish Government readier to accept the Anglo-American point of view.

After the suspension of Allied shipments of war ^{Turkey} material to Turkey (*cf.* *The Eighteenth Quarter*, Chapter I, Section 3) the question of Turkish exports of chrome to Germany was taken up by the British and United States Governments and on April 14 the British and American Ambassador presented to the Turkish Government Notes concerning Turkish exports to Germany and German-occupied territories.

In this connexion Mr. Foot, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare, stated in answer to a question in Parliament on April 18 that while exports of chrome from Turkey to the United Nations during 1943 had amounted to about 56,000 tons against 47,000 tons exported to Germany, 14,800 tons were exported to Germany during the first two months of 1944 and only 1,870 tons to the United Nations, the falling off in the exports to the United Nations being chiefly due to transport difficulties. Since November, 1943, there had been "a substantial increase in the monthly rate of consignments to Germany in return for increased German deliveries of arms." Our Ambassador at Ankara, fully supported by his United States colleague, had drawn the most earnest attention of the Turkish Government to "this increased assistance to our enemies and His Majesty's Government feel sure that as a result of these representation the Turkish Government will realize the need either to prohibit these exports entirely or to limit them to the barest minimum."

In fact, the Turkish Government decided to suspend the export of chrome to Germany and her satellites. The decision was announced by the Foreign Minister, M. Menemenjoglu, to the Grand National Assembly on April 20 and became operative on April 21. It took the Germans and, for that matter, the Allies by surprise since the Turkish reply to their representations had not been definite. In May it was announced that deliveries of chrome to the Allies had greatly increased. At the same time it could not be said that the settlement of the chrome question had met all Allied requirements. Other Turkish exports to Germany—wool for one—were of importance to our enemy's war effort and British opinion found it strange that a Government which remained our ally and, indeed, was disposed to insist on its loyalty to the alliance, should give any aid whatsoever to our deadly enemy. Not all these anomalies were explained by Mr. Churchill in his references to Turkey in the course of his review of foreign policy in Parliament on May 24, but he said enough to enable his audience to understand some of the causes of the suspension of the supply of British and American arms to Turkey in February.

Mr. Churchill told the House that the disappointment of October, 1943 when we had not the necessary forces to win command of the Aegean had been accompanied by an exaggerated caution on the part of the Turks. Our hopes that Turkey would enter the war in February or March or grant the Allies the necessary bases for air action had been disappointed. After we had given £20,000,000 worth of U.S. and British arms to Turkey in 1943 we and our Allies had suspended the process and ceased to urge Turkey to join the victorious Powers. At the end of 1943 the Turks had taken the gloomiest view of Russia's prospects and had magnified their own danger. They had increased their demands for arms and munitions to such a point that having regard to means of transport and communications alone, the war would probably have been over before these supplies could have reached them. These supplies had therefore been suspended since it seemed that the Allies would win the war in south-east Europe without Turkey being involved. The course now being pursued by Turkey would not procure for her the strong position at the peace which would attend her military support of the Allies, but her good service in suspending chrome exports to Germany—an action said to have been taken on the initiative of President İnönü—must be appreciated.

One more incident cast a temporary cloud on the relations between Turkey and the United Nations. After the success of the Russians in the Crimea German vessels,

some of which had been used for military purposes in the Black Sea, were allowed to withdraw through the Straits into the *Ægean*. On June 14 Mr. Eden informed Parliament that to obtain passage for certain of these ships

"the Germans dismantle their armament, which will be installed again when the ships reach their destination in the *Ægean*, and pass them through as commercial vessels." There were two types of these vessels, the K.T. of some 800 tons normally carrying two 3.7-in. guns and machine-guns, and the E.M.S. of some 40 or 50 tons armed with a three-pounder gun, machine-guns and depth charges. The former were used as armed transports, the latter for various purposes including submarine chasing. Four K.T. class vessels and eight of the E.M.D. type had been passed through the Straits in the early days of June. In spite of the representations of our Ambassador, not merely against the passage of war vessels by a belligerent in war-time through the Straits, but against the inadequate and hurried inspection to which they were subjected by the Turkish authorities, the Turkish Government "have persisted in their claim that they can find no evidence on examination that they are other than commercial vessels."

In view of this unsatisfactory attitude "His Majesty's Ambassador on instructions has represented to the President of the Turkish Republic that His Majesty's Government are profoundly disturbed that the Turkish Government should have lent themselves to this palpable manoeuvre of the German Government. . . . The President has now promised to have the whole matter re-examined by his Government. . . ."

The President acted with promptitude. The Cabinet met early on June 15 under the Presidency of the Prime Minister, M. Sarajoglu. It did not approve the policy of the Foreign Minister, M. Menemenjoglu, who consequently handed in his resignation. M. Sarajoglu took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He informed the Press on June 16 that no vessels of the K.T., *alias* "Mannheim," and E.M.S. classes would be allowed to pass through the Straits, and that German merchantmen arriving at Istanbul would be subjected to strict examination. On the same day he informed the People's Party that the Government had come to the conclusion that the German vessels attempting to pass through the Straits were provided with arms and munitions which placed them in the category of warships. He also gave a detailed explanation of the circumstances which had led to the resignation of M. Menemenjoglu, whose attachment to a policy equivalent to the strictest neutrality and legalistic outlook had helped to produce results which large sections of the Turkish public regarded with

something like dismay. Commenting on public criticism, the correspondent of *The Times* at Ankara observed

"perhaps it would be unfair to hold M. Menemenjoglu entirely responsible for that state of affairs, to which many political and psychological causes contributed ; but, as often happens under Parliamentary régimes, Ministers are held responsible for faults that are not of their own making."

At all events his resignation, the consequence of widespread dissatisfaction with his policy, unquestionably cleared the air.

2 : GERMANY AND HER SATELLITES.

The increasing pressure on the German armies in Russia; the fall of Rome and the destruction, which no censor could conceal from neutral or satellite, which Allied air attacks were wreaking on the German industrial cities were having a marked effect on Germany's client states before the invasion of Normandy. By the end of June all the smaller nations ranged under the German banner were acutely anxious for their future, but their most immediate problem was how to deal with the Germans whom they had rashly admitted within their gates.

Finland Negotiations for an armistice between Finland and the U.S.S.R. had not been broken off in late March when M. Paaskivi left again for Moscow to obtain "clarifications" of the Russian terms. He returned to Helsinki on April 1. On April 9 Swedish newspapers outlined these terms which were subsequently given by M. Vyshinsky, Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to the Press. As given by him they were :

1. Rupture of relations with Germany and internment of German troops and warships in Finland, or rupture of relations and expulsion of the German troops and warships by not later than the end of April. In either case the Soviet Government can give Finland assistance with its armed forces.

2. Re-establishment of the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of 1940 and withdrawal of the Finnish troops to the 1940 border by stages during April.

3. Immediate repatriation of Soviet and Allied prisoners of war and Soviet and Allied civilians interned in concentration camps or employed in forced labour. Should a peace treaty instead of an armistice agreement be signed between the U.S.S.R. and Finland, the repatriation of war prisoners must be reciprocal,

4. Demobilization of half of the Finnish Army to be carried out during May, and the whole Finnish Army to be placed on a peace footing during June and July. This point must be included in the treaty, for it must be formulated in a separate Soviet-Finnish agreement, to be signed simultaneously with the peace treaty or armistice.

5. Reparation for damage caused by Finland to the Soviet Union through hostilities and occupation of Soviet territory amounting to 600,000,000 American dollars (£150,000,000) to be paid within five years in goods, paper, cellulose, sea and river craft and machinery.

6. Return to the Soviet Union of Petsamo and the Petsamo area which were voluntarily ceded by the Soviet Union to Finland under the peace treaties of 1939 and 1940.

7. In the event of these six conditions being accepted by Finland, the Soviet Government would consider it possible to renounce in favour of Finland its rights for the lease of Hango and its area without any compensation.

To the general regret the Finns rejected these terms. On April 4 the Finnish Parliament adjourned for Easter without being officially informed of the results of M. Paaskivi's mission. Reassembling on April 12, Parliament approved the Government's latest action regarding the peace-terms which was understood to have been a refusal. On April 23 the Government announced that the Russian terms had been rejected after "taking into account the future of the country." Their spokesmen gave out that the reparations demanded by Russia were too severe, and it must be said that the veteran Swedish economist, Gustav Cassel, had published an appeal to Russia to renounce this claim (April 8) reminding her statesmen of his warnings after the war of 1914-18 that reparations would create insuperable difficulties for the restoration of a normal economic world order. This view was disputed by M. Vyshinsky, who was on safer ground when he observed that the Finnish complaint that the Russian terms threatened Finnish national independence was unfounded. He explained :

"Now it is a question of restoring Finland's lost independence by expelling the German troops from Finland and ceasing hostilities. It is a well-known fact that as a result of . . . admitting German troops on Finnish territory for a joint attack on the Soviet Union, the whole northern half of Finland came under the control of the Germans, who are the real masters here. . . ." Even in southern Finland the Finnish Government did not possess full authority. . . .

The Swedes, who had done the Finns no harm for more than a century, were disappointed. They still considered the Russian financial conditions harsh, but they felt that the Finns were making these an excuse for refusing

what were otherwise moderate terms when their real reason for refusal was their fear of their German allies and of the small but active pro-German faction in the Army and the civil administration. Once again it was proved that the next worst thing to being conquered by Germany was to be allied with her.

It may be added that the British Government had been consulted by the U.S.S.R. at all stages of the negotiations and that the U.S. Government were also informed of their progress.

On May 12 it was announced that the British, United States and Soviet Governments had issued a warning to the peoples of Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria.

The present policies and attitudes of these States were contributing materially to the strength of the German war machine. They still had it within their power by withdrawing from the war and resisting the forces of Nazism by every possible means, to shorten the European struggle, diminish their own ultimate sacrifices, and contribute to the Allied victory. While they could not escape their responsibility for having participated in the war at Germany's side, the longer they continued to be allies of Germany the more disastrous would be the consequences for them, and the more rigorous the terms imposed upon them by the Allies. They must therefore decide now "while there is yet time for them to contribute to the inevitable Allied victory, whether they intend to persist in their present hopeless and calamitous policy of opposing that victory."

There was no response from Finland although public opinion was disturbed by the German reverses in Russia. Then came signs of American displeasure.

On June 3 the U.S. Government hoping thus to induce Finland to break with Germany put 84 Finnish firms on the black list.¹ On June 13 the Finnish Legation in Washington announced that Finland would pay to the U.S.A. the interest due on her 1914-18 debt if the Treasury permitted Finnish funds in America to be used for this purpose.

Three days later, while the Russians were breaking into the Mannerheim Line, M. Hjalmar Procope, Finnish Minister in Washington, and three counsellors of the Finnish Legation were handed their passports and asked to leave the United States. The State Department said that their activities

"were inimical to the interests of the United States," but that the American action did not constitute a rupture between United States and Finland. The action of the Government provoked criticism, but this died down when Mr. Cordell Hull, at a Press Conference on June 19, said that Finnish policy had been thoroughly pro-Nazi and Mr. Roosevelt on June 23 told his Press Conference that the public must not forget that Finland was

¹ With 53 Swedish and 17 Swiss firms.

allied to the common enemy. Referring to the Finnish offer of the interest on the loan, he observed that the United States was not "for sale for \$145,000," the amount of the annual debt payment.

The loss of Viborg and the extension of the Russian offensive east of Lake Ladoga caused alarm in Finland. On June 26 it became known that Ribbentrop had visited Helsinki in order to prevent the Finns from making a separate peace. On June 28 Field-Marshal Keitel himself arrived to organize military reinforcements for the Finnish front. These included an anti-tank brigade from Estonia and one of the divisions of the army of Marshal Dietl, recently killed in an aeroplane accident, was sent to southern Finland. That night news reached Stockholm that President Ryti and the Foreign Minister Ramsay had defeated a move to reconstruct the Cabinet for peace-making. In fact the Finnish Minister at Stockholm had got into touch with the Russian Ambassador, Madame Kollontay, who agreed to receive an authorized representative of the new Cabinet.

An appointment was fixed, but the news then came that the reconstruction of the Cabinet had been delayed. There was more delay and the Russians, "mindful of earlier Finnish tactics . . . demanded that President Ryti and Marshal Mannerheim should sign a declaration that Finland was willing to surrender." The Finnish Government behaved as they had done in March and April. They asked for a "clarification" of the Russian demand, to which the Russians replied that once surrender had been accepted "in principle" Finnish delegates might go to Moscow "to discuss terms." The Finnish Government apparently made no reply.

The explanation was simple if unexpected. On June 25 President Ryti, in a personal letter to Hitler countersigned by M. Ramsay, pledged the existing Government not to make a separate peace, and added that the undertaking would apply to any Ministry which he might appoint. "Thus, short of Ryti's resignation, only a *coup d'état* could reverse the situation."¹

Next day the United States severed diplomatic relations with Finland. The Finnish Chargé d'Affaires was called to the State Department and presented with a Note, signed by Mr. Cordell Hull, which informed the Finns that the maintenance of relations was "now impossible."

¹ Summarized from a message to *The Times* from its Stockholm Correspondent published on June 30.

The Note added that the United States Chargé d'Affaires in Helsinki had been instructed to ask for his and his staff's passports.

The Note opened by reminding the Finns that their Government had announced Ribbentrop's visit to Helsinki during which Finland expressed her desire for military aid and Germany declared herself ready to comply with this wish. The Finnish Government, the Note continued, thus formally admitted to the world that it had now entered "a hard and fast military partnership with Nazi Germany, irrevocable throughout the war, for the purpose of fighting the allies of the United States." This action had been taken "without recourse to the established democratic procedure of Finland, and responsibility for the consequences must rest solely on the Finnish Government."

The Note then referred to the infiltration of German troops into Finland with the consent of the Government and German infiltration into the Finnish Government's councils which had "deprived Finland of her liberty of action and reduced the Government of the Republic of Finland to the condition of a puppet of Nazi Germany.

"This," continued the Note, "necessarily changes the status of the Finnish Government." The Note reminded the Finns of past warnings by the United States of the inevitable consequences of continued association with Germany. Finnish operations, it added, had a direct bearing on the success of the Allied effort, and "Notwithstanding the esteem in which the American people have held the people of Finland, further relations between the United States and Finland are now impossible."¹

It may be added that the Germans' insistence on the maintenance of the alliance was due to the fact that Finland had been contributing more than half the German supply of nickel and cobalt and a quarter of the supply of molybdenum. German dependence on Finland for these metals had been increased by the shortage of manganese and chrome for which nickel and molybdenum could to some extent be substituted in the production of alloy steel, while tungsten or molybdenum was essential to the production of tool steels for armament manufacture. As Germany could obtain very little tungsten, the significance of Scandinavian molybdenum had vastly increased. These facts were disclosed by Mr. Leo Crowley, U.S. Foreign Economic Administrator, on June 28.

Hungary

While there was much discontent at the German *coup* of March 19, it did not take a violent form. The retirement, at his own request, of Colonel-General Szombathely from his post as Chief of the General Staff, and the departure of Count Andrássy from Hungary after taking refuge at the Turkish Legation, were symptoms of aristocratic dissatisfaction, but far more significant was the extremely poor response to the order for a general mobilization which the Germans had ordered in March.

On the other hand the new Government faithfully obeyed German orders for the persecution of the Jews which grew more intense throughout

¹ Summarized from a Washington message published by *The Times* on July 1.

the quarter. Late in June it was reported that the German and Hungarian authorities were resorting to the barbarous system of deportations and that in their course many persons had been killed. A curious light was thrown on German methods when 32 members of the wealthiest Jewish business families were allowed to go by air to Portugal (with forged entry visas) after making a huge deal, of which the Hungarian Government knew nothing, with a German financial group.

The war had never been popular in Rumania. The **Rumania** peasantry were irritated by German exploitation of the country, as were the commercial classes. The Army had fought well enough for two years in Russia, but the men were war-weary. They had suffered heavy losses and incurred several disastrous defeats. These according to Rumanian officers were largely due to the inferior equipment supplied them by their German masters. The young King, never pro-German, bitterly resented the use of his name by Marshal Antonescu and the German authorities, and especially the issue to the Army, when the Marshal brought Rumania into the war with Russia, of a "Royal Proclamation" to which he had never assented. The isolation of large Rumanian forces in the Crimea where they were obviously doomed to capture or destruction whenever the Russians chose to attack Sevastopol on a large scale, added to the anxieties of King and Army. Everywhere the loss of half Transylvania to Hungary by the Vienna award rankled.

Late in March, at the King's initiative, Prince Barbu Stirbey, assisted by M. Vishevanu, a former Rumanian Minister at Warsaw, made his way to Cairo, got into touch with Allied representatives and eventually communicated their conditions to Bucharest. Meanwhile, the Russians opened their offensive on the Pruth, and on April 2 M. Molotov made an important declaration which was broadcast from Moscow. He said:

The Red Army, as a result of a successful offensive, has reached the River Pruth, which is the state frontier between the U.S.S.R. and Rumania. Thus the full re-establishment of the Soviet state frontier as fixed in 1940, in accordance with the agreement between Soviet Russia and Rumania, has been begun. This agreement has been treacherously violated by the Rumanian Government in alliance with Hitlerite Germany.

At the present time the Red Army is carrying out the clearance of Soviet soil of all the enemy still there, and the time when the entire Soviet frontier will be completely restored is not far off.

The Soviet Government hereby declares that the advancing units of the Red Army pursuing the German troops and their allied Rumanian troops have crossed the River Pruth in several sectors and have entered Rumanian territory. The Supreme Command of the Red Army has given orders to the advancing Soviet troops to pursue the enemy until his final rout and capitulation.

At the same time the Soviet Government declares that it does not pursue the aim of acquiring any part of Rumanian territory, or of altering the social structure of Rumania as it exists at present. The entry of Soviet troops into the boundaries of Rumania is dictated exclusively by military necessities, and the continuing resistance of enemy troops.

The statement was warmly welcomed in London and Washington. It aroused anxiety in Berlin for it undermined the strongest argument by which Germany could persuade the Rumanians to continue the fight, viz : that Russia intended to destroy their national life. Press eulogies of Marshal Antonescu and attacks on other Rumanian leaders who were trying "to influence his decision" were evidence of German fears. It was hoped that prominent Rumanians who knew that Great Britain and the U.S.A. had been in close touch with the U.S.S.R. on the subject of Rumania would seize this opportunity of breaking loose from the German grip. The broadcast certainly influenced public opinion in Rumania as did favourable reports of the behaviour of the Russians who had crossed the Pruth. Marshal Antonescu, however, refused to consider the very possibility of surrender and paid no attention to a memorandum submitted to King Michael early in spring by Dr. Maniu, the leader of the National Peasant Party, and M. Bratianu, the leader of the Liberals, both men whom the great majority of Rumanians regarded with deep respect. When late in May Prince Stirbey communicated the Allied terms to the King and his advisers, their anxiety and distress had been increased by the disastrous close of the Crimean campaign which may have cost Rumania another 50,000 men, and King Michael urged the "Conducator" to accept the conditions offered. But Marshal Antonescu remained obdurate, and early in June the political leaders came together to form a democratic coalition of the National Peasant, Liberal, Social Democrat and Communist parties to work for peace with Russia and the

other Allies and to oust the Antonescu régime, when a favourable opportunity arose.

During May the Bulgarian political situation remained ^{Bulgaria} outwardly unchanged, but behind the scenes there was continual friction between three main groups. These were defined by the well-informed Constantinople correspondent of *The Times* (*loc. cit.* May 8) as

"the pro-Germans of various shades, represented by the Regents and the Government . . . kept in line by the Germans with the threat of bringing to power extreme Nazis like Tzankov or Gabrovski ; the pro-Russian opposition, placing its hopes on Russia . . . trying to propitiate Moscow," and a middle group, representing the propertied classes and supported by civil servants and army officers, which realized that Germany was beaten, but was attempting to protect itself from Communism by the formation of a coalition government.

The Russians certainly did not accept Bulgarian attempts at propitiation with smiles. Their Press had sharp words to say about the catastrophe which threatened Bulgaria and asked whether she could really claim to be neutral in her relations with Russia when German garrisons held Varna and other ports on the Black Sea and the Danube. On May 22 the Bojilov Government resigned, and it was believed that Colonel Christo Kalfov, associate of Tzankov, whose Foreign Minister he had been after the overthrow of Stambuliski's Agrarians, would form the next Government. But by this time the Russian Government, tired of the double-faced Bulgarian policy of placating Germany and humouring the U.S.S.R., had intervened with effect.

In a minatory Note they called on Bulgaria to declare where she stood, and called on her, as a guarantee of good faith, to agree to the opening of Russian consulates in several large towns in order to ensure that Bulgarian naval and air bases and other resources should not continue to be put at the service of the Germans. The Germans opposed acceptance of the demand. The resultant crisis brought about Bojilov's resignation, but Colonel Kalfov was unable to form a Cabinet. The crisis did not end until June 1 when M. Bagrianov, a former Minister of Agriculture, a supporter of the Axis, formed a Ministry. He was Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. The other portfolios were held by Professor Stanischev (Interior) ; Lieutenant-General Russev (War) ; M. Dimitar Savov (Finance) ; Professor Kostov (Agriculture) ; M. Vassilev (Trade) ; Professor Arnaudov (Education) ; M. Kolchev (Transport and Public Works). Of these Kostov passed for being a cosmopolitan with pro-Russian sympathies, while Professor Stanischev was a violently anti-Greek and anti-Serb Macedonian.

The new Prime Minister, apart from his pro-German leanings, had two main characteristics. He was undeniably popular with the peasants and he was a close friend of the Royal family. His first public statement was non-committal, but it was generally thought that the Germans had tightened their grip on the country. This impression was strengthened when it became known on June 12 that owing perhaps to the admonitions of the German Minister to Sofia, Beckerle, the Prime Minister had appointed M. Draganov, formerly Minister in Madrid, and a notorious Germanophile, to be Foreign Minister, had given the vacant portfolio of Public Works to Slaveyko Vassilev, also a pro-German, the President of the Union of Reserve Officers, and had dismissed M. Kostov. Other changes in the Army and Police confirmed the view that the Germans were gaining ground again.

The Russians still remained quiescent if observant but the "partisan movement" had caused the Government some trouble. The general mobilization of the Bulgarian Army which Bozilov had ordered in March was nearly complete and outwardly all seemed quiet. But as the excellently informed Correspondent of *The Times* at Ankara observed (*loc. cit.* June 5), "the two main issues, the breaking of relations with Russia and the dispatch of Bulgarian troops to the eastern front, remain unsettled, and the Germans seem to have decided to rely on Bagrianov to ensure Bulgarian loyalty and assistance to the limit of Bulgarian acquiescence."

Theirs was not an enviable position. But they could not now risk a *coup* such as they had carried out in Hungary, for they were far from sure of the Bulgarian Army and knew that while the Bulgars might fight to retain their Macedonian booty they would be most unwilling to join in resisting a Russian drive to the Danube.

3 : INTER-ALLIED RELATIONS

A. POLITICS

Since Great Britain was the base of the great forces which had been preparing for many months for the invasion of the German-garrisoned "Fortress of Europe," it was natural that the British Government should have taken precautions against any disclosure which might

inform the Germans of the points at which the first Allied landings would be made. On April 17 the Foreign Office announced one measure which aroused some criticism in diplomatic quarters, neutral and Allied, but was approved by public opinion. This was the temporary suspension of the normal diplomatic privileges enjoyed by foreign Embassies, Legations and Consulates. The heads of such missions were informed that as from midnight the Government

would be unable to permit the transmission or receipt by them of any telegram not in plain language, the dispatch or receipt of any diplomatic bag without prior censorship, and the departure from the United Kingdom of official couriers or diplomatic and consular representatives or any members of their staffs. It was pointed out that any inadvertent disclosure of information which resulted in helping the enemy or in the unnecessary loss of Allied lives might have such serious effects, not only upon the military operations, but also on the relations between Great Britain and any foreign country whose nationals were concerned that the Government had reluctantly felt bound to adopt this unusual security measure. These restriction would be removed at the earliest possible moment, and in the meantime all such steps as were possible would be taken to facilitate communications between diplomatic and consular representatives of other Governments. The restrictions did not apply to the U.S. and Soviet Embassies and to the missions of the Dominions which were engaged in the war.¹

Before reviewing the relations between the Allied Powers in so far as they were made the subject of official announcement or responsible Press comment during this quarter, the writer will chronicle such developments of the Russo-Polish question as became known in the course of these three months. As Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden had to admit the efforts of the British Government to bridge the rift between the Polish Government in London and the U.S.S.R. were unsuccessful.²

Early in April an announcement by the Polish Telegraphic Agency in London aroused some hopes of a practical understanding in the field between the Polish Underground Government and the Russian Armies who had entered territory which the Polish Government had possessed, although the Russians were now claiming it. The Agency stated on official authority that the Government of M. Mikolajczyk had given instructions to the

¹ These restrictions were removed at midnight June 19-20.

² *q.v.*, Chapter IX, Section 2.

Underground forces and administration to offer their collaboration to the Red Army when entering Poland and to make the following declaration :

"Acting under instructions from the Polish Government's delegate we meet the forces of the U.S.S.R. on Polish soil as our co-belligerent in the fight against Germany, our common enemy. Poland was the first country to wage war against her in defence of her own and other nations' independence and she has been fighting against Germany with her allies for over four years. At the same time we bring to your knowledge that there is in existence in these territories an administration, secretly organized by the Polish State under the yoke of the German occupation. We expect that, in accordance with international law, the Soviet Army will enable Polish authorities, during military operations on Polish soil, to assure the social and economic welfare of the population." On the whole co-operation between Poles and the Red Army had been satisfactory.

It was stated on April 7 that the Russian Commander on the First Ukrainian Front had summoned the leader of the Underground troops in Volhynia and had suggested that these should co-operate fully with the Red Army. The detachments could not remain in arms behind the Russian lines, but if they were regrouped in the Polish divisions under Russian command they would be permitted to maintain their liaison with their superior officers and with their Government without interference and would be fully equipped by the Russian Army. The Polish commander got into touch with the representatives of his Government in Poland and was told to accept these proposals and co-operate with the Russian Army.

On May 11 M. Stanczyck, the Polish Minister of Labour, who was visiting the United States in connection with the International Labour Conference, made a statement on Russo-Polish relations. Poland, he declared, would never turn back until Germany was defeated. He believed in Russo-Polish collaboration not only in the field but also in a permanent understanding between the two countries. The Polish Government and people desired a genuine democratic system after the war and wished for good relations with their Russian neighbours. His Government were ready to discuss all outstanding problems with Russia, including frontiers. As to these Poland would be agreeable to a plebiscite, but this could not be held now since it must be under international supervision.

This quiet spell in Russo-Polish weather was, however, interrupted towards the end of May. On May 24 Moscow radio reported the establishment of a Polish Soviet in Warsaw which had sent representatives to Moscow, also that the "First National Polish Army" would now be raised. It was suspected that this rather cryptic announcement presaged the opening of another campaign against the Polish Government in London. Four days later *Pravda* opened fire on them again, charging them, as it had done before, with pursuing an inactive policy in Poland and energetic action outside it in opposition to the cause of Allied victory, and sneering as offensively as

usual at "these gentlemen who style themselves a Government." Meanwhile, the Polish Prime Minister had arrived in the United States. On June 14 he made an interesting statement to the Press at Washington in which he defended Poland's claims to East Prussia and pointed out that Germany had so changed the economic structure of the countries which she had overrun that even were she defeated militarily there was a great risk that she would still hold them in economic chains. He desired closer co-operation between the East European countries who had been victims of the Reich and advocated some form of federation.

He said he wished to see relations with Poland re-established and his Government were working for this. The Russians, he thought, could not complain of the amount of help they were getting from the Polish Underground forces. Poland desired to collaborate with Russia, but collaborations mean that both sides must be doing the same thing. This appeal, nevertheless, produced no official reply from Russia, and towards the end of the month it began to be rumoured that the Russian Government were preparing to set up a Polish Government of their own making in those Polish regions which they had occupied.

Negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia regarding the administration of territory that might be liberated by the Soviet Armies in their coming advance were successfully concluded in April. On April 30 M. Vyshinsky announced at a press conference at Moscow that an agreement had been reached.

It provided, he said, that supreme power in military matters in the operational zone on Czechoslovak territory should be vested, for as long as should be necessary, in the Supreme Commander of the Soviet (Allied) troops. National Front Committees, under the direction of the Czechoslovak Government, would take over the administration of liberated territory in conjunction with the Russian Commander-in-Chief. The following method would be followed. The Government would appoint a delegate empowered (1) to form and direct the Administration in the liberated territory; (2) to form Czechoslovak military forces; (3) to ensure the active assistance of the Administration and its branches to the Soviet (Allied) Commander-in-Chief by giving appropriate instructions to the local authorities on the basis of that officer's requirements.

The local committees would be democratically elected by universal franchise—Fascists and active collaborators with the Germans being naturally disfranchised. The committees would elect delegates to district committees who would in turn elect delegates to the provincial committees. The delegates of the provincial committees would form a provisional parliament for Czechoslovakia until a free general election could be held. M. Vyshinsky added that the British and U.S. Governments had been

informed of the course of these negotiations on April 18 and that the U.S. Government had expressed their agreement, as did the British Government later.

The British and U.S. Governments, who were both preparing for the invasion of the Continent, were also in negotiation with the Governments of Norway, Holland and Belgium on the subject of the administration of the liberated areas of those countries. Agreements were signed in London on May 16 by representatives of the Dutch and Belgian Governments and of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom. The agreement affecting Norway was also signed by the Soviet Government.

The Norwegian agreement, from which the others differed in no essential stated that "these agreements are intended to be essentially temporary and practical in character. They are designed to facilitate the task of the Allied commanders and to further the task of the Governments concerned —i.e. the speedy expulsion of the Germans from Allied territory and the final victory of the Allies over Germany. They recognize that the Allied commanders must enjoy *de facto* during the first or military phase of the liberation of Norway such measure of supreme responsibility and authority over the civil administration as may be required by the military situation. It is laid down that as soon as the military situation permits, the Norwegian Government shall resume their full constitutional responsibility for the civil administration, on the understanding that such special facilities as the Allied forces may continue to require on Norwegian territory will be made available for the prosecution of the war to its final conclusion."

The statement issued by the Foreign Office on behalf of the Governments concerned further announced the conclusion of agreements with the Governments of the Netherlands and Belgium and added: "The Soviet Government have been consulted regarding these arrangements and have expressed their agreement." The agreement with the last two Governments referred to "the Allied Supreme Commander," while that with Norway spoke of "the Allied commanders." There was a good reason for this difference of detail, which was suggested by the Norwegian Government. They foresaw the possibility that military operations in Finland might involve the retreat of the German troops in the north of Finland into Norway and their pursuit across the border by the Russians.

The tangled and far less agreeable story of the slow progress of the conversations on the same subject between the British and U.S. Governments on the one hand and the French Committee of National Liberation on the other is told later in this volume (Chapter VIII, Section 1). Mr Churchill's explanation of the inability of the British and U.S. Governments to recognize this body as the Government of France is recorded in Chapter IX,

Section 2. It need only be said here that it was held, rightly or wrongly, in many quarters that the British Government had conformed without any particular enthusiasm to the attitude of the American Government and was not primarily responsible for some of the eccentricities of policy which attracted a great deal of notice and criticism, not among Frenchmen only, in June.

In spite of the approach of the Presidential election in the United States and the consequent temptation to American politicians and publicists of the less responsible sort to indulge in the time-honoured diversion of "twisting the British lion's tail," there were no really serious Anglo-American Press polemics during the quarter,¹ the official relations between the two nations were good, and those between the British and the American members of the Allied Supreme Commander's Staff could not have been bettered. Here General Eisenhower showed astonishing skill in obtaining the maximum of "team-play" from the armies under his command, and it may be added that in Italy General Alexander handled his multi-national Army on similar lines and with abundant success.

On April 7 Mr. Stettinius, who had succeeded Mr. Sumner Welles as Mr. Cordell Hull's second-in-command at the State Department, arrived in London, accompanied by a strong staff of experts. On his arrival he told the Press

that the purpose of his visit was "not to conclude agreements, but rather to discuss in an exploratory manner a wide range of topics of particular interest

¹ An unfortunately worded phrase in a speech by Mr. Oliver Lyttelton at the American Chamber of Commerce, London, on June 21, aroused much agitation in the U.S. Press and provoked a rejoinder by Mr. Cordell Hull. On June 22 the Minister of Production, speaking in Parliament, said that the words he had used in expressing the gratitude of this country for American aid against Germany before the Japanese attack "when read textually apart from the whole tenour of my speech, seemed to mean that the help given to us . . . provoked Japan to attack, and that is manifestly untrue. . . . Any misunderstanding is entirely my own fault. I ask this House to believe that the fault was one of expression and not of intention. I hope this apology will undo any harm which the original words may have caused here and in the United States." Mr. Hull rejoined that there was no question of "gratitude." The help given under lend-lease to Britain and other countries was "vital to the defence of the United States." It sounded brusque, but it prevented polemics.

to our two Governments at the present time." The names of the four principal experts on his staff were published on the same day. They were Mr. John Lee Pratt, State Department consultant on commercial affairs; Mr. Wallace Murray, Director of the State Department's Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs; Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs; and Dr. Isaiah Bowman, adviser to the State Department on post-war problems, who had been the chief territorial specialist on the American Commission to negotiate peace in 1918-19.

Mr. Stettinius lost no time in beginning his conversations with British statesmen, while his expert assistants conferred with their British "opposite numbers." He saw Mr. Churchill on April 9, spent a great part of April 11 with Mr. Eden, and afterwards met Mr. Law, the Minister of State, and Sir Alexander Cadogan. He met the Prime Minister again on April 15 in a conference at which Mr. Winant, the U.S. Ambassador, and members of Mr. Stettinius's staff were present. A week-end with Mr. Eden and conversations with Mediterranean and Middle Eastern experts followed in which problems already covered broadly in the talks with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary were reviewed in detail. Talks on war supplies, neutral trade and food for Britain and liberated European countries followed, and the U.S. Under-Secretary of State met the representatives of all the Allied Governments who had their headquarters in London. He also visited U.S. camps in this country. A particularly busy day was April 26, when Mr. Gusev, the Soviet Ambassador, whom he had met on several occasions during his visit, joined in a general discussion at the Foreign Office, in which Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Eden, Mr. Winant, and Sir Alexander Cadogan also took part. Mr. Stettinius also discussed Russo-Polish relations with M. Mikolajczyk and other European problems with Dr. Benesh.

On April 27 *The Times* published the following survey of this visit of nearly three weeks. Its Diplomatic Correspondent wrote :

"The visit has been a success because the American visitors and the British Ministers and officials who met them talked freely and openly together on all problems. . . . Their immediate task has been to ensure that diplomatic and economic efforts give the maximum support to the Allied fighting forces. They examined all the disruptive and corrosive effects of the German war, likely to be still more devastating before Europe is freed.

They attended to the first tasks of restoration behind the Allied lines as they are pushed forward, making sure that Britain and America work in understanding together, and within the wider Allied partnership. . . .

The civil affairs branches of the western Allied forces will do all they can to give help to civilians caught near the fighting, and later, according to careful arrangements, the Allied Governments will take control. There remains a strong hope that a clear agreement on civil administration in France will be made with the French Committee. . . .

At the same time those taking part have inquired . . . into ways of expediting the work of the inter-Allied commissions—the European Advisory Commission in London and the Advisory Council on Italy.” Other questions discussed included the projected American pipe-line across Arabia, the future of Lend-Lease, the future of world trade, the attitude of the neutrals towards trade with Germany (*q.v.* Section 1 of this chapter) among others.

On April 28 the Foreign Office issued the following announcement :

“Mr. Stettinius, Under-Secretary of State, and a delegation composed of senior representatives of the United States Government have been visiting this country during the past three weeks on behalf of Mr. Cordell Hull, United States Secretary of State, for informal and exploratory exchanges of views. Their visit has afforded His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom a welcome opportunity to repay the courtesies extended to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and other members of the Foreign Office on their visits to Washington in the recent past.

During their stay Mr. Stettinius and his party have had informal discussions covering the very wide fields in which the two countries are collaborating so closely in the prosecution of the war. They have had conversations with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary as well as with numerous other Ministers and with officials. The discussions have covered important current questions, others, that will become of great importance as hostilities draw to a close, and also long-range questions in connection with the post-war period.

In all fields the discussions have revealed a very large measure of common ground. The talks have been of great assistance in the task of co-ordinating policies, and all those concerned in both Governments have expressed great satisfaction with the results. During the period of the talks opportunities have been taken to keep the Soviet and Chinese Governments informed as to the course of the discussions. Mr. Stettinius has particularly expressed on behalf of himself and the members of his mission great appreciation of their warm friendly reception and of the frank co-operation that they have received from all quarters.”

The reference to problems “that will become of great importance as hostilities draw to a close” was understood as showing that the Allies would not allow themselves to be surprised by a sudden German collapse as they were in 1918. Mr. Stettinius returned to Washington well content with his visit on May 4, and reported at length to Mr. Hull on May 6.

B. CIVIL AVIATION AND PETROLEUM

Two questions which particularly interested both the United States and the United Kingdom from the economic and hardly less from the political standpoint, were the subject of important conversations between representatives of their Governments during the quarter. One was civil aviation, the other was the development of mineral oil supplies, more especially in the Middle East. Discussions on civil aviation opened in London on April 3. The U.S. representatives were Mr. Adolf Berle, Assistant Secretary of State and head of the civil aviation section of the State Department, and Dr. Edward Warner, Vice-chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board. The British representative was Lord Beaverbrook, who was assisted by a number of technical advisers. The Aeronautical Correspondent of *The Times* wrote (*loc. cit.* April 4) :

"The talks . . . are not designed to result in immediate decisions, but are rather in the nature of an informal and preliminary exchange of views on a matter of great complexity which equally affects other countries, including the British Dominions and other Allied Nations which operated international air services before the war. Talks of similar scope are taking place in Washington between representatives of the Soviet Government and Mr. Joseph Grew, former United States Ambassador to Japan; Mr. Welch Pogue, Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board; and Mr. William Burden, Special Aviation Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce. These Allied talks may be considered the next step forward from the conference held at London last October between representatives of Britain, the British Dominions, and India, at the close of which it was officially stated that unanimous agreement had been reached on recommendations which should be made regarding the lines on which civil aviation should be developed after the war, and as to the contribution which the Governments of the Commonwealth and Empire could make towards international co-operation in this field."

On April 7 the following statement was issued from the offices of the Lord Privy Seal (Lord Beaverbrook) :

"The representatives of the British and United States Governments have consulted together in preparation for an international conference on civil aviation. They are of opinion that there is sufficient agreement between them to justify the expectation that final dispositions can be reached at an international conference. They have in mind that the Soviet Union and other Governments would likewise enter into conversations prior to such international conference."

The Governments of the United Kingdom and of the United States have agreed that international control should govern a considerable field

of technical matters. They have made arrangements for continuing technical conversations for the purpose of reaching detailed agreement on the several aspects of this field."

The statement gave the names of the representatives of the two countries and added that talks on similar lines had been taking place at Washington between American and Soviet Russian representatives.

At a Press Conference held on April 8 Lord Beaverbrook and Mr. Berle both made it clear that these discussions had been preparatory. Neither Government wished to confront other Powers with decisions finally taken, and Mr. Berle in particular stated that the U.S. Government did not expect to take part in all the preliminary discussions.

At the Press Conference Mr. Berle emphasized the difference between the British and the American approach to the use of aviation. Americans regarded the aeroplane as a vehicle of trade. In England it seemed to be regarded as an evil thing to be controlled lest it spew out death and destruction.¹ Concessions had been made on both sides to reconcile these two outlooks. Mr. Berle said that while subsidies were necessary in some cases, they should not be used to crush competition. It was the abuse rather than the use of subsidies that had concerned the conference most, and various means of controlling subsidies had been discussed. Connected with this question was the policy to be adopted by each country in regard to the single "chosen instrument,"—i.e. a State or State-controlled monopoly of aviation—or to free competition. This matter concerned each country alone, and the United States would not presume to suggest a change of policy to other nations. There would inevitably be some degree of competition between any nations which conducted international air services, but this must not be allowed to interfere with the common interest or with international security or to permit the raising of problems which could embitter international relations. The two Governments had agreed in principle on the measure of control of air transport which Governments should exercise but the mechanics of that control must be devised later.

On the question of the use of air bases built in various parts of the world for war purposes, Mr. Berle said that his Government hoped that countries generally would allocate for use by all air lines sufficient bases for trade with these countries, and here the British representatives had shown sympathetic understanding. A nation was presumed to own the air above its territory, but the discussions at the conference had been concerned with the use of territorial air as a barrier to trade.

Commenting on the results of this preparatory conference *The Times* observed in a leading article of April 10 that nations, while asserting their sovereignty over their own air, would make a partial surrender of it in the terms of an international convention. Such a convention would require an international authority to watch over the observance of its provisions and it was suggested that it would exercise control over technical matters, e.g., the qualifications of pilots, the code regulating air traffic and the air-worthiness of machines. Such an authority would also see that essential ground services, e.g. weather reports, radio-location and the like, were equally available to all. But Mr. Berle's language had implied that this

¹ The United States had had no experience of air raids.

authority would have no voice in the allocation of airports for the great transcontinental and transoceanic services. "This is regarded as matter for the wise and co-operative exercise of national sovereignty. It is . . . possible that objections will be raised to this proposal. Powers such as the United States, Russia and Britain are in a sufficiently strong bargaining position to get what they want. But . . . Holland, which has great air services to maintain and few geographical advantages with which to support them, is not likely to forget that her international aircraft were refused landing facilities at Miami, and may well desire some right of appeal against the absolute power of any nation to allocate landing rights in its territory."

No official information as to the results of the Russo-American conversations on civil aviation was made public during the quarter. An outline of the debates on that subject in the House of Lords on May 10 and 11, when Lord Beaverbrook had much to say of the conference with the U.S. representatives, will be found in Chapter IX, Section 2.

Oil supplies also interested the United States Government, who feared an early exhaustion of their home supplies and the British Government who were dependent largely on the oilfields of the Middle East. As naval and oceanic Powers both had every interest in obtaining assured supplies of fuel for their fleets ; but the fact that the Middle East seemed the likeliest source of new supplies and that some of the best existing oilfields were in the hands of British groups who had obtained concessions from the Governments of Iraq and Persia, each of which was allied with Great Britain, made friction between the two English-speaking Powers possible in default of some general agreement.

On April 3 the Foreign Office published the names of the members of an official delegation which was leaving for Washington to conduct preliminary and exploratory discussions on petroleum questions. Sir William Brown led the delegation. The other members were Commodore A. W. Clarke, Sir William Fraser, Sir Frederick Godber, Mr. F. Harmer, Mr. J. H. Le Rougetel, and Mr. F. C. Starling. Mr. V. Butler was secretary.

On April 16 the experts met their American "opposite numbers" in Washington to discuss oil supplies, particularly those of the Middle Eastern countries. Four days previously a statement made by Colonel Knox, Secretary of the U.S. Navy, on March 22 before the Naval Appropriations sub-Committee of the House of Representatives had been published in Washington. It was read with

some surprise in London. Colonel Knox had explained to the sub-committee why the United States Government desired to build a pipe-line across Saudi Arabia. In the course of this explanation

he said that the American oil companies which had obtained oil concessions in this part of Arabia had urged their Government to help and protect them because they were there "in possible competition with the British Government and with British oil companies having all the support and prestige which the British Government could bring." He also said that the Saudi Arabian Government were asking the British Government for help and that London had "advanced considerable sums of money," causing the American companies to become "a little alarmed." While the Secretary of the U.S. Navy merely reported the American companies' fears without confirming them, his words, if left unanswered, would have suggested that the British Government were attempting to jockey the Americans out of their concessions. In fact, as the Diplomatic Correspondent of *The Times* observed (*loc. cit.* April 14), London had neither the power nor the desire to upset arrangements made by a foreign Power with regard to concessions. He added that the British Government had made no financial arrangements with Saudi Arabia outside the knowledge of the American Government, and those arrangements into which they had entered had no connexion with oil concessions.

The publication of this statement on the eve of the meeting of the experts naturally caused some concern in both countries, more especially in the United States, the oil reserves of which, according to Mr. Harold Ickes, were threatened with extinction by 1958. These anxieties were largely allayed by the official statement of the result of the meetings between the experts which was published simultaneously in London and Washington on May 3.

After describing the meetings as "preliminary exploratory discussions between groups of experts," and announcing their conclusion at a joint session held on May 3 the statement continued :

"In a spirit of understanding and co-operation the two groups explored the full range of both countries' interest in petroleum on the basis of broad principles looking to the proposed long-range development of abundant oil supplies. The two groups are now reporting the results of these discussions to their Governments.

After full discussion of the broad principles, the two groups reviewed various specific matters of mutual interest relating to production, distribution and transportation of oil. These specific matters included pending problems affecting operations abroad of American and British oil groups, questions relating to oil production particularly in the Middle East, the proposed trans-Arabian pipe-line and the Iraqi Petroleum Company's project for an additional pipe-line from Kirkuk, Iraq, to Haifa. The groups shared the view that peace-time inter-Governmental aspects of such matters should be resolved, as between the two Governments, within the framework of broad principles which had been discussed."

On June 2 Mr. Roosevelt, answering questions about oil, said that he did not know whether the proposed pipe-line would be built or who would pay for it were it built. It was an "iffy subject." On June 5 the Washington Correspondent of *The Times* reported (*loc. cit.* June 6) that further discussions on oil between the two Governments were believed to be in prospect. He added :

They will centre in an American suggestion for the creation of a world oil commission, whose members will be all the oil-producing States. Such a commission would have as its purpose the allocation of petroleum supplies among the various countries on a basis of need and an economy of plenty. . . . One of the principles proposed by the United States is believed to be that only excess production be shipped from a producing country, this being aimed at improving the economy of small nations rich in oil reserves, such as Persia and Iraq. Another provides for equal access to oil by all non-producing countries commensurate with their needs. Validity of existing concessions and contracts would be guaranteed and neither Government would permit the restriction of the development of oil refineries or reserves, particularly in the Middle East.

While discussions so far have been only between Britain and the United States, it is understood that Russia has been fully informed of the plan which is believed to have found Soviet agreement to its general purpose.

As for the much-discussed American pipe-line across Arabia, the project had not been abandoned, but it remained in the background until the end of the quarter.

CHAPTER V


THE FAR EASTERN WAR

I : BURMA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN

During the second quarter of 1944 the war on the Indo-Burman borders and in northern Burma grew in violence and presented great strategical and tactical interest. Both sides were eager to obtain a decision before the coming of the rains at the end of May made fighting impossible over a great part of the front. When June ended neither had attained its full objective. The Japanese counter-stroke in Manipur had been defeated after temporarily threatening to wreck the Allied plan for the invasion of northern Burma, but Japanese troops were still fighting on Indian soil. In northern Burma the capture of Mogaung at the end of the quarter inclined the balance in favour of the Allies, but the Japanese were thought to be still capable of an offensive in this region, in part of which the monsoon rains were less torrential than in other parts of Burma. But while the ground fighting had been fiercely contested, in the air the Allies were the masters ; and the air attacks on Japanese bases in northern Sumatra, at Surabaya and in the Andamans which were delivered by the carrier-borne aircraft of Admiral Somerville's fleet presaged an early offensive against the enemy's defensive line in the Indian Ocean.

At the end of March the situation on the Indo-Burman front might be summed up as follows. Three separate but inter-dependent campaigns were being waged, in Arakan, in Manipur and in northern Burma from Indaw to the Chinese frontier. In Arakan an ambitious Japanese counter-offensive had been heavily defeated, but it had brought the British advance to a temporary standstill and it had banished any hope that Akyab might fall before the monsoon rains. In the north General

Stilwell's Chinese-American army was slowly fighting its way into and down the Mogaung Valley, while a small but mobile and enterprising force of Gurkhas and Kachin tribesmen was working down the Mali Valley towards Myitkyina and its airfields on General Stilwell's eastern flank. Behind the Japanese forces which were opposing these advances from the north or watching the Chinese in Yunnan, a special force of British, Gurkha and West African troops, air-borne and air-supplied, had descended from the skies and was attacking the enemy's communications, while another special force which had crossed the Naga Hills on foot was pressing forward to join these adventurous "Chindits." The enemy met this serious threat to his forces in the north by a bold counter-attack in the centre. His advance into Manipur from the Chindwin and the Chin Hills was beginning to take the shape of a dangerous *riposte*. It was designed to isolate the strong British and Indian force at Imphal, the base of the IVth Army Corps, which was responsible for the defence of the central sectors of the Indo-Burmese front, or to force it to retire by threatening its communications. Imphal, the Manipur Plain, and its airfields once in Japanese hands, the enemy hoped to be able to hold the Manipur Plain and its mountain walls throughout the monsoon rains, and to use the airfields for attacks, supplemented by minor ground offensives, on the American airfields in north-east Assam and on the Assam Railway. The railway supplied the engineers working on the Ledo road into northern Burma with food and materials. It also fed the Imphal garrison, which drew its supplies by lorry from the station of Dimapur. The transport aircraft based on the Assam airfields supplied General Stilwell's advanced troops, the column operating in the Mali Valley and the special air-borne troops dropped behind the Japanese lines. They also carried essential supplies to China. Serious interference with Allied rail and air transport would place the garrison of Imphal in a difficult position, would reduce Allied supplies to China to a minimum and by facing General Stilwell's army and the other air-supplied Allied troops



in northern Burma with the breakdown of their supplies would compel them to retreat towards the Indian border as best they could.

Although there was more fighting in Arakan in April, May, and early June, no decisive action took place there. A summary of *communiqués* from the South-East Asia Command gives the following picture of the campaign.

After the capture of the western tunnel on the Maungdaw-Buthidaung road which has been recorded in the previous volume of this chronicle, the British and Indian forces soon made themselves masters of the entire road, capturing the eastern tunnel on April 6. The Japanese, however, were still capable of counter-attacking and the British force in Arakan was being weakened by the transfer by air to the Manipur front of part at least of the 5th Indian Division. Hostile counter-attacks on each side of the Mayu range were repulsed with loss on April 9 when West African troops also inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese east of Kaladan village. On April 24 they scored a success east of the Kalapanzin river valley. Two days later troops of the Frontier Force Rifles engaged in clearing the foothills of the Mayu Range inflicted serious losses on the enemy, and on April 27 the 9th (Hyderabad) Regiment carried a Japanese position in this region and killed many of the enemy. Further fighting in the Kaladan Valley, where West African and Indian troops were engaged, was reported at the end of April.

On May 7, S.E.A.C.¹ announced : In Arakan the enemy has reacted sharply to our recent successes. Our troops defeated a number of determined counter-attacks against our positions in the Mayu Range, inflicting heavy casualties. Having established ourselves on certain features vital to the security of this line, we have carried out a readjustment of our positions, which has included a withdrawal from Buthidaung without enemy interference. Farther east in the Kalapanzin Valley another enemy attack in the same force also suffered severely. In the Upper Kaladan Valley Punjabis and West African troops have in the last few days killed 230 Japanese with a loss to themselves of 12 killed and 23 wounded. This withdrawal and those from Kaladan and Paletwa which were reported shortly afterwards were ascribed by the enemy to their pressure on our positions, but there seems no reason to doubt that the aim of the 14th Army Command was to retain commanding positions, but to remove troops from low-lying country where they would otherwise suffer from malaria during the rains. After the first fortnight in May the weather began to deteriorate and in June the rains prevented any serious fighting on this front.

On the Manipur front the Japanese followed four lines of advance. A column from Tamanthi advanced to Kohima on the Dimapur-Imphal road. Another from Homalin followed a good road to Ukhrul. There it split into two columns after its successes at Jessami and Ukhrul. One covered the flank of the force threatening Kohima. The other advanced towards the north-

¹ i.e. South-East Asia Command.


eastern edge of the Manipur Plain and the road to Imphal, aiming especially at the point where it entered the complex of some 50 miles of mountain country between the plain and Kohima. The greater part of the Japanese 15th and 31st Divisions was employed in these operations. Other Japanese columns, part perhaps of the 15th and all the 33rd Division, were attacking the south-eastern and southern perimeter of the plain by the road from the Chindwin through Tamu to Palel and Imphal and by the road from Tiddim.

It is difficult to give more than a general summary of the operations which continued throughout the quarter around the Manipur Plain. The reader will, perhaps, be grateful for an avoidance of detail in the following account, which is based upon the *communiqués* issued by South-East Asia Command (S.E.A.C.) and the dispatches of correspondents at Delhi and Kandy, where Admiral Mountbatten moved his Headquarters on April 18. A few points may be borne in mind. There was no continuous front; the armies engaged were not nearly strong enough, nor, indeed, did the nature of the country permit it. The Japanese operating from Ukhrul were lightly armed. Their troops who were advancing from Tiddim and up the Tamu road were provided with light tanks and had sufficient artillery, but their strength in guns and armour was nevertheless inferior to that of our IVth Corps. Against this handicap they had the advantage that our main line of communications, the Imphal-Dimapur road, ran parallel with the front and was therefore liable to attack by small lightly equipped raiding parties emerging from the forest-clad mountain circumference of the Manipur Plain. In the air the enemy was markedly inferior, but the forests gave his troops abundant cover both from attack and observation.

The first Japanese parties to reach the Imphal-Kohima road appeared on April 2. On April 3 it was made known that the 17th Division had made good its retreat from Tiddim, aided by a column from Imphal which intervened when the Japanese cut in behind it. Although the Japanese claimed to have destroyed it, its losses were not severe and it brought back about 85 per cent of its transport and equipment. The 20th Division left Tamu on April 5, removing their stores and destroying five Japanese tanks before the evacuation. The garrison retired to strong-points which

had been established on the road between Tamu and Pael, some 40 miles from Imphal, and here they held their own, as did the 17th Division who blocked the Tiddim road near its entry into the Manipur Plain.

The main Japanese thrust at this stage of the Manipur campaign was directed against Kohima. The approaches to this mountain summer-resort favour attack. It is a straggling little town surrounded by jungle and mountains



MANIPUR

which command it, and the Japanese infiltrated into the outlying quarters and indeed claimed the capture of the place on April 7. They were able to bring up light artillery as well as mortars with which they kept up a harassing fire on the straggling township while their infantry made attempts both by direct attack and infiltration to seize the centres of the defence. The garrison, a British battalion of a Home Counties regiment and part of the newly-formed Assam Regiment of the Indian Army who had never been in action before, put up a magnificent

defence. Although they were temporarily cut off from Dimapur by a road block set up by the enemy four miles to the north and the road to Imphal had been cut at several points, they fought, under excellent leadership, with the utmost confidence and inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese.

Meanwhile, a strong force was rapidly concentrated at Dimapur for the relief of Kohima. It included the 2nd British Division which had served in Flanders to Dunkirk, as well as Indian units. These fine troops, who had been excellently trained in India, first encountered strong opposition at the road block north of Kohima. Their progress was recorded in a series of *communiqués* issued by S.E.A.C. during the last half of April which can only be briefly summarized here.

On April 13 and 14 night attacks on Kohima from both east and west were repulsed and operations to clear the Kohima-Dimapur road were reported to be progressing satisfactorily on April 16. Further Japanese positions in this area were reported captured on the following day, and on April 17 the artillery of the relieving force was able to engage the Japanese guns shelling Kohima. On April 24 S.E.A.C. announced the relief of the garrison in these words: "The road from Kohima to Dimapur, though still threatened in places, is at present open, and the relief of the original garrison of Kohima which withstood all attempts to capture the town has been completed." The Japanese, however, did not withdraw to any distance, although they seem to have detached part of their force to join their troops who had attempted to advance into the plain from the Ukhrul road and had been roughly handled. The rest of their force at Kohima held the highest point in the town, the Naga village to the east of our southernmost positions there, and also on a high ridge some miles north of Kohima.

Meanwhile, there had been sharp fighting at many points on the edges of the Imphal Plain. Japanese attempts to reach the plain by the Tamu road were held by our road blocks and other defences near Palel. The force advancing from Tiddim, though also provided with light tanks and medium artillery, was equally unsuccessful. The Japanese who tried to enter the plain from the Ukhrul road were driven back and by April 22 this road was clear for 30 miles from Imphal and at no point had the enemy secured a footing on the plain.

The Japanese, nevertheless, were extremely pertinacious, as the next series of reports from S.E.A.C. showed. On April 14 it was admitted that "small parties" of the enemy had been edging their way round the perimeter of the Imphal Plain until they reached the bad road linking Imphal with

Silchar in Assam near Bishenpur. Within a week sharp fighting was being reported almost daily from the Bishenpur area and on May 1 enemy counter-attacks were repulsed there and a block on the track west of Bishenpur was cleared.

The hardest fighting, however, was north of Imphal and in the Kohima region. A column from Imphal moving into the hills between the plain and Kohima encountered stiff resistance near Kanglatongbi and seems to have been held up after a while. South-west of Ukhrul "troops of the 16th Punjabi Regiment inflicted casualties in a successful raid." During the next week the Japanese made several attempts to regain ground which they had lost to the relieving force at Kohima, where the official report from S.E.A.C. on May 8 said that "heavy fighting continues" with "no material change." Japanese attacks on the Palel and Tiddim roads were thrown back and a day later the enemy round the Imphal Plain were on the defensive, and their losses near Kohima, where 750 dead had been counted after three days' fighting, had taken the edge off their attack.

On May 11 S.E.A.C. reported the progress of an important operation to clear the ridge south-west of Kohima, and further fighting in the Palel and Bishenpur areas. The action at Kohima was highly successful and the Japanese were driven from their last holdings near the town on May 14. The Naga village was next captured. The Japanese on the night of May 25 "launched a determined attack . . . supported by a considerable weight of artillery and mortar-fire," but suffered heavy casualties and broke off the assault. The Aradura ridge was our next objective, and in spite of bad weather and an obstinate defence the British infantry made ground there and also to the north-east of the town. But the monsoon was beginning to break and progress was very slow.

Then suddenly the Japanese gave way. On June 7 S.E.A.C. reported that "owing to their heavy losses" the Japanese were retreating so rapidly in the Kohima area that "our patrols have not been able to keep up with them." Their retreat was expedited by the appearance of outflanking columns on the Jessami and Kharasom tracks in their rear and by their increasing difficulties of supply.

The discovery of an Order of the Day issued by Lieutenant-General Mutaguchi, the Commander of the 15th Japanese Army in Burma, on June 1 threw light on the causes of the retreat. "We had the enemy hemmed in round Imphal and the battle situation stabilized. Still, all this has not been fully up to the expectations of our nation. This is a most regrettable matter. Withholding my tears, painful as they are, I shall for the time being withdraw my troops from Kohima. It is my resolve to reassemble the whole army and with one great push to capture Imphal. If a decisive victory is not obtained we shall not be able to strike back again. On this one battle rests the fate of the empire."

The fact was that the 31st Japanese Division had been too heavily punished to continue the fight with any hope of success. It had suffered casualties estimated at 50 per cent of its original strength of some 18,000 men. Our casualties, British and Indian, had been heavy, but they

were not comparable to the enemy's loss. Our Kohima force was now able to press some distance along the Imphal road, and by June 16 it had reached the 60th milestone from Dimapur at Vizwema, from which a Japanese rear-guard, perhaps belonging to the 15th Division, had been driven after a long and hard battle.

Meanwhile, S.E.A.C. had reported heavy fighting almost daily round the Imphal Plain. The Japanese made a most determined attempt to capture the Bishenpur area where the general commanding the infantry group of the 33rd Division engaged there ordered his troops to rally for a final attempt on Imphal, but warned them at the same time that they must be prepared for extermination and that officers had been ordered to use their swords on shirkers. But every attempt failed, although the Japanese managed to bring light tanks and a fair amount of light artillery round the southern edge of the Imphal Plain and the Japanese suffered heavily.

On the Tamu and Palel roads the enemy made a number of attacks. More than once they seemed near success, but no important position was lost, and the troops of the IVth Corps under the able leadership of Lieutenant-General G. A. P. Scoones were equal to every emergency. They had been joined by part of the 5th Indian Division which had been brought to Imphal by air.¹ This was the work of Troop-Carrier Command, which was supplying and reinforcing the IVth Corps, General Stilwell's Chinese and American army in northernmost Burma, the "Chindits" of the Special Force on the Upper Irrawaddy, the West African and Indian troops on the Kaladan, and the Gurkha-Kachin column in the Mali Valley at the same time, an astonishing performance on the part of its American commander, Brigadier-General Old, and his Staff. Nor did the IVth Corps fight only on the defensive, although it had been on reduced rations since the cutting of its supply line to Dimapur. A Gurkha battalion established a block on the Tiddim road in rear of the 33rd Division, beat off many attacks and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. On the Ukhrul track our troops made a successful advance into the lower hills. On the Tamu-Palel road, try as they would, the Japanese could not break through. So though the enemy had been reinforced by contingents drawn from other divisions as well as drafts, he not only failed to carry out General Mutaguchi's "one great push to capture Imphal," but he was also unable to prevent troops of the IVth Corps from co-operating in the clearing of the Dimapur road with the column pressing south from Kohima.

To the general relief, for rations were short at Imphal, and the supply of the large force there imposed a serious strain on Troop-Carrier Command, the road was cleared much more rapidly than had been expected. On June 20 nearly 30 miles of hilly country intervened between the two forces advancing northward from Imphal and southward from Kohima. On June 23 S.E.A.C. reported :

¹ The remainder of the 5th Indian Division was engaged at Kohima.

"The ten-mile gap between our troops on the Kohima-Imphal road was closed on Thursday (June 22) when by co-ordinated thrusts from north and south we cleared it of the remnants of the Japanese 15th and 31st Divisions left to oppose our advance. The whole of the road is now open. . . . In the Palel-Tamu area our troops successfully ambushed a party of the enemy ; the majority were killed and the survivors appear to have thrown their wounded into the river to drown."

Before the month was out a strong force was advancing through the monsoon rains towards Ukhrul. The last Japanese stragglers left between Kohima and Imphal had been accounted for and the enemy's rearguards had been virtually destroyed. S.E.A.C. estimated their loss at over 3,000 killed and, though only 50 prisoners were taken, ten guns and great quantities of ammunition had fallen into the victors' hands.

While the Japanese were taking the initiative in the centre they were fighting a defensive battle on their right in the far north of Burma. And there they remained strategically and generally tactically on the defensive throughout the quarter, fighting a stubborn but on the whole a losing battle against General Stilwell's army of two Chinese Divisions reinforced by American tanks and infantry, against the mobile force of Gurkhas and Kachins in the Mali Valley, against the ubiquitous "Chindits" and latterly against Chinese troops advancing from Yunnan towards the frontier of Burma. At the beginning of the quarter their 18th Division was fighting obstinate rearguard action against General Stilwell's troops, while their 56th Division was holding Bhamo and the adjacent parts of Yunnan Province in China west of the Salween River. Myitkyina was also held in some strength by the Japanese.

During the first ten days of April General Stilwell's troops were reported by S.E.A.C. to be working down the Mogaung Valley in the direction of Kemaing, while the Mali column was attempting to force the passage of the Tiang River, north of Tiangzup, some 40 miles by air south of Sumprabum and almost as far north of Myitkyina. By this time the attacks of the Special Force on the enemy's rail, road and river communications were causing the Japanese grave difficulties in the fields of reinforcement and supply. These difficulties had been enhanced by the arrival of another substantial force of air-borne troops from India behind the Japanese lines. The official statement issued by S.E.A.C. on April 24 said, *inter alia* : "Within a matter of hours a strip capable of accepting transports was laid out, and Dakotas of the Commando Force and R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F.

transports of Troop-Carrier Command were ferrying reinforcements to join the land column which was already fanning out to attack the Japanese lines of supply and communication." An account issued simultaneously by the U.S. War Department said that the Air Commando Force engaged in these and earlier operations had been organized by Colonels Philip Cochran and J. R. Alison by direction of General Arnold, commanding the U.S.A.A.F.

On April 26 S.E.A.C. reported "limited" Chinese gains against stiff resistance in the Mogaung Valley and at the same time made it clear that the Mali column had not yet forced the Tiangzup crossings. On April 28 came news of a flanking movement by elements of the 38th Chinese Division east of the Mogaung River. An earlier report from Kandy¹ estimated the Japanese losses in three days' heavy fighting west of the river at more than 2,000 killed. On May 1 S.E.A.C. reported:

"Medium tanks were used for the first time in the Mogaung Valley when the first all-American tank unit to see action on the Asiatic continent launched an attack on enemy positions north and west of Inkangahtawng." A somewhat vaguely worded pendant to this news gave the impression that a third of the Mogaung Valley had been lost by the Japanese.

Meanwhile, the "Chindits," commanded since the fatal accident to Major-General Wingate by Major-General W. D. Lentaigne, an officer who had spent almost all his military life on the Indian frontier and had acquired an almost legendary reputation for prowess in Burma in 1942, had been wreaking havoc with the enemy's communications with Mogaung, Myitkyina and Bhamo.

It is now time to describe the exploits of these adventurous troops who, as recorded in the previous volume of this series (*The Eighteenth Quarter*, Chapter V, Section 1), had invaded northern Burma, some by land, the majority by air. The first connected account of their operations to be published was written by the Special Correspondent of *The Times* on the Assam Front (*loc. cit.* June 28). Here is a summary of his narrative.

The first "landing" from the air of the "Special Force," as the Chindits were officially styled, was in and around the base of the triangle Myitkyina-Bhamo-Indaw. This region "was, it turned out, something of a military vacuum" between the Japanese 15th and 31st Divisions which had been lined up along the Chindwin and had attacked Kohima, the enemy's 18th Division in north Burma, and a division, the 56th according to the Chinese, which held the Salween line and watched the Chinese in south-west Yunnan. The descent of these splendid special troops, British, Gurkha and West African, lightly but elaborately equipped, and much more numerous than General Wingate's force which had reached the Shan States during the previous year in its raid on the enemy's communications,²

¹ Now the Headquarters of S.E.A.C.

² *The Fifteenth Quarter*, pp. 115-17.

threatened no less than four Japanese supply lines. These were, firstly the road and railway from Mandalay to Myitkyina *via* Indaw junction, Pinhaw and Mogaung ; secondly, the route from Pinhaw to Homalin on the Chindwin and thence to the Japanese troops operating west of that river against Kohima ; thirdly, the road from northern Siam through the northern Shan States to Bhamo by which troops could be moved into south-western Yunnan and the upper valley of the Irrawaddy during the dry season ; and last but not least the Irrawaddy itself which was navigable by river steamers to Bhamo.

The object of these invasions both by air and by land (the latter under Brigadier Fergusson from somewhere in the Indian frontier Hills) was to render all possible assistance to General Stilwell's invasion of northern Burma which had been proceeding for some three and a half months when the Chindits opened their campaign. General Stilwell attached great importance to the opening of the Burma road to China and, perhaps, still greater importance to the seizure of aerodromes or of positions on which they could be constructed in northern Burma which would enable the American aircraft supplying the 14th U.S.A.A.F. and the Chinese Government with essential materials without having to cross the formidable Himalayan "Hump."¹

The value of the assistance given to General Stilwell's advance by the special troops may be judged by the following record of their operations. These fell into two phases. In the first the special troops were operating round the base of the Myitkyina-Bhamo-Indaw triangle. They had been able to establish three airfield strongholds—"Broadway, south-east of Hopyin ; Aberdeen, west of the railway town of Mawlu ; and Chowring-hee, which is somewhere in the bend of the Shweli River. From these marauding columns went out, but remained linked to the airfield bases by light aircraft and radio. They had three principal achievements to their credit. First, they established and held for the best part of two months a block on the road and railway at Henu near Mawlu. That stopped movement on the main Japanese reinforcement and supply route between southern Burma and Mogaung. Secondly, they established a block and carried out demolitions on the Bhamo road south of Myitkyina." Thirdly, they interrupted traffic on the Irrawaddy.

The two road blocks greatly embarrassed the Japanese when they began moving troops from the Salween to reinforce their 18th Division, which was hard pressed by the advance of the Chinese and Americans up the Hukawng Valley and over the saddle dividing its head from the valley of the Mogaung River. "In addition many small columns roamed the countryside, tearing down telegraph and telephone wires, destroying Japanese food and oil stores and ammunition dumps, ambushing transport, mining the roads and laying booby traps and generally doing a great deal of damage, confusing the enemy command and causing him to disperse his forces. Also one or

¹ cf. *The Eighteenth Quarter*, Chapter V, Section 1.

more special force columns sat in Pinhaw, which turned out to be the junction of the Japanese supply routes from central Burma to their forces on the other side of the Chindwin. - This may well have contributed to the eventual defeat of the Japanese at Kohima."

Committed as they were to the Manipur campaign the Japanese could not at first react effectively to this unexpected attack and the special troops established their airfields and blocked the road and railway at Henu without serious interference. The enemy, however, was able to collect a composite force of garrison and communication troops which attacked that portion of General Lentaigne's special force which had established itself at Henu and wrecked some 40 miles of the Indaw-Mogaung section of the railway to Myitkyina. This force appears to have linked up with the column commanded by Brigadier Fergusson which had marched over the mountains to Indaw. The march had been an astonishing feat of endurance. The distance was less than 300 miles as the crow flies but

"allowing for climbing and serpentine tracks—the worst, according to one officer present that men and animals can ever have been asked to negotiate —[it was] no less than 600 miles. It was completed in 40 days, and at the end of it the troops assaulted, and but for running short of water, might have taken the town of Indaw.¹ They had crossed the Chindwin during their advance and they had apparently passed unobserved round the right flank of the Japanese forces which were mustering west of the Chindwin for the attack on Imphal and Kohima."

Late in April the Japanese composite force delivered no less than five attacks, conducted apparently with more courage than skill, on Brigadier Calvert's force holding the Henu road block. Every attack was repulsed and the Japanese were believed to have lost 1,000 killed before the Henu position, known to our troops as "the White City." They fell back on Indaw and awaited reinforcements.

On May 7 S.E.A.C. reported that the Chinese after capturing Inkangaht tawng had advanced within 17 miles of Kamaing, an important point strongly fortified by the enemy, about 25 miles by air north-west of Mogaung, with which it was connected by road. On May 15 a *communiqué* from Chungking announced that Chinese forces from Yunnan had crossed the Salween on a broad front, but that heavy fighting with corresponding losses on both sides had followed the Japanese recovery from this surprise. This force was commanded by General Wei Li-huang whose troops in the

¹ *The Times*, loc. cit.

first days of their advance forced the Mamien Pass and reached the Shwele or Lung River, while other Chinese troops crossing the Salween much farther south threatened Tengchung and took Pingka. On May 16 news reached London that the Chindits had destroyed a large dump of fuel and ammunition south-west of Mogaung and had shot down seven of a number of Zero fighters which had attacked their position near Henu.

Now came a surprising and successful coup. On May 17 strong American and Chinese forces attacked and seized the southern aerodrome at Myitkyina, the enemy's railhead in northern Burma and the largest town in that region. The announcement by S.E.A.C. added :

The attack came at the end of a 20-day march by three columns of Chinese and Americans under the command of Brigadier-General Frank Merrill, over rough and tortuous ground, from the Kumon hills¹ on the eastern border of the Mogaung Valley. The attack apparently took the Japanese by surprise as only slight resistance was offered. . . . The aerodrome was captured intact. Shortly afterwards American engineers flew in on gliders, and in the afternoon Chinese reinforcements arrived.

It was hoped that Myitkyina would soon fall and that its three aerodromes would pass quickly into the hands of the Allies, thus giving them a far better all-weather air route to China. But the Japanese held out most stubbornly and the attacking force was not numerous enough, although they received reinforcements, to beleaguer Myitkyina sufficiently closely to prevent Japanese reinforcements reaching it, not, perhaps, in great strength but in sufficient numbers to maintain their most obstinate defence of this key town. Some seem to have reached it from the Mali Valley where rearguards held off the Gurkhas and Kachins at Tiangzup, others from Bhamo or Mogaung. The whole situation, indeed, was a most puzzling one owing to the absence of anything remotely resembling a "front line." The Japanese from Bhamo to the Salween were threatened in front by the Chinese, in rear by the Chindits, who were themselves exposed in some degree to Japanese pressure from the south. The enemy's garrisons at Kamaing and Mogaung had a strong force of Chindits in their rear and were threatened from north and east by Americans and Chinese, but the Chindits south of Mogaung were in their turn threatened by fresh Japanese forces advancing from Indaw.

¹ In reality mountains, some over 7,000 feet high.

The events of the next six weeks must be briefly chronicled. During the last ten days of May it looked as if the Japanese might restore the situation. Chinese progress in Yunnan was slow. On May 29 it was announced that the Chindits had withdrawn from the road and rail block on the Indaw-Mogaung line after five days' hard fighting. The Special Correspondent of *The Times* on the Assam front wrote (*loc. cit.* June 28) :

"In the second phase of their operations the Special Force, having evacuated their airfield strongholds lock, stock and barrel under the unsuspecting noses of the Japanese, moved north to help General Stilwell to capture Mogaung and Myitkyina. With great daring some of their columns took up positions overlooking the road and railway near Hopin, almost in the outer defence lines of Mogaung, and had gliders flown in under fire with equipment for the construction of an airfield. But this time fortune was unkind. Bad weather delayed the arrival of additional columns. . . . The enemy quickly brought 175-mm. artillery—to which the Special Force had no means of replying—within range and shelled them unceasingly by day, following up with heavy infantry attacks by night. The Japanese also brought up anti-aircraft guns to attack aircraft supplying the garrison, and so starve them out. Dakota pilots gallantly ran the gauntlet of fire at low altitude to drop supplies, but there were days when the weather stopped flying. . . . The Special Force held out for 17 days before abandoning the position, and when they went they carried their wounded away with them on their shoulders. Their defence had, they claim, cost the Japanese at least 700 killed. Although the block was lost, the Special Force columns remained in the neighbourhood of Mogaung. They harassed enemy movements, attacked his stores . . . and so compelled him to disperse . . . forces which might otherwise have concentrated for the defence of Mogaung.

Meanwhile Myitkyina held out stubbornly against the American Rangers and the Chinese, although they forced their way deeply into the town and took the western airfield, which incidentally rather disappointed expectations. North of Mogaung, however, the Chinese made ground on both banks of the river, taking Warong to the east and cutting the Kamaing-Mogaung road, and early in June they were in front of Kamaing. By this time more Chindits, coming apparently from the Bhamo area, had linked up with General Merrill's force and helped bar the entry of Japanese troops from the south into Myitkyina. Once again the situation changed to the advantage of the Allies. On June 9 the Chinese took Lungling on the Burma Road, and held for over a week ; on June 17 Kamaing fell. A Chinese force by-passing the Japanese posts between it and Mogaung established itself on the

river opposite the town. Other Chinese troops moving south from Kamaing destroyed several parties of retreating Japanese and the Chindits closed in from the south. On June 25 S.E.A.C. announced :

"Chinese troops and units of General Lentaigne's force have entered Mogaung, where heavy fighting is taking place. The Chindits broke through the town's outer defences on the east. Elements of Gurkha and British county regiments captured the important stretch of railway between the station and the railway bridge over the river. Some Chinese troops are in the southern part of the town and others on the northern edge along the railway. Large quantities of material have been seized."

On June 26 Mogaung fell, after a fierce house-to-house struggle, to Chindits drawn from the Lancashire Fusiliers and the 6th Gurkha Rifles and to the Chinese of Lieutenant-General Sun Li-jen's 38th Division. Although large quantities of supplies were captured many of the Japanese in the town proved to be helpless from disease and starvation. Over 400 dead were counted in the town, where bayonet and kukri were freely used in the attack. More of General Stilwell's Chinese troops pressed down from Kamaing, destroying several Japanese posts. The captors of Mogaung fanned out to south and east, taking light tanks, field guns, mortars and small arms on the Mogaung-Myitkyina railway and dispersing or destroying Japanese attempting to rally. Meanwhile, one of the Chinese columns which had crossed the Salween and the Kaolikung mountains had by-passed the Japanese stronghold of Tengchung (Tengyueh) and its vanguard was reported at Chanhsi, 50 miles from Myitkyina. The chances of its relief were receding fast.

At sea the activities of Japanese submarines and still more of a flotilla of ten or a dozen German U-boats based on Penang caused some losses of merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean during the quarter. On April 10 the first announcement from the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, was issued at Colombo. It stated that

"two large Japanese supply ships attempting to run the blockade were intercepted in the Indian Ocean by H.M. ships, naval aircraft and shore-based aeroplanes of the R.A.F. When challenged and attacked both vessels were scuttled. Our forces rescued the survivors of one ship, but in the case of the other rescue work was prevented by the suspected presence of submarines. No damage or casualties were suffered by our ships or aircraft."

On May 2 the Admiralty issued a *communiqué* recording successful operations by our submarines in Indian and Far Eastern waters. It described how during recent patrols

"H.M. submarines sank a Japanese destroyer, two medium-sized supply ships and two vessels of smaller size. In addition two other supply ships of medium size and an enemy escort vessel of small size were damaged." The destroyer had been attacked while on escort duty south of the Andaman

Islands and was seen to sink and a second torpedo hit the supply ship she had been escorting. A supply ship of medium size was torpedoed "while proceeding under a strong escort" in these waters and was seen to sink. Another supply ship carrying a deck-load, and two small vessels, were sunk by another submarine in the Straits of Malacca. Another submarine successfully bombarded military targets on Ross Island, Port Blair, in the Andamans and scored "repeated hits" on an escort vessel. The submarines which carried out these successful patrols were under the command of Lieut.-Commanders M. R. Wingfield, R. L. Alexander and E. P. Young.

Meanwhile, the Eastern Fleet had carried out an important operation against two Japanese air bases in Sumatra on April 19. S.E.A.C. announced next day

"Bombers and fighters from aircraft-carriers which were escorted by a powerful Allied fleet of battleships, cruisers, destroyers and submarines carried out a surprise raid on the Sabang and Lho-Nga airfields, in northern Sumatra, at dawn on Wednesday morning. Heavy bombs were used and fighter escorts strafed ground targets. At Sabang numerous direct hits were made on the dockyard, power-station, wharf, barracks, hangars, workshops and radio station. . . . Heavy bombs fell on two merchant ships . . . of 4,000 to 5,000 tons. Two Japanese destroyer-escort vessels were strafed and set on fire. Twenty-two aeroplanes, including six large transport aircraft, were destroyed on the ground. A 1,000-lb. bomb fell on an oil tank which was left burning. . . . At Lho-Nga airfield several aircraft were destroyed on the ground.

The enemy appears to have been taken completely by surprise, but replied to the attack by intense A.A. fire, most of which was light. Three enemy torpedo-bombers which later approached the fleet were all shot down by fighters. . . ." One of our aircraft was forced to alight on the sea but the pilot was saved by a submarine which surfaced and rescued him under fire from shore batteries. The remaining aircraft returned safely.

The next large-scale naval operation was a raid by nearly 100 aircraft which took off from a powerfully protected Anglo-American carrier force on May 17 to attack Surabaya, one of the enemy's most important naval bases and oil refining and distribution centres, and a vital point in his Indo-Malayan defensive line.

The Special Correspondent of *The Times* in Australia gave the following summary of the results of this raid :

"Ten ships, totalling 35,000 tons, were sunk in Surabaya harbour, and heavy damage was inflicted on two floating docks and also naval and oil installations and airfields. One of the most important successes was the destruction of the big Wonokromo refinery with its power-house, while the demolition of naval engineering workshops at Braat will greatly reduce the value of Surabaya as a naval base. Nineteen aircraft were destroyed and many damaged on the airfields at Malang. Our naval forces, which included Australian, French and Dutch units, suffered neither casualties nor damage."

The last important air-sea operation recorded during the quarter in this theatre was an air-raid conducted and covered by part of the Eastern Fleet under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur Power, Admiral Somerville's Second-in-Command, on Port Blair, in the Andaman Islands, on June 21. S.E.A.C. reported that

"Considerable damage was done to military installations . . . and the seaplane base, where an oil fire was started. Two enemy aircraft were set on fire on the Port Blair airfield. . . . In spite of heavy A.A. fire, only one of our aircraft failed to return . . . the enemy seemed to have been completely surprised. . . ." He made no attempt to attack our warships and no fighters were encountered.


In the air, apart from the constant tactical support given to all the Allied forces by the R.A.F., U.S.A.A.F. and the admirable Troop-Carrier Command, British and American long-range bombers made many attacks on the enemy's airfields and communications in all parts of Burma. Important raids were those on airfields in Central Burma (April 2) and Aungban (April 4) which were believed to have cost the Japanese over 40 aircraft. Later in April Mandalay, Prome, Rangoon, Moulmein and the Heho airfield were raided. The bridges over the Irrawaddy and river traffic were also attacked with success on several occasions.

The enemy's reaction was weak, especially when the monsoon rains began ; indeed in the last week in June Allied aircraft made over 200 sorties in spite of the worst possible weather conditions against one raid which accomplished nothing and cost the Japanese six out of 20 machines engaged. Nor when conditions were more favourable did the enemy show any enterprise in interception or in "intruder operations," with the result that our Dakota C47s suffered surprisingly little loss.

The course of the air war in this theatre bore out the belief of the Americans engaged in the Pacific campaigns, viz : that the Japanese airmen were poor performers by comparison with those of the first year of the war.

The following is an official estimate of Japanese and Allied losses of aircraft in combat over Burma and the Indian Ocean during this quarter.

| | | | | <i>Japanese</i> | <i>Allied</i> |
|-------|----|----|----|-----------------|---------------|
| April | .. | .. | .. | 36 | 33 |
| May | .. | .. | .. | 59 | 25 |
| June | .. | .. | .. | 8 | 13 |
| Total | | | | 103 | 71 |



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LT.-GENERAL W. SLIM, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.

2 : THE CHINESE WAR

Only in the Far East and there only in China did the war go ill for the United Nations. The Japanese, acutely conscious of their heavy shipping losses in the Pacific and in the China Seas and of the growing danger to their river traffic on the Yangtze from American and Chinese air attacks, undertook a new campaign on a great scale with the object of securing the whole course of the Peiping (Peking)-Hankow trunk line north of the great river and of at last capturing the "Changsha rice-bowl" and controlling the Hankow-Canton railway south of it. Success in the first part of the operation would give them direct railway communication from northern to central China and would relieve them of part of the burden and risk of transporting troops required in the central or southern provinces by sea, and up the Yangtze from Tientsin or other northern ports. A similar operation south of the Yangtze would enable them to make the same partial saving of shipping tonnage on the Shanghai-Canton route. It would also give them the Changsha area, the loss of which would deprive the independent provinces of China of a source of supply on which several Chinese armies and many millions of Chinese civilians depended. The Japanese had made four attempts to capture Changsha since the outbreak of war, but all had failed. They now decided to make a fifth. Before attacking south of the Yangtze the Japanese began with a heavy offensive in the province of Honan in which they first engaged about 60,000 troops with a strong force of tanks and aircraft. On April 18 it was announced from Chungking that they were moving westward in strength.

According to official reports from Chungking they crossed the flooded country from Chungmou, 23 miles east of Chengchow in Honan, and engaged the Chinese in hard fighting. A Japanese force established on the south bank of the Yellow River near the bridge close to Meng Shantou, 13 miles north of Chengchow, attacked the Chinese positions on the following day. On April 20 one column pressing south-westward from Chungmou crossed the Peiping-Hankow railway 19 miles south of Chengchow, while the column from the railway bridge was advancing against the Lunghai railway immediately west of Chengchow. Chengchow, the

junction of the Lunghai and Peiping-Hankow railways was obviously the first objective of the attack. It fell on April 22.

On April 28 a Chinese Army spokesman said that of the three columns which had started from Chungmou on April 18 one had crossed the Hankow railway south of Chengchow, had captured Mihsien and had advanced to a point nine miles east of Tengfang, covering 62 miles in ten days. The second had crossed the railway at Hsuehchang south of Chengchow and the third had made a wide sweep 44 miles to the south to cover the other columns. The force from the Yellow River bridgehead had moved along the Lunghai railway to the Hulao Pass, where it had been held since April 21.

The Chinese, however, resisted vigorously in the Mihsien area and obtained valuable assistance from the 14th U.S.A.A.F. and their own Air Force. Nevertheless, they lost the Hulao Pass between the Lunghai railway and the Yellow River on April 28, while the southernmost Japanese column on the Peiping-Hankow railway bypassed Hsuehchow, 55 miles south of Chengchow. On May 4 the Correspondent of *The Times* at Chungking cabled :

"With the Chinese High Command's announcement that the Japanese have begun a northward advance in four strong columns from Sinyang, the major Japanese base on the Peiping-Hankow railway 110 miles north of Hankow, and that they have reached the vicinity of Kioshan, all doubt that the enemy's objective is the complete possession of the Peiping-Hankow railway has been removed. Barely 60 miles of the Chinese-held stretch of the railway now remains to be taken.

Reported to be employing 80,000 men with large concentrations held in reserve, the Japanese . . . are making an all-out drive—perhaps one of the most important since the outbreak of war—to clear the railway for their land communications. They have been forced to do so first by Chennault's attacks on their coastal shipping, and secondly by Admiral Nimitz's threat to reach the China coast."

On May 7 the Chinese High Command announced that Japanese mechanized cavalry sweeping south-west from Hsuehchow had wheeled north-west and had reached Linjucheng, 25 miles south of the important city of Loyang on the Lunghai railway. The Japanese troops who had taken the Hulao Pass now thrust westward in support of this flanking movement. By May 11 the Japanese armour was only six miles from Loyang and another Japanese force had begun a significant movement from Yuanchu in southern Shansi 45 miles north-west of Loyang. They had already crossed the river here, and they threatened to cut the main line of communications

of the large Chinese army operating in Honan. On the same day it was announced that the two Japanese columns clearing the Peiping-Hankow railway had met and closed the gap. On May 12 the Japanese from Yuanchu cut the Lunghai railway 50 miles west of Loyang.

On May 25 the Japanese High Command announced the fall of Loyang after a day's hard fighting. The enemy claimed to have killed over 2,000 of the garrison and to have made more than 4,000 prisoners. Meanwhile, the Chinese troops west of the Hankow railway made a number of counter-attacks in one of which they temporarily reoccupied the railway town of Suiping. But these attacks seem to have been made mainly to cover the withdrawal of guns and stores into the hilly country in western Honan, and they did not drive the Japanese from the railway for any time. The Japanese success was due to their effective use of some 600 light tanks and armoured cars. In the air the composite Chinese-American wing of the 14th U.S.A.A.F. on the whole maintained its ascendancy over the Japanese air force except near the enemy's airfields. But in general the Chinese were too lightly armed to do themselves justice and their political divisions, of which more will be said later, also hampered their resistance.

During this campaign the Japanese had been concentrating large forces at Hankow, and on May 30 it was announced that fighting had begun north, north-east and north-west of Changsha, and that U.S. and Chinese aircraft were giving useful assistance to the Chinese forces. By June 6 the enemy's advanced troops were 25 miles north of the city. They had also landed troops on the southern shores of Tungting Lake. Next day they approached within six miles of the suburbs, but here they encountered an obstinate resistance, and it was not until the evening of June 18 that the city fell. The Chinese 90th Division which defended it made a fine fight, but was almost destroyed, and 27 guns, sorely needed by the under-gunned Chinese Army, fell into the enemy's hands. From Changsha the Japanese marched southwards along the Canton railway.

The campaigns in Honan and Hunan occupied most of the attention of the 14th U.S.A.A.F., but its bombers were able to harass Japanese shipping on the Yangtze, and on May 20 its heavy bombers raided the Pratas Islands and scored hits on three ships off the coast of south-eastern China. Less than a month later General Chennault's airmen struck at Japan itself. On June 15 heavy bombers described as "B29 Super-Fortresses of the

United States Army Air Forces' 20th Bomber Command," attacked Japan from Chinese bases. Next day it was made known that the target was Yawata, on Kyushu Island, which, the New York Correspondent of *The Times* said, is

"sometimes called Japan's Pittsburg or her Essen, because there, in the heart of her coalfield, is one of the greatest of the country's iron and steel works, a plant comparable to the Hermann Göring works at Essen, employing 20,000 workers and producing 900,000 tons of iron and steel annually." By all accounts great havoc was done to the works. The United States War Department's announcement to-day was comparatively restrained in its language, saying that "the fliers who participated in the mission reported that the bombing was accurate and that large fires and explosions were observed." The 11 War Correspondents who accompanied the airmen were less restrained and spoke of "tons upon tons of bombs" dropped upon coke-ovens and open-hearth furnaces. The War Department described A.A. fire as "moderate to intense," and said that enemy aircraft were encountered.

Only four of the B29s were lost. One was brought down by A.A. fire, one was missing and two were destroyed by an accident, but the crew of one of these was known to be safe. The Japanese, who admitted that Moji and Kohura had been attacked as well as Yawata, minimized the damage done by the bombers.¹

It was disclosed that the new heavy bombers had originally reached China from India across Burma. It was not the first time that any had been in action. Much earlier in the year one flying at an unusually low altitude had encountered a dozen Japanese machines over Burma and had shot down two. The rest turned away. The success of these huge machines which had flown over 1,350 miles to the attack aroused great interest and natural enthusiasm in America. It also showed that in these powerful aircraft the Allies had a weapon of great potentialities. In a public statement General Marshall, Chief of Staff, said that the Super-Fortress had introduced a new type of offensive and

"also creates a new problem in the application of military force." Because of the enormous range and the heavy bomb-load of this latest aeroplane, "it can strike from many and remote bases at a single objective." The power of these aircraft, said the General, is so great that the American joint Chiefs of Staff had decided that it would be uneconomical to confine the Super-Fortress organization to a single theatre, and these bombers therefore "will remain under the centralized control of the joint Chiefs of Staff with a single Commander, General Arnold, acting as their agent in directing their (the B29s) bombing operations throughout the world."

¹ Summarized from a New York message, *The Times*, June 17.

These planes will be treated as a major task force, in the same manner as naval task forces are directed against specific objectives. This type of flexible centralized control recognizes that very long-range bombardment is not a weapon for air forces alone. Under the joint Chiefs of Staff, theatre commanders will have a voice in their employment, ensuring that maximum effectiveness will be obtained through missions which will contribute directly to the overall strategy for the defeat of our enemies."

General H. H. Arnold, the Chief of the U.S. Army Air Forces, said that the employment of the B29 would make "the softening-up attack" on Japan possible much earlier than would be possible with the aircraft hitherto known. He added :


"In our new strategic thinking the B17 (Flying Fortress) and B24 (Liberator) will become medium instead of long-range bombers, and our B25 and B26 will become short-range bombers. These smaller craft will travel no less distances than they do now, but the B29 will attack over much greater distance and with more power." An Army statement said of the 20th Command that it would be "in the nature of an aerial battle fleet, able to participate in combined operations or to be assigned to strike wherever the need is greatest."

A few details about these huge bombers may be added. The B29 is an all-metal mid-wing monoplane with a wing span of 141.2 feet, a length of 98 feet and a height of 27 feet. It has four 16-cylinder radial Wright Cyclone engines rated at 2,200 h.p.

Unfortunately for the prospects of an early American air offensive against Japan from eastern China the war continued to go ill for the Chinese forces in Hunan. On June 26 the enemy advancing from Changsha captured the American air base at Hengyang (known as Hengchow on older maps) on the Hankow-Canton railway. This move brought the Japanese advancing from the north to within 200 miles of the Canton bridgehead where a strong Japanese force was preparing to march northward. The occupation of the railway would cut off the provinces of Kiangsi and Fukien from the rest of the country, and although the Japanese might not be able or willing to spare the troops for the occupation of these provinces, their control of the railway would add to the difficulties of the Chinese and would postpone any attack on Japan from east Chinese bases until the Japanese barrier had been broken. Here, as on the Peking-Hankow line, Chinese forces might cross the barrier between the Japanese posts from east to west or vice versa, but in the

words of the Military Correspondent of *The Times*, "the creation of such a corridor would constitute one of the worst set-backs suffered by China in recent years" (*The Times*, July 1).

The relations between the Chinese Government, which was monopolized by the Kuomintang Party, and the Chinese Communists—who were also supporters of rule by a single party¹ and could not complain



THE HONAN FRONT

logically of the Kuomintang monopoly—were bad. The Kuomintang accused the Communists of indiscipline, and of a non-co-operative spirit; the Communists accused the Kuomintang, and especially its Minister of War, General Ho Yin-ching, of starving their troops of supplies. The Government retorted that there was no room for two independent armies in unoccupied China. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the dispute the Communist forces in Shensi and other parts of north-western China appear to have failed to co-operate with the Government's forces or to have made any diversion during the Honan campaign—which was highly regrettable.

On May 20 President Roosevelt announced that he had asked the Vice-President of the United States, Mr. Henry Wallace, . . .

¹ It should be said here that some European and American observers insisted that the Chinese Communists had little in common with the Marxian Communists of the U.S.S.R. and other European countries, and compared them with the Agrarian (Peasant) parties of Eastern Europe. Others—and most official Chinese—would not admit this.

"to serve as a messenger for me in China. He is taking with him John Carter Vincent, Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs, State Department ; Owen Lattimore, Deputy Director of the Overseas Branch, Office of War Information ; and John Hazard, Chief Liaison Officer, Division for Soviet Supply, Foreign Economic Administration. Eastern Asia will play a very important part in the future history of the world. Forces are being unleashed there which are of the utmost importance to our future peace and prosperity. The Vice-President, because of his present position, as well as his training in economics and agriculture, is unusually well fitted to bring, both to me and to the people of the United States, a most valuable first-hand report. For the time being nothing more can be said of certain aspects of the Vice-President's trip. Suffice to say that he will be visiting a dozen places which I have long wanted to see. He left to-day and will report to me upon his return. . . ."

In a statement of his own Mr. Wallace said the object of his trip was "to let our Asiatic friends know the spirit of the American people and the beliefs and hopes of their Commander-in-Chief." He carried an assurance to China that nothing "shall stop America from bringing all possible and prompt aid to this great and enduring people."

Mr. Wallace arrived in Chungking on June 20 and had several meetings with President Chiang Kai-shek. Speaking at a banquet on June 21 he outlined the three essentials for peace in eastern Asia and the Pacific as

"the demilitarization of Japan, understanding and collaboration among the nations of the Pacific, and self-government for the peoples of Asia." The territories forcibly taken by Japan must be restored. Independence had been promised for Korea and the United States favoured the restoration of national sovereignty to Thailand. "In Asia there are other racial and political entities now in a state of colonial dependency whose aspirations for self-government should receive prompt and positive attention after victory." He hoped China would work for an enlightened solution of the national minority problems within China.

In a Press interview on June 23 he expressed the utmost confidence in Chinese ability to continue resistance against the Japanese. Conditions, he said, looked better than he had expected, but the Allies must do everything in their power to break the iron ring round China. He left China at the beginning of July, after an apparently successful visit. It struck some observers, however, as somewhat incongruous that the Vice-President whom millions of his countrymen recognized "as a Christian and an idealist . . . moved by simple faith in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of justice and equality"¹ should before his departure have laid a wreath on the tomb at Lanchow

¹ *The Times*, from a Washington message, published May 22.

which is alleged to contain the ashes of Jenghiz Khan. Such a tribute to that terrific and ferocious conqueror whose Mongol and Tartar armies conquered the world from Korea to the Danube and slaughtered many more millions of mankind with arrows, lances and scimitars than Hitler could destroy with tanks and aircraft, came strangely from this champion of "the common man."

3 : THE SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC

The war in the south-west Pacific theatre took a new turn during the second quarter of 1944. In New Ireland, New Britain and Bougainville Island, the only one of the Solomons which still harboured an important garrison, the Japanese were left to Generals Fever and Famine, who could be trusted to deal effectively with them. In New Guinea, on the other hand, General MacArthur, combining sea, air and land attack with rare skill, enveloped and neutralized the powerful Japanese forces centred on the enemy's base at Wewak, and having rendered them harmless or at least incapable of more than defensive action, turned to the reconquest of the key points in Dutch (Western) New Guinea. These operations met with such success that on May 27 the General's Headquarters could announce that in the strategic sense the campaign in New Guinea was now concluded. All that remained was the tactical problem of completing a conquest which would bring the Allied forces within striking distance of the Dutch East Indies.

The few outstanding events of the campaign in the Solomons and New Britain can be summarily recorded. After the costly repulse of their attacks on the Torokina position, as the American beach-head had come to be called since its extension, the Japanese gradually drew back from its perimeter and then retired into the interior where the Americans had no reason to follow them. They still held the harbour and air base at Buka on an island off the northern tip of Bougainville, but their air force there had been reduced to a few sea-planes, and the occupation of the Green Islands by the U.S. forces

diminished the enemy's hopes of obtaining supplies or munitions from Rabaul by barges or light craft.

On May 3 A.H.Q., Australia, announced that aircraft and torpedo-boats had now sunk 1,717 barges, small coasters, schooners and the like. The Allies had thus prevented the enemy from rendering any useful assistance to his 17th and 18th Armies, now isolated in New Guinea, New Britain, New Ireland and the Solomons. The number of small craft damaged was given at 3,548.

On June 2 American forces landed at the mouth of the Jaba River on Bougainville, and on June 8 it was announced that they had occupied Mauraraka village and Gazelle Harbour at the southern entrance of Empress Augusta Bay, thus increasing their hold on the south-west coast of the island. Such Japanese troops as were left in Choiseul Island could safely be neglected.

In New Britain the Japanese who had held Gazmata on the southern and Cape Hoskins on the northern coast of the island, as well as Rabaul, must have been informed by Tokyo that there was no immediate prospect either of relieving, removing, or even supplying them by sea or air. The Americans were firmly established in the Arawe; Cape Gloucester and Talasea areas. They held the command of the sea and air. Their occupation of the Admiralty Islands and the St. Mathias group enabled them to patrol and control the northern approaches to New Britain so effectively that no convoy could reach Rabaul without being attacked by American aircraft. On April 11 General MacArthur announced that the major portion of New Britain was now under Allied control.

The Japanese had evacuated their positions at Cape Hoskins and Gazmata. They were now digging themselves in on the neck of the Gazelle Peninsula between Open Bay and Wide Bay on a front of from 20 to 25 miles. Since the opening of the campaign in New Britain 4,679 Japanese had been left dead and 23 had been taken prisoners,¹ and their losses from wounds, starvation and disease must have brought up the total of their casualties to fully 10,000. The Allied casualties in the campaign had been 442 killed, 1,062 wounded and ten missing.

Commenting on the Japanese retreat, the Special Correspondent of *The Times* in Australia said that it seemed to have been caused by fear of further landings which would outflank the enemy's positions. The Japanese army in New Britain had been estimated at 50,000 men. Its present strength

¹ Slightly different figures, viz: 4,379 dead and 232 prisoners, were given by Mr. Stimson to the United States Press on April 13.

could not exceed 40,000. Its prospects were bleak, for the constant air attacks on its airfields and depots at Rabaul and nearer the Gazelle Peninsula were destroying appreciable quantities of its war material, and its hope of relief must have gone.

During the remainder of April the Americans continued to bomb the port and airfields of Rabaul and Kavieng. American torpedo-boats also attacked any small craft that ventured out of harbour in their sight. In May and June the air attacks were less frequent, but by this time the Allies had disabled or destroyed most of the enemy's useful shipping and disposed of almost all his serviceable aircraft in this region.¹ On May 12 the heaviest air attack for several weeks was directed against Rabaul when Dauntless and Airacobra machines equipped with rocket-guns sank 49 barges.² On one occasion mistaken identity caused a tragic clash between two Allied torpedo-boats, one of which was helping another off a reef near Cape Lambert, the north-west tip of New Britain, and several Allied fighters which took them for Japanese vessels. Both torpedo-boats and two fighters were lost.

In the Admiralty Islands "mopping-up" proceeded. More small islands were captured with little or no resistance, and by the middle of May the Japanese force in Manus Island, the largest of the group, had been reduced to about 400 hard-pressed, fever-stricken survivors in the south and centre of the island. The number of Japanese dead found by the Americans in the Admiralties was stated by Mr. Stimson on April 13 to have been 2,962.³

Before opening his attack on the Japanese 18th Army in northern and western New Guinea, General MacArthur delivered a number of heavy air attacks on the enemy's chief airfields. Hollandia and its three aerodromes, Wewak, Aitape and Hansa Bay were repeatedly bombed

¹ Yet the Special Correspondent of *The Times* observed (*loc. cit.* May 9), "It is three months since a Japanese fighter tried to intercept Allied aircraft over New Britain, but the enemy continues methodically to repair the cratered runways of the bombed aerodromes."

² The Warhawk, Lightning, Thunderbolt and Mustang fighters used in the various Far Eastern theatres of war also carried rocket guns beneath the wings.

³ An official summary on May 12 gave the enemy's loss in the Admiralties as 3,202 killed and 169 captured.

both from Allied bases in New Guinea and from Australia. Early on April 6 Liberators and Catalinas struck a new target in Wadke Island, 110 miles from Hollandia, a Japanese staging base for their aircraft bound for or from Hollandia and Wewak. On April 11 Allied destroyers shelled Japanese positions at Hansa Bay, Alexishafen and Madang, and on April 13 Australian troops occupied Bogadjim without resistance. Some pockets of Japanese left behind east of Bogadjim were quickly disposed of. A message from the Special Correspondent of *The Times* at A.H.Q. Australia (*loc. cit.* April 19) said that on April 19 Hollandia had had its heaviest bombing which had provoked

only weak A.A. fire and no attempt at interception by aircraft. Airfields, shipping and supply dumps, mainly on the shores of Humboldt Bay, had been bombed for two hours by Liberators and Mitchells. In the Bogadjim region the Japanese appeared to be in retreat towards Madang. Japanese losses of material in the Hollandia-Wewak region had been heavy.

On April 22 the blow fell. It had been carefully prepared and it had been preceded by naval and other movements which gave the Japanese the impression that the Allies intended to attack Madang and Wewak and led them to withdraw a number of troops from the Hollandia area.

"The biggest assembly of air, sea and land forces yet seen in the south-west Pacific converged on Hollandia and Aitape, while far off-shore a formidable aircraft-carrier force kept watch for possible interference from the sea. . . . Under cover of heavy naval and air bombardment powerful American forces landed at Aitape in British New Guinea, about 85 miles west of Wewak, and at Hollandia near the border between British and Dutch New Guinea and at Tanahmera Bay, some 30 miles north-west of Hollandia. At Tanahmera the Americans landed at two points, encountering slight opposition at one and none at the other, while their warships sank six Japanese landing barges. The settlement six miles to the west which was garrisoned by the Japanese was shelled and set ablaze.

No initial opposition was encountered at Humboldt Bay near Hollandia until the Americans reached the two sides of the entrance to the inner bay of Jauteffa where pill-boxes and machine-gun nests were attacked and captured. Combining its movements with those of the troops pressing inland from Tanahmera the force advanced against the airfields. At Aitape the leading troops of the landing force soon overpowered a weak defence and

reached the Tadjai airstrips. The town of Hollandia was quickly captured and a Dutch force trained at Merauke took part in the landing and hoisted the Netherlands flag beside the Stars and Stripes. The American losses were extraordinarily small.

The Japanese had been misled and surprised. They had lost a most important position and were in no position to regain it. "The operation," A.H.Q. Australia stated, "throws a loop of envelopment round the enemy's 18th Army, estimated to total 60,000 men, which is dispersed along the New Guinea coast in the Madang, Alexishafen, Hansa Bay and Wewak sectors." To the east of this army were the Australians and Americans, and to the west the newly landed American forces. To its north was the Allied-controlled sea; southward lay untraversed and foodless jungle and high mountain ranges. The Japanese Seventeenth and Eighth Armies, which were intended, it was supposed, for the invasion of Australia, were already trapped, the Seventeenth in New Britain and New Ireland, the Eighth in the Solomon Islands. "The enemy," said General MacArthur, "is completely isolated and his communications severed."

Hollandia itself was a more than useful prize.

The Military Correspondent of *The Times* wrote (*loc. cit.* April 26) :

The harbour and airfield potentialities increase the military value of the Hollandia area. Humboldt Bay provides the only extensive anchorage between Wewak and Geelvink Bay, a distance of 450 miles, and is equipped with a pier. The hills surrounding Humboldt Bay form the foothills of the Cyclops Mountains, the peaks of which rise to 7,128 feet. Hollandia, which the Japanese captured in April, 1942, was used as a flying-boat base by the Netherlands Navy. A 24-mile motor road links Pim village with Depapre on Tanahmera Bay, passing three airfields named Hollandia, Sentani and Cyclops respectively.

The Japanese air forces at Wewak were inactive during the landing; indeed, it was not until the night of April 23 that a single Japanese machine bombed the beaches at Humboldt Bay, causing some damage and casualties. There was good reason for their inactivity. The Japanese airfields at Boram, But, and Dagua near Wewak and at Wewak itself received 176 tons of bombs. Nor was there any interference from the west.

"Heavy bombers from Australian bases on April 22 and 23 struck at airfields on Noemfoor Island, Geelvink Bay, to the west of Humboldt Bay, and within easy bombing range. Of the 30 Japanese fighters which engaged the Allied bombers in these attacks 14 were shot down and three others were probably destroyed."

There was no serious Japanese reaction to the landings which had been made by the American 24th Division at

Tanahmera, the 41st Division at Humboldt Bay, and part of the 32nd Division at Aitape.¹ The great majority of the Japanese troops stationed at these places were men of the auxiliary services. Most of the Sixth South Sea detachment of Japanese Marines, picked troops some 3,000 strong, had been sent to Wewak ; and although the Japanese Army Command presently realized that Hollandia needed more fighting troops and sent some Marines back, their vanguard, arriving after the landing, fell into an ambush and accomplished nothing. All the enemy could do was to try to build up sufficient air strength at Wakde Island and other airfields in the Geelvink Bay region and at Sorong on the north-western "beak" of Dutch New Guinea. At Aitape the Japanese, who had been leading a soft life with captive Javanese to do their heavy work, made little more resistance. Some 200 were killed there and at the Tadjik air strip the possession of which gave the Americans air cover against raiders coming from Wewak. Australian airmen occupied the strip and a "Works Unit" made it usable within 42 hours of the landing.

During the last week of April events moved fast in New Guinea. A summary of the bulletins issued by A.H.Q., Australia, gives the following record :

On April 24 Australian troops who had forced their way through the forests from the Ramu Valley to Bogadjim entered Madang after some skirmishing with the retreating Japanese. On April 26 they took Alexishafen, again without serious fighting. Meanwhile the Americans, whose advance was delayed by the difficulties of the country rather than by the enemy, had captured all three airfields in the Hollandia region by April 27, routing or destroying such Japanese groups as they met. Besides attacking the airfields in the Geelvink Bay region, the Americans made further heavy raids on Wewak and its airfields, doing great damage among aircraft in the dispersal bays. Much booty was captured near Hollandia, including several aeroplanes still in their crates, and several score wrecked machines were found on the bombed aerodromes. At Aitape, however, the Japanese, after their initial panic, got their "second wind" and fought hard, handling one American patrol roughly on April 28, but failing to destroy it, until a relief force appeared. By April 29, 468 Japanese dead had been found in the Aitape area. On May 4 the Americans made new landings at two points, at Orare Bay, 12 miles north-west of Hollandia and at Demta, 16 miles west of Tanahmera Bay. These landings seem to have been designed to prevent the still numerous Japanese fugitives from Hollandia building up

¹ The 41st Division had fought at Salamaua, the 32nd at Buna. The 24th had not been engaged before.

nests of resistance where they might hope to receive reinforcements by barge from Geelvink Bay or Wakde, where the arrival of more aircraft and much activity on shore were observed.

The Japanese in the Hollandia area were, however, none too eager to fight nor, when they fought, was the resistance very effective. On May 9 it was officially announced that the American losses in this area during and since the landings had totalled only 28 killed and 95 wounded. The Japanese had lost 732 killed and over 150 prisoners, an unusually high proportion in these ruthless Pacific battles. On May 11 General MacArthur announced that 621 prisoners had been recaptured from the Japanese. Of these 462 were Sikhs of the 15th and 1st/16th Regiments of the Indian Army who had been captured in Malaya.

The Correspondent of *The Times* at Melbourne said (*loc. cit.* May 12) that there were Americans, Australians, Dutch, Chinese, Poles, Czechs, and Filipinos among the prisoners. The figure excluded the Javanese released at Aitape, but presumably included 100 missionaries who reached safety on April 30. Of the Sikhs 69 came from the Admiralty Islands. The Sikhs complained of many cruelties and indignities. The Chinese in Malaya were kind and often tried to help them, but when caught were tortured and killed.

The missionaries had been in the enemy's hands for 15 months. Forty were killed and many wounded when American bombers attacked the ship taking them from Wewak to Hollandia. The aeroplanes came back for a second run, but some nuns leapt to their feet and the pilots must have distinguished them for they did not bomb again. The Japanese had employed them in growing vegetables, but always moved them on from village to village before they could enjoy the fruits of their labours. Finally, when the Americans landed at Hollandia they took them to a swamp and left them there. They were in rags, half starved and often suffering from sores when they were rescued (*The Times*, May 2).

On May 14 the Americans at Hollandia made contact with a Japanese force at Ajapo, nine and a half miles south of Hollandia airfield, and another body at Masro on the south-east shore of Lake Sentani. These and several other parties of die-hards were gradually hunted down and destroyed. A number of stragglers were also killed or captured. Meanwhile, the Australians from Alexishafen had advanced 30 miles beyond Madang without making any contact with the enemy, and Allied bombers had dropped over 780 tons of high-explosive bombs on Wakde Island, Maffin aerodrome on the neighbouring mainland, and the enemy's air bases in Geelvink Bay, during the week ending May 15. American destroyers and corvettes shelled enemy positions on the northern coast of New Guinea between Wewak and Hansa Bay.

The next blow fell on May 17 when American forces supported by cruisers and destroyers landed at Arara

on the mainland opposite Wakde Island, where they encountered no opposition, and on Wakde Island itself where a Japanese force, perhaps 1,000 strong, resisted obstinately. These two points are about 125 miles west of Hollandia.

On May 19 A.H.Q., Australia, reported that the first landing on Wakde Island, or rather Islands, was made on Insoemanai, the smaller of the two. The Americans immediately entrenched and opened artillery fire on Insoemoea, the large island, where Wakde aerodrome is situated. On May 18 they landed on Insoemoea, supported by fire from destroyers, bombers and large landing-craft armed with rocket-guns. Within two hours they had reached the airfield but even when they had taken it the enemy held out in the north-east corner of the island, resisting with mortars and machine-guns. But they were gradually driven to the north-east corner of the island, and by May 21 the whole force, composed apparently of an infantry battalion with some Air Force troops and auxiliary details, had been destroyed. The Americans found over 700 dead on Wakde. They lost only 18 killed and 83 wounded. Within 48 hours of their seizure of the airfield on May 18 their transport aircraft were landing supplies and evacuating wounded, an astonishing achievement.

The first landing on the mainland had been bloodless. The area immediately seized extended to the Tor River, five miles west of Arara, and to a village two and a half miles to its east. The invaders established a bridge-head over the river in the face of slight opposition, but the Japanese now appeared in some strength, and on May 19 and 20 they made heavy attacks which were broken, largely by American aircraft. The Americans wished to gain possession of the airfields at Maffin, three and a half miles beyond the river, which was still not completed, and at Sawar, seven miles from the river. Crossing the river was a difficult task as the stream was several hundred yards wide and ran between marshy banks, and the Japanese had artillery as well as mortars. Nevertheless they pressed on towards the Japanese base at Sarimi under heavy fire, beat off counter-attacks and reached Maffin airfield on May 24. Their warships shelled Japanese positions on the coast near Maffin Bay while their aircraft were active against all visible Japanese positions.

But before the fighting in this area was nearly over, for the Japanese resisted stubbornly west of Maffin airfield, the Americans had made a third amphibious attack on the Japanese positions in the Schouten Islands off Geelvink Bay in Dutch New Guinea. Here the enemy held Biak Island with its three aerodromes, Mokmer, Sorido and Borokoe, in strength. Within Geelvink Bay he held Noemfoor Island with its two most useful airfields, Kamiri and Koransorea. On its north-western entrance on the back of the "Eagle's head," as the Dutch call the strangely shaped western peninsula of New Guinea, is Manokwari with its aerodrome, the administrative centre


of Dutch New Guinea. At the extremity or beak of the "Eagle's head" is Sorong, also with an aerodrome, where the Japanese had recently strengthened their garrison. Several attempts by Japanese aircraft to intercept American and Australian machines attacking these airfields and counter-raids on Hollandia by small numbers of bombers suggested that the enemy, foreseeing and fearing a further thrust to the west, was attempting to build up his air strength in Dutch New Guinea. General MacArthur consequently decided to attack, although the Japanese in the Sarmi area were giving the American landing force a deal of trouble, and the troops who had reached the Maffin aerodrome found themselves unable to hold it against artillery and mortar fire.

On May 27 United States troops landed on Biak Island. Once more they took the Japanese by surprise and their only casualties during the morning of the landing were a few wounded. But on May 29 the Special Correspondent of *The Times* at A.H.Q. cabled :

"The Japanese are making a determined attempt to save Biak. . . . Their bombers and fighters have attacked the American beach-head and Allied shipping, and their defending garrison is stoutly resisting the Americans' advance inland." On the afternoon of May 27 ten Japanese aircraft bombed or strafed the beaches, over which half of them were shot down. When the Americans pushed inland, assisted by squadrons of Bostons and Thunderbolts, they encountered increasing resistance, and though they captured eight guns at Bosnek village on their right flank they were held up by Japanese troops entrenched on ridges overlooking the shore approaches to Mokmer airfield. On May 29 "Japanese medium and light tanks armed with 75 mm. guns formed the spearhead of the counter-thrust against the Americans between Mokmer village and airfield. . . . They were repulsed by American medium tanks, which destroyed eight and damaged others." American and Australian warships shelled the Japanese gun positions, and after ground had been lost and regained the attack which began at dawn was checked at 10 a.m., when the Japanese retired to their strong positions. Six of their aircraft were lost in this sharp action, against one Allied machine.

Although they repulsed another attack the Americans were unable to advance until reinforcements and more equipment had been landed. The main Japanese resistance was west of their beach-head where numerous Japanese snipers lurked in the hills overlooking the coastal road to Mokmer aerodrome. To the east of the beach-head resistance had collapsed by June 1. The Americans, however, did not "rush their fences," but built up their strength from the sea in preparation for a large-scale attack. Meanwhile the enemy had shown marked activity in the Maffin-Sarmi area and aircraft presumably from Noemfoor, Manokwari and Sorong made three raids, 30 to 50 strong, on May 29 and 30 on the American positions covering Arara and the Tor bridgehead, but with small success.

But before the final attack on Mokmer began, the Japanese attempted a naval diversion while their aircraft again attacked the Biak beach-head. On June 6 it was



learnt that they had lost one destroyer for certain; and probably a second, several small craft and 12 aircraft, in attacks and counter-attacks over Dutch New Guinea and as far as Halmahera Island, 575 miles west of Biak. On June 7 American infantry captured Mokmer aerodrome by an outflanking movement over rough ground with slight loss and during the next two days a Japanese naval movement was detected and defeated with loss. The Special Correspondent of *The Times* at A.H.Q. recorded¹ the severe reverse inflicted on a force composed of a

¹ *The Times*, June 12.

heavy cruiser, the first seen in these waters for many months, and six destroyers on June 8.

The squadron was seen by Allied aircraft 120 miles north-west of Manokwari. "While Lightnings gave air cover—shooting down five out of ten Japanese fighters and disabling a sixth—ten Mitchells attacked the destroyers from masthead with thousand-pounders. Four destroyers were sunk and a fifth was damaged before the cruiser and the remaining destroyer disappeared." On Thursday night Australian and American destroyers found another Japanese naval force 80 miles nearer Manokwari. They gave chase and one of the Japanese destroyers was hit at six miles' range. A barge laden with troops was sunk. Next day Bostons sank three 1,000-ton cargo ships in Manokwari harbour, while Liberators sank a coaster off Capé Waïos and farther east destroyed two Japanese fighters. Several other Japanese aircraft were destroyed in the Halmahera area.

It was supposed that the enemy had hoped to evacuate some of his troops from Biak by sea and bring supplies to the remainder. The Japanese made no further naval attempt at rescue, but their aircraft made several attacks on Allied shipping off Biak, in the course of which an American destroyer was damaged and a few casualties were caused on the beaches. Against this the Allied airmen sank four 1,000-ton cargo boats and two luggers in Geelvink Bay and brought down three hostile aircraft. By June 5 the Americans were using Mokmer aerodrome. They had drawn nearer Borokoe aerodrome and their casualties on the island totalled only 85 killed and 340 wounded. On June 21 A.H.Q. announced the capture of the remaining airfields on Biak, and next day that only small groups of Japanese were continuing to resist. It may be added that they had fought it out in the traditional manner, resisting stubbornly to the last and making many vigorous counter-attacks. By June 20 the Americans had buried 1,820 of them, including 100 who had committed suicide in a cave. That night U.S. torpedo-boats sank three barges laden with troops and supplies off the west coast of the island. By the end of June some 2,700 of a garrison of probably less than 3,500 men had been killed.

During the campaign on Biak there had been many small encounters with Japanese groups in the Sarmi-Maffin and Hollandia-Aitape areas. Many Japanese were found dead in the forests in the Hollandia region, where their stores had been seized by the Americans and they were no longer able to levy food from the Papuans. Near Hollandia a fair number gave themselves up. The American estimate of the enemy's losses in these two areas up to June 13 was 6,700 including 630 prisoners. So though

American patrols were occasionally roughly handled by ambushed Japanese die-hards, there seemed no danger of any Japanese "come-back" such as had happened at Finschhafen, in these areas.

Nor did the Japanese advance against the Americans at Aitape from Wewak where they still had a strong force. So much of their transport had been destroyed that they may have been incapable of making the attempt and they were short of provisions. On their eastern flank the 18th Army made no attempt to hold Hansa Bay. The Special Correspondent of *The Times* in Australia cabled on June 29 (*loc. cit.* June 30) :

"In an uninterrupted advance of more than 100 miles along the northern coast of New Guinea, Australian infantry have reached the Sepik River, 70 miles south-west of Wewak. They occupied Bunabun on May 31 and Hansa Bay on June 15, capturing much booty. In their long coastal trek . . . the Australians averaged over three miles daily and met only slight opposition throughout. Papuan infantry worked inland along their flank. The Japanese 18th Army is now cornered in the 140 miles of coastline separating the Australians on the Sepik and the Americans east of Aitape. . . ."

Here General MacArthur could safely leave them under close observation by sea and air, and prepare for further operations against the enemy's remaining positions in Dutch New Guinea. There the Japanese seemed to have given up any hope of an active defence. The Special Correspondent of *The Times* summed up the situation thus (*loc. cit.* June 28) :

"The Japanese have virtually abandoned the air defence of western Dutch New Guinea. They are not attempting to replace aircraft. The major bases of Manokwari at the western end of Geelvink Bay and Babo on the MacCluer Gulf are deserted, and only a small number of aircraft remains at Sorong, the third large base at the north-western extremity of the mainland. Apparently the Japanese intend to conserve replacements for the defence of more vital centres beyond New Guinea. In past Pacific campaigns they poured in aircraft regardless of heavy losses until the bases became untenable.

As if to emphasize this ascendancy General MacArthur to-day announced the creation of a new army air force known as Far East Air Force, embracing the veteran 5th and 13th Air Forces. Lieutenant-General Kenney commands the new force, in which Major-General E. C. Whitehead commands the 5th Air Force and Major-General St. Clair Street the 13th Air Force."

4 : THE CENTRAL AND NORTHERN PACIFIC

While the Americans with Australian and New Zealand aid were reducing three Japanese armies to impotence in the south-west Pacific, their attack in the central Pacific

began to threaten the inner defences of Japan. After the successful expedition against the most important atolls in the Marshall Group, the heavy raid on Truk in February and the equally effective bombing of Truk and the Palau (Pelew) Islands at the end of March, they paused for a while to strengthen and consolidate their positions before making another move westwards. They received further naval reinforcements, especially of aircraft-carriers ; they proceeded to mop up further small atolls in the Marshall Archipelago, where they had captured 14, most of them without resistance, by April 4 ; and they continued to harass the Japanese by sea and air.

On April 1 Truk was heavily attacked by Liberator bombers as was Ponape, one of the most bombed Pacific islands. In this and later raids on Truk in early April the Americans claimed to have destroyed or badly damaged some 80 aircraft on the ground on the Moen and Doublon Islands within the Truk atoll. Wake Island, several of the Marshalls, e.g. Wotje, which the Japanese still held, Nauru and Ponape were raided, with more of the Carolines. On April 22 and 23 American forces captured Ungelap, the westernmost of the Marshalls, encountering slight opposition. Several Japanese ships were sunk during these operations.

On May 2 Admiral Nimitz issued a report on further operations in the Caroline Islands. The report said that on April 29 and 30 and on May 1 powerful naval forces commanded by Vice-Admiral Mark A. Mitscher had again attacked the Carolines. On April 29 and 30 he said :

Carrier-based aircraft had dropped 800 tons of bombs on islands in Truk atoll, causing heavy damage to ground installations. Sixty Japanese aircraft were destroyed in the air and as many on the ground. On April 30 the only enemy aircraft encountered was shot down. On April 30 Satawan, in the Namoi Islands, about 150 miles south-east of Truk, was bombed from the air and also shelled by cruisers. On May 1 Ponape, 450 miles east of Truk, was bombed by aircraft and shelled by battleships. In these operations no American surface ship suffered any damage and the losses of aircraft were described as light. An earlier announcement had recorded another raid on Ponape, and an attack by Liberators on Wake Island on which 95 tons of bombs were dropped.

On May 4 Japanese Imperial Headquarters announced that Admiral Mineichi Koga, Commander-in-Chief of the combined Japanese fleet, had been killed in March

"while directing operations from an aeroplane at the front." His predecessor, Admiral Yamamoto, had met with the same fate. Admiral Koga's place was taken by Admiral Soemu Toyoda, commander of Yokosuka naval station. Admiral Zengo Yoshida, formerly commander of the Japanese fleet in Chinese waters, succeeded to the Yokosuka command.

A summary of reports from the United States Navy Department and from Admiral Nimitz's headquarters at Pearl Harbour for the remainder of May gives the following results :

On May 10 Liberators raiding Truk at mid-day were attacked by Japanese fighters, but with one exception all the bombers got through and started a number of large fires. On May 19 a carrier task force raided Marcus Island and repeated the attack next day. In 373 sorties the Fleet aircraft dropped 148 tons of bombs on aerodrome installations and shot down the only Japanese aircraft which took the air. On May 23, 150 tons of bombs were dropped on Wake Island. American losses in these operations were four aeroplanes and three men. It may be added that according to the Japanese, the American loss over Marcus Island amounted to 32 machines—eight times the U.S. estimate—but the Japanese public had to be cheered. On June 3 Truk was again raided and the attacking Liberators shot down seven out of 20 intercepting Japanese fighters.

Now began a new campaign in the central Pacific which was to inflict heavy and, indeed, disastrous loss on the Japanese by sea and still more by air. On the night of June 11 the Navy Department announced that a powerful task force of the Pacific Fleet had attacked Japanese positions on Guam, Saipan and Tinian Islands in the Marianas on June 10. On June 13 Admiral Nimitz reported that on June 10-12 the task force had been vigorously engaged in attacking the enemy's bases in the Mariana Islands, chiefly, it would seem, with its strong force of carrier-borne aircraft.

The Admiral's report said that on June 11 two small cargo ships and an oiler were sunk during an attack on Saipan. Later, a convoy of Japanese ships seeking to escape from Saipan was attacked by American aircraft. Ten ships, a destroyer, three corvettes, a large oiler, and five cargo ships, one of large size, were destroyed. Ten more, five escort vessels among them, were damaged. In another attack on a Japanese convoy intercepted "several hundred miles away" six ships, including three destroyers, were damaged. Meanwhile, great numbers of American carrier-borne aircraft had made a concentrated attack on the enemy's airfields on Guam, Rota, Tinian, and Saipan Islands. On June 10, 124 of their aircraft were destroyed, mostly in air combats, for the American loss of but 11 Hellcat fighters and eight pilots. In the three days the Japanese had lost 141

aircraft and 13 ships, four war vessels among them, while the total American loss amounted to 15 aircraft and as many airmen.

Other islands, notably Truk, had been attacked before the main onslaught on Saipan. On June 15 Pacific Fleet Headquarters issued the following announcement :

Operations for the seizure of Saipan Island, in the Mariana group, have been initiated by strong forces. Assault troops have effected landing, on Saipan Island after intensive preliminary bombardments of Saipans Tinian, Pagan, Guam and Rota Islands by carrier-based aircraft and by battleships, cruisers and destroyers of the Pacific Fleet. Landings are being continued against strong opposition, under cover of supporting bombardment by our air and surface forces. Initial reports indicate that our casualties are moderate.

The Japanese admitted that the Americans had landed on Saipan, although they claimed that the first attempt had been repulsed. The news caused anxiety in Japan since the Marianas were much nearer the Japanese mainland than any of the other islands seized by the Americans in the central Pacific. Pagan Island is only 1,260 air miles from Tokyo. While the landing on Saipan was imminent American carrier-based aircraft had also raided the Bonins, within 700 miles of Tokyo, where they claimed to have sunk two ships and damaged ten others, to have blasted barracks, airfields and fuel supplies and to have destroyed 47 hostile land-based aircraft and to have damaged sea-planes, in attacks on the islands of Chichi, Iwo and Haha on June 14.

The next announcement from the Pacific Fleet late on June 15 said :

"Assault troops have secured beach-heads on Saipan Island and are advancing inland against artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire. Virtually all heavy coastal and anti-aircraft batteries on the island were knocked out by naval gunfire and bombing. Our troops have captured Agingan Point. In the town of Charankanoa brisk fighting is continuing. The enemy has attempted several counter-attacks with tanks, but these attacks have been broken up by our troops with the support of ships and aircraft. In general fighting is heavy, but good progress is being made against well-organized defences."

Military critics regarded the operation as the most important yet staged in the central Pacific, both because of the relative proximity of the Mariana Islands to Japan and the effect which their loss would have on Japanese morale, and also because Saipan was the largest island yet attacked by the central Pacific forces. It was known to be strongly garrisoned. One estimate, indeed, set the Japanese force in these islands at two divisions, mainly on Saipan Island.

But by this time a Japanese battle-squadron equal

perhaps to a third of the remaining Japanese fleet had entered the Pacific between the Philippines and Saipan and was moving into striking distance of the American task force. The Japanese Naval General Staff had clearly been disturbed by the threat to Saipan. Its capture would complete the breach in the eastern defensive line of islands, isolate Truk, open the way to the Philippines and establish the Americans near the line of communications between the islands conquered from the Dutch from which Japan was still drawing indispensable raw materials. Even so, the Japanese commander does not appear to have contemplated a fleet action against the extremely powerful force commanded by Admiral R. A. Spruance. It seems rather to have been his intention to attack the American battleships and carriers with his own carrier-borne aircraft; and that these after the operation should refuel on the Guam and Rota airfields and then make a further attack on the beach-heads and transports at Saipan. But the American Admiral had guessed his intention. He held his own fleet off Guam, and as soon as the approach of Japanese aircraft was reported he sent waves of bombers over Guam and Rota to bomb the airfields and prevent any Japanese landings. Mr. William Worden, representing the Combined American Press aboard the flagship of what was known as "The Fifth Fleet," vividly described the repulse of the Japanese air attack which began about 10 a.m. on June 18 and lasted until nightfall. "The first action," he wrote :

"was the take-off of hundreds of American planes as the Japanese were reported approaching. In a few minutes black puffs of anti-aircraft fire appeared over battleships on the horizon. The distant ships seemed wreathed in fire. . . . Almost immediately two Japanese planes, unidentifiable because they started burning in mid-air, crashed into the sea. Puffs of anti-aircraft fire increased and spread until a quarter of the whole horizon was polka-dotted with them in the still soundless battle. The first attack was repelled on the fringes of the fleet. An hour later more bombers appeared. One crossed our stern under intense ack-ack and dropped one bomb astern of a carrier, and the plane was set smoking as the flagship's forty-millimetre shells found it hunting refuge in a cloud. It never reached it. Instead, it hesitated like a tired buzzard and fell slowly into the sea. The American fleet turned and twisted in evasions, but other Japanese planes came on. . . . A torpedo-bomber off our starboard quarter passed over the destroyers' fire apparently unhurt and unstopped, but on the opposite side banked over the waves and crashed wing down into the sea. . . .

Overhead the war in the clouds went on silently and invisibly. The roar of the ships' guns killed the sound of the sky conflict, of which the only signs were thin vapour streaks interwoven as the fighters turned, dived, climbed and died. . . .

New attacks hit the fringes during the afternoon. But the battle centre moved toward Guam and Rota (north of Guam) where the Americans caught fuelless Japanese planes trying to land and downed Japanese fighters sent up to protect the airfields from bombers that were wrecking them. On one Guam field only five planes remained the next morning of more than a hundred which the Japanese had planned to save there. At dusk the last of the American planes returned to the circling carrier and added up the incredible score, showing only 21 of our planes were lost. . . .

The Japanese losses had been enormous. The great majority of their carrier-borne aircraft with the fleet had been destroyed and their crews had perished. Admiral Spruance steamed westward, hoping to encounter the Japanese fleet which was believed to be about 600 miles from Saipan. In the late afternoon of June 19 his scouting aircraft sighted the enemy's squadron making for the channel between Luzon and Formosa. A strong American bombing and torpedo fleet of aircraft was let loose to try to strike it and slow down its retreat, in the hope that the fast American battleships might overtake it. That hope was disappointed, but the Japanese fleet was hard hit. In his report on June 22 Admiral Nimitz began with a revised account of the Japanese air attack on June 18 in which he said :

"During that attack by enemy carrier-type aircraft 353 enemy aircraft (not 300 as at first reported) were shot down, of which 335 were destroyed by our carrier aircraft and 18 by our own anti-aircraft fire. Two of our carriers and one battleship received superficial damage. We lost 21 aircraft in combat." Of the pursuit and attack on June 19 he said : "The enemy forces attacked consisted of four or more battleships, five or six aircraft-carriers, five fleet tankers, and attached cruisers and destroyers. According to information at present available our aeroplanes inflicted the following damage :

One carrier, believed to be of the Zuikaku class, received three 1,000-lb. bomb hits ; one Hayataka class carrier was sunk and another severely damaged and left burning furiously ; a light carrier of the Zuiho or Taiho class received at least one bomb hit ; a Kongo class battleship and a cruiser were damaged ; three destroyers were damaged, and one of them is believed to have been sunk ; three tankers were sunk and two tankers were severely damaged and left burning. Fifteen to 20 defending aircraft were shot down. Our losses were 49 aircraft, including many which landed in the water at night and from which an undetermined number of pilots and crew men appear to have been rescued. . . .

The engagement was broken off by the Japanese fleet, which fled during the night towards the channel between Formosa and Luzon. The Pacific

fleet units in these actions were commanded by Admiral R. A. Spruance. The carrier task force was under the immediate command of Vice-Admiral M. A. Mitscher."

Only the fall of night had saved the enemy from as complete a disaster as that which he had suffered at Midway. According to Mr. W. Worden the stern chase was somewhat delayed by the necessity of turning the carriers into the wind, which

"cost valuable time but was unpreventable. . . . All planes were perilously low on gasoline and some were virtually out of fuel. Within a few minutes the tanks of some went dry and they were forced to land on the water. Crew men climbed on rubber rafts, adding the blinking of flashlights to the confusing battery of lights illuminating the sea from every direction. . . . From the flagship it was possible to watch the hazardous landings on the carriers. . . . Sometimes they made that perilous last ten feet safely, sometimes they were too high. . . . Then they bounced sickeningly, sometimes wrecking landing gears, or smashed into barriers where plane handlers dared whirling propellers to haul wrecks forward so others could land. . . . The planes returned faster than they could be landed. This flagship changed course . . . just enough to miss a rubber boat from which frantic signals were coming. The pilot in the boat and men on the rails stared through the dark at each other as the ship pounded past . . . and destroyers slowed to pick him up. . . ."

On June 22 the Navy Department disclosed the existence of "Task Force 58" described as "the most powerful and destructive naval unit in the history of sea warfare," whose carrier-borne aircraft had inflicted such damage on the Japanese two days earlier.

The latest and swiftest battleships, aircraft-carriers, cruisers and destroyers make up this force to which will be assigned "the entire Pacific Ocean up to the gates of Japan as its stamping ground." Rear-Admiral Radford, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, told the Press that it might safely assume that most of the 22 big new aircraft-carriers commissioned since Pearl Harbour had been operating as part of this "vast" Task Force 58. More than 1,000 aircraft could be launched from the decks of the aircraft-carriers in this force.¹

The American Fleet did not cease to harass the Japanese. On June 25 aircraft of a "fast carrier force" raided Iwo, one of the Volcano Islands in the Bonin group, less than 600 miles from Tokyo, and shot down some 60 aircraft of a force which tried to intercept them. A dozen Japanese aeroplanes got through to the aircraft-carriers but were shot down before doing any damage. The Americans lost four fighters. On June 24 another American force of carrier-borne aircraft attacked Pagan

¹ *The Times*, New York message published June 24.


Island in the western Marianas and destroyed altogether ten aircraft, also sinking four small cargo ships. On June 26 Admiral Nimitz issued a new assessment of the Japanese losses of ships and aircraft in the operations among the Marianas and in the two-hour attack on the enemy's fleet between Saipan and the Philippines.

The final figures showed that another small aircraft-carrier had been sunk and a large aircraft-carrier of the Shikoku class (about 27,000 tons) had been struck by three torpedoes, fired by an American submarine, and was thought to have been sunk. The total of Japanese aircraft destroyed in the engagements of June 19 and 20 and in other actions in the expedition against the Marianas was 747. Thirty ships had been sunk and 51 damaged. Against this the Americans had three warships slightly damaged and they had lost 151 aircraft and 98 airmen.

The Japanese estimate of the American losses in ships and aircraft was as fantastic as usual. But they confessed to a loss of 50 aeroplanes, more than double the American estimate, on June 20; they admitted the sinking of an aircraft-carrier and two fleet tankers; and they confessed that their fleet had been "unable to inflict a decisive blow upon the enemy." The chief of their naval Press section at Imperial Headquarters declared in home and foreign broadcasts on June 23 that "the battle situation in the Saipan area is the most critical since the outbreak of war." Great efforts would be required to repel the American naval forces "centred on more than 20 aircraft-carriers with a dozen battleships or more, and over 100 transports." "The enemy's plan of advance is the greatest since the beginning of the war in the strength of its main force and in the fury of the enemy's fighting morale," he said. Pointing out that Saipan is 1,268 miles from Tokyo and 1,500 miles from the Philippines, he declared: "If the enemy succeeds in building a powerful air base there the effect on our sea and air supremacy in the western Pacific will be great. If he uses long-range bombers the homeland of Japan will come within the bombing sphere of his aeroplanes."

The severe reverse inflicted on the Japanese fleet on June 19 and 20 seemed to make any early renewal of an attempt to take the offensive improbable. Meanwhile, the Americans on Saipan had landed more troops, had captured the important Aslito airfield (which their "Seebies"—Construction Battalion—immediately began to recondition), had driven across the island to Magicienne Bay, and had beaten off Japanese attacks supported by tanks with heavy losses. By June 24 they had taken the entire Kagman Peninsula, thus conquering a third of the island, and had destroyed 36 Japanese tanks and captured 40 more. They continued to advance along both the eastern and western shores of Saipan. They scaled and stormed Mount Topatchau overlooking the useful harbour of Tanapag on June 24-25; they fought their way into

the town of Garapan and gradually beat down the defence with their artillery and tanks. The attempts of Japanese coastal batteries on Tinian Island, which is divided from Saipan by a narrow strait three miles wide, to drive off the United States transports anchored off Saipan did little damage. By June 26 half the island was in American hands ; two divisions had been landed ; further bombing



attacks on Truk prevented such Japanese aircraft as were undamaged there from intervening in aid of the Saipan garrison. But the Japanese continued to resist with the utmost fury ; American progress through the cane-fields, jungles and rocky hills of the island was slow, painful and costly.

On June 30 the U.S. Navy Department announced that the American casualties in the ground fighting from the beginning of the invasion on June 15 until June 28 had totalled 9,752—1,474 killed, 7,400 wounded and

878 missing.¹ No accurate estimate of the Japanese losses was yet possible, but 4,951 bodies had been buried by the American troops.

During these operations the American forces in the Aleutian Islands in the north Pacific kept the Kurile Islands under constant observation from the air and made several bombing attacks on Paramushir and other strongholds. On April 13 Pacific Fleet Headquarters reported a series of raids.

Paramushir and Shimushu had been bombed on April 11 and 12 by naval Venturas. Matsuma and Onnekatan Islands which had been raided on April 10 were again attacked on the 11th, and Liberators bombed Matsuma and Shasutokan on the 12th without encountering any opposition. On April 18 the Secretary of the Navy hinted that these attacks and a subsequent raid on Matsuma (April 14) were preliminaries to the eventual seizure of some of these islands. Further raids on the Kuriles were reported in May, but no landing was attempted.

Throughout the quarter the U.S. submarine flotillas in Pacific waters continued to inflict great loss and damage to Japanese shipping. The following announcements of their successes were made during the quarter:

April 4. *Sunk*. Two medium-sized tankers, 11 medium-sized cargo vessels and one small cargo vessel.

April 18. *Sunk*. One large and two medium-sized tankers, a naval auxiliary vessel (repair ship), seven medium cargo vessels, two cargo passenger vessels of medium size and one smaller, and one small cargo ship.

May 2. *Sunk*. A light cruiser and two destroyers, a large naval auxiliary, a large tanker, two medium transports and five medium cargo vessels.

May 25. *Sunk*. A destroyer, a large cargo transport, two medium cargo transports and one small, three tankers, one large, one medium and one small, and seven medium cargo vessels.

June 5. *Sunk*. One large transport, eight cargo vessels, and seven other ships.

June 23. *Sunk*. Eleven medium cargo vessels, four small cargo vessels and a medium-sized naval auxiliary.

The last sinkings brought up the rate of destruction of Japanese ships by submarines to more than two a day. It may be added that since March the Navy Department had restricted its reports of submarine operations to the actual sinking of ships, ceasing to report ships probably sunk or damaged. It may therefore be supposed that the losses of the Japanese from submarine attack exceeded the 695 sunk, probably sunk or damaged by May 2.

The loss of the U.S. submarine *Grayback*, which was believed to have been operating in Far Eastern waters, was officially announced on June 30.

¹ Of these the Marines lost 1,289 killed, 6,477 wounded and 827 missing.

CHAPTER VI

THE AMERICAS

I : THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State, dealt at length with United States foreign policy in an address broadcast from Washington on Sunday, April 9.

The American people, he said, were determined to press forward with their allies to the defeat of their enemies and the destruction of the Nazi and Fascist systems which had plunged them into war. They were also determined to go on after their victory with the Allies and all other nations which desired peace and freedom to establish and maintain in full strength the institutions without which peace and freedom would not be an enduring reality. They could not move in and out of international co-operation and in and out of participation in the responsibilities of a member of the family of nations.

After his warning to neutrals (*q.v.* Chapter IV, Section 1), Mr. Hull dealt with the American official attitude to France—which had been severely criticized. He said: "The President and I are clear as to the need, from the outset, of French civil administration—a democratic French administration—in France. We are disposed to see the French Committee of National Liberation exercise leadership to establish law and order under the supervision of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. The committee has given public assurance that it does not propose to perpetuate its authority . . . it has given assurance that it wishes, at the earliest possible date, to have the French people exercise their own sovereign will in accordance with French constitutional processes. The committee is, of course, not the Government of France, and we cannot recognize it as such. In accordance with this understanding of mutual purposes the committee will have every opportunity to undertake civil administration, and our co-operation and help in every practicable way in making it successful. Our central and abiding purpose is to aid the French people, our oldest friends, in providing a democratic, competent, and French administration of liberated French territory.

"There remain," Mr. Hull continued, "the more far-reaching relations between us and our allies in dealing with our enemies and in providing for future peace, freedom from aggression, and opportunity for expanding material well-being. The free nations have been brought to the very brink of destruction by allowing themselves to be separated and divided. If any lesson has ever been hammered home with blood and suffering, that one has been. And the lesson is not yet ended. However difficult the road may be, there is no hope of turning victory into enduring peace unless the real interests of this country, the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union, and China are harmonized, and unless they agree and act together. This is the solid framework upon which all future policy and international

organization must be built. It offers the fullest opportunity for the development of institutions in which all free nations may participate democratically, through which a reign of law and morality may arise, and through which the material interests of all may be advanced. But without an enduring understanding between these four nations upon their fundamental purposes, interests, and obligations to one another, all organizations to preserve peace are creations on paper, and the path is wide open again for the rise of a new aggressor.

"In the formulation of our policy towards our enemies . . . there can be no compromise with Fascism and Nazism. It must go, everywhere. Its leaders, its institutions, the power which supports it must go. They can expect no negotiated peace, no compromise, no opportunity to return. Upon that this people and this Government are determined, and our allies are equally determined."

Mr. Hull's speech was generally well received in America. Though the Administration's foreign policy had been a topic of heated debate for many months there was not much disagreement over most of Mr. Hull's points. There was some disappointment that the French Committee of National Liberation had not been given more complete recognition, but it was admitted that the limited approval announced by Mr. Hull represented substantial progress on what had appeared to be an almost hostile attitude on the part of the State Department.

The *New York Times* described the speech as "admirable both for tone and content," and said that it represented "a programme both ambitious and difficult." The *New York Herald Tribune* regretted that the speech was not more liberal towards France, but declared: "Mr. Hull is speaking seriously, with a much greater sense of responsibility and appositeness to present issues than was manifested in some of his previous utterances. What he said was not a complete exposition of our foreign policy, but an important contribution to the subject, and it deserves to be taken with an equal sense of responsibility and the sober and considered thought which he asked for it."

A second declaration on American foreign policy—this time by a Republican—was made by Mr. Thomas E. Dewey, Governor of New York, who on June 28 accepted the nomination as Presidential candidate of the Republican party for the election of November, 1944.

"To our allies," Mr. Dewey said in his acceptance speech, "let us send from this convention one message from our hearts: The American people are united with you to the limit of our resources and our man-power, devoted to the single task of victory and the establishment of a firm and lasting peace. To every member of the Axis Powers let us send this message: By this political campaign, which you are unable to understand, our will to victory will be strengthened, and with every day you further delay surrender the consequences to you will be more severe."

The foreign policy plank, as outlined in the Republican Party's platform, pledged the party to seek security "through organized international co-operation and not by joining a world State"; to the employment of "peace forces" to prevent military aggression; responsible participation by the United States in post-war co-operative organization among the sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and attain permanent peace in a free world; consultation with the members of the armed forces for their suggestions "on behalf of the security and liberty for which they fight"; and to make no treaty or agreement with any other nation or association of nations unless ratified by two-thirds of the American Senate.

Mr. Dewey endorsed this foreign policy plank at a Press conference on June 29. It should be recognized, he said, that the party platform was drawn up by persons with conflicting opinions, and that, as a result, there had had to be some compromise. He himself did not believe that a nation should surrender its "sovereign right to make war" to any international organization. "Sovereign power to make war is primarily a defensive power on our part," he declared. "We have never fought any offensive war."

Three months before he appeared in Chicago to accept the Republican Party's presidential nomination Mr. Dewey told the Press in an interview at Albany on April 6 that his repeated declaration that he would not be a candidate for the Republican nomination in 1944 still stood, and that "it is entirely clear." He gave the interview because reporters wished to discuss the Wisconsin primary election of April 4 after which Mr. Wendell Willkie had announced his withdrawal from the contest for the Republican nomination. Mr. Dewey warned his audience that he would make no comment on political subjects. Thus, "wholly engaged" in State affairs, he dismissed the question of the Presidential contest. Yet his path to Chicago already seemed clear. Through a combination of circumstances—notably partisan opposition to Mr. Willkie—Mr. Dewey was the man who was most likely to be the Republicans' choice for Presidency. He gave no sign that he wanted the nomination. There were many, indeed, who believed that he would have preferred to have it in 1948. But the Dewey movement

grew, and by the time Mr. Dewey took his special aeroplane to Chicago on the afternoon of June 28 he had been chosen unanimously as candidate. Mr. John Bricker, of Ohio, was nominated for the Vice-Presidency after he had made a strong fight for the Presidential nomination and after Governor Warren, of California, had declared that he would not accept the Vice-Presidential nomination.

As if to underline his earlier declarations that he had not sought the nomination Mr. Dewey said at the opening of his speech of acceptance in Chicago: "I come to this great task a free man. I have made no pledges, promises, or commitments, expressed or implied, to any man or woman. I shall make none except to the American people. These pledges I do make: To men and women of the Republican Party everywhere I pledge my utmost efforts in the months ahead. In return I ask for your support. Without it I cannot discharge the heavy obligation you lay upon me." On January 20, 1945, the American Government, Mr. Dewey continued, would again have a Cabinet of the ablest men and women to be found in America. He pledged a campaign dedicated to one end above all others—"that this nation under God may continue in the years ahead a free nation of free men."

On the prosecution of the war to victory, Mr. Dewey said:

"At this moment on battlegrounds around the world Americans are dying for the freedom of our country. Their comrades are pressing on . . . for total victory and for the liberties of all of us. Everything we say or do to-day and in the future must be devoted to the single purpose of that victory. Then, when victory is won, we must devote ourselves with equal unity of purpose to re-winning at home the freedom they have won at such desperate cost abroad. That we shall win this war none of us and few of our enemies can now have any doubt. But how we win this war is of major importance for the years ahead. We won the last war, but it did not stay won. This time we must also win the purposes for which we are fighting. Germany must never again nourish the delusion that she could have won. We must carry to Japan a defeat so crushing and complete that every last man among them knows that he has been beaten. We must not merely defeat the armies and navies of our enemies. We must defeat once and for all their will to make war. In their hearts as well as with their lips let them be taught to say 'Never again.' The military conduct of the war is outside this campaign. It is and must remain completely out of politics. General Marshall and Admiral King are doing a superb job. Thank God for both of them. Let me make it crystal clear that a change of administration next January cannot and will not involve any change in the military conduct of the war."

The war was being fought on the home front as well as abroad, Mr. Dewey continued, and "while all of us are deeply proud of the military conduct of the war, can we honestly say that the home front could not bear improvement? The present Administration in Washington has been in office for more than 11 years. To-day it is at war with Congress and at war with itself. Squabbles between Cabinet members, feuds between rival bureaucrats and bitterness between the President and his own party

members, in and out of Congress, have become the order of the day. In the vital matters of taxation, price control, rationing, labour relations, manpower, we have become familiar with the spectacle of wrangling, bungling, and confusion."

It was clear that Mr. Dewey intended to fight the campaign on domestic issues. Like the Republican Party's platform he attacked the policies of the New Deal. The platform declared that under the New Deal American economic life was being destroyed. The party's policy would be to re-establish liberty at home. Farmers, producers, workers and industry were assured that the Republicans would establish and maintain a fair protective tariff on competitive products so that the standards of living of the American people should not be impaired through the importation of commodities produced abroad by labour or producers working on lower standards than their own.

"If the post-war world is to be properly organized," it added, "a great extension of world trade will be necessary to repair the wastes of war and to build an enduring peace. The Republican Party, always remembering that its primary obligation, which must be fulfilled, is to our own workers, our own farmers, and our own industry, pledges that it will join with others in leadership in every co-operative effort to remove unnecessary and destructive barriers to international trade."

On the Jewish question the platform said: "In order to give refuge to millions of distressed Jewish men, women and children driven from their homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of Palestine to their unrestricted immigration and land-ownership, so that in accordance with the full intent and purpose of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the resolution of the Republican Congress in 1922 Palestine may be constituted as a free and democratic commonwealth. We condemn the failure of the President to insist that the Mandatory of Palestine carry out the provisions of the Balfour Declaration and of the Mandate while he pretends to support them."

The Republicans had now published their platform; they had chosen their candidate, and he had accepted; but the attitude of Mr. Willkie was unknown. With his enthusiastic following at home, and his international reputation as an advocate of greater world collaboration, he remained as the one great doubt that probably beset the organizers of the Republican convention and those responsible for the party's policy.

After Mr. Willkie announced his withdrawal from the contest for the Republican nomination on April 5 he made no attempt to answer the many questions that were

asked about his future plans. He had lost his hold on many "old guard" Republicans because of his radical attitude, notably on taxation and on foreign policy. He had lost other supporters because he had set out to educate his party. At Chicago little official attention was paid to him. The party was in no mood to listen to his demand for unambiguous and forceful declarations. Yet there was a danger in ignoring this powerful Republican. The Special Correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* at Chicago wrote on June 26 :

"Mr. Willkie still has millions of devoted followers throughout the country and their failure to go to the voting places might make all the difference to the Republicans between success and defeat. . . . The Republicans probably would stand a better chance if they adopted a markedly liberal programme along the Willkie lines and attempted to get the vote of the independent liberals throughout the country."

Meanwhile, President Roosevelt said nothing of his political plans, though it was the general belief that he would again be the Democratic Party's candidate, and on June 22 Governor Arnall, of Georgia, who had just had an interview with the President, predicted that he would accept the fourth-term nomination if the Democratic Convention offered it to him.

During this quarter the President had a month's rest away from Washington at Mr. Bernard Baruch's estate in Southern Carolina. He returned to Washington on May 7. Ten days later he signed the third extension of the Lend-Lease Act, declaring that the Lend-Lease programme was the symbol of Allied unity which would hasten the day of victory. Lend-Lease was now extended until June 30, 1945. The financial total of its operations up to January 31, 1944, was \$21,000,000,000. In a statement which Mr. Roosevelt made after signing the extension, he said :

"When, on March 11, 1941, the Lend-Lease Act first became law, Britain stood virtually alone before the tide of Axis aggression which had swept across western Europe. Everywhere the peace-loving peoples of the world were facing disaster, but the passage of the Lend-Lease Act gave firm assurance to those resisting the aggressors that the overpowering material resources of the United States were on their side. After we were attacked on December 7, 1941, Lend-Lease became an essential part of our war effort. Through Lend-Lease and reverse Lend-Lease, the material resources

and supplies of the United Nations have been pooled for their most effective use against our common enemies."

On June 15 Mr. Roosevelt dealt with a further aspect of Allied and, ultimately, world relations when he issued a statement outlining in general terms the American plan for an international security organization after the war. His statement said, in part :

"The conference to-day with officials of the State Department on the post-war security organization programme is a continuation of conferences which have been held from time to time during the past 18 months. These conferences have enabled me to give personal attention to the development and progress of the post-war work the Department of State is doing. All plans and suggestions from groups, organizations, and individuals have been carefully discussed and considered. I wish to emphasize the entirely non-partisan nature of these consultations. All aspects of the post-war programme have been debated in a co-operative spirit. This is a tribute to the political leaders who realize that the national interest demands a national programme now. Such teamwork has met the overwhelming approval of the American people. The maintenance of peace and security must be the joint task of all peace-loving nations. We have, therefore, sought to develop plans for an international organization comprising all such nations. . . . We are not thinking of a super-State with its own police forces and other paraphernalia of coercive power. We are seeking effective agreement and arrangements through which the nations would maintain, according to their capacities, adequate forces to meet the needs of preventing war and of making impossible deliberate preparation for war, and to have such forces available for joint action when necessary. All this, of course, will become possible once our present enemies are defeated and effective arrangements are made to prevent them from making war again."

Mr. Hull had announced on May 30 that now that he had concluded the first phase of his "frank and fruitful discussions" with the Senate post-war advisory committee he was ready to proceed with informal talks on an international peace and security organization with Britain, Russia, and China, and then with the other United Nations. The main points of Mr. Roosevelt's announcement had been accurately forecast by the Press, and no great editorial attention was, therefore, given to it immediately. The general opinion among Americans at this period, so far as it could be gauged, was that any new League of Nations should begin modestly because a too ambitious plan might fail and the world could not afford another such failure.

Colonel Knox, the Secretary of the Navy, died on April 28. He was a Republican who had opposed

President Roosevelt when he stood as Vice-Presidential condidate in 1936. Four years later, in the critical summer of 1940, he accepted the post at the Navy Department at the same time as Mr. Stimson, another Republican, became Secretary of War. Colonel Knox directed the American Navy during the period of its greatest expansion. When he took over the work he declared: "I am an American first, and a Republican after that." His successor, whose appointment was approved by the Senate on May 17, was Mr. James Forrestal, who had been Under-Secretary of the Navy under Colonel Knox.

The 26th session of the International Labour Conference opened in Philadelphia on April 20 and ended on May 12. There were representatives from 41 states Members of the I.L.O. Russia, however, was not among them.

"We had hoped," Mr. Carter Goodrich, the chairman of the governing body and the American representative, said, "that the Soviet Union, as a great member of the United Nations, would be represented here to discuss with us the problems of international social and economic policy. We have not ceased to hope that, as one result of the work of this meeting, the Soviet Union may see its way to return to the International Labour Organization for the purpose of co-operating on that wide range of problems common to all nations, whatever their international organization, that are determined to raise the standard of life of the masses of the people."

Mr. Nash, the New Zealand Minister in Washington, was unanimously elected as president of the conference. The agenda of the session were of wide scope. Besides discussions of the future policy, programme and status of the I.L.O., they included recommendations to the United Nations for present and post-war social policy; the organization of employment in the transition from war to peace; and the minimum standards of social policy in dependent territories. In a message to the conference, President Roosevelt said:

"I see in the I.L.O. a permanent instrument of representative character for the formulation of international policy on matters directly affecting the welfare of labour and for international collaboration in this field . . . it must be the agency for decision and for action on those economic and social matters related to the welfare of working people which are practical for industry and designed to enhance the opportunities for a good life for peoples the world over."

NOTE.—For Mr. Wallace's visit to China, see Chapter V, Section 2.

2 : LATIN AMERICA

Further nationalist demonstrations by the military Government of Argentina, the steady and sturdy co-operation of Brazil with the United Nations, Mexican fidelity to their cause in spite of disquieting underground movements, and revolutionary disturbances in some of the smaller States make up the Latin-American chronicle for the nineteenth quarter of the war. In Argentina the Government, who had recently taken measures against foreign news agencies, issued a decree on April 4 granting a virtual monopoly of broadcasting news to "Andi," the Argentine News Agency, "for reasons of state and public interest." Three days later *The United Press*, the American News Agency, and its Argentine subsidiary, *Prensa Unida*, were allowed to resume their Argentine services "provisionally."

On April 13 the Government decreed the expropriation of the British-owned Primitiva Gas Company of Buenos Aires. The concession was due to expire in January, 1945. The Government offered the Company the equivalent of £230,000, being the difference between the value of the Company's property and the cost of removing its installations. The amount offered was to be deposited with the Argentine Federal Court if the Company did not accept it. The Company declined the offer and requested the Government to study the situation afresh. On May 11 the attorney of the Argentine State Treasury opened proceedings in the Federal Court where he requested and obtained authorization for the immediate possession of the property since the Government had made their deposit and considered that the taking-over of the property could not be postponed. The anxieties of the shareholders were somewhat allayed when the decision of the Federal Judge was reversed on June 29 by the Federal Chamber, the court of second instance, which ruled that the surrender of all the Company's assets imposed an undue burden on it, and added that it was a general principle of law that suits should be decided in two or even three instances. The chamber therefore ordered the case to be re-examined.

A nationalist demonstration, in the opinion of some observers, was the fining (reported on April 14) of the Jewish Colonization Association (I.C.A.) to the tune of over 10,100,000 pesos (more than £600,000) for failing to comply with the law taxing absentees. Of the sum claimed one-fifth was for overdue taxation, the rest represented the fine. The I.C.A. claimed that as a benevolent institution they were not liable to taxation.

On April 14, the "Day of the Americas," President Farrell said that it was unfortunate that the country's relations with several other states were broken off. Argentine could quietly await the future confident in the triumph of justice and convinced that American solidarity could not be destroyed. On the same day the Government suspended the operation of the decree granting broadcasting rights to "Andi." Some newspapers were afterwards suspended or admonished for omitting to publish the President's speech or for not publishing it sufficiently fully.

Another source of friction was the Government's insistence on compulsory religious education, which led to the resignation of the Minister of Education and Justice, Dr. J. Honorio Silgueira, whose place was taken by Dr. Alberto Baldrich. *La Prensa*, the best-known Argentine newspaper, was suspended for five days in late April for criticizing municipal hospitals, but it was generally believed that this newspaper's attacks on compulsory religious teaching caused its suspension, which was decreed by the President himself instead of being ordered by the police.

On May 17 General Orlando Peluffo, who had been appointed Foreign Minister on May 2, gave a reception to the diplomatic corps from which the U.S. and British Ambassadors and the Canadian and Brazilian Chargés d'Affairs were notable absentees. It was supposed that the Minister gave the reception as a trial balloon before sending out official invitations to the festivities to be held on May 25, the Independence Day of Argentina. Expectations that the day would be marked by the promise of a return to constitutional forms vanished after President Farrell had spoken at Avellanada. The object of the revolution, he said, was not merely to change men, but to change the system which previously existed.

On the eve of Independence Day three orators had addressed a gathering of 60,000 people from the balcony of Government House in the Plaza de Mayo at Buenos Aires. One of them, a civilian, had praised General Juan Manuel de Rosas, a President whom Argentine Liberals and democrats had portrayed as a savage tyrant for nearly 100 years. These demonstrations aroused much criticism, but the critics showed more prudence than valour when it came to action. Thus leaflets had been circulated earlier in May calling on the people to show their silent disapproval of the Government by a sit-down strike on June 7. The Government made some arrests and the proposed demonstration was abandoned in consequence of these arrests and of the repressive measures taken by the police who warned business houses that they would be held responsible for all employees who did not attend work on June 7 and threatened university students who did

not attend classes with the refusal of degrees. Of the two underground movements which were believed to have instigated the silent protest, one, the "Asociacion de Mayo," was composed of Socialists with some Radicals and Anarchists, while the other, the "Patria Libre," included Communists and Conservatives, with an independent Anarchist group, a strange combination indeed!

Among other eccentricities of the Government was the ban imposed by the Federal Commission governing the province of Entre Rios on the exhibition of films depicting members of former Argentine Governments. A film shown in the province had given a "close-up" of General Ramirez while he was still President and another of the General joking with General Farrell, his supplanter, a spectacle which had filled the audience with mirth. Hence the ban. These incidents were amusing enough, but the arrest of Allied nationals as well as of members of the Axis on charges of espionage, a measure which seemed particularly directed against the Inter-Allied Committee of Co-ordination, which was chiefly concerned in propaganda for the United Nations, did not amuse the British and United States Governments. On June 27 the State Department announced that the American Ambassador at Buenos Aires had been instructed to return to Washington immediately "for consultation." In explanation of their action the State Department allowed it to be known that from the Allied point of view the Argentine situation had deteriorated.

Among the developments which had aroused attention in Washington was a speech by the Minister of War, Colonel Peron, calling on his country to become a great military Power and expressing expansionist aims. There was also much public expression of sympathy with Germany and the controlled Press had praised German military achievements, especially the defence of Normandy. The German Embassy, although German diplomatic and consular personnel were to be exchanged in Lisbon for Argentine diplomatists and consuls in July, remained active to the last and there was no visible impediment to the movement of Axis agents about the country.

In Brazil the chief political event during the quarter was a speech by President Getulio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro on April 15. He said that after the war

the Brazilian people would have the opportunity of choosing their own representative democratic government. "When we are again in full possession of the benefits derived from peace, we shall complete that which is lacking in our governmental institutions." People could choose their

own government freely and fearlessly, for "honouring her war agreements . . . Brazil in peace will be governed in accordance with national desires." This statement was loudly applauded.

Continuing, the President said that Brazil's financial position was sound and would stand comparison with any time in her history. He called for the union of all Brazilians, and for greater sacrifices now when Brazilian troops were about to leave to fight overseas. His declaration for democracy was the more impressive since it followed the publication in a newspaper owned by his brother of articles attacking democracy as corrupt and decadent and urging the adoption of a corporative form of State like Dr. Salazar's Portugal.¹

Brazilian warships and aircraft continued to give the Allies valuable assistance in patrolling the South Atlantic. The news of the successful landing of the Allied forces in Normandy was welcomed in Brazil as in Chile. But on June 9 a Brazilian educationist, Dr. Hernane Tavares de Sa, addressing an education assembly in Maryland, warned his audience that relations between the United States and Latin America had been deteriorating for months, a fact which had been carefully kept out of the American Press.

This deterioration was due to three causes, colour, political, and personal conduct. Latin Americans feared that the United States would wish to retain the Brazilian bases now being used by their forces and the Brazilians were not alone in this fear. American policy in industrial and business matters was partly responsible for the "economic disruption" which was causing actual hardships in parts of Brazil. He added, "Many United States efforts to build good will have back-fired, especially United States propagandist short-wave radio programmes, which are addressed to 12-year-old morons, when, as a matter of fact, short-wave sets are owned only by people of some means who rely more on the B.B.C. because of its higher standards." Dr. Tavares also said that many of the multitudes of officials whom the U.S. had been pouring into Latin America "with a most disastrous effect," had adversely affected the feelings of Brazilians towards the United States by their personal conduct, especially by rowdiness and drunkenness in the casinos frequented by the better types of Brazilians. In short they had been most carelessly selected.

There was little news from Chile during the quarter save the unexpectedly large gains of the Left-wing parties in the municipal elections. In Ecuador a military revolution broke out in Guayaquil, the chief port and second city of the Republic, during the night of May 28-29. The movement synchronized with an outbreak at Quito, the capital. Some 240 persons were killed and wounded

¹ Summarized from a message from the Washington Correspondent of *The Times* published on April 17.

in the Guayaquil fighting in which the rebel troops used American lend-lease tanks against the Government. President del Rio surrendered, the acting President, Dr. Allende, was next overthrown and a provisional government, headed first by Colonel Pablo Borja and then by General Alba, was set up pending the return of Dr. Juan Velasco Ibarra, president in 1934-35, and subsequently an exile in the Republic of Colombia.

The causes of the revolt and the intentions of the revolutionaries were far from clear. Tension resulting from the vigorous and bitter campaign which preceded the presidential elections, which should have been held on June 4, had something to do with the outbreak. It was also believed that the rebels resented President del Rio's settlement of the century-old boundary dispute with Peru, an achievement which had recently been the subject of congratulations from President Roosevelt to Señor del Rio. Arriving at Quito on May 31, Dr. Ibarra cast a number of persons into prison, froze the funds of various firms and individuals connected with his predecessor's administration and publicly promised to establish a Government on a democratic basis within two months, the people to exercise power through a constitutional assembly. The American Government expressed no views on the legality or otherwise of the new Government and followed a "wait-and-see" policy.

The relations between Bolivia and the English-speaking Powers returned to normal towards the end of the quarter. The Washington Correspondent of *The Times* stated on June 23

"The United States renewed diplomatic relations with Bolivia this morning when the American Chargé d'Affaires at La Paz presented a Note to that effect at the Bolivian Foreign Office. An announcement by the State Department here says that since January the provisional Government of Bolivia had carried out a number of decisive affirmative acts in support of hemisphere security and the cause of the United Nations. Accordingly the American Governments have reviewed the situation, and the consensus of opinion is that there is no longer reason for withholding recognition.

There were in President Villaroel's original revolutionary Government members of the *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario*, the right-wing political party, but President Villaroel eliminated them when it became apparent that the other American nations would not recognize a Bolivian Government in which members of this party had a share."

The British Government also recognized the Villaroel Government. The President's extrusion of his erstwhile colleagues may have caused an attempt at revolt which was suppressed at the end of April when many politicians were arrested.

In Mexico an army officer attempted to assassinate the President on April 10, but missed him at point-

blank range and was afterwards shot while attempting to escape. The Mexican Government's whole-hearted adhesion to the United Nations and the remarkable speech delivered at "the famous conference at Rio de Janeiro in January, 1942," by the Mexican Foreign Minister, Señor Ezequiel Padilla, were praised by Mr. Churchill in a speech at the Mexican Embassy at a lunch given by the Mexican Ambassador in his honour on June 15. In the United States some disquiet was caused by the growth in Mexico of "Sinarquism," a secret organization of Fascist character, which openly claimed 1,000,000 members. The writer of an article in the Roman Catholic weekly review *Commonwealth*, said that although both the Archbishop of Mexico City and *El Sinarquista*, the official organ of the movement, dissociated the Catholic Church from Sinarquism, its leaders were fervent Catholics. Sinarquists, said the article,

"cultivate and exploit the country's fear alike of Communism and of the 'imperialistic ambitions' and materialism of the United States, and they favour the Latin-American policy of the Spanish Falange. Worsening economic conditions, including inflation and a reduction of the country's main food supply, maize, through heavy purchases by the United States, are assisting the growth of the movement."

The social objectives of the movement seemed to resemble those of the Salazar régime in Portugal. Its political programme had a decidedly Fascist appearance. It aimed at national regeneration by order and discipline, and included one-party rule, the abolition of any representative assembly, the displacement of United States news services in Latin America by a chain of newspapers and wireless stations under Sinarquist control, and a native motion picture industry minutely regulated by the régime.¹

A revolt against the Government in the Central American State of Salvador began on April 2. It was bloodily suppressed after some ten days' fighting by President Maximilian Martínez. Eleven army officers including Colonel Calco, the leader of the revolt, were executed.

¹ *The Times*, June 13.

CHAPTER VII

IN THE GERMAN FORTRESS

JANUARY 1—JUNE 30, 1944

The year opened gloomily for the German people. Nothing in the Führer's New Year proclamation encouraged any hope of a relaxation of the struggle against the increasing weight of Allied attack. High-pitched and discursive, his appeal for still greater efforts against the enemy evaded most of the real issues and enlarged on the danger of Bolshevism, the "treachery" of Britain, and the inevitable decay of her power in consequence of her alliance with Russia. The following passage contained the guiding theme of his address to his compatriots :

"Britain, who so often used the nations only as a means to gain her unscrupulous aims in Europe, has to-day become herself a mere instrument in the hands of even more unscrupulous Powers. However else this war may end, Britain's power will at any rate be weaker at the end than it was at the beginning. Britain has allied herself with the Devil, and this alliance will have the same result as always. Britain will not calm the devil of Bolshevism ; the Bolshevik poison will eat increasingly into Britain and finally cause her decay."

Not all the disasters of the past year were explained away. Hitler might ascribe the defeats in Italy to treachery, as he ascribed the Allied landing in North Africa to breaches of faith by French Admirals and Generals. He might argue that these events had influenced the whole course of the war. But it is doubtful whether the more intelligent members of his audience quite accepted this explanation, and it is quite certain that the leading professional officers of the Army ascribed most of the reverses which Germany had sustained during the year to Hitler's interference with the High Command. They hinted that with a free hand to evacuate territory in Russia which they could not defend with any economy of force, the German Army would not have suffered the almost unbroken series of defeats which it had sustained

since the Stalingrad disaster. To the Army Hitler stated in a New Year Order of the Day that

All the troublesome problems presented to Germany by "the treachery of the Italian King" had been solved. But their solution had involved the relinquishment of other positions. To form a front in Italy and to hold the Balkans and all the Greek islands the rear and transport services of the Eastern Front had been perforce reduced. "This, my comrades on the Eastern Front, is the reason for many of your difficulties and preoccupations." Yet 1943 had become a great historical success. Bolshevism had not attained its aims. "Wherever a landing is attempted in the west it will fail." If the enemy had made a greater advance in the sphere of technical inventions "we shall catch up. The apparent slackening of the U-boat war was due only to a single technical invention on the part of our enemies." And so, although 1944 would be "a very hard year," it was their common task to get over the period of pure defensive warfare and deal heavy blows until Providence gave victory to the nation that deserved it most.

This was all very well, but the High Command must have realized that, thanks to the Führer's refusal to surrender Russian territory on the scale which the situation required, the situation on the Eastern Front was more precarious than ever. Other leaders and writers dwelt on the dangers and difficulties of the position and emphasized the necessity of a redoubled effort in the factories and of a more merciless prosecution of the war. Their tone was sombre as was that of the Press, though its gloom was now and again illuminated by flashes of ferocity, notably when new weapons "hitherto on the secret list" were mentioned.

The decision of the Argentine Government to sever diplomatic relations with the Axis was a blow, the shock of which was, however, lessened by the subsequent success of the military faction (cf. *The Eighteenth Quarter*, Chapter VI, Section 2). But signs of doubt and despondency among Germany's allies and of the growing belief of the neutrals that the Reich was doomed to defeat were manifest and had an effect on German officials abroad who were not party members.¹ Hitler's speech on January 30, the eleventh anniversary of the Nazi assumption of power, cannot have given them much comfort. It contained some interesting features. In the words of a leading article in *The Times* (*loc. cit.* January 31),

¹ E.g. the flight of Dr. Vehmehren, assistant to the chief of the German Secret Service in Turkey, to an Allied country.

"The Jew made his inevitable appearance in it, but the Versailles Treaty was a notable absentee. There was the now familiar lament that Great Britain began to prepare for war on a peaceful and innocent Germany so long ago as 1936, and much else in the same strain. This is not new. . . . What, by contrast, was new was the emphasis he put on "the National-Socialist community" rather than on the geographical Germany and the Germany of the *Herrenvolk*. "The National-Socialist community," he said, "has become the indisputable centre of all European self-preservation."

He embroidered extensively on this theme. Thus "Germany is struggling in this war not for herself only, but for all Europe . . . there will be only one victor in this war and that will be either Germany or Soviet Russia . . . a Russian victory will mean Europe's annihilation." As *The Times* observed, "Hitler in the guise of the good European will impress no one, least of all his victims." But it was interesting to note that shortly before and after this speech German agents and officials in neutral countries put out tales that Germany had proposed to surrender her conquests and her fleet in return for being allowed "a Government of Generals" (from which Hitler would by hypothesis be excluded) and a measure of liberty after the war. This story was actually put about by the German Oversea News Agency on January 21. It was interpreted in well-informed quarters as an exploitation of the mischievous tale published by *Pravda* concerning a secret meeting between "two leading English personalities and Ribbentrop" on January 17 (q.v. *The Eighteenth Quarter*, Chapter I, Section 1).

Within the Reich there was evidence that the total civilian mobilization ordered by Hitler after the Stalingrad disaster had not yielded the labour power required to meet the increasing military needs of Germany. In February Sauckel, the Director of Labour both within Germany and in the occupied countries, made an impassioned appeal for voluntary service in war industries and called upon all who for age, or other reasons, had not been called up for war work to examine their consciences and to volunteer for "a service of honour."

Already (January 5) a decree had been broadcast for mobilizing school-children for war purposes at the direct order of the Council of Ministers for the Defence of the Reich. The decree, which came into operation shortly after the announcement authorized the Hitler Youth Leader "to regulate and direct the employment, of German youth for war purposes." I followed an announcement that boys of 16 were to register for service in the armed forces.

The food situation in the early months of the year was still fairly satisfactory, but some anxiety was caused by the failure of the 1943 potato crop and in February the authorities ordered a reduction in the number of pigs and poultry and forbade the use of potatoes as fodder, besides curtailing plans for distilling potato spirit. But the loss

of the Ukraine, whence the Germans had obtained great quantities of livestock and still more of cereals, aroused serious misgivings, and German eyes turned anxiously towards Rumania and Hungary, granaries which must be preserved. The occupation of Hungary was warmly supported by the German Press as the necessary protection of a weak point in the European fortress. The *Bodensee Rundschau* put the matter thus :

"The occupation of Hungary . . . and the change in the political leadership of the country can be appraised only in this connexion. It is not merely a question of assuring the protection of the Carpathian front, food supply, the railways to Rumania, or the utilization of the whole Hungarian Army in the fight against Bolshevism, but also, and not least, the frustration of all possibilities by which Churchill and Stalin might be able . . . to break important blocks out of the European front. It goes without saying that we shall not allow another Badoglio *régime* to arise either in Hungary or anywhere else in Europe."

With the advent of what was sometimes called "the invasion season," German precautions redoubled. On March 30 the German News Agency broadcast a decree making immediate training in rifle shooting compulsory. It began :

During April the S.A. will organize service rifle shooting in all the regions of Greater Germany. All German men will be called on to attend, according to the Führer's will. Shooting practice is to be especially encouraged . . . opportunities will be offered everywhere to attend the service rifle shooting. All Germans must learn to use a rifle. Every German ready to defend his country must give evidence of his wish to be able to use arms. . . ." And the decree added that a mass attendance of German men was expected at these meetings. "This will make it, apart from its original purpose, a powerful demonstration of the faith in victory and the German people's firm determination to fight."

On April 6 it was announced that Hitler had appointed Goebbels sole administrator of Berlin with the title of "Town President." He was "to concentrate all administrative power in his person particularly for the prosecution of the war. The provisions of the law covering the constitution and administration of the Reich capital have been suspended." The Lord Mayor would remain in charge of municipal administration and the town vice-president would take over the State administration of the city. Goebbels had already stated in an address to Nazi leaders in Berlin on April 1 that the Eastern Front was only one in their grand strategy, and developments there could only be judged in the context of other strategic tasks, "the solution of which is impending within the framework of our master plan." He was firmly convinced that the High Command would master the situation which an Anglo-American invasion would create, and the defeat of that invasion "may be the point at which the developments of this war will converge." As for the air war, "we must stick it."

Further internal measures for the defence of the homeland were next announced, e.g., the appointment of an "inspector-general" for the training of military leaders whose business it would be to "unify National-Socialist education and the military training of future officers and n.c.o.'s." He would collaborate closely with the Hitler Youth and give directives for its pre-military training, thus ensuring a supply of suitable future leaders up to front-line standards. Goering, who no doubt realized the internal danger caused by the presence of a mass of Russian prisoner-workers in the Reich, signed a decree later in April putting into operation measures for improving the conditions of work of the Russians, who were to receive wages and salaries on the same scale as other foreigners and to be granted other concessions. But the Nazi chiefs did not expect these measures to guarantee them against trouble should the war approach the borders of the Reich. On June 1 the *National Zeitung* stated that Himmler had formed S.S. battalions of mixed nationality to supervise foreign labour and to do propaganda and police work in Germany. They did not form part of the redoubtable *Waffen S.S.* The first battalion had taken the oath in May after 18 months of propaganda and recruiting. It contained 320 Dutchmen and Flemings, possibly quislings, possibly men sick of drudgery in the Reich who hoped that they might improve their chances of escaping in the coming confusion and did not attach much importance to an oath taken, perhaps, with mental reservations.

So the Germans, fed with confident declarations by their leaders and by the military experts in whom they were still disposed to trust, awaited the blow. When it fell there was at first a brief expectation of a rapid defensive success. In succeeding days the note changed rapidly. On June 15 a special correspondent of *The Times* wrote :

Four days after the launching of the assault it was being said in Berlin that the operations had been carried out "at a fantastic speed and with colossal forces," and in contrast to all earlier predictions the German public were told, "No premature judgment of the final development must be made." Spokesmen of the Propaganda Ministry, the High Command, and the Foreign Office alike emphasized the ferocity of the battle and the

importance of its issue for all Europe, and German correspondents paid a tribute to the high training, physical vigour and admirable *morale* of the British and United States armies. At the same time there were signs that the delivery of the blow had aroused a certain relief, no doubt because the tension of waiting for its fall had tried military and civilian nerves alike.

But this relief could only be temporary, and there must have been many Germans who, on reflection, wondered why the Atlantic Wall had been so swiftly breached. They had to be heartened and the opening of the flying bomb campaign against London gave the official propagandists their opportunity of encouraging an uncritical public to hail the advent of an age of military miracles. The reader will find in an earlier chapter of this volume (Chapter II, Section 2B) some account of the wild exaggerations put about by German propagandists concerning the effects of these unpleasant engines. They certainly heartened the German public for a while, so much so, indeed, that the military commentators had in the end to warn listeners and readers against putting excessive faith in new inventions. But for the time the use of V 1 did something to rally German spirits which had been shaken by the Allied landing and hints of the approaching use of still more horrific inventions helped to give the average citizen some of the encouragement which he sorely needed. But by the end of June it was plain that he was again in a highly questioning mood. Although he was assured that the High Command was playing, thus far successfully, for time, and that it still held great strategic reserves in hand for massive counter-blows, he was also informed by inspired spokesmen that the war had reached the "all or nothing stage." He would not have been human had he remained indifferent to the warning and unmoved by the discovery that the flying bomb had not diminished the volume of Allied air attack on the industries of the Reich.

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CHAPTER VIII

VICTIMS AND NEUTRALS

I : FRANCE AND ITALY

A. FRANCE. THE WAY OF LIBERATION

In the closing weeks of the three months ending on June 30, 1944, many illusions and misgivings about the course and character of the struggle in France were swept away. With the great Allied invasion of Normandy it was revealed how little the Vichy *régime* counted with the mass of the French people and how firmly and bravely popular sympathy and support had ranged themselves behind General de Gaulle and the French Committee of National Liberation installed in Algiers. There were circles in the United States and to a less extent in Great Britain who feared that when the liberation of France was begun something approaching civil war would ravage the land and divide the nation. The contrary was the case. The rally to the Cross of Lorraine was instant and massive, and the contribution of the movement of resistance to the success of the Allied landings was invaluable—in contrast to the unhappy experience in North Africa in 1942 when, as has since been disclosed, General Eisenhower was left in ignorance of the extent of the “resistance” which his troops might expect from the French. There was no repetition of that when the invasion of metropolitan France was undertaken by the Allied forces. Some mistakes there were, but they were transient. One was a disposition even at the twelfth hour to keep General de Gaulle in the background.

Before the Normandy landings some advance had been made towards clarifying the position of the Committee of National Liberation headed by General de Gaulle. The movement in favour of the recognition of the Com-

mittee as the Provisional Government of France had grown in scope and strength, and there was disappointment when reports came from Washington that the American Government had suggested that the Allied commander-in-chief should choose his French civilian administrators from groups which might emerge in France during the liberation, and should avoid treating the Committee as a provisional government. From the first British opinion had expressed a stronger preference than that attitude represented. Many foresaw that if it was sought to give effect to such a suggestion then civil war was certain. Much relief and satisfaction were felt, therefore, when Mr. Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State, in his notable declaration on foreign policy on April 9 said :

The President and I are clear as to the need, from the outset, of French civil administration—and democratic French administration—in France. We are disposed to see the French Committee of National Liberation exercising leadership to establish law and order under the supervision of the Allied commander-in-chief.

There followed the natural and necessary qualification that the American Government relied on the Committee not to seek the perpetuation of its authority, but that at the earliest moment the wish of the French people would be sought on the future *régime*. The American declaration was welcomed and endorsed by the British Government, and was recognized in Algiers as a step forward. Speaking in the House of Commons on May 3, Mr. Eden said :

I am happy to take this opportunity to emphasize that His Majesty's Government are in full agreement with the statement made by the United States Secretary of State on April 9 in regard to the administration of liberated France. In accordance with this, conversations are now in progress between the Supreme Allied Commander and the French Military Mission in this country under General Koenig with a view to working out detailed arrangements.

And when Mr. Eden was asked : "Does that mean that the authority with which we deal in liberated France will be the French Committee of National Liberation?" he replied categorically :

"Yes, sir. I do not know of any other authority except Vichy, and we have no intention of dealing with Vichy under any circumstances. It will be for the French nation in due course, as has been repeatedly declared by the leaders of the French Committee of Liberation, to make their own choice of government."

The statements of Mr. Cordell Hull and Mr. Eden cleared the air. In Algiers the demand for the recognition

of the Committee as the Provisional Government of the Republic was, however, insistent. On May 15, for example, the Consultative Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution to this effect.

General de Gaulle, closing a debate on foreign policy, declared that the common desire of all the speakers was for the greatest possible vigour in French policy and for the clarification of France's position among the United Nations. Those who had been critical of the attitude of the United Nations should realize that, after the defeat of France, Governments with the awful responsibility of carrying on the war had had the right to ask—since so many Frenchmen had doubted their own country—"Where is France?"

The Committee of Liberation took note of the Assembly's resolution. It was to be noted that the Assembly's own resolution followed one passed by the National Council of Resistance in France, and to that extent was a further indication of how the Assembly in Algiers more and more reflected the desires and the demands of the men and women who were fighting and dying on the soil of France. This was a factor of which General de Gaulle was not slow to take account, not only on this, but also on other issues. Early in April he had reconstructed the Committee of National Liberation by bringing in two well-known and able Communists, M. François Billoux and M. Fernand Grenier. Whatever might have been thought of the behaviour of the French Communists in the first year and a half of the war—and little good could be thought of it—there was no doubt that the party was pulling its weight in the resistance movement, although to some extent this may have been because of its sympathy with Soviet Russia and its admiration of the achievements of the Red Army. Communists would have been represented on the Committee of Liberation long before if the party had not arrogated to itself the right to "mandate" its own nominees. This was an infringement of his responsibility which General de Gaulle was not prepared to countenance. In the end a compromise was devised by which General de Gaulle signified his choice and the party then did its "mandating."

At the same time as these appointments were made

other changes took place, the most dramatic of which was the removal of General Giraud from the office of commander-in-chief and the assumption by General de Gaulle as President of the Committee of the new post of "Head of the Armed Forces." General Giraud's supersession gave rise to some controversy, and opponents of General de Gaulle were quick to see in it a further assertion of his personal rule. Among those who took a more detached view there was keen regret that a good patriot and loyal soldier should be thus removed. The facts were that in the stage on which the war was entering, when French troops would be fighting on more than one front, a commander-in-chief would be an inconvenience; and in any case there was a feeling in the highest Allied circles that, good soldier as General Giraud had proved himself in the past, he was not altogether fitted by temperament or by training for the fast-moving warfare which was to be expected. General de Gaulle's decision was seen to be not only right, but inevitable, and there is little doubt that in the tribute he paid to the dismissed commander-in-chief, and in the hope he expressed that General Giraud would march at the head of a French army into Metz, he spoke from the heart. General Giraud was offered the post of Inspector-General of the Forces. This he declined. It was clear that he was aggrieved by the fact that French soldiers were not to go into the final battle under his command. A rather peevish exchange of letters did not destroy the esteem in which General Giraud was widely held.

I leave you, General Giraud said in a farewell order of the day, with a heartfelt pang. . . . There is now only one voice, that of France. Men may go, France remains.

General de Gaulle's Administration did not escape criticism. In particular, misgivings were expressed by those whose loyalty to the *régime* was not in question that the arrangements made for the restoration of full republican and democratic government were not adequate. An ordinance had been promulgated laying down the procedure after liberation, but the Communists complained that although this averted the possibility of an

Allied Amgot "after the Italian fashion," it did not rule out a French Amgot recruited entirely from outside France—a plain intimation that what must count in the future was the influence of the resistance movement. Reassurances were given on this point.

In a statement to representatives of the Press in Algiers on April 21, General de Gaulle proclaimed that the administration of the liberated territories in continental France was an exclusively French concern, and that the French people would not tolerate anything else. In a clear reference to criticism of his own position he said :

"The French will not accept any dictatorship by a Frenchman, and still less will they accept a foreign dictatorship."

With the approach of D day (June 6) the need for a firmer and clearer understanding between Great Britain and the United States on the one hand and the Committee of National Liberation on the other became pressing. The negotiations between General Eisenhower and General Koenig to which Mr. Eden referred in his statement to Parliament made excellent progress, but were then held up when the British Government imposed a ban on the use of foreign codes with a view to preventing any leakage of information about the coming invasion of Western Europe. The United States and Soviet Russia were exceptions, and there was some resentment among French people at this discrimination. There was widespread satisfaction, therefore, when Mr. Churchill invited General de Gaulle to visit London for an exchange of views on the widest lines and at the highest level. The British Government's hope was that the American Government would join in the discussions and that a political agreement would result making clear how, when, and where civil authority was to be transferred to French hands. Washington declined to send a representative to the London conversations, although General de Gaulle was later invited to a conference with President Roosevelt. Thanks largely to the untiring efforts of Mr. Eden, backed throughout by M. Massigli, the French Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, a draft agreement was drawn up covering immediate political issues. A similar agreement with the American Government remained to be reached, and meanwhile time and events were on the march.

The urgency of a comprehensive understanding was emphasized by the disclosure that the American authorities had arranged to issue franc notes for the needs of the forces of invasion. The episode gave rise to much disquiet. Notes to the value of 80,000,000,000 f. had been printed in the United States, and it soon became apparent that this had been done without the authority of the French. President Roosevelt, when questioned, said that the French had been consulted, but reading between the lines of his statement it was clear that, although consulted, the French had not consented—as, indeed, they could hardly be expected to do. The franc issue struck at the very sources of French sovereignty. The blunder—for such it was quickly seen to be—powerfully reinforced the case for an agreement with the French not less relevant and realistic than the agreements which Great Britain and the United States had earlier entered into with the Norwegian, Netherlands, and Belgian Governments.

These depressing political controversies were relieved by all the news reaching the outside world from France herself. There the resistance movement went from strength to strength, and the Vichy *régime* was exposed more and more for the hollow sham it was. The resistance movement was put on a regular footing by the formal recognition of the French Forces of the Interior and the appointment of General Koenig as their commander-in-chief. He had shown himself to be one of the most brilliant of the younger generals of the new France. At Bir Hakeim during the Libyan campaign in 1942 he won world-wide regard for a stout-hearted defence. He had earlier fought in Norway, and during the battle of France he had fought on to the last in Brittany, escaping in the end to England in a fishing boat. A Norman of an Alsatian family, he put himself immediately at the disposal of General de Gaulle. In him the French Forces of the Interior had an inspiring leader, and both before and after the Allied landings they struck lusty blows for freedom and France by cutting communications, by derailing troop trains, by blowing up bridges, by ambushing parties of the enemy, by fighting Vichy's militia, and by

pinning down many German divisions in the *maquis*. One of the exploits of the patriots was the killing of Henriot, the Vichy Minister of Information, whose voice on the Paris wireless had served the enemy so well.

There was no doubt where France stood in the battle which was to bring about her liberation. Soon after the landings Mr. Churchill and other Allied leaders visited the bridgeheads. General de Gaulle, as was noted at the time, and not least by the French, was not of the party. When, however, he did cross over there was no mistaking the joyous welcome he received. There were tears and cheers and flowers as he moved about among his own people after four years of struggle and separation. Although formal agreement had to be reached with the United States, he proceeded to appoint representatives of the Algiers Administration—which had been recognized by four of the Allied Governments in London as the Provisional Government of the French Republic—to assume civil authority. Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force, the title by which General Eisenhower's great organization was known, was among the first to acknowledge that the change-over was being made smoothly and with the co-operation of the local population. The re-birth of France had begun.

B. THE EVOLUTION OF ITALY

The pace of the political evolution of Italy has remained slow, painfully slow for those of her friends who looked for a great democratic resurgence once the blight of Fascism was removed. None the less the advance, although slow, has at least been sure. By the end of June, 1944, something like institutional stability was achieved, and with the Government rightly installed in Rome there was the prospect of constructive work unhampered by the controversy over monarchy *versus* republic. The result was brought about not without an element of comedy.

In the preceding volume of this chronicle brief reference was made to the strange political developments which

brought about a new alignment. It is now possible to tell the story in rather fuller detail. On March 30 *Izvestia*, which is the voice of the Kremlin, published an article highly critical of Allied policy in Italy, and in particular complained of decisions by the British and American Governments taken, it was said, without consultation with the Soviet Government. *Izvestia* sharply condemned the plan by which radical changes in the Badoglio Government were to be deferred until the liberation of Rome, and insisted on immediate democratization. The Moscow pronouncement had a prompt reaction in Italy. Only a few weeks before the Communist Party had been loud in its denunciation of the monarchy, and had laid down that there could be no collaboration with the King's Government. On the walls of towns and villages such slogans as "Away with the Fascist King" were to be read. On April 1 and 2 the Communists met in Naples, and passed a resolution which, without saying it in so many words, clearly advocated co-operation with the King's Government with the fullest popular backing. This was a complete change of front. By accident or design there arrived in Italy Signor Palmiro Togliatti, a leading member of the party, who had spent most of the years when Mussolini ruled in exile in Russia. He was more generally known by the *nom de guerre* of Ercoli. There is no doubt that he returned to Italy with precise instructions to end the boycott of the Badoglio Government. When he addressed his first public meeting at Naples on April 11 he was acclaimed as the undisputed head of the party.

In his speech he called for the collaboration of all other democratic parties and for national unity. At the present tragic stage of the country's fortunes all Italians were proletarians together and must pull together. The dispersion of the country's strength in a score of small parties disputing among themselves weakened it for the essential task of freeing it from enemy occupation and played into the hands of the reactionaries who were trying to revive Fascism. They must liberate the country first and then settle the constitutional question. The question of the monarchy could not be settled so long as the country was disunited, but there was not the slightest doubt how it would be decided.

This was all sound sense. So, too, was the Communist leader's statement of his programme for the new Italy

in which he called for freedom of the Press and religion, and protection of small and medium properties. The note of moderation and realism was in line with much, but not all, of recent Russian policy. The Communist decision, however, put the democratic parties in the unhappiest of dilemmas, for some of their outstanding leaders had taken the strongest stand against joining the Government so long as Victor Emmanuel remained on the throne. It may be also that principles weighed rather more with them than tactics did with others. The way to a compromise without sacrifice of principle or prestige was opened by a decision of the King to withdraw from public affairs when the Allies entered Rome and to appoint the Prince of Piedmont as Lieutenant of the Realm—*Luogotenente*—a device which has been adopted more than once at difficult or unprecedented moments. It was semi-abdication, and in making the gesture the King was primarily mindful not of the future of the House of Savoy but of the interests of the country. The democratic parties were far from satisfied, and they would have preferred to have the change take effect at once and not be dependent on the liberation of the capital. Nor was there any marked enthusiasm for the Prince of Piedmont. Sober counsels carried the day, the King's decision was accepted, but not acclaimed, and a new Government was formed by Marshal Badoglio in which all six parties of the Democratic Front were represented. Among the five Ministers without portfolio were such veterans as Signor Croce and Count Sforza; Signor Togliatti was another. A Socialist was appointed Minister of Economic Affairs and a Communist Minister of Agriculture. The Finance Minister was Signor Quintieri, head of the Banca Calabrese. Thus, as *The Times* Naples Correspondent remarked, for the first time in history Communist Ministers sat in a Cabinet beside a millionaire banker.

The new Government was "a mixed bag," but its intentions were good, and there was general acknowledgment that its formation was a step in the right direction—that is, it marked an approach to political freedom and

civilian authority. Development was, however, inevitably limited by two factors: (1) that war continued to be waged on the national soil, and (2) that the new Italy could not find full expression until the industrial North, with its robust and perhaps restless spirit, was liberated. As a sign of confidence it may be noted that the price of Government securities rose slightly on the formation of the new Cabinet. It explained its policy in two declarations.

The first dealt with internal affairs. The Cabinet boldly announced that its chief task was the prosecution of the war. The strength of the fighting forces was to be increased, and all possible assistance was to be given to partisans "to whatever party they belong." It was further proposed to create a small consultative assembly to take the place of Parliament for the time being. This would be done in consultation with the committees of liberation which had been set up in every province after the overthrow of Fascism and which were for the most part representative of the six democratic parties. The declaration foreshadowed measures to purge the country of Fascism, and announced the revival of May 1 as the national Labour Day.

The second declaration repudiated the entire foreign policy of the Fascists, who were described as having betrayed the country by plunging it into "the most un-Italian of wars" against Great Britain and France and later against the United States and Russia. The invasions of France, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Albania were condemned, and the hope was expressed that Albania would regain her independence as soon as possible. Nothing, however, was said about Abyssinia, the other African territories, or the Dodecanese. Finally, the Government announced its willingness to help in the drawing up of a new international law in accordance with the Atlantic Charter.

On June 5 Rome was liberated by the Allied forces. The same evening Victor Emmanuel, "by the grace of God and the will of the nation King of Italy"—as the official decree put it—transferred his powers to the Prince of Piedmont in fulfilment of the undertaking he had given. The next day the Badoglio Government formally tendered its resignation to the Prince as Lieutenant of the Realm.

The recovery of Rome had an electrifying effect, not only throughout Europe and the world but also in free Italy. When Marshal Badoglio arrived in the capital on June 8 with a view to forming a government he found a fundamental change in the political situation. The democratic parties refused to serve under him. Their attitude came, as a surprise to some circles in London and

Washington, but not to those who had been in a position to study the Italian scene at close quarters.

It was a decidedly healthy sign, however awkward for the short-term policy which the Allies were following at this stage of the war. Marshal Badoglio had proved himself a most loyal and sage counsellor. He took the leadership after the dismissal of Mussolini at some personal risk and certainly in circumstances of the utmost difficulty and perplexity. He was always as good as his word, and there was widespread regret when he was no longer at the helm. The democratic parties' charge against him was that his *régime* contained too many Fascist-minded generals and others, that there was undue delay in giving effect to the wishes of liberal and proletarian Italy, and that he might be disposed to maintain the monarchy. The Marshal's overriding thought had been the waging of the war, and he felt that radical political and constitutional changes could not be embarked on simultaneously. Characteristically he offered his support to the new Government.

This was headed by Signor Ivanoe Bonomi, lawyer, journalist, and former Prime Minister, who retired from public life in 1922. He was called to power again at the age of 71, and it was complained that the three principal members of the new Government were over 70 years of age. When the Ministers were sworn in they adopted a new formula under which they pledged themselves to exercise their functions solely in the interests of the country and to abstain from any act which might prejudice "the institutional problem"—that is, the question of monarchy or republic—until a constituent assembly was summoned. It was eight days before the Allies recognized the new Government, and there was a still further delay before authority was given for it to transfer from Salerno to the capital. Meanwhile, with general acceptance, Prince Filippo Doria-Pamphili, head of one of the great aristocratic families of Rome, had been appointed Mayor; his mother was English, as is his wife. Another change was that Brigadier-General Hume relinquished his post of head of the Allied Military Government (the successor to "Amgot"), and was succeeded by Colonel Fiske, who was American military attaché in Rome some years before the war.

Throughout the period the patriots in Northern Italy continued the unequal fight against the German occupiers and the Neo-Fascist accomplices. Fittingly, General Alexander accorded a special *communiqué* on May 22 to

their gallant and effective work, in the course of which he said that no fewer than six German divisions of the 25 in Italy had been despatched to the northern regions either to fight against the Italian patriots or to meet Yugoslav partisans on the border of Venezia Giulia. Reports from anti-Axis sources stated that up to April 50,000 Italians had been killed in combat, murdered or executed in northern Italy since the German occupation. In Piedmont the patriots formed a Garibaldi Brigade, and a significant development was that the fighting Italians of the north made contact with the men of the French *maquis*.

2 : THE GERMAN FOOTHOLD SLIPS

Bohemia
and
Moravia

Executions of Czechs for "sheltering enemies of the Reich," assisting "fugitive prisoners of war" and other patriotic acts were reported by the German authorities on several occasions during the period under review. The systematic massacre of the inhabitants of the Czech colony of Cesky Malin in the Ukraine by a German battalion was reported by the organ of the Czechoslovak forces in the U.S.S.R. Out of 444 Czechs, 370 were killed and all the 26 Poles. The people were burnt in their barns or shot whole trying to escape from the flames without distinction of age or sex. Dr. Marcovitch, a former Czechoslovak Minister of Education, died in a German concentration camp. The Czechoslovak peoples sustained a heavy loss in the death in the United States on the night of June 27 of Dr. Milan Hodza, Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia from 1935 to 1938, who

"was one of the leading advocates of co-operation between the different ethnical elements in the Czechoslovak State," and "was also a champion of a policy based upon Czechoslovak political support of the ideal of a Commonwealth of Central European States, preserving their sovereign independence but linked by . . . co-operative solidarity." In pursuance of this ideal he urged that Czechoslovak foreign policy should aim primarily at being an agent of mediation between the small States of Central Europe, and only secondarily at playing any part in the power politics of the Great Powers. He held it more important for his country to arrive at a good understanding with the other Danubian or Succession States than to be

"the policeman of France" or any other Great Power. Hence his differences with Dr. Benesh.¹

The unsatisfactory state of Russo-Polish relations is dealt with in Chapter IV of this volume. In Poland German repression continued, but the Poles struck many blows at their oppressors. The head of the German police in the suburban district of Warsaw, Colonel Otto Grunwald, was killed with two members of his escort by order of the Polish Underground Government on April 26. In May three delegates of that Government, M. Stanislawski, M. Berezowski and M. Pomian, arrived in London, where they gave some account of the work of the Government in Poland to the Press on May 16. Poland

M. Stanislawski said that 14 Government departments had been formed corresponding to those of the Government in London. Seven were concerned with economic matters. Taking the Department of Agriculture as an example, it was controlled by a dozen persons at most who met regularly, but did most of their work at home. Their subordinates were scattered about the country. The Department gave instruction in methods of withholding information and supplies from the Germans, and when necessary the secret army was called in to destroy documents and registers. This was a typical department. The administration numbered some 30,000 persons, most practising a craft or profession or having some occupation to cover them.

Parliamentary meetings at which any large number of deputies could attend were usually out of the question owing to the danger of a concentration of deputies. Those held were generally confined to the leaders of the four chief parties, National Democrats, Christian Labour Party, Social Democrats and Peasants.

On military matters M. Pomian, a delegate of the secret army, explained that while the lack of mountains prevented an insurrection on Yugoslav lines, local operations were continuously carried out. The chief objectives of the secret army were the three main and two secondary railways supplying the German armies on the Eastern Front, and the enemy's ammunition and supply dumps. Preparations had been made for a general attack on German communications, which would be carried out on the instructions of the Government in London in conformity with the plans of the Allied General Staffs. This would involve a general rising. Although German civilians had become more polite to the Poles, the Army and the Gestapo seemed more ferocious than ever, now that they were in danger. This intensification of violence was most noticeable in the cities. In the country, said M. Pomian, "the day belongs to the Germans, the night to the Poles." M. Mikolajczyk, the Polish Prime Minister, who was present, said that members of the underground civil administration in Poland had received orders from London to remain at their posts when the Russians arrived and to offer their collaboration to the Russian commanders.

An example of what the secret army could do was given on June 11 when a detachment raided the prison hospital at Warsaw and set free 16 Poles, nine of whom had been condemned to death. This exploit and the

¹ *The Times*, June 30.

account given of the secret army and Government of occupied Poland reminded many British and Irishmen of Ireland under the "Invisible Government" of Sinn Fein in 1919-21.

Allegations of the persecution of Jewish soldiers among the Polish troops in Great Britain were made in April. On April 11 the Government in London issued a statement on the matter. They said that an enquiry had shown that the complaints were chiefly concerned with remarks, alleged to have been offensive, made by Christian soldiers and n.c.o.'s and that there had been isolated cases of discrimination against Jews when soldiers were selected for special courses. The commission of enquiry recommended that disciplinary action be taken against men guilty of showing anti-semitic feelings, and that all officers be instructed to suppress incidents that could be interpreted as anti-semitism with energy.

There had been some cases of desertion by Jewish soldiers which the Polish Commander-in-Chief condemned in an order of the day in which he also said that he intended to destroy all unfriendly behaviour wherever it might occur. "The armed forces must be based upon equality of rights and duties without regard to faith or political opinion. . . . The creation of discord by reason of faith, nationality or politics I regard as equally harmful. All such acts injure the interest of Poland."

On April 22 some 30 Jewish soldiers of the Polish Army were sentenced to imprisonment for desertion. They declared that they had been ill-treated by non-Jewish soldiers and had come to London to join the British Army. The matter had come before the House of Commons on April 5, when Mr. Eden said that on one exceptional occasion the transfer to the British Army of a number of deserters from the Polish Army in this country had been arranged. He had represented to the Polish Government the desirability of making a thorough investigation of the men's grievances. The matter was again raised on April 7 when Mr. G. R. Strauss (Lambeth N., Labour) pointed out that the trouble had been caused by the influx into the Polish Army of late of men who had been impressed into the German Army, had been captured or deserted, but while serving in the Reichswehr had been subjected to intensive anti-Jewish propaganda which had left its traces. On May 17 Mr. Eden, replying to a question by Mr. Driberg, who had championed the cause of the deserters with energy, said that the Polish Government had granted an amnesty to Jewish and other deserters from the Polish forces in Great Britain. Their action had been warmly welcomed by the British Government. He was satisfied that the Polish authorities were doing their utmost to stamp out religious discrimination in the Polish Army. In answer to a further question by Mr. Driberg, Mr. Eden said that he had "made it quite clear that we are not prepared to accept these men in the British Army."

On May 18 the Polish National Council in London adopted a resolution asking that the offices of Commander-

in-Chief and successor-designate to the President should be separate. Both were held by General Sosnkowski.

The outstanding event in Belgium during the quarter Belgium was the removal of King Leopold to captivity in Germany on June 7, some 24 hours after the Allied invasion of France. His transfer did not alter the constitutional position in any way, for he had been the Germans' prisoner for more than four years. On June 9 his two children were arrested and transported to Thuringia. In a broadcast from London on June 13, M. Pierlot, the Prime Minister, said that at the moment when the enemy felt that Belgium was about to escape him he had put the finishing touch to his work of disorganization and destruction. He continued :

"On the deliverance of Belgium and the collapse of the military and political power of Germany, each of our institutions will take up its normal role again and the King will recover, by the very fact of his liberation, the exercise of his prerogatives."

There were numerous executions of Belgian patriots by the German authorities during the quarter. Details published by the Germans showed that most of these were "in reprisal" for attacks on Belgian traitors or German soldiers.

There was no weakening of Danish resistance to the Denmark Germans during the quarter. Strikes occurred on several occasions ; there was much sabotage, and neither collective fines nor executions prevented attacks on German soldiers and Danes who had sided with the enemy.

One of the strikes was an act of protest against the impatient violence of the Germans. The commander of a German warship, impatient at the delay in opening the swing-bridge between Als Island and the mainland of Jutland, ordered two shells to be fired at the bridge. A Dane was killed and this tragedy led to a general strike at the neighbouring town of Sønderborg. and officials of patriotic associations placed wreaths on the graves of Danes killed in the war of 1864 against Prussia and Austria to commemorate the gallant stand on the Dybbøl line. On April 20 the Gestapo arrested all the executive of the Danish Conservative Youth Organization and other members of this body. Altogether about 100 persons were arrested that day. Sabotage rose to a high pitch at Copenhagen and early on April 25, after a night during which 60 explosions were heard in the capital, the Germans cut off all communication with Sweden for two days. They arrested 200 hostages whom Best, the German plenipotentiary, threatened to shoot if sabotage continued ; they proclaimed that the unauthorized possession of arms would henceforth be punishable with death. They were particularly incensed at an incident on the night of April 23 when patriots entered 20 cinema houses and substituted for the films being shown a film depicting the "Lambeth walk," with caricatures of Hitler and his Nazis

goose-stepping. Cinema houses were shut for a while. On May 13 the Germans announced the condemnation to death of a British-born woman, Fru Monica Wichfeld, *née* Massy-Beresford, for "activities on behalf of the enemy." Her sentence was afterwards commuted to hard labour for life. Further death sentences were announced and Georg Quistgaard, the alleged leader of a sabotage organization, was put to death. Five Nazi informers were killed by Danish patriots during the week ending May 20,

On May 26 the Germans made a great round-up of Danish officials in Jutland, arresting the Governor of South Jutland, the head of the Jutland police and several police-officers, journalists and politicians. Colonel Paludan-Muller, commander of the frontier gendarmerie, was killed fighting in his house and took two German soldiers with him.

Strangely enough, when the Allies landed in Normandy, the Germans, perhaps relieved that Denmark was not being invaded, allowed Danish newspapers to give ample space for the news and even to place General Montgomery's portrait in their columns between those of Marshals Rundstedt and Rommel. This was the more remarkable since till then portraits of Allied leaders had been forbidden and newspapers had not been allowed to publish the picture of Donald Duck! However, this relaxation of the censorship did not diminish Danish sabotage. Three German ships were sunk and another damaged on June 10 at Svendborg shipyard when one armed man held up the gate-keeper and another disguised as a dock labourer went aboard one ship after another past German sentries. Shortly after both had vanished the ships began to explode at intervals of fifteen minutes. Two were cargo steamers under repair and two were patrol boats. All were German military property.

Finally, on June 22 some 70 patriots drove to the plant of the Danish Rifle Syndicate in three lorries bearing fire brigade and ambulance markings, overpowered the guards, drove the workers to shelter and wrecked almost the whole factory with T.N.T. bombs. The Germans retorted by killing eight hostages, banning the traditional bonfires and fireworks on St. John's Eve, and proclaiming a curfew from 8 p.m. to 5 a.m. The Danes nevertheless discharged great numbers of rockets at the Gestapo Headquarters. Leaflets from the rockets rained down and others were distributed by cyclists. They paid homage to the memory of the slain hostages and promised that ten fighters would enter the struggle for every hostage killed. The underground Press conveyed the congratulations of the Allied High Command to Danish saboteurs.

When the new curfew was introduced the Danes disregarded it. Rioting broke out at Copenhagen on the night of June 26-27. Seven Danes were killed and about 50 wounded by German patrols. The workmen at the Burmeister and Wait shipyard ceased work, and on June 30 a general strike broke out at Copenhagen. Among the demands of the strikers was the removal or disband-

ment of the detested Schalburg Korps, the unsavoury and criminal remnant of the Danish National-Socialists who had formed a local wing of the Gestapo. Fritz Clausen, the leader of the Danish Nazi Party, had resigned his post on May 6 and the leadership of these collaborators was taken over by a council of three. Clausen had lost German support after his failure to rally any considerable number of Danes to the cause of the invaders.

Little news came from Holland during the quarter. Holland The German yoke was as oppressive as ever. The Germans still talked of flooding large tracts of Holland in the event of invasion, and they executed 22 Dutchmen connected with the resistance movement whose deaths were announced the day after the invasion started by S.S. General Rauter, chief of the Gestapo in Holland. Nine of the executed men were minor officials. In London the Dutch Government was busy with problems connected with the government of Holland immediately after its liberation. In an article published in *The Times* on May 10 a Dutch correspondent wrote :

"Preparations for the period of transition have been made. Certain questions are so urgent that it will be impossible to deal with them on the spur of the moment. Apart from the provision of food and medicine for the starving population, arrangements for which at present are mainly international, there are three sets of problems that will have to be dealt with at once. They are punishment, administration, and the changes introduced by the Germans."

As regards the first, the Government in London had passed a decree-law providing for the punishment of traitors and including the death penalty. Care would, however, be taken, to guarantee the rights of the subject, and persons condemned would have right of appeal and would not be judged save by Courts including assessors from their own provinces and from their own professions. As regards the administration a "decree for the purge of public authorities" had been prepared, but it was fully recognized that some Dutchmen who had collaborated with the Germans had done so in accordance with international law and for the public benefit, e.g. in the introduction of rationing.

The third and most important measure would deal with German decrees since the conquest. "It will be impossible to declare null and void every decree imposed by the enemy since May, 1940. To do this would mean legal chaos. But wherever German decrees are illegal under international law or in direct conflict with Dutch tradition and Dutch legal sentiment they will be declared null and void retroactively. Where this is impossible, they will be abolished from a given date."

It was announced on June 3 that a separate Ministry of Shipping had been formed and M. de Booy appointed

Minister, and a new Department of Trade, Commerce and Agriculture had been formed and placed temporarily under the Minister of Finance. M. Kerstens, Minister of Trade, Commerce and Shipping, resigned. M. Burger, Minister without Portfolio, became Minister of Home Affairs, and M. van Boeyen, Minister of General Affairs.

Norway Patriotic resistance to the Germans increased and their attempt to raise additional labour forces in Norway through the Quisling Government failed. There were disturbances in Oslo (which the Swedish Press reported on May 19) in consequence of an order from the Quisling Government's Labour Department to all men born in 1921, 1922 and 1923 to register under the Labour mobilization decree of February 22, 1943.

The German-controlled Press explained that the order only meant that men might be transferred to forestry or other essential work for six months. The leaders of the patriotic movement, however, warned the public that labour service might be a pretext for a military levy or a method of laying hands on young men connected with the Norwegian resistance to Quisling and his protectors. According to the Swedish Press bombs exploded at a labour exchange and a labour mobilization centre on May 19 and there was rioting in Oslo. On May 20 Quisling's police rounded up men of all ages in Oslo for sentry duty at important buildings. The German censorship allowed Swedish correspondents in Norway to telegraph that the response to the mobilization of the 1921-23 classes had been "poor" and they extended the time-limit for registration until May 21 without much effect. On May 30 a factory making electrical equipment at Oslo was wrecked by explosions.

The Germans met this patriotic resistance with their usual violence. A number of persons were executed or sentenced to execution in May for enticing Norwegians who had joined the German S.S. forces to desert, for sabotage, for alleged Communist activity or for the manufacture or possession of explosives. On June 3 five more were executed, according to a German official statement, for sabotage.

Quisling, however, continued to believe in the high hand. Addressing an S.S. detachment of Norwegian National Socialists, he admitted (on June 3) that the registration of the 1921-23 classes "had not gone well everywhere," but labour mobilization would be enforced "100 per cent," and the Norwegian S.S. would enforce it.

It would seem, however, that all Quisling's Ministers were less "thorough" in their support of repressive measures than their chief, for on June 14 it was announced that he had reshuffled his Cabinet, dismissed Blehr, his Minister of National Economy, and Irgens, Minister of Shipping,

and combined their Ministries in an enlarged Ministry of National Economy, over which he set Whist, till then Minister without portfolio. Quisling himself retained the special powers of control over Labour and national economic life in general which he had obtained by the Labour mobilization decree (*q.v.* *The Fourteenth Quarter*, p. 196). Whist was given full control over rationing.

Independence Day (May 17) was celebrated in Norway behind closed doors. King Haakon broadcast to his people whom he told that Norway was now facing the final battle between oppression and freedom. Everyone must give his utmost for victory.

On April 13 Hr. Sohlman, head of the commercial department of the Swedish Foreign Office, stated that a Swedish-Norwegian reconstruction credit agreement had been signed in London that day.

The Norwegian Government had placed orders with Swedish firms for the delivery after the liberation of Norway of goods amounting to about 50,000,000 Swedish kronor. The credits would come out of the appropriation of 100,000,000 kronor which was approved by the Swedish Parliament last autumn for purposes of post-war relief, but were not necessarily limited to that amount. Most of the orders so far placed by the Norwegian Government concerned foodstuffs. The Dutch Government had also placed orders in Sweden for delivery after the war and discussions with the same object were in progress with the Belgian Government.

The internal affairs of Greece and Yugoslavia have been treated in Chapter I, Section 2, of this volume.

3 : NON-BELLIGERENTS AND NEUTRALS

Pro-German and, still more, anti-Communist elements ^{Spain} in Spain, prompted, no doubt, by the Government, opened a Press campaign in April for a negotiated peace. On April 11 *Arriba* led off with an article composed on lines with which the broadcasts since 1942 of William Joyce (Lord Haw-Haw) had familiarized many British listeners. The article suggested

that the German danger which gave rise to the war had been superseded by the Soviet danger, which the Western Allies were beginning to see in its true colours. Since Great Britain lacked the population, raw materials and assimilative power (*sic*!) to compete with the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. in the new world order, she would be well advised to parley with a weakened Germany, who, would "no doubt" be ready to relinquish her European conquests for the

sake of peace.¹ Next day *Ya* welcomed the article, and on April 13 *A.B.C., Arriba* and *Ya* published articles pleading for a speedy termination of the war in Europe. They argued that the fate of smaller nations at the hands of Germany was nothing to what awaited Poland and the Baltic and Balkan States at Russian hands. Since the entry of Russia and Japan into the war the objectives of the belligerents had undergone such radical changes that it was not clear what the Western nations were fighting for, while it was only too clear that the Atlantic Charter was defunct.

Neither British nor Americans, whatever their views as to certain aspects of Russian policy, were likely to oblige Spanish pro-Germans by even considering a peace which would enable the Germans to salve an army from the wreckage and prepare to resume the national industry of war after an interval for rest and refreshment. As has been already recorded, the relations between Spain and the Western Allies improved markedly during the quarter.² Nevertheless, General Franco, in a speech at Madrid on May 11, defended the attitude of Spain during the earlier stages of the Second World War in a manner which was neither candid nor diplomatic. Spain, he said, would not brook any alien interference whatsoever. He continued :

"The truth as we see it exists and is marching on even if it is not recognized abroad. We must regret that the unbridled passions of others impair their vision. It is a mistake . . . for our way of living and of organizing ourselves must be exclusively Spanish." He added that Spain from her experience understood the dangers of Communism, and had allowed her volunteers to take their part "in the glorious task" of preventing the danger of its extension ; but later, when her purpose of checking Communism might have dragged her into a war with nations with whom she had maintained friendly relations, "we were compelled to sacrifice that ideal momentarily for the sake of the supreme interests of our motherland." The dangers of Bolshevism and the conflagration of the civilized nations of the West appeared to Spaniards to constitute two different problems. He only wished the theories of the Bolshevik bear's tameness were true, but painful experience compelled Spaniards to live on the alert.

No doubt a great many Spaniards, not excepting the Socialists,³ had a lively recollection of the miseries which the Communists, among others, had inflicted on Spain.

¹ General Smuts's not altogether happy speech of November 28, 1945, may have provided the writer of this article with this argument, which left the British Dominions and the Empire entirely out of account.

² *q.v.* Chapter IV, Section 1.

³ Witness the Communist outbreak against the Socialists and Syndicalists that preceded the fall of Madrid.

No doubt many Spaniards had sympathized abundantly with the Lutheran Finns in their heroic defence of their territories against Russia in 1939-40. But these same Spaniards who professed to be the champions of Catholicism against the impious Marxists had made no public protest when Catholic Poland was overrun by Germany, her churches robbed and her clergy and her scholars imprisoned, murdered or deported by the savages of the Gestapo and the Waffen formations.

British diplomacy in Spain suffered a sad loss when Mr. Arthur Yencken, a vital, popular and talented Australian, British Minister and Chargé d'Affairs in Madrid, was killed in an aeroplane accident on May 18. He had been an admirable second to our Ambassador, Sir Samuel Hoare, who had taken a short leave after the successful conclusion of the Anglo-American negotiations with Spain.

In spite of difficulties of supply and the decline of the mining industry Portugal remained quiet during the quarter. A Government motion envisaging a drastic reorganization of industry was laid before the National Assembly in May.

The main purpose of the new plan, the Lisbon Correspondent of *The Times* (*loc. cit.* May 27) reported, "is to centralize and modernize industry with special attention to exportable products. Emphasis is laid on the need for better industrial education and an improved standard of living for the workers. It is estimated that the first phase of this comprehensive plan could be accomplished in eight years at a cost of about £13,000,000. . ."

The second congress of the National United Party—the only political party allowed in Portugal—passed important resolutions on Portuguese foreign policy on May 28. It was resolved

to maintain, strengthen and develop the alliance with Britain, including the Dominions, and especially South Africa; to maintain and develop the Peninsular bloc; to develop good relations with France, with particular reference to the defence of western Europe; to strengthen links with Brazil; and to collaborate with the United States, recognizing its geographical position within the "Atlantic Square."

The British agreement with Portugal on the subject of wolfram exports has been referred to in Chapter IV, Section 1, of this volume.

Turkey Turkish relations with the United Nations have been dealt with earlier in this volume.¹ The most important internal development was the discovery, announced on May 15, of a dangerous secret society with a most subversive programme. The well-informed Correspondent of *The Times* in Turkey stated (*loc. cit.* May 16) that the police had taken action after demonstrations in Ankara at the beginning of May and had searched the houses of the instigators of these demonstrations, whom they had arrested.

Documents were found which proved that a secret society had been organized in 1940, with strong Nazi proclivities, but adapted to Turkish conditions in the form of racial and pan-Turanian theories. Members of the society, the emblem of which is a grey wolf, were bound by oath. Its objects were to change the Turkish constitution . . . to reform Turkish public life according to racial ideals, to carry on relentless war against Jews, non-Moslems, and all those who are not of pure Turkish stock and to annex for Turkey foreign regions inhabited by people of Turkish blood.

The society was ruled by a secret committee of four, who were to occupy respectively the posts of President of the Republic, President of the Grand National Assembly, Prime Minister and Chief of the General Staff. The members were recruited from all classes, but especially from among university and high-school professors, and most of the promoters of the movement were of Moslem Turkish families from Russia, who had emigrated thence to Turkey.

It was strongly suspected that this movement had been financed by the Germans, and that it had been responsible for a campaign that had been pressed against the Anglo-Turkish alliance and also against Russia. Many arrests had been made in Istanbul, Ankara and other parts of Turkey as far east as Diarbekir.

On May 19 President Ismet İnönü, speaking after martial law had been strengthened in Istanbul as the result of demonstrations against the secret society's activities, condemned these agitators who sought to lead the youth of Turkey astray. His tone was severe.

"If these people . . . try to lead our good Turkish folk astray in the belief that we do not seek quarrels and that we shall not quarrel with them, they are seriously mistaken." He went on to say that only foreigners could benefit from such activities. "Are these agitators in the service of foreigners? Is there some close tie between them and foreigners? Is the tie so close that the foreigners can give the agitators orders?" The President warned trouble-makers that they must expect drastic action from the authorities; and he made a point of referring to the friendliness shown by the Soviet Union to Turkey during her war of independence. Although he tactfully

¹ Chapter IV, Section 1. The reader will also find there a summary of Mr. Churchill's observations on Turkish foreign policy from his survey of May 24.

abstained from naming the foreign propaganda which had been inciting Turkey against Britain and Russia, his reference to it was so thinly veiled that nobody failed to notice it.

There were further references to the conspiracy by the President who warned his countrymen against unscrupulous school-teachers who poisoned the minds of the young, and by the Prime Minister, M. Sarajoglu, who defended Kemalism against Right or Left Wing ideologies in the Assembly and promised heavy punishment for convicted conspirators (May 29). In general it could be said that discovery of the Turanian conspiracy and the popular belief that it had been engineered by German agents made the Turkish people realize the nature of the perils to which their country would have been exposed by a German victory.

Swedish negotiations with Great Britain and the U.S.A. Sweden on the subject of the export of ball-bearings to the Reich have been referred to in an earlier chapter.¹ On April 18 the Swedish Government made representations to the Wilhelmstrasse expressing their surprise and displeasure at the discovery on April 15 at Halsingburg of a consignment of 23,000 military maps of Central Sweden, copied from a Swedish original, which were being sent to Oslo. They pointed out that this incident "necessarily affects the Swedish view of the right of transit of mails to Norway which Germany has hitherto enjoyed."

On April 18 a spokesman of the Wilhelmstrasse denounced "insinuations" about German military designs on Sweden as unfounded, and went so far as to say that the "affair of the maps" was "more than mysterious." On the same day the Königsberg radio station, broadcasting in Swedish, insisted that the incident was caused by an Allied plot to intimidate the Swedish Government. Unfortunately for this explanation, after the Swedish State Railways Administration had announced that the German Army's postal privileges had been terminated (April 24), and that German mail to the northern garrisons in Norway would be handled by the Swedish postal authorities, more maps were discovered. The Customs authorities confiscated a consignment of 3,000 road maps of Sweden addressed to the Wehrmacht at Oslo and found at Trelleborg on April 24. The next find was made on April 29 at Haparanda, the Swedish-Finnish frontier station. There were 2,850 of these and they showed 12 distinct areas near the Norwegian frontier and in the adjoining parts of Swedish Lapland. These incidents caused more anger than alarm among the Swedes.

On May 10 the Government announced that the

¹ *q.v.* Chapter IV, Section 1.

German service of courier aeroplanes between Norway and Finland across Swedish territory would be discontinued from May 31, but that a single *Lufthansa* passenger aircraft would be allowed to pass daily over Swedish territory from Oslo to Rovaniemi, the German Headquarters in northern Finland. On May 16 Hr. Gunther, the Swedish Foreign Minister, referred to the maps incidents in the Riksdag.

He found it "remarkable and unpleasant" that in the present incalculable war situation the German military command had found reason to distribute fresh copies of ordnance maps of Sweden among their troops. He said that when he expressed his Government's concern to the German Minister at Stockholm, Herr Thomsen had explained that this was a "routine Staff measure," but had added that it was necessary for the German troops in Norway to possess maps of Sweden owing to circumstances which might arise independently of any steps taken by the Germans.

A number of Allied aircraft, mostly American, landed in Sweden during the quarter. Their surviving crews were interned. On May 11 a "flying torpedo" coming from the direction of Bornholm Island, where the Germans had been experimenting with "secret weapons," crashed without exploding in southern Sweden. Accounts of its appearance and flight indicate that it was a "flying bomb" of the type with which London became unpleasantly familiar after mid-June.

Switzer-
land

On April 1 bombs dropped by mistake on Schaffhausen by U.S. aircraft killed 39 and wounded 60 people, besides destroying several houses and factories and the railway station. The U.S. Minister and Mr. Cordell Hull expressed their regret, and on April 11 the U.S. Minister paid the Swiss authorities a million dollars as the first instalment of compensation. The grounding of 13 U.S. bombers in Switzerland on April 13, presumably after the raids on Augsburg and Schweinfurt (*q.v.* Chapter II of this volume), and the internment of their crews, numbering 130 officers and men, raised the number of Allied airmen interned at Adelboden in Switzerland to nearly 500.

The
Vatican
City

On June 2 the Pope broadcast to the world. He said that the Eternal City had learnt by hard experience how the existing methods of warfare had grown even more ferocious, but he did not overlook the fact that the

threat of air attacks on districts within the outer boundaries of Rome had given way to a conduct which showed greater regard. He hoped that city might be spared from becoming a theatre of war and he repeated that "whoever dares raise a hand against Rome would be guilty of matricide in the eyes of the civilized world and in the eternal judgment of God."

He then spoke of peace. The world was on the threshold of even more dramatic and decisive events, yet discussions of the question of peace were becoming increasingly numerous, and these discussions were attracting a larger number of participants even though the voices of moderation were mingled with those of open violence. He quoted Cicero's dictum that victory was "by nature insolent and haughty—complete victory or complete destruction—there is no other alternative for peoples and nations," and observed that once this idea had been infused into the mind, "it turns even those who would naturally incline to accept a reasonable peace. Those whom such a thought possesses continue as if in the grip of some dream through unheard-of sacrifices, dragging others along with them in a conflict of exhaustion, the spiritual and social consequences of which threaten to become the curse of the future. It is therefore of the highest importance that honest solutions be found—solutions which are not merely partially successful but are true and enduring, so that in the days of peace no new threat may evolve. Any solution must reflect the thought that responsibility for wars to-day, as in the past, can only be laid with difficulty on peoples and nations as such. We have on several occasions made concrete suggestions for international collaboration on the indispensable basis of Christian principles. . . . To-day we limit ourselves to pointing out that any just solution of the world conflict must consider, as two very distinct and important questions, firstly, the guilt of causing or prolonging a war, and secondly, the terms of peace and their guarantee. This distinction leaves untouched the tenet that the just expiation of acts of violence . . . does not depend on the conduct of the war, but is a necessary guarantee against armed attempts. A just policy must leave to the vanquished a hope or rather a faith that their vital necessities will be safeguarded. Therefore we hope that the rulers will keep in mind those fundamental principles which inspired the words of Marcus Claudius Marcellus—"Conquer yourself, keep your temper, spare the conquered, help the fallen foe to his feet."

CHAPTER IX

THE KING, MINISTERS, AND PARLIAMENT

I : THE KING AND QUEEN

The King crossed the Channel to Normandy on June 16 and spent several hours in the invasion area with General Montgomery, the Commander-in-Chief. The occasion was historic and significant; the King had last been in France in 1939, when he toured the Maginot Line. His visit marked the secure footing which the liberating armies had so rapidly and successfully won.

The great assault began on June 6. The same afternoon the King, accompanied by the Prime Minister, visited General Eisenhower at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces. They talked to high officers directing operations in the field, and saw reports coming in from the beach-head. They also visited Air Chien Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied air forces, at his headquarters. That evening the King broadcast to the nation, calling his people to prayer and dedication "that we may be worthily matched to this new summons of destiny." In this message the King said :

"Four years ago our nation and Empire stood alone against an overwhelming enemy, with our backs to the wall. Tested as never before in our history, in God's providence we survived that test; the spirit of the people, resolute, dedicated, burned like a bright flame, lit surely from those Unseen Fires which nothing can quench. Now once more a supreme test has to be faced. This time the challenge is not to fight to survive but to fight to win the final victory for a good cause. Once again what is demanded from us all is something more than courage and endurance; we need a revival of spirit, a new unconquerable resolve. After nearly five years of toil and suffering, we must renew that crusading impulse on which we entered the war and met its darkest hour. We and our Allies are sure that our fight is against evil and for a world in which goodness and honour may be the foundation of the life of men in every land."

When he went to Normandy the King made the

journey in the cruiser *Arethusa*. It was escorted by two destroyers and preceded by a fleet of mine-sweepers, and flights of Spitfires provided continuous air cover. He was accompanied by Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord, Sir Bertram Ramsay, Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief; Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff; Major-General Laycock, Chief of Combined Operations; and Sir Hastings Ismay.

All the way across the Channel he remained on the cruiser's bridge, watching the endless stream of convoys and craft of all kinds going to and from the beach-head. About three miles off shore the party transferred to a launch, and afterwards to a "duck," and the sight of the Royal Standard flying from them caused great excitement in the crowded ships. Landing on a beach just west of Courseulles, the King was met by General Montgomery and drove with him to his headquarters. After luncheon an informal parade was held, and the King decorated a number of officers and men who had won awards for bravery, mostly in the Mediterranean campaigns. After his return he sent this message to General Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the A.E.F. : "To-day I have visited the beaches of Normandy, which will be for ever famous. All that I saw, on my journey and on the soil of France, has moved me deeply. I have come home feeling an intense admiration for all those who planned and organized so vast a project, and for the gallant and successful execution of it in all its varied phases by every one of those now engaged in this great battle."

The series of visits to troops in training for the invasion, on which the King had been engaged earlier in the year, was continued during April and May. On April 5 the King and Queen made a tour of inspection at the Admiralty, and afterwards visited the Ministry of Information. The King inspected Canadian and British units, naval establishments, and airborne troops, and stayed four days in May with the Home Fleet. During this visit he went on board 14 ships, and inspected detachments from nearly every ship in the great fleet assembled in northern waters. He put to sea

in an aircraft-carrier, and saw fighters and torpedo-bombers in "action," on the bridge of a famous destroyer took part in a dummy U-boat hunt, and inspected the midget submarines and "human torpedoes." Before he left, the King attended Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser's staff conference in the flagship. Shortly after his return to London the King took the salute at a parade in Hyde Park to mark the fourth anniversary of the Home Guard, when more than 5,000 men drawn from every unit in the London area marched past the saluting base. Other official visits were to General Sir Bernard Montgomery, Commander-in-Chief of the British group of armies, at his headquarters in the country on May 22. Here he inspected armoured and commando units, and naval and air detachments.

The Prime Ministers of the Dominions assembled in London were all received in audience by their Sovereign, and Mr. Curtin, who had been made a Privy Councillor on April 30, was sworn at a Council held a few days later. A dinner party was given in their honour by the King and Queen at Buckingham Palace on May 1. Mr. Churchill, Lord Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Sir Godfrey Huggins, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, the Maharaja of Kashmir and Sir Firoz Khan Noon, Indian representatives at the War Cabinet, were also guests. Princess Elizabeth was present, attending her first important official dinner party. The Duke of Gloucester, the Princess Royal, the Earl of Harewood, and the Duchess of Kent were other members of the Royal Family who attended.

Princess Elizabeth celebrated her eighteenth birthday on April 21, and began to take a more active and independent part in public life. She received many telegrams and messages of congratulation, and attended a family luncheon party at her war-time country home. The only ceremonial observance was a mounting of the guard in her honour by the Grenadier Guards, of which she is Colonel, when she was presented with a miniature of the King's Colour of the 1st Battalion. On May 17 she inspected two battalions of the regiment, and took

the salute at a march past, lunching afterwards with the officers.

She made her first public speech at the annual meeting (on May 23) of the Queen Elizabeth Hospital for Children at Hackney, of which she was elected president; and on May 30 undertook her first public engagement in the City, making a short speech at the diamond jubilee celebrations of the N.S.P.C.C. at the Mansion House.

Telegrams and congratulatory messages from the Empire and from the Heads of foreign States were received at Buckingham Palace on June 8, when the King's birthday, which actually falls in December, was officially celebrated.

On May 11 the King and Queen celebrated the seventh anniversary of their coronation.

Viscount Lascelles, elder son of the Princess Royal and the Earl of Harewood, serving with the Grenadier Guards on the Italian front, was reported on June 27 to be wounded and missing, believed to be a prisoner of war. Lord Lascelles, who is 21, was gazetted a second lieutenant in November, 1942.

2 : MINISTERS AND PARLIAMENT

To the series of outstanding Parliamentary scenes which have marked the quarters since September, 1939, as the war has passed what Mr. Churchill has described as its climacterics, there was added another, and the most hopeful and momentous, in the quarter ending June, 1944. Parliament reassembled after the Whitsun recess on the morning of June 6, while the first news of the assault on Normandy was still only an hour or two old. This coincidence gave to the normal excitements of reassembly a tense and dramatic expectancy. It was a scene of memorable quality, etched more deeply by the rare spectacle of a House waiting ten minutes for the Prime Minister to make his first report on the invasion.

The ordinary proceedings of question-time with which the day began ended unexpectedly early. Mr. Churchill was not in his place. The Speaker made the most unusual announcement that there would be an interval before further business was taken, and in confident expectation of what that implied the House, in which

almost every seat was occupied, was content to wait. The hum of conversation changed into a warm cheer as the Prime Minister entered at the normal time for questions to end and immediately offered an apology for his late arrival.

His statement on Normandy, awaited with such anxious interest, was prefaced by an account of the successes in Italy, in which he invited the House to take formal cognizance of the liberation of Rome and to pay the warmest tribute of gratitude to General Alexander for his skilful leadership of an army of so many different States and nations. Then, after a slight pause, came the announcement of the "liberating assault" on the coast of France, made to the accompaniment of bursts of cheers. It was followed by a promise to keep the House freely informed, at any rate in the early part of the battle, on the course of events, and at the end of the day's sitting Mr. Churchill reported further to a cheering House that the operation was proceeding "in a thoroughly satisfactory manner."

Two days afterwards, informing the Commons that he would not make any statement about the battle that day, as it had been generally expected he might, the Prime Minister took the opportunity to express the earnest hope that when members went to their constituencies at the week-end they would not only maintain morale as far as that was necessary, "but also give strong warnings against over-optimism, and will remember that although great dangers lie behind us, enormous exertions lie before us."

That week-end the Prime Minister, who had ardently desired to accompany the invasion forces on D day, visited the beach-head in Normandy. It was the first time he had been in France since his visit to M. Reynaud in the disastrous days of 1940.¹

Foremost among the debates of outstanding importance and high quality during this quarter, a period of the year dominated by financial business, must be placed the Budget, introduced on April 25 by Sir John Anderson. It was notable not only because it contained no changes in taxation, and contemplated taxation producing 52 per cent of the total revenue—the highest proportion in this

¹ See also Chapter II, Section 3A.

war or the last, but also because the Chancellor of the Exchequer devoted a substantial part of his speech to the part of taxation policy in the work of reconstruction, particularly in relation to industry, and gave a forecast of the methods by which industry would be assisted in the change-over to peace production and the challenge to regain our export trade.

The conference of Dominion Prime Ministers was preceded by a debate on inter-Imperial affairs, on which members of the House of Commons showed themselves to be in general agreement. Mr. Churchill spoke with warm and reminiscent appreciation of the magnificent response of the Empire in two wars, and with fine eloquence on the spirit of Empire. In a two-day debate on foreign affairs the Prime Minister went on from a wide survey of Europe to express some views on the world organization to be established after the war, equipped this time with the necessary power; and the Foreign Secretary indicated some of the main principles on which such an organization should be based.

The exciting events of the Government defeat in March had few echoes during the present period. Mr. Attlee, the leader of the Labour Party, in a speech at Leeds, endorsed the Prime Minister's view that support of the Government in matters pertaining to the war and hostility to it in domestic affairs was an untenable proposition, and said that Labour members in the Government would not accept it. On May 11 the Prime Minister announced that the Government had decided to set up a Royal Commission on equal pay for equal work, but the personnel of the Commission had not been determined by the end of June.

The Government's policy at home was developed further in the issue of a series of White Papers, dealing with matters as varied as State aid for research and rural water supplies and the major questions of employment and monetary policy. The White Paper on employment policy was the subject of three days' discussion in the Commons, and that on monetary policy was discussed in both Houses. Another White Paper, on the use of land,

was issued towards the end of June and did not come before Parliament until the following month.

Of more immediate domestic interest to Parliament was the discussion on delegated legislation and the innovation in Parliamentary procedure represented by the Government's decision, in response to a widely expressed anxiety, to set up a Select Committee to examine and report upon statutory rules and orders, with the double purpose of providing a check on the Executive and enabling the work of Government to proceed with an expedition in line with modern needs. Parliament welcomed with relief the decision early in April to remove the ban imposed for security reasons on the publication of future dates of its sittings, and thus to abandon the cumbrous formula which had been in force since the days of the blitz on London. In a secret session on May 18 the Commons discussed, according to a report of the proceedings issued by the Speaker, a proposal to alter the hours of sittings. The proposal was defeated by 208 votes to 74, the Government having previously stated that they would permit a free vote on the question.

In advance of the conference of Empire Prime Ministers the Commons held a two-day debate on April 20 and 21 on Imperial affairs, a topic which had been discussed more than once by the Lords earlier in the year. The debate was intended not so much to be the occasion for any Government pronouncement, which clearly could not be expected in view of the coming conversations, as to afford an opportunity for members of the House as a whole to express their views, and this purpose it fulfilled admirably. At the end of it Mr. Churchill was able to say that the discussion had been of far-reaching usefulness and had shown that there was all-party agreement on most fundamentals.

The debate arose on a motion, which found ready acceptance, moved by Mr. Shinwell (Labour) and seconded by Sir Alfred Beit (Conservative) "that the United Kingdom should do its utmost by close co-operation and regard for the different points of view of the nations of the Commonwealth to preserve in time of peace the unity of purpose and sentiment which has held them together in time of war." It turned largely on trade within the Empire in relation to international trade generally, and indicated the existence of a strong body of opinion that Empire unity was not incon-

sistent with closer co-operation with America nor hostile to acceptance of a full part in world affairs.

Mr. Shinwell opened the debate with a speech of high quality, in which he associated himself fully with the Prime Minister in refusing to contemplate the liquidation of the British Empire. He spoke strongly in favour of the development of inter-Imperial trade, but with the qualification that there should be no exclusiveness. Among his suggestions were that there should be an Empire economic council, and a voice for the Dominions in the economic development of the Empire as a whole. The issue in Imperial relations as he put it was whether or not members of the Commonwealth would face singly or in co-operation the problems of defence, trade and living standards. Sir Edward Grigg spoke eloquently in defence of the principle of first consideration for the members of the Imperial family, and emphatically repudiated the idea that by insisting on our freedom to look first to the welfare of the peoples of the Empire we should be acting in restriction of world trade, pointing to the fact that both Russia and America controlled vast domestic markets. The President of the Board of Trade, winding up the first day's debate, spoke of the substantial value of Imperial preference to this country in the difficult years between the wars and stated that the Government would not alter the preference arrangements except after discussion and agreement with the Dominions.

Mr. Hore-Belisha examined some of the proposals which had been made for consolidation of the separate communities of the Empire into a single body, all of which had been rejected because they were political in character, but suggested that closer union might be achieved on functional lines.

Mr. Churchill disclosed early in his speech how he had safeguarded the structure of Imperial preference. At his first meeting with President Roosevelt in Newfoundland he had asked for the insertion in the Article of the Atlantic Charter on international trade of the words "with due respect for their existing obligations," for the express purpose of retaining to this country and the Dominions the fullest rights and liberties on Imperial preference. Similarly, in February, 1942, he did not agree to Article Seven of the Mutual Aid Agreement without first obtaining from the President the definite assurance that we were no more committed to the abolition of Imperial preference than was the American Government to the abolition of their protective tariff. He affirmed his strong conviction that there should be a "cheerful, searching, far-reaching" discussion on the economics of the post-war world, a sincere desire to reconcile conflicting interests, and a whole-hearted endeavour to promote the greatest possible interchange of goods and services between the various units of the world.

From these material matters he turned to the spirit of the Empire, declaring that he had never thought the Empire needed "tying together with bits of string." He professed his faith that natural developments and natural forces would carry everything before them, especially when these were fanned forward, as they would be, by the wind of victory in a righteous cause. He drew on recollection for a vivid picture of how doubts were dispelled in 1914 by the magnificent response of the Dominions in the war, and spoke of the Empire bonds growing unseen in the intervening years, so that when in 1939 the King declared war once more the whole Empire "with one lamentable exception, about which we must all search our hearts," was at war. In a fine passage he asked what was the miracle that called men from the ends of the earth to help the old land, to serve the good cause, and to be at the common enemy. The answer was to be sought deep in the heart of man, and would not be found unless looked for with

the eye of the spirit. Human beings were not dominated by material things, but by ideas for which they were willing to give their lives or their lives' work.

On the practical steps which might be taken to bring the nations of the Empire into closer counsel on world events, Mr. Churchill said that he saw little difficulty about functional bodies being developed, and great advantages in Ministerial conferences. It was not necessary for such meetings to be held in London. He looked forward to the time when peace returned when conferences between Ministers of the Dominions, India among them, would be among the regular annual events.

Of this debate *The Round Table* wrote: "though intentionally planned . . . not to precipitate any controversial issue or to provoke the Government to any fresh declaration of policy that might prejudice the Conference, [it] yet gave remarkable evidence of the unanimity upon essentials that now prevails in Parliament when the Empire is discussed." Mr. Shinwell, one of the most formidable critics of the Government, Mr. Hore-Belisha and Lord Winterton "gloried in the record of the Commonwealth's unity in resistance at the crisis of danger in the present war, all postulated its participation in a new system of collective security, and all . . . argued that the continuance and intensification of the Commonwealth's tradition of combined action was necessary both for its own safety and for the wider international system. They looked forward to its full articulation for mutual help in all aspects—military, political, social and economic." (*Loc. cit.* No. 135, p. 195).

Sir John Anderson presented his first Budget on April 26. It differed little from preceding Budgets in its balancing of income and expenditure, but was significant for the observations he made on the economic outlook after the war and the policy he indicated for helping industry in the reconstruction period. The House was greatly impressed by the Budget speech. The Chancellor's frank survey of the outlook was welcomed, and great satisfaction was expressed at the early statement of policy on the assistance contemplated to industry and agriculture by various taxation reliefs. His candid survey of post-war prospects, in which he held out no hope of any quick relief from present taxation burdens, was also appreciated.

To deal first with that part of the speech relating to the nation's accounts, Sir John Anderson presented a balance sheet for 1943-44, which showed a total revenue of £3,039,000,000—£131,000,000 above the last Budget estimate. The excess of expenditure over revenue was £2,760,000,000—£89,000,000 less than the Budget estimate. On the revenue side, Customs and Excise receipts had shown a substantial surplus of £67,500,000 over the estimated £975,500,000, due to two main factors—a remarkable and unexpected resilience in the consumption of beer and tobacco, in spite of the high taxation, which had yielded a surplus of £18,000,000; and a similar excess of £24,000,000 in the receipts from the oil duties, largely

conditioned by the rate of consumption in the Forces and therefore very difficult to estimate in advance. The net borrowings during the year had been £2,750,000,000—£54,000,000 less than before. They included an increase from 21 per cent to 25 per cent in the amount borrowed in the form of "small" savings. The 1943-44 deficit was covered by overseas disinvestment, balances and savings, and the national finances could thus be reckoned as on an even keel.

In calculating expenditure for 1944-45, which he put at a total of £5,937,000,000, the Chancellor observed that war expenditure financed out of Votes of Credit was full of uncertainties. "I must recognize (he said) that there are possibilities of a change in the course of the war before the end of March, 1945. It would be idle to attempt to evaluate the bearing of such possibilities on the Budget; indeed, to do so would hardly be consonant with the Government's determination to press on with the war effort and to take nothing for granted until victory is achieved." Therefore he assumed a very round sum for Vote of Credit expenditure and put it at £5,000,000,000, £50,000,000 more than the actual expenditure last year.

Towards a total revenue which he estimated at £3,102,000,000, he expected Inland Revenue duties to produce £2,000,000,000 for the first time. This was £122,000,000 more than in the preceding year, and practically all the increase was attributable to income tax. It was necessary to discount the Customs and Excise estimates because "this year will see the departure overseas of large numbers of those who consume some of the principal dutiable commodities." The estimate he made was consequently £1,038,000,000, £5,000,000 less than was received last year.

On this estimated revenue and expenditure there would be an excess of expenditure over revenue of £2,835,000,000 to be met by borrowing. The Chancellor pointed to three salient features of the outlook for the financial year—the prospective deficit was practically the same as that expected a year ago; revenue from taxation would amount to 52 per cent of total expenditure, a higher proportion than in any year during this or the last war; it appeared that it would be well within our capacity to finance the prospective deficit from savings and other sources of a non-inflationary character. And then, in the final sentence, came abruptly the announcement for which all had been waiting: "In all the circumstances it is not necessary for me to propose any additional taxation on this occasion. The prescription is—the mixture as before."

Early in his speech he confessed that he was not happy about one aspect of war-time finance and issued some warnings. To maintain reasonable stability in the cost of living the subsidies had been increasingly costly. The figure for 1943 was £190,000,000, and was likely to become greater still. Without these subsidies the cost of living index, instead of being 28 per cent over the pre-war figure, would probably have reached 45 per cent or even 50 per cent. On the other hand wage rates had increased considerably, and showed a rise of 11 per cent more than the cost of living. While emphasizing the value and the success of the stabilization policy and the Government's intention to maintain it, he warned the country that grave dangers loomed ahead if the upward movement of wages was not kept in check. A cost of living figure 25 per cent to 30 per cent above pre-war as laid down in 1941 when the stabilization policy was introduced could no longer be regarded as sacrosanct, and for the ensuing year a range of 30 to 35 per cent should be substituted. Dealing with external finance, he also warned the House of the deep inroads which the war was making in our resources. He did not complain of it, "the country was in the war for all it had got," but it could not wage a war of this magnitude and emerge

without a price to pay—a price which we had not yet paid. He detected a mood in the House and in the country which did not pay due regard to these sombre facts—an observation which was received with cheers.

The passage in which Sir John Anderson dealt with the position of industry was remarkable for its candour and confidence. After describing the blow which the last war dealt at our export trade, he pointed to the deep inroads which the second world war was making into our net oversea income from investments. When it was over we should have ceased to be a large-scale creditor country.

It would be “a matter of life and death” for us to increase our exports and recapture some of the trade lost in the inter-war years. The Government could not make an export trade: that depended on the manufacturers, merchants and workpeople; the Government could try to make conditions in which an export trade could flourish. “The plans which I and my colleagues are preparing for the days after the war are based on the assumption that we shall be in a position to import the raw materials necessary for active employment and sufficient food to maintain a standard at least a little better than we are enjoying now. We shall start with no solid or realized basis for it. A nation of sound heart should find such a situation stimulating. I take it as a challenge to the industry of this country. Our aim must be to re-establish old connections and develop new ones which are likely to be of enduring value rather than to snatch quick gains in a seller’s market. We must always be a country predominantly of high-grade products, for otherwise we throw away part of our inherited technical industrial skill.”

From this he proceeded to the methods by which industry could be aided to face the coming task. He could not entertain suggestions that Excess Profits Tax should be reduced from 100 per cent during hostilities, but from April 1 all standards except profit standards would be increased by £1,000, which would benefit 30,000 small businesses. A special initial allowance of 20 per cent would be given in addition to the existing wear-and-tear and obsolescence allowances. The cost of buildings such as factories would be written off on the basis of a 50-years life by annual depreciation allowances.

The outline of post-war taxation policy which followed was given thus early, he said, so that industry could plan ahead for reconstruction and in the light of the main purpose—the challenge which he had mentioned, and the interests of employment policy, which would call for modernization and re-equipment. The proposals were based on a fresh examination of the position of industry in relation to income tax. His main proposal for the reconstruction period was that there should be a 20 per cent allowance, as a deduction from taxable profits, on all expenditure on new plant and machinery—of particular value to shipping—and an allowance of 10 per cent on new industrial buildings. Concessions would also be made to help agriculture, for which ample facilities for long-term loans at reasonable rates would be made available. Normal capital expenditure on research would be allowed for five years or for the life of the asset as a deduction from profits. There would also be help for the extractive industries, where capital expenditure was incurred in respect of assets with a limited life.

In the succeeding debates the judgment of the House was clearly shown to be one of general approval and praise for the Budget. The only qualification of any note came from the Labour side, where doubt was expressed on the wisdom of raising the permitted increase in the cost of living index. It was suggested that the index did not represent the actual increase in the normal budgets of wage-earning families, and that actual earnings were a more potent factor in inflation than wage rates themselves.

Sir John Anderson denied that he had made an attack on wage rates, and described his statement as a warning and not a threat. In the concluding debate on May 2 he amplified this. He declared his "desperate anxiety" to maintain the price stabilization policy and repeated his warning that the process could not go on indefinitely of the Government selecting certain components in the index and deliberately and artificially lowering by means of subsidies the cost of those components to offset increases in other directions. It was because that could not go on indefinitely that he was anxious to make clear to all who might be able to influence the factors that led to an increase in the cost of certain components that they should consider what was the inevitable result of what they were doing. To go on cutting the connection between increased costs and increased prices indefinitely was bound to lead to trouble sooner or later.

The new Defence Regulation introduced to deal with the industrial disturbances caused by unofficial strikes, in some cases fomented by outside agitators, brought about a heated discussion in the House of Commons, and had repercussions in the Labour Party which continued for some weeks. It had become apparent that the Order made under the original Regulation of 1939, when compulsory arbitration was substituted for strikes or lock-outs in the settlement of trade disputes, was inadequate. Although loyally observed by trade union executives, it had not prevented unofficial strikes or strikes which did not come within the definition of a "trade dispute," and the growth of disturbances of this kind impelled the Cabinet to take action to prevent them.

The new Regulation was based on principles discussed by the Minister of Labour with the T.U.C. and the Employers' Confederation, and had the full support of these bodies. It conferred drastic powers for dealing with persons responsible for inciting strikes or lock-outs which interfered with essential services, whether or not the cause of the stoppage came within the legal definition of a trade dispute, and provided severe penalties. It was directed against the ringleaders and instigators of indiscipline in the unions.

The effect was that it would no longer be a defence for a person to plead that he was doing nothing more than peacefully persuading others to take part in a strike. Those who only withheld their labour were not affected by the Regulation, though subject as before to the terms of the earlier Order; and there was an important provision safeguarding the free expression of opinion by trade union members at a properly constituted meeting of their unions.

The Regulation provoked immediate protests from a group of Labour members, headed by Mr. Aneurin Bevan, who at once put down a prayer for its annulment. Their objection was that it gave trade union officials absolute control over the members and was prejudicial to the interests of the workers. They also complained that it had been decided on after consultation with outside bodies, but without any consultation with the House. This view was also shared by some who were prepared to support the Regulation on its merits. A debate was pressed for, and took place on April 28. It was marked by the vigorous language used both by the Minister and his opponents, and at the end the motion for annulment was rejected by 314 votes to 23.

Mr. Bevan vigorously attacked the Minister of Labour for having put an affront on Parliament, and proceeded to indulge in a tirade against trade union officials. It was their inaction or indifference to grievances, he alleged, which had been the cause of trouble in the coalfields. By this Regulation they were being entrenched and invested with privileges. Mr. Greenwood, indicating the official support of the Labour Party for the Government, rebuked Mr. Bevan for the most anti-trade union speech he had ever heard, and deplored the lack of discipline in the unions. Mr. Ernest Bevin confronted his critics with determination, and told the House that when he first indicated that action would be taken against the instigators of strikes there was a danger of a stoppage of work by nearly three million persons in the gas, ship-building, engineering and coal industries. He strongly defended his action in proceeding by Regulation rather than by a Bill, on the ground that the Regulation would disappear when the Defence Regulations disappeared, but repealing a Bill might prove a different matter. He repudiated the charge that he was investing trade union officials with new privileges, and retorted on his critics that "some people would rather see the working class going to hell through chaos than to victory by organization."

Sixteen members of the Labour Party voted against the Government (and a number of others appeared to have deliberately abstained) and in opposition to the official decision of the party. This raised again the question of discipline in the Parliamentary Labour Party. The administrative committee recommended at a party meet-

ing on May 3 that the "whip" should be withdrawn from Mr. Aneurin Bevan and the names of the other 15 reported to the Labour national executive. No decision was reached at the first meeting, and at the adjourned meeting a week later a compromise decision was reached—by 71 votes to 60—that the whole question of party disciplinary action should be referred to a joint meeting of the administrative committee and the national executive. This decision, which did nothing to lessen the difficulties of Mr. Greenwood as acting leader of the party, was partly influenced by the belief, expressed by Mr. Shinwell, among others, that the paramount need was unity if the party was to throw its full weight into a General Election. In due course the joint meeting was held, and came down heavily on the side of the administrative committee. Mr. Bevan was called upon to give specific assurances in writing within a week that he would in future loyally accept and abide by the standing orders of the party, failing which it was recommended to the national executive that he should be expelled. The next day Mr. Bevan complied with this demand. There were more reverberations, but the matter went no further.

A subject about which public concern had long been expressed was resolved to the general satisfaction in the debate on delegated legislation on May 17, when the Home Secretary announced the Government's decision that a committee should be set up to scrutinize statutory rules and orders. The House was thoroughly pleased with the outcome of the debate and felt that the Home Secretary had met generously the demand for some new machinery to help members to cope with the spate of delegated legislation. The pleasure was enhanced by the knowledge that this improvement of Parliamentary machinery had resulted from the efforts of private members who had interested themselves in the subject and had sought unofficially to do the work which the new body was to do authoritatively.

Mr. Molson, on behalf of the committee of Conservative members which had undertaken the task of examining the instruments of delegated legislation, admirably put the case for an official scrutinizing committee. He was not opposed to delegated legislation as such: it was inevitable and

necessary in modern conditions ; but if the House was to do its work effectively there must be some body which would bring to its notice any order or regulation deserving special attention. The principle of his motion asking for a Select Committee for this purpose was supported, with some qualifications, by the Labour Party.

The Home Secretary, who had made a speech in the country expressing general support for the use of delegated legislation if Parliament was to function effectively—a speech which had been a factor in bringing the matter to a head—replied to the debate. He announced that the Government accepted the motion in principle but would ask for its withdrawal on the undertaking that the Government would bring in their own proposals later. He also stated that they would go further than they were being asked to do, in that while the sponsors of the motion did not ask that the committee should have power to send for papers, persons and records, the Government would propose that it should have authority to send for Departmental officers and to obtain memoranda. The Speaker's Counsel, Sir Cecil Carr, would act as adviser to the committee. The Government were most anxious that delegated legislation, which it was contemplated would be increased in the future, should be subject to effective Parliamentary check and control.

A month later, after discussions with representatives of the political parties on the scope of the proposed committee's functions, the Government tabled a motion to give effect to the Home Secretary's undertaking and to set up a Select Committee of 11 members.

The foreign affairs debate a day or two before the Whitsun recess was of a high level, and became largely a discussion on the means of establishing enduring peace in a rebuilt Europe. It opened on May 24 with a speech by the Prime Minister in which a broad survey of affairs in Europe was followed by some interesting observations on the structure of a world organization for peace.

Mr. Churchill began with a reference to the recent meeting of Dominion Prime Ministers, in which he said there had been revealed a core of agreement which would enable the British Empire and Commonwealth to meet in discussion with other great organisms in the world in a firmly knit array. Nothing had been more remarkable than the cordial agreement which was expressed by all the Dominion leaders in the general conduct of our foreign affairs and the skill and consistency with which they had been conducted by Mr. Eden—a compliment which the House endorsed with a cheer.

In his recital of events since his last speech about three months before, Mr. Churchill dealt first with the Mediterranean and Balkan spheres, and his references to Turkey, Spain, Greece and Yugoslavia are recorded elsewhere in this volume. About Italy, he said that he found it difficult to nourish animosity against the Italian people.

After the fall of Mussolini our action might have been swifter and more audacious. It was no part of his submission that no mistakes were made. The larger part of the country was still in the vengeful grip of the Nazis, with a hideous prospect of the red-hot rake of the battle-line being drawn from sea to sea right up the whole length of the peninsula. We should do our utmost to make the ordeal as short and as little destructive as possible, and we had great hopes that the city of Rome might be preserved from destruction by the armies. Politically, the situation had turned out as he had suggested three months ago. He had good confidence in the new Italian Government. It would require further strengthening and broadening, but it was facing its responsibilities manfully and doing all in its power to aid the Allies. It was the first intention of the Allies that Italy should have a free opportunity as soon as the Germans were driven out of deciding whatever form of democratic Government—monarchical or republican—they desired. But he emphasized the word "democratic" because we should not allow any form of Fascism to be restored or set up in any country with whom we had been at war.

In regard to Poland, he and the Foreign Secretary had been labouring for a long time to bring about a resumption of relations between the Soviet and Polish Governments, but very regrettably without success.

"I must repeat that the essential part of any arrangement is the regulation of the Polish eastern frontier, and that in return for any withdrawal made by Poland in that quarter she should receive other territories at the expense of Germany which will give her an ample seaboard and a good, adequate and reasonable homeland." They must trust that statesmanship would find some way through, and would welcome any arrangement between Russia and Poland, however it was brought about.

Coming then to relations with the French Committee of National Liberation, he praised the Forces which they had prepared and placed at the full service of the Allies, and which in the struggle against Hitler in Europe gave the French the fourth place in the Grand Alliance. But the United States and Great Britain had not yet been able to recognize the Committee as even the provisional Government of France, because they were not sure that it represented the French nation in the same way as the British, American and Russian Governments represented the whole body of their people.

The Committee, he continued, would, of course, exercise the leadership to establish law and order in the liberated areas of France under the supervision, while the military exigency lasted, of the Supreme Allied Commander, but the Allies did not wish to impose the government of the French Committee upon all of France which might fall under Allied control without more knowledge of the situation in the interior.

He had, with the full approval of President Roosevelt, invited General de Gaulle to visit England to talk things over, and the invitation had just been accepted.

After a passage on the changing ideological character of the war, Mr. Churchill came finally to the question of the future plan of world organization, pointing out as a preliminary that it was not for him nor for the House to lay down the law to the 33 United Nations, and in particular the two great Powers with which we had to work. Some things had become quite clear. The Atlantic Charter remained a guiding sign-post expressing a vast body of opinion among all the Powers fighting together. The Charter in no way bound us about the future of Germany, nor was it a bargain or contract with our enemies. The principle of unconditional surrender would be adhered to, and that in itself wiped away any danger of anything like President Wilson's Fourteen Points being brought up by the Germans after their defeat as the conditions on which they surrendered. There was no question of Germany enjoying any guarantee that she would not undergo territorial changes if such changes would seem to render more secure and more lasting the peace of Europe.

"We intend (Mr. Churchill said) to set up a world order and organization equipped with all the necessary attributes of power to prevent the breaking out of future wars or the long planning of them in advance by restless and ambitious nations. For this purpose there must be a World Controlling Council comprised of the greatest States which emerge victorious from this war, who will be obliged to keep in being a certain minimum standard of armaments for the purpose of preserving peace. There must also be a World Assembly of Powers whose relation to the world executive or controlling power I am in no position to define. . . . It would be presumption for any one Power to prescribe in detail exactly what solution will be found. . . . The future towards which we are marching must be based upon a reign of law which upholds the principles of justice and fair play, which protects the weak against the strong if the weak have justice on their side. . . . We must undoubtedly in our world structure embody a great part of all that was gained to the world by the structure and formation of the League of Nations. But we must arm our world organization and make sure that, within the limits assigned to it, it has overwhelming military power. . . . There must be room within the great world organization for organisms like the British Empire and Commonwealth, and I trust there will be room also for the fraternal association of the British Commonwealth and the United States. We are bound by our 20 years' Treaty with Russia, and besides this—I hope to deserve to be called a good European—we must try to raise the glorious Continent of Europe, the parent of so many powerful States, from its present miserable condition as a kind of volcano of strife and tumult to its old glory of a family of nations and a vital expression of Christendom."

The ensuing debate, which continued for two days, showed a marked sympathy for France and indicated that the House was not too happy about the continued non-recognition of the French National Committee. Inevitably also it produced many calls for more precise information on the proposed organization for world peace.

Mr. Greenwood, among those who took this line, also spoke of the leadership of the British Commonwealth in establishing economic co-operation for the ends of the Atlantic Charter. Mr. Shinwell asked for recognition of the fact that such an international authority was incompatible with complete national independence; and Mr. Hore-Belisha carried this

argument further, to the suggestion of federation in Western Europe, beginning with Holland, Belgium and France, in whose strength we had a primary concern.

Mr. Eden wound up the debate, and spoke mainly of the task of the Foreign Office in war-time—to help the military arm, and in that to maintain unity among those fighting the common enemy, and as far as possible to lay the foundations for co-operation afterwards. In pursuing these tasks the Government had not on any occasion in this conflict entered into any secret engagement of any kind with anybody. Nor had they asked any nation to take any step which violated its neutrality. But they must insist to the limit on our rights, for it was their duty to do everything possible to shorten the war, and if the neutrals sometimes regarded our methods as harsh and arbitrary he regretted it.

There was no part of their policy to which the Government attached more importance than the restoration of the independence and greatness of France. Full responsibility for the government of France must be handed over to the French people as soon as possible. He regretted some apparent misunderstanding on the question of recognition, and pointed out that recognition had already been given in several respects to the French National Committee. The progress of discussions had been unhappily interfered with by the restrictions on diplomatic communications.¹ That being so, the best way to deal with the question of civil administration in France was to have direct conversations. It was for this purpose that General de Gaulle had been invited here.

Mr. Eden denied categorically German propaganda that we were disinterested ourselves in certain parts of Europe. We were Europeans, and our interest was not limited to any single part of Europe. What we sought was the security of a Continent. The Dominion Governments perfectly well understood our position, and the authority and influence of the British Commonwealth—now as high as it had ever been—would be used to promote the prosperity and unity of Europe.

He spoke with great emphasis of the need there would be after the war for close collaboration between the British Commonwealth, the United States, and Soviet Russia, to ensure that Germany could not start this business again. There was nothing exclusive in that desire, but it was indispensable. Relations with the United States were as close and cordial as they had ever been, and as a result of the recent visit of Mr. Stettinius and a large number of representatives of the State Department, "there is now interlocked at every stage an understanding of each other's policy." Nothing was to be gained by ignoring that there were difficulties in regard to co-operation with Russia. There was a legacy of suspicion, impossible to exaggerate, that had always played its part in Anglo-Russian relations. There was only one cure, that bit by bit our peoples should get to know each other better. We were ready at any time to do anything in our power to further that result. The stakes for the future were so high that both must make every effort to make the 20-year Treaty a lasting reality of value to our two countries and the world.

In conclusion Mr. Eden stated five principles on which it was suggested the future world organization should be based. These were :

- (1) It must be designed in the first instance to prevent

¹ q.v., Chapter IV, Section 3.

a recurrence of aggression by Germany and Japan, and must be fully equipped with forces to meet the purpose ; (2) to ensure this there must be close political and military co-operation between the United States, the Soviet Union, the British Commonwealth, and China and other Powers ; (3) the responsibility in any future world organization must be related to power, consequently the organization should be constructed on and around the four great Powers mentioned, and all other peace-loving States should come in and play their part in the structure ; (4) the organization should be flexible and not rigid, it should grow by practice and not try straight away to work to a fixed and rigid code ; and (5) all Powers, great and small, included in the world organization should strive for economic as well as political collaboration. About these propositions the Government had already begun informal conversations with other Powers, and hoped that in the coming months they would be able to make more progress with them.

The Government published on April 22 a "Statement of Principles for an International Monetary Fund," the result of close study by experts of the United and associated Nations since the formulation of the Keynes and White plans a year before. An outline of the statement will be found in Chapter XI of this volume.

The purpose of publication, declared to be to promote informed discussion, was fully achieved. Varying opinions on the probable effect of the proposals found expression in the debates which took place during May, when after critical examination both Houses agreed to accept the Statement as a basis for further discussion between the nations. Some concern was evident whether the scheme would tie this country to gold, and whether it would work unless America permitted a larger flow of imports. Sir John Anderson, in the Commons debate on May 10, dismissed the first fear as groundless, and declared the British Government's vehement opposition to any suggestion involving a return to the gold standard.

He also emphasized that the plan contained nothing detrimental to relations between States in the sterling area. On this point he was more

explicit in an answer to a Parliamentary question on May 18, stating that wide latitude was expressly reserved for reciprocal arrangements in the monetary field during the transitional period, and that, when the full obligations of the scheme were accepted, there would still be nothing to prevent arrangements such as those governing the sterling area before the war. It was on that understanding, explicitly conveyed to the American experts, that the British experts approved the plan.

The Statement first came before the House of Lords on May 16, when Lord Bennett invited the Government to indicate their proposed economic policy before the monetary plan was discussed. This, Lord Woolton stated, they were unable to do. The Cabinet had been engaged for many weeks past on military plans and had not yet given attention to the wide and complex issues of economic policy. On this occasion Lord Keynes intervened briefly to argue that it was logical first to deal with monetary proposals, since firm ground on that would be a foundation on which to build. The subsequent debate on May 23 was notable for a striking speech by Lord Keynes in commendation of the proposals, in which he paid high tribute to the undertaking voluntarily given from the American side that there would not be repetition of the conditions which between the wars had done more than any single factor to destroy the world's economic balance. He described the present plan as a considerable improvement on either its British or American parent, and he expressed confidence that something very like it would be adopted. He emphasized that it placed a proper share of responsibility for maintaining equilibrium in international payments squarely on the creditor countries. As for the criticism that to prepare a monetary scheme first was putting the cart before the horse, it was most unlikely in his view that fuller knowledge of future commercial policy would of itself necessitate alteration of any clause in the proposals. The scheme was in essence the reverse of any return to the gold standard. He finally praised the representatives of the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve Board, whose "idealism in unflagging pursuit of a better international order" had made possible so great a measure of agreement. The story ends for the present chapter with the announcement on June 18 of the British delegation, headed by Lord Keynes, to the monetary conference at Bretton Woods summoned by President Roosevelt.

Civil aviation was another subject of Anglo-American discussion which Parliament scrutinized. The talks between Lord Beaverbrook and Mr. Berle in London early in April produced a statement that "there was sufficient agreement between them to justify the expectation that final dispositions can be reached at an international conference."

A fuller account of the proceedings and of British policy was given in the House of Lords on May 10 by Lord Beaverbrook.

He described the conversations with the U.S. as very satisfactory, and indicated that the purpose of the projected international conference would be to draw up a convention on air navigation to be implemented by an international transport organization. He expressed regret that the Canadian draft convention for an international regulating authority with

powers of enforcement, which the Americans considered too rigid, had had to be abandoned. Lord Beaverbrook endorsed, on behalf of the Government, the two principles advocated by President Roosevelt—the right of innocent passage for commercial aircraft over all territory, and the right to land for fuel and services—and further declared that this country claimed no privileges for British machines in air bases situated on British territory.

What he had to say about the prospects at home aroused considerable dissatisfaction. Lord Beaverbrook had to confess disappointment on the progress that had been possible with the construction of the new types of civil aircraft he had described in earlier debates. The delay was due entirely to pre-occupation with the war, and it was useless to expect any progress until that was ended. Generous as had been Mr. Berle's offer that American long-range transport aircraft would be made available to this country, we were not satisfied to rely solely on that source of supply.

Lord Essendon and Lord Kennet stated respectively the claims of the shipping and railway companies in regard to the operation of air services, and in the resumed debate next day this question and the part that the British Overseas Airways Corporation was to play in future development produced somelively but inconclusive exchanges between Lord Beaverbrook and other peers. Lord Beaverbrook made the authoritative statement that it would be necessary for the internal air lines to remain the concern of the Air Ministry for some time after the cessation of hostilities in Europe.

The statement of policy on employment¹ after the war, with its declaration that the Government accepted as one of their primary aims and responsibilities the maintenance of a high and stable level of employment, was the subject of searching public and Parliamentary examination in the interval between its presentation on May 26 and the three-day debate of front-rank importance at the end of June. This discussion, with its repeated emphasis by Ministers on the positive policy of prevention, afforded a marked contrast to the many debates in the years before the war when the emphasis had been on "unemployment" and the relief of the human distress resulting from it. At the end the House passed without a division a motion welcoming Government acceptance of the new responsibility.

Mr. Bevin introduced the motion as embodying the most important principle which had come before the House for many years. It meant that the country was turning its back finally on old doctrines and entering a new epoch. All measures previously tried were merely to minimize the effect of unemployment, not a recognition that it was a social disease and must be eradicated. An attempt was now being made to diagnose it and propose a cure. Men whom, with the Prime Minister, he had seen embarking for Normandy had asked: "When we have done this job are

¹ For a commentary on which, see Chapter X, Section 1, of this volume

we coming back to the dole ? ” and they had both answered “No.” The main purpose of the White Paper was to declare war on unemployment. It was not a final solution, and it did not, among other things, raise the question of private or public ownership of industry. But it should not be thought that because Labour members in the Government had made their contribution to this and other prospective social changes, they had abandoned their beliefs on what should be the right ownership of industry. After a detailed examination of the basic features of the White Paper, he ended with an expression of confidence in the country’s economic future.

The Liberal Party welcomed the proposals. The Labour Party, while whole-heartedly accepting the principle of Government responsibility for employment, were unconvinced that under a system controlled by private enterprise unemployment could be completely cured. This indeed was the one real difference of opinion in the debate, although a few members on both sides were openly antagonistic to the White Paper.

Sir John Anderson said that the White Paper did not present a cut-and-dried scheme. It was a pattern of general policy submitted by the Government, to which plans would be fashioned in detail if Parliament approved. The policy would not succeed unless reasonable continuity was assured ; that was why it had been important to frame a policy which would be as far as possible independent of purely party considerations. The Minister of Production, Mr. Lyttelton, underlined this point in the concluding speech. The White Paper, he said, asked that this great subject of promoting full employment should be added to those, such as defence and foreign policy, which should be subject to a continuous policy. If Parliament approved the policy of the White Paper, the Government would be heartened to produce the legislative and administrative means to carry it out.

In addition to these major discussions both Houses were occupied with legislative business and examination of the work of various Departments. The Education Bill concluded all its stages in the Commons. The former Clause 82, which had been the occasion of the Government’s defeat on the question of equal pay for women teachers, was restored.

An appeal for increased State grants in respect of expenditure incurred by local education authorities was rejected, but an additional sum of nearly £1,000,000 was promised for the benefit of the poorer local authorities. The Roman Catholic demand that the State should carry 75 per cent instead of 50 per cent of the cost of bringing their schools up to the prescribed standard was also refused, but the Roman Catholic interests accepted the offer to denominational school managers of facilities for obtaining loans on approximately the same terms as local authorities. Finally, the designation of the responsible Minister was changed from “President of the Board of Education” to “Minister for Education” and that of the Department correspondingly.

Proposals were introduced for shaping a national water policy, and in advance of the general legislation to carry this into effect a Bill was passed authorizing grants amounting to more than £15,000,000 for the extension of piped water supplies and sewerage in rural areas. A measure to transfer from local authorities to the Ministry of Agriculture the supervision of milk production provoked a sharp conflict over what was regarded as an attack on the local authorities, but the Government held to their view that the standard could only be raised by central administration.

An amending Bill was introduced on June 15, and quickly passed, to overcome some of the administrative difficulties—largely due to shortage of trained staff—which had come to light in preparing within a reasonable time the war-time register of voters.

The main proposal was to shorten the period of residential qualification to one month, and by this means to simplify the procedure so that the new register might be prepared earlier than would otherwise have been possible for use at by-elections.

The achievements of the transport services during the war, in face of formidable difficulties, was the subject of a striking review by the Parliamentary Secretary for War Transport on May 5, and the debate which followed furnished an occasion for a general discussion on the co-ordination of transport, including shipping, with or without national ownership. The House received a heartening account of the food front from Colonel Llewellyn on June 9, and on June 29 a colourful recital from Mr. Bracken of the activities of the Ministry of Information in presenting the British picture to the world. The Home Secretary was called upon to justify his administration of Regulation 18b, and in particular the continued detention of Captain Ramsay, M.P., and re-stated a familiar and generally accepted case in defence of his use of these emergency powers.

In the Upper House Lord Vansittart initiated a debate on April 18 the control of German war potential after the Allied victory, demanding a committee of scientists to prepare a practical scheme for permanently preventing the manufacture of explosives in Germany, since the mainstay of both Germany's world wars had been the German chemical industry. He was supported by Lord Horder, who wanted an end put to the German lien on the control of essential drugs. Lord Cherwell, for the Government, said that these matters had not escaped attention; various committees had been considering the wide questions involved, and the Government intended to call in scientists and experts in greater numbers to examine them. They were determined that nothing should stand in the way of curbing Germany's war potential.

In his account of the work of the Ministry of Economic Warfare Lord Selborne gave the Upper House on May 9 a graphic description of the decreasing war supplies entering a Germany in the grip of the British blockade, and warned neutrals that the end of the war did not necessarily mean the end of the "black list." He also made known the Foreign

Secretary's decision to create an economic intelligence branch in the Foreign Office, to which the intelligence branch of the Ministry of Economic Warfare would be transferred; but for the time being this intelligence branch was serving both Departments.

On May 16 the Commons agreed to a further Supplementary Vote of Credit of £1,000,000,000 for war purposes, the second of the year. Sir John Anderson estimated that it should be sufficient to carry on until the end of August; expenditure was then running at the rate of about £13,250,000 a day, of which £10,750,000 was on the fighting and supply services. Mr. Pethick-Lawrence (Labour) accurately reflected the general opinion of the House in the observation, "He who wills the end wills the means."

Service pay and allowances remained a matter of contention. A White Paper issued on April 26 gave details of increases in rates of pay and allowances, and changes in war pensions for Servicemen and their dependants, estimated to cost £50,000,000 in the first year, which were to come into effect at the beginning of May.

Later examination of the working of the changes resulted in many complaints of anomalies, and particularly about the difference between the increased allowances for a wife and children and a widow's pension and children's allowance. The Service Ministers were questioned repeatedly, and on May 9 the Prime Minister stated that certain modifications of the dependants' allowance scheme were under consideration. Towards the end of the month a deputation of M.P.s interviewed the Under-Secretaries at the Ministries concerned. Another Service matter about which considerable dissatisfaction was repeatedly expressed during this period was the registration of members of the Forces for electoral purposes. Some members regarding the procedure as ineffective. The Home Secretary promised in June to join the Service Ministers in discussions with an all-party deputation of members.

A series of policy statements was issued by the Labour Party in advance of the party conference arranged for Whitsuntide. But on May 16 came the Railway Executive's warning against unnecessary travel, and particularly against the holding of conferences involving long-distance journeys. The next day the party executive decided to postpone the conference indefinitely.

The Speaker's Conference on electoral reform presented an interim report, on three of the four items in its terms of reference, which was issued as a Command Paper on June 2.

The principal recommendations made were that there should be a general redistribution of seats as soon as possible, with the total membership of the House remaining substantially unchanged; and that as a temporary measure until such a redistribution was practicable, 20 abnormally large

constituencies should be sub-divided, with a limit of 25 on the number of new M.P.s who would thus be added. The local government franchise, it was recommended, should be assimilated to the Parliamentary franchise, producing a complete adult franchise for all purposes—a step which incidentally would enable local government elections to be resumed much earlier. Other proposals were that in general double-member constituencies should be abolished, except the City of London ; and that the university and business premises votes should be retained—the latter without the indirect qualification by which the husband or wife of a person with a business qualification was entitled to register. The conference rejected the proportional representation method of election, and the adoption of the alternative vote. The subject left for a future report was the conduct and costs of Parliamentary elections and the expenses of candidates and M.P.s.

The presence of the Dominion Prime Ministers in London permitted the renewal of many contacts, formal and informal, with Parliament. Outstanding among those of a formal character was the address by Mr. Mackenzie King to both Houses on May 12. A meeting was arranged on May 2, when the Maharaja of Kashmir and Sir Firoz Khan Noon, the two representatives of India at the War Cabinet, addressed an all-party meeting of peers and members of the Commons, and Mr. Curtin's address of May 17 to members of both Houses aroused much interest.

CHAPTER X

LABOUR AND FOOD

I : EMPLOYMENT POLICY

By Dr. R. H. Worsley.

The White Paper on "Employment Policy" (Cmd. 6527) presented by the Minister of Reconstruction to Parliament in May, 1944, is a document of signal importance. It deals, as its title indicates, with the problem of stable—or as the greater public mistakenly used to say, "full"—employment and the means of sustaining it. Its principal value seems, however, to lie in the fact that it constitutes the first clear evidence of the adoption by the Government of an economic policy of a very different structure from that orthodox form followed before the war. The public, engaged in the fight with totalitarianism and inclined to suffer from a phobia of economics, has either overlooked or underestimated the revolutionary changes in finance, production and trade which have been developing for some fifteen years. It is ignorant of the fundamental differences in the aims and in the technique of finance which will distinguish pre-war from post-war banking policy. All it knows is that expansionist economics require an expansionist financial policy, and that both—in connection with the attainment of a stable measure of "social security"—form the new elements of "sound" economics. It must be added in passing that the principles of planning which this involves are controversial though popular. An increasing number of economic experts and business executives in this country and in the United States oppose them, arguing that they lead inevitably to a sort of totalitarian economy which, sooner or later, implies a totalitarian course in politics.

The authors of the White Paper are aware of this fact

and of the not finished evolution with which they are confronted.

They state emphatically that the Government accept as one of their primary aims and responsibilities the maintenance of a high and stable level of employment after the war and are prepared to accept in future the responsibility for taking action at the earliest possible stage to arrest a threatened slump. This necessitates a new approach to economic activities and new measures to deal with them : it requires an expansionist production, an appropriate financial policy and an extension of State control not only over the volume of employment, but also simultaneously over the whole field of internal—and external—demand and supply. The various forms of totalitarian economics have had that aim while emphasizing Socialist tenets.

The White Paper explicitly follows a different line. It works for expansionist economics within the capitalist system, as a means of improving and strengthening it.

"The Government believe that once the war has been won, we can make a fresh approach, with better chances than ever before, to the task of maintaining a high and stable level of employment without sacrificing the essential liberties of a free society," says the White Paper. Thus employers and workers are regarded as partners in carrying out the necessary steps designed to regulate internal economic matters. As regards an economic foreign policy, an agreement with other countries on international co-operation in a common economic policy is a pre-requisite.

British employment policy must be considered both from a national and an international aspect. The level of employment and the standard of living in this country do not depend only upon conditions at home. There is a large-scale demand for imports of food and raw materials from abroad. These imports will have to be paid for to a greater extent than ever before by the export of goods and services since—particularly as a result of the Second World War—a substantial part of our foreign investments had to be sacrificed. It is therefore no longer possible to balance the value of import surpluses by the surplus of the balance of payment. In order to maintain the volume of pre-war imports a considerable expansion of exports will be required.

It is the particular structure of Britain's economy and its interdependence on internal and external conditions which give the policy outlined in the White Paper prominence far beyond the boundaries of this country. Britain needs prosperity in its overseas markets. On the other

side, if this country has to cut down its imports because it cannot pay for them by increased exports, there will be little chance of attaining a higher measure of economic stability and a better standard of living internationally since a decrease in British consumption will affect all countries exporting primary produce. In other words, if the employment policy of the White Paper can only then work properly if a basic measure of internal and international economic stability be achieved. Prosperity, it appears, is just as indivisible as collective security.

Thus it is intelligible that the Government are as anxious to arrive at a comprehensive international understanding on economics as they are to design the blue-prints of internal economics. The Mutual Aid Agreement with the U.S.A. (of 1942) has among its chief aims a policy "directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods." The Hot Springs Conference on Food and Agriculture of 1943 agreed in its 24th Resolution on the necessity of attaining "an Economy of Abundance," stating among others that "freedom from want cannot be achieved without effective collaboration among nations." The negotiations on stabilization of currencies, on an agreed policy in matters like oil, shipping, civil aviation, etc., all serve the same end.

The two main contributions which the Commonwealth can make to stability in the world's economic order are (1) the early renewal of its economic strength and the economic development of its Colonial dependencies; and (2) a home policy supporting British leaders in their effort to secure a prosperity based on stable employment. It is, however, with industry—using the term in its widest sense, including services like shipping, etc.—that the responsibility and initiative must rest for making the most of its opportunities with regard to both home and foreign markets. The war-time improvement in the technique of production must continue. And it is the deliberate policy of the Government to direct their financial and economic policies so as to assist the body economic as much as possible to that end.

The Government adopt the view generally held by economic experts that during the period of the change-over from war-time to peace-time economy, and for some afterwards, the chief problem will be that of a redistribution and shortage of man-power, and not abundance and

unemployment. The numbers involved in this change-over are estimated at approximately 7,000,000 (as against about 23,000,000 men and women at present in the Army or in gainful employment, which means an increase of 4,500,000 since 1939).

Peace-time production, like war production, will necessarily take some time to get fully into its stride. Many obstacles will have to be overcome. Among them will be prominent patches of unemployment; an inflationary rise in prices; and—from the national viewpoint—non-rational civilian production. This the Government's policy will try to avoid by a variety of measures. Among these may be mentioned plans for the orderly expansion of peace-time industries during the transition period; the firm determination to maintain stability in the general level of prices; continuation of savings; cheap money, etc. To encourage the "right sort of production," it is proposed to establish certain broad priorities and to enforce them for a time by means of the issue of licences, the allocation of raw materials and some measure of control over the labour and staff required for industry. First consideration will be given to an export drive. Home demand, whether for consumption goods or capital expenditure, must not divert the resources needed for exports. The Government believe that the immediate difficulties for our external trade will be serious. During that period they foresee the necessity of regulating imports and of a careful handling of the exchange resources.

One of the main tasks will be to create a proper industrial balance by means of a well-defined distribution of industry and labour, since experience has shown that in the past areas dependent mostly on one branch of production (such as South Wales on coal, the Clydeside on shipping or Lancashire on cotton) were particularly liable to depression.

Three measures are suggested to improve conditions, viz., diversification of the industrial composition of the area by influencing the location of new enterprises; transfer of workers from one area to another and from one occupation to another; provision of large-scale training facilities for workers. It seems that the Government will direct the location of new industry as contemplated by the Barlow Report on the Distribution of Industrial Population (Cmd. 6153, 1940). Steps have already been taken to prepare for this policy. The announcement of Government training schemes for re-settling ex-service men and women and released war workers is evidence of it. The Government have rightly divorced training allowances from unemployment benefits in order to make the worker feel that he is starting on a new job.

In order to maintain a high and stable level of employment, three essential conditions must be fulfilled: total expenditure on goods and services must be maintained; prices and wages must be kept stable; there must be sufficient mobility of workers between occupations and localities. The national expenditure in this country comes under five heads: (1) private consumption-expenditure (on housing, clothing, food, amusement, etc.); (2) public expenditure on current services (national defence,

education, medical services, etc.) ; (3) private investment-expenditure (private capital expenditure on building, machinery, durable equipment, etc.) ; (4) public investment-expenditure (capital expenditure by the central or local governments on roads, buildings, etc.) ; and (5) the foreign balance, i.e., the difference between export and import values.

Of these five components of national expenditure, experience has shown that "private expenditure on capital equipment" and the "foreign balance" are the most difficult to control, and that their spontaneous fluctuations are the most substantial. The new financial measures will therefore have to work by influencing private investment-expenditure—and following an appropriate foreign economic policy designed for the improvement of our foreign balance. A long-term policy designed to influence the volume of capital expenditure, private and public, will be drawn up. For this purpose a new technique will have to be worked out. Public investment can be used more directly as an instrument of employment policy by bringing in line the investments of the central and of the local Governments. This is to be done on the basis of five-year planning which will have to be submitted annually by the local Governments and perhaps also by the public utility companies to the Government which, on the strength of these estimates and a thorough market analysis made by a centralized expert body of economic officials, will set a target each year for the whole volume of public works in the succeeding year.

As means to guiding consumption expenditure—and indirectly private capital expenditure—a flexible scheme of contributions to the new social insurance, variation of rates of taxation, incorporation of some system of deferred credits as a permanent feature of national taxation are taken into consideration. As to the contributions to the social insurance, it is planned to fix them above the standard rate in times of falling unemployment, and below it in times of rising unemployment. This may result in fluctuations of £500,000 weekly. This will in time of crisis augment the purchasing power of the employed workers, thus helping to maintain the demand for consumers' goods, thereby offsetting, at least partly, the decline in the expenditure of those who have lost their employment. The deferred credit system in taxation is based on the idea that in prosperous times rather more taxation should be raised than was necessary for the Budget requirements of the year and the excess treated as a credit repayable to taxpayers during bad times.

None of these financial proposals involves deliberate planning for a deficit in the National budget in years of sub-normal trade. The policy to be followed will remain in budgetary matters dictated by much the same considerations as before the war, namely the need to maintain the national income and the need for a policy of budgetary equilibrium such as will maintain that confidence in the future which is necessary for a healthy and enterprising industry.

The "Capital Budget on the nation's wealth" supplemented, as the White paper foresees, by complementary "budgets for total expenditure" and "for man-power" will be the mainstay of the Government's employment policy in future. The present effect of that policy exceeds that of a declaration of mainly internal measures. This statement of policy and the emphasis put on the moment-

ous role of the "foreign balance" in British economics, coming, as it did, at the beginning of serious international talks concerning a common concept of post-war international currency and trade policies, is a timely reminder of Britain's central position as producer and consumer in the world markets, and also of her interest in maintaining and widening it. For a period after the war, the Russian reconstruction demand may approach in size or even exceed British consumption of foreign goods. But it should not be forgotten that it will be concentrated mainly on capital equipment and on certain varieties of consumers' goods, but not on raw materials and food, of which this country is the foremost and standing market. It may be that U.S. manufacturers are looking to the U.S.S.R. in their hopes for a post-war boom. But they must look to this country and the enormous economic and financial potentials for which it stands, as the rallying centre in any effort to promote post-war prosperity based on that degree of stable employment and social security which is the only safeguard for a better world to come.

2 : LABOUR AND COAL

At the beginning of the Nineteenth Quarter of the war the situation in the Yorkshire mining districts was still most unsatisfactory. Over 80,000 men were still idle and there were sharp differences of opinion among the miners on the question of accepting the Government's four-year wage stabilization plan. The Tyneside apprentices, to whose refusal to return to work reference was made in Chapter IX of the previous volume of this chronicle, were still obdurate and there was increasing evidence that they were being directed by an organization outside the Trade Unions which was also believed to have had a hand in fomenting strikes among the Yorkshire miners and the shipyard workers of the Clyde. The general public was more interested and concerned to learn that disputes in the coalfields had cost the country over 750,000 tons of coal during the month ending March 18, and

seemed likely to be equally costly during the current month.

On April 4 Mr. Bevin, Minister of Labour and National Service, speaking at a luncheon to which he went immediately after a meeting of the War Cabinet, warned the miners and the Trade Union movement that strikes at this critical moment of the war could not be tolerated. His own policy of relying on industrial negotiations and arbitration for the settlement of industrial differences, thereby retaining the freedom of the negotiating bodies of employers and unions, was jeopardized by the miners' strike. He said :

"Whether I shall survive and my policy, or whether other steps will have to be taken, I cannot prognosticate." The miners were wrecking industrial agreements, and if they went on they alone would not suffer. The country, he concluded, was not going to lose the war through strikes of apprentices or miners or anything else. "We are not going to have this country let down. Too much is at stake."

Having made the country aware of the gravity of the position, Mr. Bevin laid the issue before the General Council of the Trade Union Congress which met next day to consider questions of reconstruction. After hearing the Minister the General Council ranged itself solidly behind him, and on April 5 it issued a manifesto to the strikers.

This warned them in grave terms that persistence in their present line of conduct "cannot fail to produce a major national disaster," and that it threatened the policy the trade union movement had pursued since the war began. The General Council insisted that these unofficial strikes were acts of disloyalty to the unions and blows "struck in the back at their comrades in the armed forces" who were preparing for a life-and-death struggle on the Continent. Mr. E. Edwards, Chairman of the General Council, and its general secretary, Sir Walter Citrine, signed the declaration which prepared the way for a meeting between Mr. Bevin and the executive committee of the Mineworkers Federation.

Meanwhile the Government had decided to take firm action to deal with mischief-makers in industry. The knowledge that the Defence Regulations were to be amended for this purpose no doubt assisted Major Lloyd George and Mr. Bevin when they met the executive committee of the Mineworkers' Federation on April 6. Both spoke plainly, Mr. Bevin of the inevitable damage to the

war effort and to the influence and reputation of trade unionism if undisciplined action continued to impede the war effort, Major Lloyd George of the loss of 1,540,000 tons of coal through the stoppages of the past month. The executive promptly demanded—it could not issue an order since it had no direct authority in coalfield disputes—that the stoppages should terminate forthwith. It further resolved to call a conference of delegates from all the coalfields and to obtain its unqualified support. Its decision was framed in the following terms :

“The executive, having considered the statements of the Minister of Labour and National Service and the Minister of Fuel and Power, recognizes that the war situation makes it imperative that coal production shall be maintained and that the present stoppages shall be terminated forthwith in the national interest. The executive reaffirms its acceptance of the Porter award, which it regards as one of the most important advances ever obtained by the miners of this country.

It decides to convene a special conference on Wednesday next in London for the purpose of reporting on the serious situation in the industry, and to seek authority to continue negotiations with the Government and the owners, and the necessary mandate to enter into a final settlement.”

By April 12, when the special conference met, the strikers had returned to work. The miners' delegates authorized the executive committee to sign the four-years' wage agreement subject to the inclusion therein of provisions removing certain anomalies remaining in the wage structure. These were discussed by the committee with Major Lloyd George on April 19. Next day the new wages agreement was signed by the representatives of the mineowners and the mineworkers at the Ministry of Fuel in the presence of Major Lloyd George, who described this event in Parliament on April 21 as “a landmark in the history of the industry.”

Meanwhile, the new Defence Regulation conferring new powers on the authorities to deal with persons instigating strikes or lock-outs interfering with essential services had been issued by the Government. Its outlines have been sketched in Chapter IX, Section 2, of this volume.

On May 18 four persons were charged on-remand at Newcastle-on-Tyne for an alleged conspiracy to further an illegal strike. In the opening statement on behalf of the Crown it was alleged that these four persons were members of the organization known as the Revolutionary Communist

Party, or Trotskyists. It was also alleged that they had assisted and advised the Tyneside apprentices in their recent strike. After a hearing extending over four days they were committed for trial at the next assizes. On June 20 they were found guilty and sentenced, two to 12 months', and one to six months' imprisonment, and a woman to a nominal term of 13 days which involved her immediate release. Notice of appeal was lodged. The appeal was allowed and the sentence quashed on the ground of the misconstruction of the word "furtherance" and consequent misdirection of the jury. This judgment was delivered on September 25.

The Mineworkers' Federation called another Conference in May to discuss proposals for the amalgamation of the district unions of miners into a single organization.¹

There was considerable local opposition to the idea of "one big union," but it seemed at the end of the quarter that the idea that the miners' future lay along national rather than sectional lines was making headway.

It must be said that the results of the signature of the four-year wages agreement were disappointing. There were no more coal strikes on a large scale, but there were many small ones before the quarter ended and the rate of voluntary absenteeism remained high. Nor did the enthusiasm aroused by the opening of the Normandy Front check the persistence of these tendencies for more than a few days. There were strikes in other industries and in the transport services, but none of these was comparable, in length and in the numbers involved, to the miners' strikes. In no other industry was absenteeism nearly so rife. It is probable that three-quarters of the total of working days lost through industrial disputes during the quarter were lost in the coal-mining industry.

3 : FOOD

There was a temporary improvement in the supply of some kinds of food, rationed and unrationed, during the quarter. On the other hand the combination of drought and cold winds in March (described with reason as the

¹ In matters of policy the executive committee of the Federation can only make recommendations to the district unions. These are financially autonomous and only the political levy is centrally administered. On major issues affecting the entire industry agreement is reached by calling national delegate conferences.

second driest month of this century) and even later joined with unseasonable frost in May to cause shortages of dairy produce and soft fruit. The corn crops, however, were most promising.

On April 4 the Food Ministry announced that the allowance of *milk* to ordinary consumers would be raised from two pints to two and a half pints weekly. The allowance to adults was further raised to three pints weekly on May 7, but on June 27 the Ministry announced that a reduction to two and a half pints would have to be made in consequence of the effects of drought and of the troops' requirements of milk products.

The May frosts ruined the *soft fruit* crops in many districts and did great damage to *potatoes* in south Lincolnshire and various East Anglian districts. *Plums* suffered most among soft fruits, the loss of Victoria plums being estimated locally at 90 per cent. In view of the damage the Food Ministry revised the retail prices originally fixed for gooseberries and strawberries. The new prices for gooseberries represented an increase of 2*d.* per lb. for dessert varieties and 1*d.* per lb. for other sorts. The price revision for strawberries gave an increase of 3*d.* per lb. on the main crop in the areas where frost had done most harm. Retail prices of *green vegetables* remained stable until the end of June.

Early in April the Food Ministry announced large catches of *fish* and urged the trade to increase its purchases and to keep its shops open for longer hours both to clear its supplies and to enable housewives to take advantage of the increased supply. Fish prices were, however, raised on May 14 according to quality. Thus fillets of *prime fish* (brill, turbot, sole, and halibut) were raised 1*d.* per lb., and *flat fish* (plaice, lemon soles, dabs, etc.) by 2*d.* a lb. The price of boned *herrings* was raised from 10*d.* per lb. to 11*d.* Pleas that fish should be rationed were raised in several quarters, but the Ministry of Food maintained, probably rightly, that the uncertainty as to deliveries of fish at the ports made it an unsuitable commodity for straight rationing. There was an excellent supply of fish in late June in London.

The Herring Industry Bill was laid before Parliament on June 28. It provided for the reconstitution of the Herring Industry Board with wider powers and for a five-year plan of financial aid to fishermen in obtaining boats and equipment.

Large supplies of American *sausages* reached this country at the end of March for distribution in industrial areas. Sir William Rook, Director of Sugar in the Food Ministry, said at Washington on April 17 that *sugar* rationing in Britain would probably have to continue "for one or two years" in Britain after the war, because of the chaotic conditions in Europe. There were increased imports of *sultanas* and *figs* from Turkey in June. Before the end of that month important supplies of *new potatoes* from Cornwall were reaching London, the South-Western counties and the West Midlands. A contract for the supply of between 7,000 tons and 10,000 tons of tinned *apricot pulp* was signed at Madrid on behalf of the Ministry of Food on June 4. There were sundry minor changes in food points during the quarter.

Speaking in the House of Commons on May 25, the Minister of Agriculture said that the Government would guarantee the market prices of milk, beef cattle and sheep

for four years. The statement was widely welcomed by breeders of beef cattle and sheep who until then had had no such encouragement as dairy farmers and wheat and potato growers had received during the war.

Colonel Llewellyn's speech on the Ministry of Food Vote in Parliament on June 9 maintained the tradition of bold and resourceful planning which Lord Woolton had set. He was able to assure the House that in spite of the calls on shipping for the invasion and for the follow-up, we should be able to maintain our existing ration scales in everything—save milk, which had a seasonal flow—until the end of the year. National health had been well maintained. There was no sign of a general loss of weight; or of impaired resistance to disease.

Speaking of the Ministry's efforts to secure more variety in diet, he mentioned the purchase of 17,000 tons of *lemons*, mainly from Sicily, of all the exportable surplus of *dates* from Iraq and of *raisins* from Cyprus, with 32,000 tons of Turkish *dried fruit*. In spite of the milk shortage he hoped to increase the *cheese* ration from two oz. to three oz. before the winter. He told the House that *bread* was better than it had been and was now composed entirely of wheat.

Of the future he said that we must expect a period of shortage in dairy products and *meat* during the next four years. To ensure supplies during this difficult period he had started negotiations for the conclusion of long-term contracts for some of the chief imported foodstuffs. The British Government had invited the Australian and New Zealand Governments to consider a proposal that we should purchase all their surplus beef, mutton and lamb and dairy products until the end of June, 1948. The two Dominion Governments had accepted the proposal in principle. Negotiations were also in progress with the Government of Canada for the extension of the current *bacon* contracts up to 1947 with minimum deliveries totalling 1,850,000,000 lb. of *bacon* during those four years. We had reached agreement with Canada for the purchase of 125,000,000 lb. of *cheese* in the two years ending on March 31, 1946, at prices to be determined from year to year.

The distribution of the new ration books which included clothing coupons began on May 22. The new food book was to come into use on July 23, by which time everyone would have had to register again for all rationed foods, except milk.

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CHAPTER XI

STATE FINANCE

The following are the amounts subscribed and invested during the period under review in (a) War Bonds, 1952-54, and War Bonds, 1952-54, Series "A" ; in Savings Bonds, 1960-70, Series "C" and "D," and in loans free of interest ; and (b) in National Savings Certificates, Defence Bonds and deposits in the Post Office and Trustee Savings Banks.

| <i>Week ending</i> | (a) | (b) |
|--------------------|-------------|-------------|
| April 4 .. | £67,167,236 | £20,039,605 |
| „ 11 .. | £14,566,884 | £13,346,610 |
| „ 18 .. | £20,470,913 | £12,697,441 |
| „ 25 .. | £23,396,112 | £13,013,701 |
| May 2 .. | £45,440,189 | £16,066,722 |
| „ 9 .. | £43,241,548 | £21,509,342 |
| „ 16 .. | £40,387,512 | £23,836,317 |
| „ 23 .. | £35,024,246 | £22,890,607 |
| „ 30 .. | £24,030,716 | £20,289,643 |
| June 6 .. | £24,246,548 | £19,865,507 |
| „ 13 .. | £32,985,479 | £20,464,743 |
| „ 20 .. | £28,353,216 | £21,602,445 |
| „ 27 .. | £24,660,015 | £20,003,346 |

The high figure of both "large" and "small" savings were generally the consequence of the "Salute the Soldier" weeks which were held throughout the country. These weeks were highly successful. Up to May 21 the 351 areas which had made returns in respect of them gave a combined total of £268,245,014, which was £26,432,014 in excess of the targets at which they aimed.

On April 22 the British Government published a "Statement of Principles for an International Money Fund" in the form of a White Paper (Command 6519) containing the text of an agreement on international cur-

rency relations reached by the expert advisers of the Governments of the United and Associated Nations. The statement was published almost a year after the publication of the Keynes and White Plans (q.v. *The Fifteenth Quarter*, Chapter XI, Section 2) which were submitted by the British and United States Treasuries. Its text showed that the subsequent discussions of the experts had led to agreement on all essential points. At the same time the measure of their achievement was not to be exaggerated. As Sir John Anderson reminded the House of Commons on April 21, no Government was yet committed to the agreement. Commending on the statement *The Times* said in a leading article on April 21:

"The discussion which the White Paper expressly invites is the more necessary since no arrangement of the kind proposed could become really effective without the support of public opinion in all the countries concerned, and in particular of the British Parliament and the United States Congress. . . ." The scheme, *The Times* continued, is neither the Keynes Plan nor the White Plan. "It does not propose to create a new currency of international account. . . . In structure the idea put forward in the American plan of an international fund is followed, but the change of name from, 'stabilization fund' to 'monetary fund' is significant of the greater elasticity provided. It may be regretted that the British alternative of a clearing union working on principles analogous to those of ordinary banking practice has not been adopted. This . . . seemed to offer much greater possibilities for the future, but the idea of a fund formed out of subscriptions by the member nations proved more familiar and therefore more acceptable."

The main object of the Fund, which would amount to about \$8,000,000 if all the States concerned subscribed, was defined as

"to give confidence to member countries by making the Fund's resources available to them under adequate safeguards, thus giving the members time to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity." This would help "to promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements among member countries and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation." A further object was "to assist the multilateral payments facilities on current transactions among member countries and the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade."¹

Although the plan was "sniped" from various quarters—e.g. by the British critics who were most suspicious of anything that might link their currency with gold, how-

¹ Clauses 3, 4, and 5 of Section I, "Purposes and Policies" of the White Paper.

ever elastically, as the plan set forth in the White Paper unquestionably did,¹ and by the American critics who looked on gold as the only "real money" and wished all countries to anchor their currencies to it—the joint statement of principles met with an encouragingly favourable reception. There was general agreement with the statement that among the chief objects of the Fund must be

"to facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade and to contribute in this way to the maintenance of a high level of employment and real income. . . ."²

The experts in the opening paragraph of their statement had expressly said that Governments were not asked

"to give final approval to these principles until they have been embodied in the form of definite proposals by the delegates of the United and Associated Nations meeting in a formal conference."

On June 8 Sir John Anderson stated in the House of Commons that the President of the United States had invited the United and Associated Nations to be represented at a monetary conference to be held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, U.S.A., on July 1. The British delegation would be composed as follows :

Lord Keynes (leader), Sir Wilfrid Eady (one of the Second Secretaries, H.M. Treasury), Mr. N. B. Ronald (Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office), Professor Lionel Robbins (Head of the Economic Section, War Cabinet Secretariat), Professor D. H. Robertson (Economic Adviser to the Treasury), Mr. Redvers Opie (H.M. Embassy, Washington). Mr. R. H. Brand, who had been appointed to represent the Treasury in the United States and had been released from his post of head of the British Food Mission and British member of the Combined Food Board, would be associated with the delegation and would attend its meetings as might be convenient.

NOTE.—For an outline of the discussion of the Statement of Principles in both Houses of Parliament the reader is referred to Chapter IX (Section 2) of this volume.

¹ cf. Section II, clauses 1 and 3, Section III, clauses 3, 4 (b), 5, 6 and 7, etc. etc.

² Section I, clause 2.

CHAPTER XII

THE DOMINIONS AND THE PRIME MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

I : THE DOMINIONS

On May 9 Mr. de Valera's Government were defeated ^{Eire} by one vote—64 to 63—on the second reading of their Transport Bill which the Minister of Supplies had described as one of their plans for the after-war period.

The Bill proposed the establishment of a company with capital amounting to £20,000,000 to operate all rail and road transport in Eire. The Opposition parties tabled a motion asking the Government to postpone the discussion of the Bill because an official inquiry was being held concerning allegations that there had been a leakage of information concerning a proposed new company which enabled speculators to make huge sums by investing in railway shares. Mr. de Valera refused the demand, which was by no means an unreasonable one in the circumstances. The Dail divided and the Government were defeated. Mr. de Valera "may not have welcomed, but he certainly accepted, this opportunity of improving his party's position by an appeal to the electorate to give him, this time, an over-all majority."¹ From the tactical standpoint his decision could be defended and Mr. de Valera is an excellent political tactician. He obtained President Hyde's consent to the dissolution of the Dail and to the holding of a general election on May 30.

The Opposition, notably the Labourites, who had split into two parties, the National Labour Party (Cumann na Thalmhain) and the Irish Labour Party, strongly criticized Mr. de Valera's decision on May 10. Mr. Norton, the Labour leader, described Mr. de Valera arriving on "a midnight raid" at President Hyde's residence to beseech him to dissolve the Dail,

"not because the people wanted an election, but because Mr. de Valera was in a temper that no thermometer could measure." Dr. O'Higgins, acting-leader of Fine Gael, said that the decision was deplorable. Safety, security, neutrality—nothing mattered but that a piqued individual must avenge himself on deputies who exercised their functions as deputies. To this Mr. de Valera retorted that no party but his could form a stable Government and that everybody knew it. No doubt it was an inconvenient time to go to the country, "but we did not defeat the Government."

¹ From a leading article in *The Times*, May 13.

The General Election was duly held and Mr. de Valera, whose party organization was in excellent running order, won his over-all majority with ease. The final figures follow. Those in brackets represent party strength after the General Election of June, 1943.

Fianna Fail, 76 (67); Fine Gael, 30 (32); Farmers, 11 (14); Independents, 9 (8); Labour, 8 (17); National Labour 4. Polling was higher than had been expected, amounting to about 65 per cent of the electorate; and it was generally felt that Mr. de Valera's policy of neutrality, which he had maintained more successfully than a composite Ministry could have done, had been endorsed by the great majority of the people of Eire.

The new Dail met on June 9 when Mr. de Valera was re-elected Prime Minister by 81 votes to 37 and later formed his cabinet. It was composed of the following Ministers: Mr. S. T. O'Kelly (Finance), Mr. S. Lemass (Supply, Industry and Commerce); Mr. S. M'Entee (Local Government and Public Health); Dr. Ryan (Agriculture); Mr. F. Aiken (Co-ordination of Defensive Measures); Mr. Derrig (Education); Mr. P. Little (Posts and Telegraphs); Mr. G. Boland (Justice); Mr. O. Traynor (Defence); Mr. S. Moylan (Land).

Meanwhile, the economic situation deteriorated rapidly. On June 7 Mr. Lemass ordered the stoppage of all electric tramcars and drastic reductions of domestic electricity consumption, with the warning that from July onwards even priority industries might not be able to get coal. These drastic cuts in supply affected three-quarters of the industries of Eire which were operated wholly or in part by electric power. Dublin cinema shows were reduced to one daily and two on Saturdays. On June 21 Mr. Lemass informed the melancholy Dail that no paraffin was available for domestic lighting and that the shortage of candles was such as to make rationing impracticable. The curtailment of train services on the G.S.R. lines had been in operation since April 24, when passenger trains from Dublin to the provinces were restricted to two a week and goods trains ran on but four days a week. Air mail services to the Continent of Europe and North Africa with the neighbouring Atlantic islands and also to prisoners of war were suspended from April 19.

Northern
Ireland

Sir Basil Brooke, Premier of Northern Ireland, visited London in late April to meet the Dominion Prime Ministers and again in June for consultations with the Imperial Government.

Because of the abolition of the Ministry of Public Security, with the transfer of its functions to the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the establishment of a new Ministry of Health and Local Government, the Governor of Northern Ireland approved the following appointments taking effect from June 1 : Minister of Labour—Mr. H. C. Midgley (previously Minister of Public Security) ; Minister of Health and Local Government—Mr. W. Grant (previously Minister of Labour) ; Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health and Local Government—Sir Wilson Hungerford.

The Budget was presented to the North of Ireland House of Commons on May 23. Expenditure for the year 1944-45 was estimated at £19,471,000 and the total revenue at £54,507,000. The estimated Imperial contribution for the current year amounted to £35,000,000. From the beginning of the war until March, 1944, Northern Ireland had invested £91,000,000 in all forms of War Savings.

On April 9 Mr. Wild, Finance Commissioner of New-^{Newfound-}foundland, announced a surplus of \$5,634,000, more than ^{land} thrice the total estimated. He said that the revenue from direct taxation had exceeded all previous records.

On April 12 Lady Walwyn, wife of the Governor of Newfoundland, named the *Clarendville*, the first of ten vessels built by the Government to engage in the carrier trade, which had been largely lost to foreign shipping, and also for use in the new fresh fish industry.

On May 1 the Dominions Office announced the appointment of Sir George London, Colonial Secretary, the Gold Coast, to the Commission of Government of Newfoundland, *vice* Sir Wilfrid Woods.

It was announced on April 23 that Colonel Ralston, ^{Canada} Minister of National Defence, would act as Prime Minister of Canada while Mr. King attended the conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London. Mr. T. A. Crerar, Minister of Mines and Resources, became deputy leader of the House of Commons and President of the Council, and Mr. L. S. St. Laurent, Minister of Justice, temporarily held the portfolio of External Affairs.

There were signs of coming changes in Canadian politics. After their defeat by the Progressive Conservatives in the Ontario provincial election (q.v. *The Sixteenth Quarter*, Chapter XII) where the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation—henceforth styled the C.C.F.—a Socialist party, gained a surprising number of seats, and were, in fact, only narrowly defeated by Conservatives, the Liberals suffered another severe defeat. This was in Saskatchewan, where on June 15 an electoral landslide

gave the C.C.F. a sweeping victory in the province of its birth. The C.C.F. won four-fifths of the seats. The Liberal Premier of the province secured a bare majority of 30 votes and five of his Cabinet of seven were defeated. This was the first Socialist victory in a Canadian election, and though provincial elections are not always a reliable test of national sentiment, the outlook for the Liberals in the Federal election which was due next spring was none too bright.

"The Saskatchewan election," wrote the Ottawa Correspondent of *The Times*,¹ "did two things. It gave emphasis to a conviction, already strong, that a Socialist party had emerged in such force as to be a factor in Federal politics; and it gave emphasis also to a suspicion, already felt, that Liberalism was losing in popularity. The first was proved when the C.C.F. was shown to be stronger than the two other parties, and the second was substantiated when it eliminated the Liberal régime in what had long been a Liberal region. . . . The defeat of the Liberals in Ontario was only a tactical victory for the Conservatives; but the defeat of the Liberals in Saskatchewan was a strategical victory for the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation." At the same time the C.C.F. did not put its Socialism in the forefront of its campaign among the farmers who compose the great majority of the electorate in the province. The programme put forward by its leader, the Rev. T. C. Douglas, who became Premier, was moderate enough, and the party also capitalized the general discontent caused by the strains and restrictions of war which, for the public, outweighed the present great prosperity of Saskatchewan.

In Quebec much political excitement was caused by a maiden speech delivered in the Dominion Senate by Senator D. T. Bouchard, a former minister of the Quebec Government, on June 21. The Senator alleged that a secret organization known as the Order of Jacques Cartier² was deliberately disturbing the relations between English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians.

Speaking on a motion demanding the appointment of a committee of competent historians to prepare an objective text-book of Canadian history, he maintained that the nationalist and secessionist spirit which existed among some French Canadians was attributable to wrong teaching and false interpretation of early Canadian history in Quebec schools. The Order of Jacques Cartier was arousing racial animosities and many Catholics who did not suspect its motives were being influenced by its false political philosophy which reposed on a basis of distorted history.

The speech aroused loud protests in Quebec and on June 25 Mr. A. Godbout, Premier of Quebec, announced that he had relieved Senator

¹ *Loc. cit.* July 11.

² A famous French explorer who discovered the St. Lawrence in the sixteenth century.

Bouchard of his duties as chairman of the Quebec Hydro-electric Commission, to which post he had been appointed in April. No reason was given for the Senator's dismissal, but public opinion attributed it to his speech, and it was pointed out that the protests included "at least one demand that he should be deprived of the chairmanship of the Hydro-electric Commission . . . the political feelings that were aroused when the speech was delivered have now been aggravated by suggestions that freedom of speech, even when exercised in the Dominion Senate, is being denied to a prominent public man." It was, however, recognized that the issue had to be decided in Quebec where it involved the "firmly held and mutually contradictory views" of the clerical and anti-clerical elements in that province.¹

The Government opened their sixth victory loan campaign on April 24 when 150,000 volunteers began a nation-wide drive to raise \$1,200,000,000. The loan was over-subscribed and the objective was attained before the sales campaign terminated on May 13. On June 26 Mr. J. L. Ilesley, Minister of Finance, presented his sixth war budget to the Dominion House of Commons.

He said that Canada's cash requirements for the current financial year would exceed \$6,000,000,000, of which more than \$3,200,000,000 would be sought by borrowing from the Canadian people. He estimated expenditure at \$5,152,000,000 and revenue at \$2,617,000,000, leaving a budgetary deficit of \$2,535,000,000; but as the cash outlay was expected to exceed the estimated expenditure, borrowing would be necessary to the amount indicated. In his speech he contended that the greatest national exertion was still necessary to finish the war in Europe and to contribute to the elimination of the Japanese power. He emphasized the importance of the savings programme in the country's war effort in keeping down the cost of living and preventing inflation.

No tax increases were announced and no important tax reductions were imposed, but the Minister made readjustments in individual income-tax, including the abandonment of the compulsory savings portion of the tax as from July 1. As regards agriculture, he said that it had been decided to remove all Customs duties from imports of agricultural implements without waiting for other Governments to agree to reciprocal measures.

On the eve of his departure to attend the conference of Prime Ministers, Mr. Fraser announced that he was confident that an appeal from Great Britain for a substantial increase in shipments of dairy produce would be met. He outlined plans which the Dominion Government, aided by the Dairy Industry Council and the National Council of Primary Production, had drawn up and would carry out as a matter of urgency.

¹ Summarized from an Ottawa message published in *The Times* on June 26.

On April 16 Mr. Roberts, Minister of Agriculture, announced that primary producers in the Dominion had been given higher objectives for 1944-45 in order to make more food available for Great Britain and for the Allied fighting forces in the Pacific. The objectives announced were reasonably within the country's powers, since men were being released from the armed forces for the purpose. On the following day Mr. Fraser, who had arrived at Washington, told the Press that, on the advice of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, New Zealand "would transfer temporarily a number of suitable skilled men from the armed forces to arrest the decline in food production which threatens to have world-wide implications."

On the same occasion he discussed the relationship of the British Commonwealth to such an international organization as that contemplated by the Moscow Declaration. He said that it would not conduce to the success of the new organization if the British Commonwealth or any other combination of nations should attend a world conference bound by a prior agreement among themselves. Asked about the implications of the Canberra "working agreement" between Australia and New Zealand (q.v. *The Eighteenth Quarter*, Chapter XII), he denied that the two countries had pledged themselves to any specific course. What they had done was to pledge themselves to discuss together, and with other nations, defence and other problems arising in the Pacific.

Speaking in London on May 5, Mr. Fraser gave an account of the part that New Zealand had played in the war. Though the Dominion began with a regular army of only 1,000 men, they had maintained a division (the 2nd) in the Middle East and Mediterranean since 1940.

Mr. Fraser told how part of the Division had been sent for a time to Kent, ready to meet the threatened invasion. He followed the history of this admirable division through Greece, Crete, Libya, and Italy to Monte Cassino. In the Pacific the 3rd New Zealand Division had taken part in the counter-offensive in the Solomons and New Zealand airmen had fought in practically every theatre of the war, especially over Europe.

"Our casualties," he said, "have been extremely high, and with the probable exception of Russia they are, in proportion to population, the highest among the United Nations. They are as follows:—Killed, 7,300; missing, 1,850; prisoners, 7,300; wounded, 13,400; total, 29,850." The population of New Zealand at the outbreak of the war was 1,630,000. Of 355,000 men between the ages of 18 and 45, 157,000 were serving full time with the armed forces at the peak of the mobilization. New Zealand also maintained a part-time Home Guard of 124,000 men, and 160,000 had been enrolled in the civil defence organization. The total number at present withdrawn from industry and serving in the armed forces is 146,000, and 110,000 have been sent overseas since the war began. This means that approximately one of every three men of military age, regardless of his family obligations, children or occupation, has seen overseas service.

On May 8 Mr. Sullivan, the acting Prime Minister, announced that an organization for national development was being set up by the Government to examine and co-ordinate all proposals about problems expected to arise after the close of the war. New Zealand public

accounts for the year ended on March 31 showed a war expenditure of £163,161,000 compared with £144,000,000 in the previous year and receipts on the war expenses account of £162,540,000 compared with £148,000,000. Of the receipts £32,478,000 were derived from lend-lease and £72,755,000 from loans.

Admiral Halsey, U.S. Navy, Commanding the Allied Naval Forces in the South and South-West Pacific, visited New Zealand in June and spoke most highly of the New Zealand forces fighting under him.

A sharp dispute arose in Sydney between the Commonwealth Minister of Information, Mr. A. A. Calwell, and three of the principal Sydney newspapers, viz: the *Sunday Telegraph* and two dailies, the *Sydney Morning Herald* and *Sydney Daily Telegraph*, which were seized by the Commonwealth security police. Mr. Calwell accused these newspapers of sending mischievous messages to the United States. Mr. R. Henderson, chairman of the Australian Newspaper Proprietors' Association, had replied, quoting instances of the censor's deletions from local reports and telegrams for dispatch oversea. Parts of his reply to Mr. Calwell were cut out from the *Sydney Daily Telegraph* of April 15 by the censor, and the *Sunday Telegraph* was ordered to obey the censorship's instructions concerning the reply and was seized for disobedience.

On April 17 the dispute extended to Melbourne where Commonwealth peace officers seized the bulk of the final edition of the evening *Melbourne Herald*. In Sydney two evening newspapers were placed under a seizure order for reproducing the matter which had been banned in other Sydney newspapers. Finally, the full bench of the High Court of Australia granted an injunction restraining the Commonwealth Government and the censors from continuing to ban editorial matter dealing with the conflict between the Press and Mr. Calwell over the censorship.

On April 19 it became known that the New South Wales police had not been involved in the suppression of newspapers. Mr. Calwell had protested against their failure to uphold authority and asked for disciplinary action against Mr. Mackay, the N.S.W. Commissioner of Police. Mr. McKell, the Premier of New South Wales, in reply denied Mr. Calwell's right to interfere in the administration of the State.

On the same day a *Reuter* message from Sydney explained that although Mr. Calwell's statement attacking Mr. R. Henderson was published in full, the Commonwealth censorship had deleted passages of Mr. Henderson's reply in which he quoted instances of what he considered to be political censorship. These included the following :

"In the tramway strike newspapers were prevented from informing the public that the order of the Prime Minister to the men to return to work was being defied and that there would not be any tramcars or buses running the next morning; that certain facts about the recent south coast coal miners' strike were deleted; that *Reuters* was forbidden to send extracts from Melbourne leading articles about Mr. R. G. Casey's appointment as Governor of Bengal; and that a dispatch by the correspondent of the *Yorkshire Post* on immigration was suppressed."

Members of the Opposition appear to have laid the matter before the Advisory War Council and the dispute dragged on for some time. On May 5 Chief Justice Latham in the High Court suggested that the parties to the actions brought by the newspaper proprietors against the censors and the Commonwealth arising from the recent suppression of newspapers should endeavour to find a means of settling the conflict.

He urged that they should consider whether the Press censorship could not be placed on a practical basis which would enable the Government to protect the public safety and the Press to publish news and comment which did not in any way compromise public safety. Neither party need fear, if the suggestion were adopted, that there would be any abandonment of any position that ought to be defended nor any surrender of any principle that ought to be maintained.

On May 18 it was announced that the dispute had been settled. A code of censorship had been drawn up and new regulations governing the powers of the censorship had been gazetted. Mr. Forde, the acting Prime Minister, enumerated the chief points in the code. He said that

The censorship would be imposed exclusively for reasons of defence security. Criticism and comment, however strongly expressed, should be free. Mere exaggeration or inaccuracy should not give ground for censorship. The censorship order in its present form did not expressly require censors to exercise their powers on grounds relating solely to considerations of defence security. The Government therefore proposed to make the necessary amendment in the existing order. Except in the case of immediate and obvious danger to defence security a breach of censorship direction would be dealt with by prosecution and not by the seizure of the proposed publication.

Australian party politics were marked by the expulsion of Mr. Hughes, at the age of 80, with all but 50 years of service in Parliament behind him, from the United Australia Party. Like Mr. Spender, who was also expelled, he had remained in the Advisory War Council in spite of his party's decision to withdraw from it. In the Queensland State election on April 15 Labour lost a

little ground, chiefly to the new Queensland People's Party which had conducted a strong campaign against the machine politics of official Labour, and won eight seats. In the South Australian Parliamentary election on April 29, the Liberal and County League Government were returned to power, but with a reduced majority—20 out of 39 seats—but they could depend on the support of three Independents. No material change in party strength emerged from the New South Wales election where the official Labour Party led by the Premier, Mr. McKell, made certain of 54 out of 90 seats on May 27.

On May 3 Mr. Curtin issued a statement in London concerning the Australian effort in the common cause. There had been some concern, expressed in the United States as well as in Australia, at the baldness of Mr. Forde's statement on April 9 that the Commonwealth Government would reduce the army by 90,000 men during the next 12 months, including the release of 20,000 men for primary industry, chiefly food production, which was already in progress.

In his admirably clear statement Mr. Curtin explained that re-allocation of man-power had been proceeding since October, 1943, and that Australia was resolved to win both her battles—one in the jungle, sea and air, and the other in the fields and factories. The re-allocation of man-power would not impair the fighting strength of the Army. Now that the threat of invasion had receded it was proper to review the national war effort, in the light of the national man-power available, to ensure that Australia would continue to make the maximum contribution possible on the military and production fronts. Australia had provided under reciprocal lend-lease 90 per cent of the food needed by the American forces in the south-west Pacific area, as well as clothing and war supplies. At the same time "we have done our utmost to maintain food production for the United Kingdom. To December last year we had shipped food worth £129,527,000, or 53.42 per cent of all food exported. . . ." "Our food commitments are : to feed every Australian and Allied service man in the south-west Pacific war theatre ; to feed the Australian civil population ; to maintain food exports to the United Kingdom at the highest possible level ; to contribute to the food supplies of British service units in certain areas." To meet these commitments the following re-allocation of man-power was being made over a period of 15 months : special releases from the armed forces, 20,000 ; releases from munitions industries, in some sections of which production had become redundant, 20,000 ; routine discharges from the services, 30,000 ; additional diversion of women to war production, 30,000.

On May 31 Mr. Forde announced the reduction of the butter ration from eight to six oz. weekly for eight weeks.

The cut caused a strike in five mines in New South Wales, but most people accepted it with a good grace.

Thirteen members of the British and Canadian Parliaments visited Australia in June. The Canadian delegation was led by Mr. J. G. Ross, the British by Lieut.-Colonel E. T. Wickham.

Mr. Curtin returned to Australia on June 26 after visiting Canada and the United States after the Prime Ministers' Conference.

South Africa On April 3 General Smuts expressed the South African Government's determination to fight "the black market in gold" when replying to the gold debate in the House of Assembly. After describing how South Africa had sold her gold to Great Britain at 168s. an ounce before the war, he said :

"Now, as the result of the accumulation of money all the world over, inflation has set in on a large scale and gold has become involved in this rising of prices. In countries like Egypt and India . . . people are paying £14 and £15 an ounce for gold." This was a "black market" which was causing the British Government no small concern. They wished to counteract this inflation and they had decided to do so by selling gold in these markets at a higher price. The Union Government had suggested to the British Government that South Africa should get the benefit, to which the British Government raised no objection. Negotiations on the matter were in progress.

On April 18 Mr. Hofmeyr, Minister of Finance, explaining the South African share in the British sale of gold to India, said that the British and Indian Governments were maintaining the rupee-sterling exchange rate in spite of Indian inflation.

This meant that the British Government paid more for their needs in India than they would otherwise have to do. The British Government therefore decided that "in so far as they could sell gold in India, they would cancel out the effects of the high exchange rate by selling gold up to a certain point and so combating inflation in India."

South Africa was also a purchaser from India and it was reasonable that she too should get the benefit of the higher price of gold in India. On this point agreement had been reached and the British Government would give South Africa facilities for sharing in the sale of gold on the Indian market to the extent to which South African import requirements justified it.

The by-election at Wakkerstroom caused by the death of Colonel W. Collins, Minister of Agriculture, was won by Mr. Jan van Niekerk, the Nationalist Opposition candidate, with a majority of 221 votes over the United

Party candidate. It was a sharp and disappointing defeat for the Government. On May 14 the Dominions Office announced that Lord Harlech, who had served since May, 1941, as High Commissioner for Basutoland, Swaziland and the Bechuanaland Protectorate and as United Kingdom High Commissioner in the South African Union, had asked to be relieved of these appointments in view of his public responsibilities and public and private duties in Great Britain. The Secretary of State had reluctantly accepted his resignation and had conveyed to him the warm thanks of H.M.'s Government for his outstanding work. In a farewell message to the Union, Lord Harlech paid a tribute to the remarkable contribution made by South Africa to the common cause and to the leadership of General Smuts. Of the native territories he said :

"I am proud of the war effort of the native territories. Apart from some thousands in the Union native military corps, we have recruited and sent well over 30,000 under Imperial officers up north. The bulk of these men are now in Italy attached to the Fifth and Eighth Armies. I have had nothing but praise from the various high officers under whom they are serving for the courage, discipline and adaptability of these African troops. . . ."

In April the South African Government decided to withdraw the Indian Pegging Act which had caused bitter feeling in India and strong criticism in England and America.

The Act was to be superseded by the appointment of a Natal provincial Board of Control which would divide the towns of Natal into three areas. There would be prohibited areas, where the occupation of land would be confined to a designated race, areas for the most part where there are anti-Asiatic clauses in the title deeds and which form a compact area; restricted areas in which members of other races would not be totally prohibited, and exempted areas where the populations are so mixed that regulation is impossible. A plan for the improvement of conditions in native reserves was outlined by Major Van der Byl, Minister of Native Affairs, in an interview published on June 6. But the Union Government's insistence that in official correspondence the same formalities such as "Sir" or "Madam" should be employed in correspondence with coloured persons as with whites, threatened to provoke a storm among the Nationalists. It caused the resignation of four permanent officials and the dismissal of 19 women temporary clerks from the Ministry of Pensions for non-compliance.

Before returning to South Africa General Smuts visited the Normandy and Italian fronts.

2 : THE PRIME MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

The Conference of British Commonwealth Prime Ministers opened quietly on May 1 and ended on May 16. It had been preceded by the important debate in the Commons to which reference has already been made in Chapter IX of this volume. The Prime Ministers who attended it were :

Mr. Churchill (United Kingdom), Mr. Mackenzie King (Canada), Mr. Curtin (Australia), Mr. Fraser (New Zealand), General Smuts (South Africa). The Maharajah of Kashmir and Sir Firoz Khan Noon, India's representatives at the War Cabinet, and the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia (Sir Godfrey Huggins) also took part in the meetings. All were attended by Mr. Attlee, as Deputy Prime Minister, and Lord Cranborne (Dominions Secretary) ; and Mr. Eden was frequently present.

The first subject to be discussed by the Conference was the foreign and defence policy to be pursued in shaping the victory and the subsequent reconstruction. The Diplomatic Correspondent of *The Times* grouped the main problems before the Prime Ministers as follows (*loc. cit.* May 2) :

The War. After Mr. Churchill's opening survey all the Prime Ministers would join in discussion on the next steps in the war against both Germany and Japan.

Foreign Policy. There would be a full investigation of armistice terms, plans for world settlement and the future organization of public law. Mr. Eden would survey British foreign policy. Much discussion was expected to turn on ways of putting into effect Article IV of the Moscow agreement. "The Three Powers recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest possible date a general international organization, based on the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States."

The Commonwealth. Proposals had been mooted for the improvement of consultation within the Commonwealth on defence, foreign affairs, and economic progress. The clearest had been made by Mr. Curtin, suggesting a standing Committee and a secretariat representing all the Dominions. On the other hand Mr. Mackenzie King had asked in public speeches whether more elaborate machinery of co-operation would not run counter to the establishment of a wider world organization.

Colonies. General Smuts and others would put forward proposals for the regional grouping of colonies, some groups to be under the leadership of the nearest British Dominion. A wider scheme which had been mooted for international commissions on which vitally interested Powers, whether colonial or not, would agree to a common policy of defence and development within a given colonial region would also be examined, and in each case the examination would be made in the desire to promote the welfare of the indigenous peoples.

Commonwealth Trade. Here the question of Imperial Preference was certain to arise and Mr. Churchill had already explained that the scheme put forward in Article VII of the Mutual Aid agreement did not presuppose the abolition of preferential treatment within the Commonwealth.

Emigration. The Dominions needed men and women for industry and agriculture, but they had hesitated until then to reply to enquiries made last year by the United Kingdom Government, since their first duty was to find work for their own demobilized men. Their Prime Ministers wished to discuss various questions connected with British emigration, e.g. the reluctance of people from the United Kingdom who were otherwise willing to begin afresh in the Dominions to sacrifice accumulated benefits in industrial and other insurance schemes and the methods of getting over this difficulty.

Transport. All forms of transport including aviation were on the agenda of the Conference.

Education. An examination would be made of the development of education throughout the Commonwealth in the desire to promote still closer understanding among their peoples.

This programme was closely followed. The Prime Ministers discussed plans of attack with the Chiefs of Staff and the service chiefs from the oversea Dominions on May 2 and 3. Mr. Eden joined them in their survey of foreign policy in the course of which plans for bringing food and other supplies to the stricken peoples of Europe during and after their liberation were discussed and approved. During the second week of the conference methods of consultation and other questions in the programme were examined and discussed. Final decisions were not taken, but were left to the Sovereign Governments and Parliaments of the Dominions. As regards the important question of consultation within the Commonwealth, the well-informed *Round Table* observed (*loc. cit.*, p. 198) :

that while Mr. Mackenzie King remained constant to his belief that the existing system is adequate, and that "any attempt to give it a closer texture would endanger the intimate ties with friendly Powers, especially the United States, which are of such vital value to the Empire and of which Canada is in a peculiar sense the trustee, Mr. Curtin and Mr. Fraser . . . have stood for a different view—that a stronger apparatus for the concerting of policy in time of peace is necessary to the Empire's defence, and to the evolution of its role in collective security." The *Round Table* added that Mr. Curtin had no intention of insisting on any of the specific schemes he had suggested for giving effect to the general principle that he advocated, so that the way was clear for "the frankest discussion of the issues that separate him from Mr. King."

On May 18 a declaration was issued signed by all five Prime Ministers. They had met to discuss common

interests and future plans. "At this memorable meeting," the declaration continued :

"We give thanks for deliverance from the worst perils which have menaced us in . . . this long and terrible struggle against tyranny." They expressed their confidence in victory, their admiring gratitude to the Armed Forces and the peoples of all their countries. They honoured the famous deeds of the United States and Soviet Russia, they remembered the stubborn and prolonged resistance of China and they rejoiced in "the unquenchable spirit of their comrades in every country still in the enemy's grip. We shall not turn from the conflict until they are restored to freedom. Not one who marches with us shall be abandoned."

They had examined the plans for the British Empire's and Commonwealth's share in the struggle against Germany and Japan and they cordially agreed with them. They were also agreed on the principles governing their foreign policies. They were unitedly resolved to make sure of an enduring peace and "it is our aim that . . . all countries now overrun by the enemy shall be free to decide for themselves their future form of democratic government."

"Mutual respect and honest conduct between nations is our chief desire. We are determined to work with all peace-loving peoples in order that tyranny and aggression shall be removed or . . . struck down whenever it raises its head. The peoples of the British Empire and Commonwealth of Nations willingly make this sacrifice to the common cause." They sought no advantage for themselves at the expense of others. They desired the welfare and social advance of all nations. "We affirm that after the war a world organization to maintain peace and security should be set up and endowed with the necessary power and authority to prevent aggression and violence."

"In a world torn by strife, we have met here in unity. That unity finds its strength, not in any formal bond but in the hidden springs from which human action flows. We rejoice in our inheritance of loyalties and ideals, and proclaim our sense of kinship to one another. Our system of free association has enabled us . . . to claim a full share of the common burden. Although spread across the globe, we have stood together through the stress of two World Wars, and have been welded the stronger thereby. We believe that when victory is won and peace returns, this same free association, this inherent unity of purpose, will make us able to do further service to mankind."

It is impossible within the compass of this chronicle to give summaries, still less texts of the numerous speeches made at the close of the Conference and on other occasions by the Prime Ministers. Two particularly interesting and important speeches were those made by Mr. King to both Houses of Parliament on May 11 and General Smuts's thoughtful speech on the war and security after victory which he made after receiving the freedom of Birmingham on May 19. Describing the astonishing effort made by Canada as "the free expression of a free people," Mr. King said that their contribution

had been the greater because they lived side by side with the United States. Without the harmony and reciprocity which existed between them neither could have achieved so much. The war, continued Mr. King, "is all one war : a monstrous conspiracy of the Fascist Powers to dominate and enslave the world." The efforts of Great Britain and the Dominions in the struggle against tyranny owed their inspiration to the love of freedom and the sense of justice which had been nurtured and cherished in Britain as nowhere else in the world.

He defined his position towards closer Commonwealth consultation in one of the most interesting passages of his speech. It was true, he said, that they had not, sitting in London continuously, a visible Imperial War Cabinet. But they had something more important although invisible, "a continuing conference of the Cabinets of the Commonwealth, each sitting in its own capital." When decisions were taken they were not the decisions of Ministers meeting away from their own countries, but decisions reached after mature consideration by all members of the Cabinet of each country, with a full consciousness of their responsibility to their Parliaments.

In considering new methods of organization they could not be too careful to see that, to their own peoples, the new methods did not appear as an attempt to limit their freedom of decision, or to peoples of other countries as an attempt to establish a separate *bloc*. Here he appositely quoted Mr. Churchill's words in 1907 : "Let us . . . seek to impress, year after year, upon the British Empire, an inclusive not an exclusive character." The spirit of the British Commonwealth expressed itself in co-operation wherein lay the secret of its unity.

In his speech at Birmingham General Smuts made a number of interesting suggestions concerning the solution of post-war problems. Europe was "the heart of the cause of man," and had been the source of Western concepts of progress and liberty. She must not therefore be "atomized" or reduced to "a helpless chaos of fragments," but should receive a new structure as the United States of Europe, in making which Britain should play a leading part. Security against war would "almost inevitably" be secured by a new version of the League of Nations in which responsibility for keeping the peace should be placed, at least during the transition period, upon those who have the power. The new organization should be buttressed by regional groupings or other friendly associations between nations whose traditions qualified them as supporters of world security. Such would be the existing association between the United States and the British Commonwealth, but there must be nothing exclusive about it and it must not exclude close collaboration with Russia whose rise "need not frighten the world." The third great task was to prepare for a new era, that of the common man, for whom there had been "sorrow and suffering on a scale unexampled in history" as the unparalleled Jewish horror had shown. Nothing had been more remarkable during the war years than the growing resolve among the peoples that there should be a better social order after the war, and Governments and Parliaments everywhere were now endeavouring to establish a new social code which would secure for all the conditions of a fair and civilized standard and a decent life.

Other noteworthy speeches, which can only be alluded to here, were those of Mr. Curtin and Mr. Fraser at the Guildhall, when they were given the freedom of the City of London on May 10. Mr. Curtin, a newcomer to

Conferences, acquitted himself admirably, and his address to a meeting of the Empire Parliamentary Association held at the House of Commons on Parliamentary Institutions made a profound impression on the many members of both Houses who were present. He and Mr. Fraser visited Canada on their return journey.

As for the results of the meetings, they were summed up by General Smuts at Birmingham in the following words :

"It has been a wonderful Conference. During the last 30 or 40 years I have attended many Imperial Conferences, but I can truthfully say that I recall none which compares with this Prime Ministers' Conference both in the magnitude of the issues raised, and in the spirit of mutual understanding which has prevailed throughout."

CHAPTER XIII

INDIA

The tendency for the imperious claims of war conditions and the pressure of economic realities and planning to divert attention from the Indian political stalemate was somewhat modified by the reappearance on the scene of Mr. Gandhi. His health having deteriorated, the Government of India decided, solely on medical grounds, to release him unconditionally, and he was set free on the morning of May 6, after nearly 21 months' sequestration from public affairs. His two Indian physicians, his secretary and the devoted Mirabai (Miss Madeline Slade), left the Aga Khan's palace at Poona with him.

Though he was reported to be suffering from amoebic dysentery and hookworm, and the doctors advised mental and physical rest at a seaside resort, the Mahatma soon made his presence felt by giving interviews, holding conferences with prominent Nationalists, and generally seeking to revive the fallen fortunes of the Congress Party. His claim that the members of the Working Committee of the Congress who were arrested with him in August, 1942, should now also be released was supported by the bulk of the Indian Press, and was urged on Mr. Amery, the Secretary of State, in a letter from 11 Labour M.P.s, headed by Mr. Rhys Davids.

Mr. Amery's reply, which was published on May 22, was to the effect that while Congress remained wedded to the "Quit India" resolution of August, 1942, "it is difficult to see how their release could be contemplated by the Governor-General and his Council, who are responsible for the security and defence of India. Moreover, the state of opinion among the other parties does not encourage the expectation that such a step would promote a general settlement."

Near the close of the quarter the Government of India issued a pamphlet giving the full text of correspondence between Mr. Gandhi and the Viceroy and others. On July 15, 1943, the Mahatma wrote a letter of inordinate

length to Lord Linlithgow controverting the statements and conclusions of the official pamphlet "Congress Responsibility for the Disturbances" (see *The Fourteenth Quarter*, pp. 278-9). A full reply was sent, but Mr. Gandhi continued to reiterate his arguments. The gist of the correspondence is to be found in letters which passed between him and Lord Wavell from February to April, 1944. Writing on March 28, the Viceroy expressed regret that he must adhere to the view that the policy of the Congress Party was "hindering and not forwarding India's progress to self-government and development."

"I am quite clear that India's problems cannot be solved by an immediate and complete withdrawal of the British. I do not accuse you or the Congress Party of a wish deliberately to aid the Japanese. But . . . it is clear to me that you had lost confidence in our ability to defend India, and were prepared to take advantage of our supposed military straits to gain political advantage. . . . As to the general Congress Party responsibility for the disturbances which followed, I was, as you know, Commander-in-Chief at the time. My vital lines of communication to the Burma frontier were cut by Congress supporters, in the name of the Congress Party, often using the Congress flag. I cannot therefore hold the Congress Party guiltless of what occurred."

The Viceroy went on to urge that a great opportunity awaited the Party for participating in the work, so urgent and stimulating, of national reconstruction. "With general co-operation," he affirmed, "we can, in the immediate future, do much to solve India's economic problems, and can make steady and substantial progress towards Indian self-government."

Though by dress and speech the Mahatma has identified himself for years past with the poverty-stricken masses, the plea for co-operation in the betterment of their lot seemed to leave him entirely unmoved. In the words of *The Times* (June 23),

"He stands forth as a complete traditionalist. He is less concerned with the future than with the past. With the casuistry of which he is at certain moments so completely master, he bends all his energies to vindicating the policy underlying the 'quit India' resolution of August, 1942; to defending the Congress Party from all responsibility for the dangerous outbreaks which subsequently occurred; and to emphasizing implicitly his conviction that the Party is the sole repository of political wisdom—and, it would sometimes appear, of patriotism—in India."

On June 17, some six weeks after his release, Mr. Gandhi wrote to the Viceroy asking permission to see the members of the Working Committee of the Congress, since he could do "little or nothing" unless he knew the

mind of the committee. In his reply, dated June 22, adverting to a suggested meeting with his correspondent, Lord Wavell wrote :

"In consideration of the radical differences in our points of view which appeared in our recent correspondence, I feel that a meeting between us at present could have no value and could only raise hopes which would be disappointed. I am afraid that similar considerations apply to your request to see the Working Committee. . . . If, after your convalescence and on further reflection you have a definite and constructive policy to propose for the furtherance of India's welfare, I shall be glad to consider it."

"Further reflection" and manœuvring for position led the Mahatma to some modification of his attitude, for addressing a group of Congress Party workers at Poona on June 29 he disclaimed any intention to renew civil disobedience, but linked the statement with a recommendation to all Congressmen to practise "non-violent non-co-operation." He airily declared that neither the conduct of the war nor the alleviation of present economic ills could be effectively pursued except by a representative Indian Government, free from all foreign control. He dismissed the "communal tangle" as no more than a quarrel between brothers.

The "tangle," however, became more and more intricate in provinces where autonomy functioned. In the Punjab it was not only between Hindu and Moslem, but also between Moslem and Moslem. Malik Kizir Hyat Khan, the Premier, stood firm against the demand made by Mr. Jinnah on April 27 that every member of the Moslem League in the Punjab Assembly should declare that he owed allegiance solely to the Moslem League Party therein ; that the present label of the Coalition "Unionist Party" should be dropped, and that it should be renamed the Moslem League Coalition Party. The Malik also dismissed from his Ministry a supporter of these demands, Capt. Shaukat Hyat Khan. On account of his refusal to allow the Unionist Party, which had held office for seven years, to be broken up, the Malik was directed to appear before a committee of the Moslem League to explain his position. He refused to do so, and at the end of May was expelled from membership. It is significant, however, that the secretary of the provincial

branch of the League stated soon after (June 12) that it wished to see the popular war effort organized as well and effectively as possible. The responsibility rested, necessarily, upon the Central and Provincial Governments. The League was prepared, and even anxious, to share that responsibility under the present constitution, but without prejudice to its political demand of Pakistan.

Near the close of the quarter differences between Ministers in the small Orissa province led to the resignation of the Premier, the Raja of Parlakimedi, and two Ministers. The Governor, Sir Hawthorne Lewis, failing to form a substitute Ministry likely to have the confidence of the Legislature, issued the requisite proclamation under section 93 of the India Act, and Orissa reverted to the status of a Governor-administered province. This tilted the balance by once again making six of the eleven Governors' provinces temporarily non-autonomous.

Meanwhile communal feeling found vehement expression in the Bengal Assembly, in relation to the time-worn controversy over the control of secondary education. The Moslem League Government, going further than any previous proposals (for legislative drafts date from 1940), sought representation of Hindus, Moslems and Depressed Classes on the projected Secondary Education Board by means of communal electorates. The opposition parties resorted to obstructive tactics on a scale recalling the attitude of the Parnellites at Westminster over 60 odd years ago, but with the addition of frequent defiance of the rulings and orders of the Chair. After seven stormy weeks this vehement bickering was brought to an end by the Governor, Mr. R. G. Casey, exercising his discretion (and therefore not under obligation to consult his Ministers) in proroguing the Assembly. The leaders of the opposition parties thereupon issued a statement attacking the Governor, whose action, they affirmed, retained in office a Ministry not possessing the confidence of a majority of the Assembly.

The undignified action of the Bengal Legislature has to be judged against the background of the facts that the province last year came through a disastrous famine

brought about in part by administrative inefficiency ; that its economic condition remained precarious, and that Bengal is the base for the Fourteenth Army, which in the spring stood between Bengal and an attempted Japanese invasion. These considerations were in the minds of the Government of India in the issue on June 23 of an Ordinance providing for the constitution of a commission of enquiry "upon the causes of the food shortage and subsequent epidemics in India, and, in particular, in Bengal, in the year 1943, and to make recommendations as to the prevention of their recurrence." The commission would in the first instance direct its inquiries to the case of Bengal. Subsequently the selection of Sir John Woodhead, an adviser to the Secretary of State for India, to be chairman was made known.

The commission is not to impinge on the functions of the Health Survey and Development Committee, which is presided over by Sir Joseph Bhore. This is one of a number of committees containing non-officials which have been contributing to the Government's planning for post-war India. Before the ordinance was issued had come the announcement (June 1) that Lord Wavell had decided that such planning had reached a stage at which it required the attention of a member of his Executive Council freed from ordinary departmental responsibility. Sir Ardeshir Dalal would have charge of the new Department of Planning and Development, and would take up his duties as a member of the Executive Council early in August. Sir Ardeshir was in the Indian Civil Service until 1931, when he resigned to become director-in-charge of Tata's Iron and Steel Company, Ltd., the largest industrial enterprise in India.

Sir Ardeshir was one of the eight authors of the much-discussed "Bombay plan" of Economic Development for India, which, during the quarter, was made available to British readers in the Penguin Series (see *The Eighteenth Quarter*, Chapter XII). Various other plans, official and non-official, have been under consideration, and some of them are issued. It falls to Sir Ardeshir to prepare from the spade-work accomplished and the many converging schemes a single co-ordinated plan of national development. The task is eased by his avowal with that of his collaborators in the Bombay Plan that it has been issued not as a complete scheme, but as affording a basis of discussion.

A further Governmental step was the appointment of another Parsee, Sir Pheroze Khareghat, I.C.S., to be an additional secretary in the Education, Health and Lands Department, to be concerned with all measures, immediate and long term, for increasing food production, in the light of his experience as the vice-chairman (that is the working head) of the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research.

British interest in the problem of food supplies for the rapidly growing population of India was stimulated by the sense of urgency underlying the conclusions of Professor A. V. Hill, M.P., F.R.S., expressed on his return from five months' investigation of scientific teaching and practice in India. He said that the immediate consequence of better health and better food was a lowering of mortality, which meant a further increase of population. There was need for 50 per cent more food to-day, and in thirty years' time, when the population might reach the enormous total of 750,000,000, three times more food would be needed than at present. It was really a question of scientific development or disaster.

India's great contribution to the war effort was maintained and increased, though two untoward events had an adverse effect. On the afternoon of April 14, in the hot season, an accidental fire broke out in a ship in the Bombay docks. Before it could be brought under control it spread to some ammunition and caused violent explosions. Very soon adjacent godowns (warehouses) and dwellings in the dock area were in flames. Magnificent preventive and rescue work was done by both civil and military organizations, but the death-roll mounted to 357 persons, and 1,000 were seriously injured. A commission of inquiry into the calamity was instituted. The local insurance companies demurred to liability for the losses suffered on property insured with them against fire, on the ground that the first cause of the damage was blast. On May 30 it was announced that the Government of India would give compensation for damage to property and injuries caused by the explosions, while in respect to insured property the insurance companies would make a voluntary contribution of 12½ per cent. The total cost to Government was estimated at Rs. 25½ crores (£18,750,000), but with about Rs. 3 crores to be recovered from the insurance companies. The other disaster was in the Mysore State where generating

plant of the great hydro-electric installation from the Cauvery River at Sivasamudram was struck by lightning resulting in fires on a great scale. Many industrial enterprises, and notably the Mysore Iron and Steel Works and the Kolar goldfields, suffered suspension or heavy reduction of output.

These two events inflicted more damage than anything accomplished by the enemy in his precarious foothold on the eastern confines of Assam. The Viceroy, whose son lost a hand in fighting with the Chindits, paid a flying visit to them and saw something of the fine operational work of the Fourteenth Army. In return for food requisitioned in Manipur the Japanese issued forged rupee notes unsigned and with no promise to pay. Sir Sultan Ahmed, the Information Member of Government, on returning from the front, testified to the high morale of the Indian troops and spoke of their determination to drive the enemy from the Indo-Burma frontier.

Despite Bose's support, the enemy was successfully bluffed by a party of 12 Indian soldiers, Viceroy's commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers, who had been taken prisoner in Malaya. They were landed in March, 1944, from an enemy submarine off the desolate coast of Baluchistan, near Pasni, in the Kalat State. They had been trained by the Japanese in sabotage, demolition, propaganda, and wireless transmission for more than a year before being embarked on the submarine at Penang in February. Immediately on being quit of their Japanese escort they gave themselves up to the village postmaster. They were taken to Delhi, where they handed over equipment and money given them by the enemy, together with a few diamonds which had been provided by way of reserve funds. They stated that they never had the slightest intention of carrying out the rôle assigned to them, but had pretended compliance in order to get back to India.

The growth of good relations with other parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations was reflected by exchange of High Commissioners with Australia. Sir Raghunath Paranjpye, the distinguished educationist

who was bracketed Senior Wrangler at Cambridge in 1899, was appointed as first representative of India at Canberra. Another forward step was the renaming at the beginning of the quarter of the Department of Indians Overseas to the Department of Commonwealth Relations with charge of those relations in addition to its previous functions.

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